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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Omnis substantia singularis in perfecta notione sua involvit totum universum
—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz1
 1. From Opuscules et fragments inédits de  Leibniz: Extraits des manuscrits de la Biblio-
thèque royale de Hanovre, 521 (edited by Louis Couturat. Paris: F. Alcan, 1903, https:// archive 
.org /details /opusculesetfrag00bibgoog [accessed July 1, 2015]).
THE BEGINNING POINT of this study was an observation about the dis-
position of ladies and knights in courtly romance poetry of the late twelfth 
and early thirteenth centuries, composed by authors such as Marie de France, 
Chrétien de Troyes, Wolfram von Eschenbach, and Gottfried von Strassburg. 
Imaginary courtiers are able and willing in adventure and love— the principal 
concerns of this poetry— to dedicate themselves to transitory things entirely. 
This disposition of self is very much in the foreground of the poetry, eludes 
not even the most casual reader, and thus perhaps seems self- evident. Yet 
there is something extraordinary about it that seems to call for elucidation 
on its own absolute terms. Ladies and knights in court poetry, who manifestly 
regard themselves as Christians, are dedicating themselves as such to concerns 
that are understood to be passing. They are reiterating the Christian attitude 
of absolute dedication, but by directing this dedication to something mutable, 
they act in a manner different from, if  not opposed to, the value placed by 
Christians in things everlasting, the “unchangeable life,” the vita incommuta-
bilis as St. Augustine puts it (Doctrina Christiana, I.VIII, 8). Coupled with the 
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observation of what seems to be new kinds of absolute dedication of self in 
the romances was the related observation that adventure and love are, as well, 
frequently if not typically depicted as games or contests, as  if they needed 
to be understood as efforts or moves on which success or failure, growth or 
diminishment, happiness or sorrow depend.
 The absolute disposition of self in adventure and love toward the tran-
sitory and mutable, toward something closer to chance than providence or 
fate, which is rendered as a contest or game: the implications of this obser-
vation formed the original kernel and forms the current nucleus of the pres-
ent study. As an apparent reorientation in and of medieval Christian culture, 
I have assumed that this disposition is extraordinary enough to warrant being 
regarded as cultural and not only poetic in its import, even if poetry may be its 
most indelible specific marker. This is to say, one must try to provide a context 
for seeing how the complete, universal, or what I shall also call the global inte-
gration and mobilization of the resources of self that is supposed to be occur-
ring in medieval Christian culture continues, even as it is drastically reoriented 
in adventure and love. The present study is my endeavor to provide such a 
context and to do justice to the observation that this cultural reorientation is 
occurring as games or contests— hence my concept of cultural action and the 
chapter headings I have chosen. In order to illustrate how Christianity can be 
regarded as a global orientation of self that is in turn reoriented in adventure 
and love, I take a correspondingly global approach and consider source texts 
by pagan and Israelite predecessors (and later rivals) of Christianity, as well as 
seminal Christian texts: Homer’s Iliad, Virgil’s Aeneid, biblical verses from the 
Old and New Testaments, and writings of St. Augustine— as indicated in the 
overview of my study below.
 Following from my observation that adventure and love occur as games 
or contests, I  develop and elaborate an approach to cultural production as 
structured competitions involving the element of chance in my study’s first 
two chapters, “The Cultural Action” and “The Medieval Self as Bankroll.” 
In  emulation of the analytic posture of systematic studies of the dynamics 
of games and athletic contests, I  take a descriptive approach to the compe-
titions in religion, politics, and poetry that I see as constitutive of medieval 
culture. In my consideration of these competitions, I undertake descriptions 
of culture as action based on the assumptions that culture is always happening, 
that it happens as competitions for rewards, and that chance or indetermi-
nacy is a describable aspect of these competitions, as it is of any competitions 
in which the action remains ongoing (as  in “repeated games”). In these ini-
tial chapters, I approach cultural action in terms of different dispositions of 
self, which in turn are indicative of different overall dispositions of cultural 
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resources, be  these spiritual, intellectual, or  physical- material. We  observe 
that the cultural action of pagan peoples in antiquity and the Middle Ages is 
shaped by sacrificial practices in discrete cultural domains over which local 
deities and spirits preside. In the pagan sacrificial cultural action as rendered 
by Homer and Virgil, for example, people seek optimal outcomes with sacri-
fices according to the local logics of such discrete cultural domains. Outcomes 
in this action are local and immediate, and the statuses of selves and cultural 
resources are relatively fixed or determinate, having been decided at higher 
levels by fate and capricious deities. By contrast, the global cultural action of 
Christianity, as defined by St. Paul and elaborated and given imperial Roman 
dimensions by St. Augustine, articulates cultural domains universally in the 
name of Christ and in competition with the cultural action as assessed by 
pagan and Jewish rivals. Freed by Christ’s sacrifice from the sacrificial prac-
tices of numerous different discrete cultural domains, as well as from the laws 
of the Israelites (though emerging competitively from these), the Christian self 
disposes of resources globally in a cultural action of greater indeterminacy. 
Based on Augustine’s City of God, we observe that cultural moves have only 
to be made in a Christian sense. As long as the self loves God and neighbor, 
as long as it manages cultural resources globally in dying to the world in emu-
lation of Christ as it makes its way toward its heavenly reward, the widest lat-
itude remains for exploiting cultural resources in the interest of growth. Such 
exploitation is what happens in the Middle Ages, particularly in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries as court poetry shows, for which reason I propose the 
view of the medieval self as a “bankroll.”
 In my third chapter, “Rules of the House,” I  regard competitions among 
the households of secular and ecclesiastical princes as constitutive of medieval 
court society and as setting an imperial tone for the cultural action at court, 
from the highest principes to the lowest squires and servants. An  imperial, 
global view of the competitive action at and among medieval courts is consis-
tent with Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the “structural transformation 
of the public sphere” (Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit), according to which 
a “culture of representation” (repräsentative Öffentlichkeit) is characteristic of 
the Middle Ages. In  the cultural action at courts in the High Middle Ages, 
in which there is as yet no private sphere juxtaposed to a public one, every-
thing is on the table. Following through my global and imperial view of the 
medieval cultural action, in a manner consistent with Habermas’s understand-
ing of medieval society as based on a representational “public,” I describe some 
of the principal competitions that establish the relative stature of princes and 
their courts. These representational events at court range from the sponsor-
ship of poetry to warfare and feuds, from the rivalries of ambitious courtiers 
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to the global moves made by emperors and popes in the interest of imperial 
ascendancy.
 My fourth chapter, “The Poetic Action,” brings us closer to the medieval 
romances by focusing on the literary performances of poets as competitors. 
The contests in poetry are consistent with the dynamics of rivalries among 
princes and their respective households, as the latter were seen in the previous 
chapter, and with competitions in other domains of courtly culture (such as 
chivalric tournaments). Based on passages that underscore poetry as compet-
itive effort, I observe that the value of a poetic performance has much to do 
with rendering things better than one’s competitors, past and present. Finding 
the competitive edge vis- à- vis one’s rivals drives the innovation characteristic 
of poetic developments, including tapping the potential of the vernacular lan-
guages and their associated narrative traditions and concerns. In  the poetic 
action, poet- performers make their best moves before critical audiences that 
deal out praise and shame, decide winners and losers. As in the political com-
petitions among princes, in the global action of Christianity outlined in the 
initial chapters, and in the imaginary action involving adventure and love to 
be examined in the following chapters, we also observe in the poetic action 
that joy or pain is at stake— a growth or diminishment of self that is experi-
enced collectively and individually.
 Adventure and love are viewed in the fifth and sixth chapters, respectively, 
as related “cultural wagers.” In these chapters, I describe the competitions in 
which knights and ladies are involved in the interest of stature in the eyes of 
their peers (honor) and in the interest of the dedicated devotion of another 
(love), as  these competitions are rendered in the imaginary action of the 
courtly romances. The imaginary action is real, as  I observe with the help 
of fMRI- based research into physiological responses to fictional narratives, 
which demonstrates neurological simulations of narrative events and suggests 
these simulations rehearse different kinds of social experience. In the imag-
inary competitive action involving the concerns of adventure and love, the 
Christian self, which is described in the initial chapters of this study as glob-
ally mobilized in the interest of its heavenly prize, puts itself into play again, 
in  a specifically medieval way. In  an expanding, increasingly indeterminate 
cultural action, the courtly chivalric self speculates it will experience growth 
by investing itself absolutely in the temporal, perishable goods associated 
with adventure and love, without foregoing the play for its timeless heavenly 
reward. In this medieval poetic reiteration of the absolute investment of self, 
now in the interest of temporal goods, we  observe a culture of wagers and 
investments emerge from and begin to replace a culture based on sacrifice. Cor-
respondingly, the examples from the court poetry surveyed in these chapters 
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show the competitive action of adventure and love to be rendered as games, 
particularly games of chance, in which ladies and knights put themselves into 
play absolutely. The imaginary moves of knights and ladies in romance poetry 
and the outcomes of these moves— which creatively build upon and vary the 
moves visible in patristic literature and saints lives— are concretely demon-
strative of the cultural innovation and growth occurring in the European High 
Middle Ages.
 My final chapter and conclusion, “The Modern Self in Play,” follows 
through my approach to the cultural action and considers ways in which the 
modern individual self takes over the imperial parameters of the medieval 
City of God (i.e.,  the Roman ecclesia) as  the new principal locus of indeter-
minacy in the European risk- reward society. I  look first at the Reformation 
and early writings of Martin Luther, in which this later cultural moment of 
transition is made manifest in religious terms. I then focus on a few cultur-
ally significant individualizations of the universal during the Age of Enlight-
enment, including Gottfried Leibniz’s Christian cosmological understanding 
of monads and binary numbers and Immanuel Kant’s dualistic and identifi-
ably Lutheran conception of Enlightenment in his famous definitive essay of 
this movement, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? Finally, 
I survey the imaginary cultural action depicted in Mark Twain’s A Connecticut 
Yankee in King Arthur’s Court. This action follows from the Reformation and 
Enlightenment moves already observed in this chapter; brings us back to our 
concerns with courts, adventure, and love; and widens our focus to include 
Europe and North America, the industrial revolution, and totalitarianism 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With the help of Twain, Hannah 
Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition), and others, 
I conclude with the open- ended, global observation that modernity is not so 
much a break with the Middle Ages as it is an expansion and acceleration of 
the medieval cultural action.
 Adventure and love as I understand them involve significant moments of 
transition in European cultural history. I do not differentiate strictly between 
the modern terms and their medieval versions— avanture, âventiure, amor, 
minne— because the specifically medieval moment of cultural transition desig-
nated by these terms has modern ramifications. In this study, more interesting 
and consequential than such terminological differentiations is how the medi-
eval terms and what is designated by them prepare the way for the modern 
ones and what is designated by them. The alterity of the rapidly increasing 
cultural dynamism that we observe in the High Middle Ages pertains to the 
still primarily communal rather than individual parameters of action. We shall 
observe that medieval ladies and knights are not yet positioned to claim the 
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courtly concerns of adventure and love for themselves alone. The findings of 
my study are in this way consistent with cultural developments— particularly 
regarding the early modern emergence of autonomous subjectivity— as under-
stood by the above- mentioned Jürgen Habermas, whose writings on antiquity, 
the Middle Ages, and modernity corroborate findings of my study and provide 
important signposts for it.
 In the foreground of this study will be the medieval transition from a cul-
ture of sacrifice to a culture of wagers and investments. A more specific asso-
ciated contribution that I hope my study of the medieval risk- reward society 
brings to scholarly discussions of cultural developments, particularly to the 
understanding of the above- mentioned dynamism observable in the High 
Middle Ages, is the finding that adventure and love involve an absolute wager 
on or investment in the mutable, perishable individual self that occurs even 
as the still predominantly communal (i.e., religious and imperial) parameters 
of medieval culture are maintained. As  such, the absolute valuation of the 
individual self that is posited in adventure and love may be considered an aus-
picious cultural precedent, a first significant and perhaps indispensable move 
in the direction of subjectivity and individual autonomy as hallmark features 
of the cultural action of modernity. This specific finding— involving what I call 
individualizations of the universal or the apprehension of modern subjectivity 
as a contingency of medieval communal absolutes— is achieved by way of an 
approach to the source texts that I hope will be considered a contribution 
in its own right, possibly as a step in the direction of a cultural game theory. 
My view of culture is shaped to the degree possible by the global parameters 
set forth in and by the source texts themselves, and by nothing else other than 
the action I endeavor to describe. This approach and the associated hope con-
cerning its productiveness carry over to my positions vis- à- vis past scholarly 
discussions of the various texts and topics examined in the different chapters 
of this study.
 Adventure and love as considered in this study are trendsetting cultural 
moves in a European risk- reward society that extends from the High Middle 
Ages to the present. I concur with the gist of Zygmunt Bauman’s observation 
below— though we observe already in the High Middle Ages much of what he 
describes here. Europe, according to Bauman, is an “unfinished adventure”:
Adventure? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in Middle English 
that word meant anything that happened without design— a  chance, hap, 
luck. It also meant a happening pregnant with danger or a threat of loss: risk, 
jeopardy; a hazardous enterprise or hapless performance. Later, closer to our 
own modern times, “adventure” came to mean putting one’s chances to the 
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test: a venture, or experiment— a novel or exciting endeavor as yet untried. 
At the same time, a derivative was born: the adventurer— a highly ambiva-
lent noun, whispering in one breath of blind fate and cunning, of craftiness 
and providence, of aimlessness and determination. We may surmise that the 
shifts in meaning followed the maturation of the European spirit: its coming 
to terms with its own “essence.”2
Correspondingly, my  approach to the risk- reward society in the following 
pages is also self- consciously European and by this extension also North 
American, a  limitation that I hope may help to place the cultural develop-
ments as I describe them in a fruitful transcultural context.
 2. Europe, 1–2.
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TOWARD A CULTURAL GAME THEORY
In this study of courts, adventure, and love in the European Middle Ages, 
I  endeavor to describe European cultural history as action.1 The various lit-
erary sources employed for this description— poetic, theological, political, 
philosophical, and historical— are regarded as records of the ongoing cultural 
action in the past. The descriptive apprehension of culture as action shows 
itself to be especially appropriate and useful for European developments gen-
erally and for the European Middle Ages in particular. During the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, we  witness a moment in the European cultural action 
when a baton is passed from Greco- Roman, Judeo- Christian antiquity to the 
modern world as shaped by European peoples and their cultural descendants. 
Especially noteworthy about the moment when the baton is passed is the 
degree to which medieval European people actually understand themselves 
 1. What I call cultural action involves the indeterminate status of culture between conti-
nuity and change that is referenced by Zygmunt Bauman in his book Culture as Praxis: “The 
work of culture does not consist so much in its self- perpetuation as in securing the conditions 
for further experimentation and change. Or, rather, culture ‘self- perpetuates’ in as far as not the 
pattern, but the urge to modify it, to alter and replace it with another pattern, stays viable and 
potent over time” (xx).
C H A P T E R  1
The Cultural Action
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to be in a race. Following through the athletic analogy, medieval people are 
like competitors running a leg in a relay, competing with runners on the same 
team— trying to be as fast or faster so as to avoid being considered a weaker 
link— as well as against the opposing runners on the other tracks. The medi-
eval action that becomes visible in the sources examined in this study is one 
in which people are newly keen to compete with the great cultural performers 
of the past and among themselves. While the cultural action becomes tangible 
in the sources as interrelated competitive performances of different kinds, 
there is also an observable shift in the cultural loci of the self- investments and 
the experiences of success and failure involved in these competitions. From 
the twelfth century, individual striving at the courts of households of nobil-
ity has ever more to do with this temporal, mutable world. At  these courts, 
the cultural action is increasingly about the full and accurate assessment 
and exploitation of perishable goods, as a fixed or determinate culture based 
on sacrifice gives way to an ever more indeterminate culture of wagers and 
investments.2 With the help of the literary sources, the subsequent chapters 
of this book describe how a European society of risk and reward emerges in 
the High Middle Ages.3 In the present chapter and the next, I focus on basic 
parameters of cultural action and on significant moments in the action that 
precede and prepare the way for my medieval topics.
 My approach to culture as action combines a traditionally humanist, close 
textual analysis with a descriptive posture modeled on the systematic consid-
eration of games and athletic contests.4 Considering the religious, political, 
and poetic cultural action at high medieval courts in a manner analogous to 
games and contests is consistent, as we shall observe in later chapters, with 
competitions for ascendancy among households of nobility, among top poets 
in literary performances, and among knights and ladies in their imaginary 
adventures and loves. My view of culture as action seeks to extend descriptive 
 2. The transition from a culture of sacrifice to a culture of wagers and investments needs 
to be regarded not as inevitable or essential (i.e., given in the nature of things), but rather as a 
shift in the preponderance of certain kinds of moves in the action.
 3. “Literary scholars [. . .] use the phrase ‘High Middle Ages’ for the entire courtly age 
which began with the emergence in the twelfth century of the courts of the secular princes as 
the new centers of literature, and which lasted to the end of the thirteenth century” (Bumke, 
Courtly Culture, 18).
 4. My approach to culture as action involves games in the broadest sense and works 
against the dualistic thinking to which Eric Dunning draws attention, with specific reference 
to sports, in the preface of his coauthored (with Norbert Elias) collection of essays, Quest for 
Excitement: “Sport appears to have been ignored as an object for sociological reflection and 
research because it is seen as falling on the negatively valued side of the complex of overlapping 
dichotomies which are conventionally perceived, such as those between ‘work’ and ‘leisure,’ 
‘mind’ and ‘body,’ ‘seriousness’ and ‘pleasure,’ ‘economic’ and ‘non- economic’ phenomena” (4).
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analyses of the dynamics of games that have provided insights into language, 
politics, social phenomena, economics, and natural sciences.5 A basic assump-
tion in the consideration of different cultural domains as games or contests 
is that their dynamics can be modeled or described, and possible outcomes 
in them anticipated to some degree, but that one cannot know with certainty 
how any specific future outcome will be decided. Games are understood to 
be indeterminate in view of outcomes that have yet to be decided, as well as 
in view of the time and space within them for players to pursue their various 
different strategies individually or collectively. Motivated and inspired by its 
medieval subject matter, the present study extrapolates the indeterminacy of 
games and athletic contests to cultural developments. Accordingly, the literary 
sources are approached not as containing or referring to truths that have yet to 
be discovered or unveiled, but rather as records of the parameters according 
to which cultural action is occurring. Chapter titles suggestive of games of 
chance have been selected, because these reveal chance in its greatest relief 
and transparency, and are also one of the preferred manners of courtiers in 
romance poetry to express their own wagers of self.
 For the purpose of describing the indeterminacy of cultural action, the 
above- referenced race needs to be qualified as one of myriad possible analo-
gies. The descriptive terminology and imagery employed in this study draws 
from numerous different endeavors— games of chance, individual and team 
sports, business and financial markets, and so on6—in which the element of 
chance and the dynamics of competitive performance are common denomi-
nators. In  contravention of the conventional decorum of academic writing, 
I  will occasionally avail myself of colloquial speech and idioms when these 
seem especially adept at bringing the dynamics of a crucial moment in the 
cultural action to the fore. What matters in the cultural action is what matters 
in games: strategies, skills, training, and poise under pressure, combined with 
 5. See, for example, Eichberger, Game Theory; Hamburger, Games as Models; McCarty 
and Meirowitz, Political Game Theory; Pietarinen, Game Theory; and Samuelson, Evolutionary 
Games.
 6. Johan Huizinga, in his Homo Ludens, argues that a stark distinction between wagers 
and investments, in the specific case of financial markets, is questionable: “The hazy borderline 
between play and seriousness is illustrated very tellingly by the use of the words ‘playing’ or 
‘gambling’ for the machinations on the Stock Exchange. The gambler at the roulette table will 
readily concede that he is playing; the stock- jobber will not. He will maintain that buying and 
selling on the off- chance of prices rising or falling is part of the serious business of life, at least 
of business life, and that it is an economic function of society. In both cases the operative factor 
is the hope of gain; but whereas in the former the pure fortuitousness of the thing is generally 
admitted (all ‘systems’ notwithstanding), in the latter the player deludes himself with the fancy 
that he can calculate the future trends of the market. At any rate the difference of mentality is 
exceedingly small” (52).
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innate or acquired personal characteristics, such as mental acuity, athleticism, 
endurance, a  certain competitive edge. As  in “repeated games,” outcomes in 
the cultural action typically do not mark absolute beginnings and ends, but 
occur as significant structuring moments of an action that remains ongoing. 
In the ongoing action, players are able to adjust their strategies based on previ-
ous outcomes and the reputations players have gained for themselves.7 As one 
might expect, it  seems crucial for players in the cultural action to know or 
at least have a good idea about the track records and preferred strategies of 
others— to be able to “put themselves in the other person’s shoes.”8
 The sources surveyed in this study show that the indeterminacy of the 
European cultural action is shaped by a recurring pattern that indicates what 
is at stake in the action and how outcomes in it are marked. Tapping into the 
various innate and acquired resources at their disposal, players venture them-
selves in the action with an exertion that manifests pain, corresponding to the 
status of a self and its resources placed at risk of decrease or loss. This pain is 
comingled to varying degrees with anticipatory happiness, corresponding to 
the prospects of success. The other significant moment punctuating the cul-
tural action is the experience of joy accompanying rewards in the event of suc-
cess and victory, or conversely, pain- magnified, shame, ignominy in the event 
of failure and defeat. Thus, victory joyfully increases self and its resources, 
defeat painfully decreases them. In the cultural action, self is a resource and 
stake in ongoing competitions in which, overall, the resources of some tend 
to be increasing or decreasing relative to those of others. In the European cul-
tural action beginning with the court societies based on risk and reward that 
emerge in the twelfth century, we observe that it becomes ever more difficult 
not to be a player. The sources that we shall examine demonstrate a culturally 
bullish principle of action to be increasingly valid at medieval courts.9 Holding 
oneself and one’s resources in reserve, standing pat, resting on one’s laurels is 
too risky because one misses out on the possibility of increase and finds one-
self relatively behind. One must accept that the world is a risky place of com-
petition for limited and fickle resources, and venture oneself. In the medieval 
world, no longer viewed primarily as a “vale of tears” (Ps 83:7), but rather as a 
field of play, one increasingly recognizes that it is better to try to improve one’s 
chances with an interested, strategic approach to the mutability of things.
 7. See Mailath and Samuelson, Repeated Games.
 8. Dixit and Nalebuff, Art of Strategy, 5.
 9. This seems an appropriate point to reference my 2010 article “Bullish on Love and 
Adventure,” a preliminary look at some of the concerns that are developed more fully in the 
fifth and sixth chapters of this study.
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 Mathematics has been the primary descriptive language for the appre-
hension of the indeterminacy of the action of games and by extension the 
action of other complex cultural domains. But even mathematically oriented 
game theorists have suggested there are aspects of games that might best be 
approached with other, non- mathematical analytic and descriptive tools.10 
The present study of the European cultural action is humanist and philolog-
ical in its approach and bases itself on the written records of the action pre-
served in languages of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modernity. I  regard 
traditionally humanist domains— such as religion, literature and the arts, 
and philosophy— and the array of associated human capacities, ranging from 
spiritual- intellectual to physical- material, all as being in play.11 An influential 
humanist manner of apprehending the indeterminacy of the European cul-
tural action is provided by the modern philosophical discussion of subjective 
identity. The following view of subjectivity, excerpted from a commentary on 
Hegel by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, might be seen to have a broader 
applicability to the cultural action of European modernity:
The question arises as to whether the principle of subjectivity and the struc-
ture of self- consciousness residing in it suffice as the source of normative 
orientations— whether they suffice not only for “providing foundations” for 
science, morality, and art in general but also for stabilizing a historical for-
mation that has been set loose from all historical obligations.12
The question posed by Habermas in this context draws attention to subjec-
tivity and to the cultural action in the cultural domains shaped by subjec-
tivity (i.e.,  modernity), as  something indeterminate. The modern subject is 
disengaged from history and tradition. Instead of being a fixed figure in a 
determined world, the subject— along with all the cultural domains based on 
 10. For example, see Dixit and Nalebuff: “Many mathematical game theorists dislike the 
dependence of an outcome on historical, cultural, or linguistic aspects of the game or on purely 
arbitrary devices like round numbers; they would prefer the solution be determined purely by 
the abstract mathematical facts about the game— the numbers of players, the strategies available 
to each, and the payoffs to each in relation to the strategy choices of all. We disagree. We think 
it entirely appropriate that the outcome of a game played by humans interacting in a society 
should depend on the social and psychological aspects of the game” (Art of Strategy, 114).
 11. In keeping with my global view of the cultural action, I  employ the terms spiritual, 
intellectual, physical, and material to describe the range of cultural resources available to people. 
I  also occasionally juxtapose the terms spiritual- intellectual and physical- material in order to 
describe different ways in which cultural resources are organized along dualist lines, beginning 
with the religion of the Israelites discussed later in this chapter.
 12. Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 20. I return to these considerations in later chapters 
of this study.
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or driven by it— is  “set loose” from the past and rolls, somewhat like dice, 
indeterminately into the future. The philosophical discourse of modernity, 
as elaborated here by Habermas, is largely about working out the possibility of 
“stabilizing” subjectivity, developing some normative orientations that would 
not be forced upon it. While this endeavor is ongoing, elsewhere in philos-
ophy it has been suggested that the indeterminate status of subjectivity and 
modernity with all its implications might rather be accepted as such. Richard 
Rorty’s observation here provides a philosophical underpinning for my own 
view of the European cultural action:
The line of thought common to Blumenberg, Nietzsche, Freud, and Davidson 
suggests that we try to get to the point where we no longer worship anything, 
where we treat nothing as a quasi- divinity, where we treat everything— our 
language, our conscience, our community— as a product of time and chance. 
To reach this point would be, in Freud’s words, to “treat chance as worthy of 
determining our fate.”13
In this study, I  try to make moves consistent with Rorty’s line of thought. 
I  speculate that the cultural indeterminacy of the modern subject— even as 
philosophical attempts to stabilize or determine it continue— might eventu-
ally be comprehended as congruent with the dynamics of games or contests 
involving the element of chance.14 Correspondingly, with my approach to cul-
ture as action, as  outlined on the pages above and elaborated in this study, 
I hope to contribute useful humanist perspectives to the possible future devel-
opment of a cultural game theory.
THE NEW MEDIEVAL MOVE
The philosophical discussion of Habermas referenced above offers a view 
of modern (European) culture as shaped throughout by the indeterminate 
dynamics of subjectivity. The self- positing and self- reflective subject with all 
 13. Rorty, Contingency, 22.
 14. The social scientist Gerda Reith makes consistent points in her book The Age of Chance: 
“In the late twentieth century, chance is understood as a constituent part of the world, codified 
in the rules of probability theory and, in the branches of quantum mechanics and chaos theory, 
an irreducible feature of modern science.” Reith goes on to place the emergence of chance in 
modernity in a broader sociocultural context that is consistent with the findings of the present 
study: “However, this theoretical perspective is a recent development and represents the apogee 
of a long historical process that culminated in the separation of ‘chance’ or random phenomena 
from broadly religious notions of divine providence and fate” (13).
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its unresolved questions is involved in all cultural domains—“science, moral-
ity, and art in general”—and provides the most encompassing and appropriate 
descriptor of (the indeterminacy of) the cultural action. Looking back to the 
twelfth century as the beginning point of a European society based on risk 
and reward, this study will observe that we did not reach a point— at the end 
of the Middle Ages and the dawn of subjectivity and modernity— when the 
cultural action more or less suddenly began to become indeterminate. The 
sources examined in this study will show that the medieval cultural action 
was already indeterminate in ways that later began to be reconfigured and 
technologically enhanced and accelerated. While this study differs from the 
assumption, whether overt or implicit, that the cultural action of the Middle 
Ages has to be viewed as fixed or determinate in some basic or essential way 
(vis- à- vis the dynamics of subjectivity), it reiterates a move of Habermas and 
other philosophers in assuming that certain parameters can be regarded as apt 
descriptors of the (indeterminacy of the) cultural action generally. Whereas 
the indeterminacy of the cultural action of modernity— whether religious, 
political, or poetic— can be described subjectively, that of the medieval cultural 
action can most aptly be described religiously and imperially.15 Religion and 
empire in the Middle Ages and modern subjectivity correspondingly frame 
how the action in a given cultural domain— such as politics— may be relevant 
for or transferrable to that in others— poetry, philosophy, the arts, and so on. 
In order to keep the focus on the open- endedness of the cultural action, inde-
terminacy according to these parameters will be understood and described 
in this study in terms of potential.16 Potential is the possibility for moves to 
be made and, by  extension, for moves made in any one cultural domain to 
 15. Based on the assumption of a connection between the (indeterminate) constitution 
of the individual self and its (similarly indeterminate) cultural and social situation or position 
(a  connection that is also implicit in the cited passage from Habermas), I make reference in 
this study to the medieval self and the modern self, to be sure, as cultural players whose actions 
have to be described as accurately as possible.
 16. I use the term potential to describe the room, leeway, or  indeterminacy in a society 
for moves to be made. Freedom can be understood as a related term designating individuals’ 
capacity to employ or take advantage of such potential according to the resources available to 
them. Correspondingly, I am as interested in the ways that new social arrangements open up 
new possibilities for people as I am in the ways new social arrangements may limit, restrain, 
or fix the positions of people (especially when the arrangements are viewed retrospectively). 
I understand freedom (and by extension potential) relationally in a manner consistent with the 
view of Zygmunt Bauman: “For one to be free there must be two. Freedom signifies a social 
relation, an asymmetry of social conditions; essentially it implies social difference— it presumes 
and implies the presence of social division. Some can only be free in so far as there is a form of 
dependence they can aspire to escape” (Freedom, 9). Accordingly, as we observe in this study, 
Christianity liberates from the temporal and spatial constraints of pagan religious practices 
(as  will be seen in this chapter); adventure and love will involve an emancipation of people 
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be relevant for and reiterated in others throughout the cultural action, inde-
pendent of their original specific (i.e., religious, political, or poetic) intention or 
purpose.17
 Cultural indeterminacy is not specific to modernity, as  inclined as one 
might be to see indeterminacy and modernity as two sides of the same coin. 
Modern Europeans move and compete in faster and more complex ways than 
their medieval predecessors, and subjectivity is a designation one could give to 
this greater velocity and variability in the action. However rapidly the cultural 
action changes in modernity, the differences between modern subjectivity and 
the— also indeterminate, as we shall see— medieval parameters of religion and 
empire should not obscure the continuities connecting medieval individuals 
with modern ones.18 Arguably the most pronounced of these continuities in 
the literary sources examined in this study is the quest for one’s own advan-
tage and the advantage of one’s own achieved via competitive performances.19 
Attention to this continuity enables the appreciation of a novel medieval dis-
position of self and cultural resources that is this study’s principal point of 
focus. In  the medieval cultural action of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
we observe new moves at European courts, by means of which courtiers wager 
from the exclusivity of the absolute orientation of self toward the heavenly afterlife (as we shall 
see in later chapters).
 17. The absolute investment of self in another is the principal such move to be scrutinized 
in this study.
 18. This seems an appropriate point to reference Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (originally pub-
lished in German in 1986). This book was very much shaped by the nuclear disaster at Cher-
nobyl, and the urgency of Beck’s case is doubtless strengthened by the recent nuclear disaster 
at Fukushima, as well as by the ever- increasing evidence of manmade global warming and its 
destructive consequences. Beck reserves the designation “Risk Society” for the latest, postin-
dustrial stage of cultural history, although he concedes risks are not an “invention of moder-
nity”: “Risks are not an invention of modernity. Anyone who set out to discover new countries 
and continents— like Columbus— certainly accepted ‘risks.’ But these were personal risks, not 
global dangers like those that arise for all of humanity from nuclear fission or the storage of 
nuclear waste. In that earlier period, the word ‘risk’ had a note of bravery and adventure, not 
the threat of self- destruction of all life on Earth” (21). Without disputing Beck’s contention that 
the modern globalized and individualized cultural action has possibly reached a critical point 
and that disasters of global dimensions have become possible if not probable today, one must 
question Beck’s somewhat dismissive view of the role played by risk in the medieval and early 
modern periods. The association of medieval and early modern risk with a “note of bravery and 
adventure” is simplistic and smacks of a romanticizing view of the days of yore. On a different 
front, Beck indirectly draws attention to the crucial question of the sustainability of the cultural 
action that I am endeavoring to describe in the present book.
 19. As a concrete example of continuities between the Middle Ages and modernity, see the 
essays in Linda Gregerson and Susan Juster’s edited collection, Empires of God, which stress 
the ongoing importance of religion and empire in Europe’s self- understanding into the early 
modern period, when religion and empire serve as forces driving Europe’s colonization of the 
New World.
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or invest themselves absolutely in the interest of a particular, specific worldly 
end, a “perishable good.” The increasing prevalence of this innovative cultural 
move— which in romance poetry is invariably rendered as the crucial moment 
of a contest or game— marks the transition from a society based on sacrifice 
to the medieval risk- reward society. In the next chapter, my focus will be on 
the development of religion and empire in late antiquity as (indeterminate) 
parameters of cultural action, according to and by means of which medieval 
courtiers will endeavor to obtain advantages and realize their potential. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I  seek further to illustrate and exemplify cultural 
action as I have outlined it above, and to indicate how (monotheistic) religion 
and empire emerged in the ancient world as parameters of cultural action, 
by  means of an overview of the competitions occurring at and among four 
ancient cities.20
A RACE OF FOUR CITIES: 
TROY, JERICHO, ROME, AND JERUSALEM
The historical kernel of the action at Troy would have been in the late Bronze 
Age, in  the latter part of the second millennium bce. The poetic rendering 
of the action, as preserved in Homer’s epic poem, was composed around the 
seventh century bce. As frequently happens later, the cultural action occurs 
as the siege of a city.21 Troy is only the latest and greatest prize the Achaeans 
seek, and the most formidable one in view of the continuing strong resistance 
of the city’s inhabitants that is not yet over when Homer’s song ends. The 
ostensible aim of the Achaeans is the recovery of Helen, the abducted wife of 
Menelaus, but the action is also manifestly about acquiring the city’s resources: 
the women of Troy, the lives of the heroic warriors of Troy, horses with char-
iots, basins with handles, tripods, cauldrons, gold, and bronze. In the previ-
ous successful sieges of other cities referenced in Homer’s poem, the Achae-
ans have already earned many prizes, and it is a dispute over one of these 
that provides Homer’s narrative focus. It is evident from the start of Homer’s 
poem that the struggle between Achilles and Agamemnon over Briseis is also 
about which of them is best— the applicable term is ἄριςτος, the etymological 
 20. Three of these four cities are in Asia. “Like much else that is defining of European 
culture, the walled, largely self- governing urban space had originated in Asia” (Pagden, Peoples 
and Empires, xviii.)
 21. Sieges of cities are, of course, also a conspicuous constituent element of the medieval 
courtly romances, which seems to be suggestive of a broader cultural pattern.
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ancestor of aristocracy.22 Both men lay claim to this status, the former on the 
basis of divine parentage, ferocity, and victories in battle— the latter on the 
basis of his kingship.
 The value of individuals in the Iliad is tangible and, with rare exceptions, 
immediately evident. Before the initial conflict below the walls of Troy, when 
the Trojan king Priam surveys the enemies arrayed against him, he immedi-
ately recognizes the best among the Achaeans: Agamemnon, Odysseus, Ajax 
(in descending hierarchical order)—by  this time, Achilles is angrily waiting 
by his ships. The concern about who is best arises and is maintained, even 
as there seems to be no overarching standard according to which a definitive 
comparative evaluation might be made. Barring fate alone, the principal gods 
and goddesses are the greatest powers, and they exercise the greatest control 
over things (and hence over the values things can have), but each deity’s sway 
remains closely connected to a particular, discrete cultural domain.23 Each 
deity is sovereign in some area— for example, Zeus in the broad political view 
and administration of things, Hera in fidelity and matrimonial matters, Ares 
in war, Aphrodite in love— but the various sovereignties are not articulated, 
constituent components of any identifiable broader design, such as providence 
or empire. The relations among the deities are characterized by unpredict-
ability and volatility.24 Zeus has power over other deities, but it is far from 
the absolute sovereignty claimed by the God of Abraham over rival gods and 
his Israelites that we shall observe below. The authority of the sky god is lim-
ited by fate and also by concern about how he will be seen if he undertakes 
something against the will and pleasure of the other deities. Zeus is thus con-
strained, though only unpredictably so, by the views and feelings of the other 
deities, and he sometimes even seems moved by mortals when they success-
fully appeal to him with their prayers and sacrifices.
 Similarly, there seems to be no overarching organizational principle for 
sorting out the relative worth of mortals in the action around Troy, beyond 
the kind of immediate assessment made by Priam when he first beholds the 
 22. On Homer’s depiction of society in the Iliad, M.  S.  Silk, in  his Homer: The Iliad, 
observes: “Above all, there is the individualist ethic to which the aristocratic heroes subscribe; 
their concern for personal honour [. . .] and their competitive ambition ‘always to be best’ 
(VI.208)” (25).
 23. “The Iliad makes it clear that over a wide area of behaviour and experience, the gods 
are to be thought of as sources of permanent human faculties and— especially— momentary 
human impulses” (Ibid., 71).
 24. “In paganism, it was the behaviour of the gods that counted and the gods were nothing 
if not volatile” (Lewis, Ritual Sacrifice, 49).
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Achaean host before his city’s walls.25 As with the gods, the value of mor-
tals is attached to discrete, immediately evident characteristics and capaci-
ties. One can receive advantages from the start by being born of a god and 
a mortal (as  Achilles, Aeneas, and Sarpedon), one can be of great age and 
experience (as Nestor), one can be clever and resourceful (as Odysseus), one 
can wield great political power (as Agamemnon), one can be a lover and not 
a fighter (as Paris), one can be swift of foot (Ajax minor). The value of these 
different attributes and capacities fluctuates according to the exigencies of the 
moment, but it is difficult to see them as systematically articulated. The status 
of Aphrodite and Paris, for example, is greatest in the domain of erotic love. 
Their limitations become quite evident, and they are chided when they engage 
themselves militarily and their efforts fall short (Paris failing before Menelaus, 
Aphrodite before the mortal Diomedes). Capacities in one cultural domain 
cannot readily be translated into those of another. There seems to be no com-
mon cultural currency throughout the action. Accordingly, it  seems difficult 
to see mortals in the Iliad as endowed with abiding personal qualities— such 
as character, courage, or cowardice— to  the degree that events and the roles 
mortals play in them are determined in a manner that is continuously imme-
diate, rather than based on any longer term considerations such as abiding 
characteristics of self. Athena leads Diomedes, and Apollo leads Hector to 
victory at different moments in the conflict before Troy. In  the latter case, 
even a seasoned veteran such as the major Ajax— whom no one considers a 
coward— flees for his life.
 Outcomes in the cultural action around Troy are largely fixed according 
to the various discrete capacities attached to gods, mortals, and events, which 
are not systematically articulated among each other beyond the immediate 
assessment of them as better or worse.26 This is the case in the military conflict 
before the walls of the city, and this is the case as well in the athletic compe-
titions among the Achaeans that are arranged as part of the funeral rites for 
Patroclus near the end of Homer’s poem. The dynamics of the funeral games 
 25. Correspondingly, the narrative frequently proceeds from one event to the next with-
out evidence of a broader organizational principle, particularly in the lengthy battle scenes on 
which Silk observes: “Particular heroes have their particular hours of glory, the tide of battle 
ebbs and flows for both armies, various gods intervene at various moments— all with the result 
that, while some events follow earlier events ‘by probability or necessity’ (as Aristotle puts it), 
many others merely ‘come next,’ as unpredictably as, indeed, the actual events of an inconclusive 
war might strike an eye- witness at the time” (Homer, 33).
 26. Silk’s introduction to the Iliad stresses immediacy as a central aspect of this epic poem, 
both generally, “Despite its pervasive stylization, the poem has an extraordinary immediacy all 
its own” (54), and more specifically in its characterizations, “Like so much else in the Iliad, its 
human figures are strikingly immediate and alive” (72).
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are similar to those of warfare (correspondingly, the terms Ἆθλοs, Ἆθλον , 
and ἀθλητήs, the etymological ancestors of “athletics” and “athlete,” mean 
“champion, master of a given thing,” “a contest in war or sport,” and “prize, 
reward, recompense,” respectively).27 The only manner for mortals to access 
and endeavor to influence the higher Olympian level, at which outcomes are 
being decided, is by means of prayers and sacrifices at the scattered temples 
of the different deities in their various discrete domains. The logic of self- 
investment as sacrifice in the Trojan cultural action is immediate, domain- 
specific, and quid- pro- quo, much like a bribe.28 Typically turning to the deity 
in charge of the pertinent cultural domain, according to the exigencies of the 
moment, mortals try to achieve specific aims with their prayers, burnt animal 
offerings, and libations: the release of a captured relative, survival in a pending 
battle, hitting one’s target with an arrowshot, winning a footrace. The lack of 
an overarching standard of evaluation might be related to the dubious efficacy 
of these sacrifices to shape outcomes in a consistent way. Prayers accompa-
nying sacrifices may be heard but not heeded, heard and heeded only in part, 
or not heeded at all by whimsical deities in their various separate domains, 
who are themselves engaged in unpredictable contests with one another. The 
doubtful efficacy of sacrifices is one of the things that makes the lot of mortals 
in the Trojan action seem very difficult. The risk- reward ratio is bleak even for 
the very best, as we see in Achilles’s lament to Priam near the end of Homer’s 
epic, when the Trojan king tearfully begs him for the body of his son Hector:
So the immortals spun our lives that we, we wretched men,
Live on to bear such torments— the gods live free of sorrows.29
The consolations of heroism are meager, as M. S. Silk has observed: “Achilles, 
the supreme achiever, sums up his experience of life, not in terms of glory 
and hope, but through the image of the urns of Zeus. That image promises 
 27. Liddell and Scott’s Greek- English Lexicon, 16. All translations of the ancient Greek terms 
are from this text.
 28. Lewis addresses what I am calling the “quid- pro- quo” nature of pagan sacrificial 
practices in this way: “Sacrifices could serve as means of winning divine favour for specific 
purposes— to ensure a good hunt or harvest, to grant fertility or success in war, to ensure pro-
tection for the family of community, to preserve good health and strength and generally acquire 
what was most meaningful and necessary in life” (Ritual Sacrifice, 3). In her characterization of 
pagan Roman religious practices, Valerie Warrior uses the term do ut des rather than quid- pro- 
quo, though the basic principle is the same: “Thus, traditional Roman religion was essentially 
pragmatic, a  contractual relationship based on the so- called principle of do ut des (I  give so 
that you may give). The gods were asked, and the hope was that they would respond favorably” 
(Roman Religion, 6).
 29. Homer, Iliad, 605.
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blessings as well as afflictions, but afflictions predominate and, in particular, 
nothing is said of any permanent consolation.”30 Overall at Troy, the experi-
ence of joy is sparse and fleeting in a cultural action organized hierarchically 
and immediately according to one’s greater or lesser share in a given cultural 
resource at a given moment. Gods tend to succeed over demigods and heroes, 
and demigods and heroes over rank and file mortals by virtue of their rela-
tively greater incipient share in military prowess, political sovereignty, clever-
ness, beauty and seductiveness, and so on. Evaluations are made according to 
the interests and capacities of the most immediately pertinent cultural domain 
(war, love, wisdom, etc.), and the incipient superiority of some over others 
results in a cultural action that is highly determinate, especially for the mor-
tals in it who dispose of fewer resources.31
 The action at Jericho as recounted in the book of Joshua, a near contem-
porary of the action at Troy and also structured as the siege of a city, looks 
quite different.32 This action is articulated with the history of the tribes of 
Israel extending back to Abraham. For many generations, the Israelites have 
been unified or integrated as the “seed of Abraham” under a single leader 
or paterfamilias and their single God. Those who assault the walls of Jericho 
are likely made more effective than the frequently divided Achaeans by an 
administrative structure instituted by Moses on the advice of his father- in- law 
Jethro, not long after the exodus from Egypt began. Holy men, handpicked 
by and answerable to Moses, supervise thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens 
(Ex 18:18–26).33 This administrative and legal apparatus ensures that the Isra-
elites follow the many laws handed down from on high, so as to enable Moses 
as head of the whole people to dedicate himself more completely to his role 
as principal mediator between his people and the Lord. The thoroughgoing 
integration of the tribes of Israel, achieved by means of laws and an admin-
istrative structure, underpins their status as the single chosen people of their 
single God. Burnt animal offerings are made, as they are in the Trojan action, 
but not at the scattered temples of various deities in charge of discrete cultural 
domains and not mainly on a quid- pro- quo basis to achieve immediate ends. 
 30. Silk, Homer, 85.
 31. Reith would say that such a culture leaves no room for chance: “Nowhere in ancient 
or primitive cosmology do we find systematic consideration of chance as a phenomenon in its 
own right. Instead, its occurrence was consistently conflated with notions of destiny and the 
will of the gods” (Age of Chance, 17).
 32. In his study, The Iliad: Structure, Myth, and Meaning, Bruce Louden questions why the 
numerous potentially productive parallels between Greek and Israelite culture have not been 
more closely examined (8).
 33. Here and elsewhere in this study, unless otherwise specified, I  cite the online Biblia 
Sacra Vulgata. English translations are from The Holy Bible: Authorized King James Version.
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The single Lord God, set beyond all other gods, has set His people apart from 
all others in the interest of a collective reward that requires the deferment of 
immediate gratification and a longer- term posture.
 Long before Jericho, there are indications in the cultural action of the Isra-
elites that obeying and fearing the Lord and following His commandments— 
that is, an  abiding inner attitude, orientation, or character— can be as good 
as making sacrifices and has potentially begun to replace them. The Israelites 
make their sacrifices on altars not to be fashioned of hewed stone, correspond-
ing to a more mobile, fluid kind of piety. This piety is not fixed to the partic-
ular holy sites of discrete cultural domains, but rather borne by the flesh via 
circumcision, by stone tablets with the laws inscribed in them, by the arc con-
structed to house these tablets, and by an abiding internal attitude of fearful 
reverence and obedience to the single Lord God, He who possesses an inte-
grated sovereignty in all cultural domains. The mobility of the religion of the 
Israelites will be reinforced during a later period, when portable canonical lit-
erature is produced. As repositories of religion, holy scriptures help further to 
disengage religion from the sacrificial logics of discrete cultural domains and 
put it into circulation. Scriptures set forth new dualist parameters of risk and 
reward that pertain no longer immediately and directly to the characteristics 
of sacrificial rites in discrete cultural domains, but rather to the integration 
and mobilization of the various capacities of self for the sake of a single way of 
believing and living. Via the holy scriptures of the Israelites— and later those 
of the Christians— the loci of risk and reward shift from the more immedi-
ate characteristics of particular offerings at particular times and places to the 
organization of all the resources of self, and to whether these resources are 
sufficiently integrated and focused so as to measure up to the dictates of that 
absolutely other One.
 The action of the Israelites at Jericho seems thoroughly articulated. The 
Will of the Lord as conveyed to patresfamilias such as Abraham and Joshua 
provides the overarching standard that seems absent in the action at Troy. The 
Israelites are an integrated and mobile force, uniformly obedient to the Lord’s 
instructions and thereby seemingly made all the more effective. Recently cir-
cumcised and bearing the arc before them as they circle the city’s wall for six 
consecutive days, they effect with a collective shout on the seventh day what 
the Achaeans take some ten years to accomplish. The walls of Jericho come 
tumbling down and the Israelites take possession of their prize. As in the cul-
tural action elsewhere, this prize includes precious metals— gold and silver— 
but here it is a collective reward that is supposed to come into the Lord’s trea-
sury and not be distributed to individuals (thus seeming to forestall the kind 
of disintegrative strife that comes about between Agamemnon and Achilles). 
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In  the broader integrated history of the Israelites, the fall of Jericho marks 
the point at which they begin to take possession of the reward promised by 
the Lord to Abraham, the same “land flowing with milk and honey” (Ex 33:3) 
promised to Abraham’s seed. Jericho is a short- term outcome in a longer- term 
cultural action, in  which the Promised Land as a collective reward is sup-
posed to be conferred upon the chosen people for living justly and obeying 
the Will of its single God. The Israelites engage themselves in the action, as the 
events at Jericho and elsewhere in their history show, in  competitions with 
other peoples— Canaanites, Jebusites, Hittites, Philistines. Correspondingly, 
the “monolatry” of the ancient Israelites, as which it has been termed by Nili 
Fox, involves a God who has gained ascendency over other deities and idols 
(without yet having done away with them completely).34
 Outcomes in the competitive cultural action of the Israelites at Jericho and 
elsewhere are shaped by the possibility of a universal evaluation of cultural 
resources for which I use the descriptive term dualist. In this study, this term 
describes a kind of cultural action in which a single God (or  idea) presents 
an absolutely other perspective according to which all cultural resources— all 
those discrete domains we saw in the action at Troy— are to be seen as uni-
formly articulated or integrated. Though the Lord of the Israelites sometimes 
acts in ways that are reminiscent of the immediate and volatile approach to 
things characteristic of the multiple deities at Troy, His action seems relatively 
fixed by the covenant with His chosen people and by His laws. In this mortal 
world, the Israelites are supposed to be both liberated and constrained by the 
Lord’s master plan, but events recorded in Exodus, when the Israelites cre-
ate their golden calf and temporarily revert to idolatry in Moses’s absence, 
show the obligation to fear and obey the Lord to be a new locus of indeter-
minacy in the cultural action. The Israelites are supposed to fear and obey 
the Lord, collectively and individually, but they might not. The dualist evalu-
ation of cultural resources does not necessarily replace the logics of religious 
 34. On the religiosity of the ancient Israelites, Fox observes “a diverse society, exhibiting 
variant religious expressions [. . .] What has been labeled diffused monotheism or monola-
try coexisted with polytheistic cults, at least among certain groups in certain periods. Radical 
monolatry at best was an ideal promoted by prophets and other reformers who in their own 
minds may actually have perceived YHWH in monotheistic terms. What percentage of the 
general population fit into each group is unknown, though our sources suggest that a sizable 
portion of Israelites recognized YHWH as the Supreme National God and worshipped him, 
if not exclusively, then in concert with other divinities who seem to qualify as members of his 
host” (“Concepts of God,” 344–45). The emergence of Judaism as a scriptural monotheistic 
religion begins in the sixth and fifth centuries bce and continues into the early centuries of the 
Common Era, alongside the emergence of Christianity as a scriptural monotheism. See also the 
introduction in Philip R. Davies, On the Origins of Judaism, 1–5.
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practices associated with discrete cultural domains, but rather becomes 
another option— to  be sure, the one the Israelites are supposed to choose— 
situated alongside or superimposed upon them. Overall, the availability of a 
new dualist evaluation of cultural resources, which encompasses and articu-
lates older domain- specific ones, increases the indeterminacy of the cultural 
action in a way that makes the attitudes and actions of individual mortals 
matter more. The articulation of cultural resources according to the dualist 
master plan of the Israelites disengages them from the scattered, fixed, discrete 
pagan temples of the multiple deities and renders the relationships among 
them more fluid and indeterminate. Selves and things receive a new value, 
supposedly their highest one, by virtue of their successful participation in the 
dualist longer- term grand design, even as the possibility of (lapses into) more 
immediate, short- term, domain- specific cultural evaluations remains. A strik-
ing aspect of this increased indeterminacy is that an entirely new possibility 
manifests itself. According to circumstances, the very same thing can be high-
est or lowest, best or meanest. Abraham is created in God’s divine image and, 
as paterfamilias of the Israelites, ranks highest, and he is also merely pulvis et 
cinis—“ashes and dust” (Gen 18:27).
 As important as Troy and Jericho will be for the European cultural action, 
the Middle Ages are much more directly affected by events at two later ancient 
cities that grow out of and compete with the earlier ones. The Troy of Homer 
is connected to the history of Rome in the first century bce in the Aeneid of 
Publius Vergilius Naro. In Virgil’s epic poem, Aeneas and his group of Trojan 
refugees flee from their burning city and embark on an odyssey that spans 
more than seven years. They are brought eventually to Italy where they lay the 
foundations of Rome and the Roman empire in military struggles with the 
Latins and their military leader Turnus, Aeneas’s principal rival for the hand 
of the Latin princess Lavinia. The prevalent disposition of cultural resources 
in the action around Virgil’s Rome- to- be remains much as it was at Homer’s 
Troy. The various gods and goddesses continue to hold sway in their differ-
ent, discrete cultural domains. In the cultural action recorded by Virgil, as at 
Homer’s Troy, “love of honor and appetite for glory,” according to Gransden,35 
characterize the competitive approach both to warfare and athletic compe-
titions in the interest of tripods, green palms, armor, gold, and silver. In the 
competitions, the various gods still play the main role in fixing outcomes on a 
moment- by- moment basis. Aeneas’s ongoing difficulties in reaching his own 
promised land that has been prophesied to him, and in realizing the destiny 
 35. “A thirst for individual glory is thus the prime motivation of many of the heroes of the 
Aeneid no less than in the Iliad” (Gransden, Virgil, 89).
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which Jupiter announces for him early in the epic— that his descendants will 
be “Lords of the world, the toga- bearing Romans”36—are mainly due to the 
continuing enmity of Juno (the reiteration and elaboration of Homer’s venge-
ful Hera). In Italy as at Troy, the most important outcome is determined by 
fate and the gods. In the final verses of Virgil’s poem, Aeneas kills Turnus in 
single combat, and nothing stands in the way of the prophesied marriage of 
Aeneas and Lavinia and the cultural joining of the Trojans and Latins that later 
results in the Romans. Though fixed from the mortal perspective, this positive 
outcome for Aeneas and the Trojans has to be sorted out in an ongoing com-
petition between Jupiter and Juno, with the former acting as the custodian of 
Aeneas’s fated ascendancy in Italy and the latter employing every device at 
her disposal to avert or postpone it. These gods contend with each other over 
the course of Virgil’s poem, according to the exigencies of the immediate cir-
cumstances, until a breakthrough is achieved. Recognizing that Juno can and 
will continue to complicate and postpone things indefinitely, Jupiter makes a 
deal with her. Aeneas will kill Turnus and the Trojans will win the battle, but 
effectively lose the war. Trojan language, dress, and customs will be submerged 
by Latin ones, and Italian valor will be the strength of the later Rome. Jupiter 
acquiesces to Juno’s demand: “Once and for all, Troy falls, and with her name 
let her lie fallen.”37
 The pagan sacrificial logic of discrete cultural domains is not undone or 
overcome in Virgil’s poem, even as an idea gradually comes to interconnect 
them. Though her position is contrary to fate and the supreme sky- god’s own 
inclinations, Juno’s vested interests have to be taken into consideration. In the 
final outcome, the diminishment of the importance of Aeneas’s Trojan her-
itage is balanced by Virgil against his project to underscore Rome as Troy 
reborn. The founder of the Roman empire, Julius Caesar, will be the descen-
dent of “Iulus”—that is, Ascanius, Aeneas’s son by his deceased Trojan wife. 
The longer- term history resulting in the “Trojan Caesar” foretold by Jupiter 
at the outset of Virgil’s poem is not prevented by the arrangement made with 
Juno near the end. Without transforming the basic organization of the cul-
tural action according to discrete domains with their respective patron deities, 
which was also characteristic of Homer’s Troy, Virgil nevertheless shows the 
cultural action at his Rome- to- be as occurring in a way that is consistent with a 
global principle. The grand design into which Virgil’s poetic action merges, for 
better or worse, is the poet’s own imperial Rome and that of his contemporary 
 36. Virgil, Aeneid, 13.
 37. Ibid., 398.
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Augustus Caesar, son of the deified Caesar.38 The indeterminacy of the action 
as rendered by Virgil paves the way to Rome’s universal imperial mission in 
the latter first century bce— and in later times, to the medieval Christian reit-
eration of the Roman empire as the Holy Roman Empire. The medieval people 
on whom this study focuses will consider that the cultural action depicted by 
Virgil merges with their own. Ladies and knights at medieval courts and in 
medieval romances will be the cultural heirs of Dido, Lavinia, Aeneas, and 
Ascanius, as well as their latest rivals.
 The action at Jerusalem, the last of our four cities, reveals some of the 
most important moves medieval people will later use to make the imperial 
Rome of Aeneas and Virgil their own. The figurative moves employed by the 
Apostle Paul, who writes about a century after Virgil in the early first century 
ce, make it possible to speak of a military action occurring at this city as the 
site of Jesus Christ’s Crucifixion and Resurrection. With succincti lumbros ves-
tros in veritate—“loins girt with truth,” loricam iustitiae— the “breastplate of 
righteousness,” scutum fidei— the “shield of faith,” galeam salutis— the “helmet 
of salvation,” and bearing gladium spiritus (quod est verbum Dei)—“the sword 
of the spirit that is the Word of God,” Christian soldiers take possession of 
Jerusalem, stare adversus insidias diaboli— by “standing against the wiles of the 
devil.” The Jerusalem of which Christian soldiers are supposed to take posses-
sion, as set forth here in military terms by Paul (Eph 6:11–17), is not the literal, 
historical city, “which now is, and is in bondage with her children,” but rather 
the free allegorical Jerusalem, “mother of us all” (Gal 4:25–26). In contrast to 
the approach of the Israelites at Jericho, who followed the dictates of the law 
and precise instructions given to them by the angel of the Lord, Christian sol-
diers are supposed to occupy their heavenly Jerusalem by means of faith (and 
in his Epistle to the Hebrews 11:30, Paul retrospectively asserts that the success 
of the Israelites at Jericho was really due to their faith).
 Paul’s Christian view of the cultural action at Jerusalem grows out of a 
lengthy and complex history. It  is a reiteration and extension of the cultural 
action of the Israelites, but with some definitive elaborations that seek to set 
it beyond its monotheistic predecessor and contemporary. Christians form a 
unified community like the Israelites, but they are integrated and universal in 
 38. The words “for better or worse” in this sentence allude to the different ways Virgil’s 
Rome- to- be has been seen by scholars as connected to Augustan Rome via the battle between 
Aeneas and Turnus and the brutal slaying of the latter by the former: is the poem Augustan or 
anti- Augustan? See Andreola Rossi’s treatment of this scholarly discussion in her Contexts of 
War, 150–52. Gransden states more generally that “Virgil’s vision of Roman history forms the 
central organizing principle of the Aeneid” (Virgil, 44).
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an unprecedented way that Paul puts like this: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, 
there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all 
one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:28). The Christian community for Paul potentially 
includes all of humanity (hence my use of the term global to characterize it) and, 
despite its many different parts, is fluidly articulated, with Christ as its head,
Ex quo totum corpus compactum et connexum per omnem juncturam sub-
ministrationis, secundum operationem in mensuram uniuscujusque mem-
bri, augmentum corporis facit in aedificationem sui in caritate.
From whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that 
which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the mea-
sure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in 
love. (Eph 4:16)
The most important move that enables the constitution of this fluidly articu-
lated, potentially universal community is the disengagement of Christians by 
means of faith from the laws of the Israelites. Observing it is possible for Jews 
to be unjust knowing the law, and for Gentiles to be just not knowing it, Paul 
reasons that what is truly important is an abiding inner posture or attitude of 
belief rather than the law (somewhat as Abraham and Isaac had once discov-
ered the advantages of an inner posture of abiding obedience over those of 
concrete sacrifices). With his figurative moves, the Apostle seems to reject the 
law and take it a step further at the same time, aligning circumcision and the 
stone tablets borne by the arc at Jericho with the fallen “outward,” fleshly man 
and sin, while on another level regarding the gospel of faith as written “in the 
fleshly tables of the heart” (2 Cor 3:3).
 The Christian disengagement of self from the law via faith (see Gal 2:19), 
and the global extension of the fluidly articulated Christian community 
enabled by it,39 reiterates, varies, and extends the dualist evaluation of cultural 
resources that we observed in more limited and exclusive dimensions in the 
action of the Israelites at Jericho. Selves and things are good (righteous) or bad 
(sinful) across the board, depending on whether they are based on faith or the 
law, on spirit or the flesh. In Christianity, this universal dualist disposition is 
brought about by sin, which, even as it renders selves in terms of their same-
ness, effectively incapacitates them:
 39. Consistent with the idea of Christianity being fashioned by Paul into what I term a 
global religion is the heading of the first chapter of Hans Küng’s Great Christian Thinkers: “Paul: 
Christianity Becomes a World Religion” (5).
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Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum. Nam velle, 
adjacet mihi: perficere autem bonum, non invenio.
I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will 
is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. (Rom 
7:18)
The burden of sin— a term that encompasses all the difficulties and troubles 
associated with the mutability of the flesh and other physical- material cul-
tural resources as universally harnessed in Christianity— far surpasses any-
thing humans can do to offset it. Only a sacrifice of the same universal 
dimensions— the self- sacrifice of divinity occurring in the Crucifixion— can 
ensure a favorable outcome. By means of faith in this Sacrifice, the immense 
weight of the burden of sin is removed from Christians. They are effectively 
released by means of faith from the immediate need to tend to the demands of 
various discrete cultural domains. They no longer have to endeavor to control 
the mutability of things and achieve positive outcomes by means of discrete 
quid- pro- quo sacrifices to the numerous fickle deities in charge, as  people 
continued to do in the pagan Greco- Roman cultural action— and would con-
tinue to do in the cultural action of pagan Celtic and Germanic peoples long 
into the Middle Ages.40
 More important for Paul, Christians are released from the laws that 
structure(d)  the cultural action of their own monotheistic predecessors and 
guide(d) them in the direction of their own “promised land” as their reward. 
All Christians have to do in order to take possession of their heavenly Jerusa-
lem is believe that the debt they owe has been paid in full for them by Christ’s 
sacrifice, and in so doing, die to the world and the flesh in emulation of Him. 
Outside of faith and the love of one’s neighbor that faith brings with it, accord-
ing to Paul’s streamlining of the multiple laws of the Israelites, Christians are 
not constrained in their lives in any way, a condition the Apostle puts this way 
in Romans 13:7:
 40. “Utter devotion to many deities is difficult for any human being, but monotheism sup-
plies the kind of focus that makes a more fervent devotion possible, and the intensity of the 
personal relationship between divine and human is given its fullest expression” (Fowler, Per-
spectives of Reality, 21). Though her study is devoted to Hinduism, Fowler offers observations 
that are relevant to this study, for example, in seeing dualism as a definitive characteristic of 
monotheism, generally: “Monotheism is a dualistic principle, one that separates the divine 
from the world and from humanity [. . .] the monotheism of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
considers the nature of the divine to be separate from creation in order to maintain divine 
transcendence and omnipotence” (20).
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Reddite omnibus debita: cui tribulatum, tributum: cui vectigal, vectigal: cui 
timorem, timorem: cui honorem, honorem.
Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to 
whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.
These various imperatives are licenses rather than obligations. Leaving no 
aspect or cultural domain of a believer’s life untouched, Paul’s Christianity 
pervades and articulates them spiritually, while at the same time, leaving 
concrete political, social, and economic relations largely intact. The fluidly 
articulated, potentially universal Christian community as constituted in Paul’s 
Epistles establishes new parameters that will shape the cultural action of medi-
eval Europe and, by extension, that of European modernity. Christian selves 
and things are both absolutely the same in sin and absolutely other by virtue 
of grace, and an unprecedented degree of indeterminacy is thereby achieved. 
As long as a given thing— for example, tribute, custom, fear, honor— is con-
veyed in Paul’s fluid Christian sense, nothing prevents it from being exchanged 
or transferred freely throughout the cultural action.
 Shown the way by Paul, Christians reiterate and radicalize the risks and 
rewards of the Israelites’ dualist arrangement of cultural resources. In  the 
Christians’ global dualism, the permanent joyful bliss of the heavenly Jerusa-
lem associated with the Resurrection is the counterpart to the painful burden 
of sin associated with the Crucifixion. Because one is bound in this mortal life 
to the flesh and mutable things, the joy experienced by Christian soldiers as 
they take possession of their heavenly city via faith in Christ’s Crucifixion and 
Resurrection is only a minute anticipatory measure of the full draught of bliss 
to be possessed in the heavenly afterlife. In the Christian cultural action, the 
reward enabled by faith is no longer a temporal promised land to be conferred 
upon one’s people in this life and this world, as  it was with the Israelites at 
Jericho, but rather a heavenly kingdom not to be experienced in this life at all. 
In Christians as understood by Paul, the inner attitude of fearful obedience 
and reverence is reiterated and varied in the speculative posture of faith. Faith, 
fides— the lynchpin in the evaluation of selves and things both as what they are 
all alike (sinful/indebted) and as absolutely other (redeemed)—is sperandarum 
substantia rerum, argumentum non parentium— the substance of things hoped 
for, the evidence of things not seen (Heb 11:1).
 For the speculative effort involved in achieving the reward of the heavenly 
city, Paul alternately employs a figurative move that puts athletic events to 
Christian use and bears directly on my view of cultural action as competitive 
performances:
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Nescitis quod ii qui in stadio currunt, omnes quidem currunt, sed unus 
accipit bravium? Sic currite ut comprehendatis.
Know ye not that they which run in a race run all, but one receiveth the 
prize? So run, that ye may obtain. (1 Cor 9:24)
The prize for which Paul here admonishes the athletes of Corinth and by 
extension all Christian competitors to run is the coronam incorruptam, the 
“incorruptible crown” of the heavenly kingdom (1 Cor 9:25). One has only to 
imagine this crown as crafted of heavenly gold, silver, and gemstones in order 
to see the Christian correspondents in the cultural action to the rewards we 
have seen at Troy, Jericho, and Rome.
 In the cultural action at these four ancient cities, individuals and groups 
invest themselves and the resources available to them in the interest of reward. 
The action occurs as competitive performances in wars and games, the distinc-
tion of which hinges on the specific rules of engagement or play. What are the 
available strategies and moves? What are the implications of non- engagement 
or standing pat? How much aggression may be employed and with what 
means? What are the rewards in the case of victory and the penalties in the 
case of defeat? What are tolerable levels of pain and shame?41 As competitions 
in wars and games, the cultural action at the four cities is constantly being 
viewed, assessed, or  “witnessed,” as  Taylor puts it,42 from different perspec-
tives, as it will also be in the Middle Ages. At each of the surveyed cities, the 
 41. Richard Rorty offers a view of pain/shame as a common denominator of human expe-
rience that goes in the direction of a potential global ethics of cultural action: “The view I am 
offering says that there is such a thing as moral progress, and that this progress is indeed in the 
direction of greater human solidarity. But that solidarity is not thought of as a recognition of a 
core self, the human essence, in all human beings. Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see 
more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as unim-
portant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation— the ability to 
think of people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’ ” (Contingency, 
192). Coming from a different direction, Hans Küng’s ecumenical vision of a global ethic advo-
cates a commitment to a culture (1) of non- violence and respect for life, (2) of solidarity and 
a just economic order, (3) of tolerance and a life of truthfulness, and (4) of equal rights and 
partnership between men and women (Yes to a Global Ethic, 17–25).
 42. In her book Fictions of Evidence, Jamie Taylor focuses on the importance of “witness-
ing” for cultural production in the past, as  well as for our own access to that production: 
“By paying close attention to the forms and practices of witnessing, as well as to the implicit 
claims of authenticity and truth witnessing assumes, we can read across the past and the present 
to conceptualize what it means to produce and to analyze the ‘evidence’ of a life. Indeed, we can 
ask ourselves by what means we produce and analyze the Middle Ages itself. If we, as scholars 
of the Middle Ages, are witnesses to it, then we must take care to recognize our own role as 
narratores of the past” (198).
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most crucial events take place before critical onlookers and judges. One of the 
most watched events in the ancient world would have been Achilles’s pursuit 
of Hector around the walls of Troy, a race in which the competitors, the stakes, 
and the action and its critical assessment are succinctly and effectively trans-
mitted in one of the highlights of epic poetry:
They raced, one escaping and one in pursuit
and the one who fled was great but the one pursuing
greater, even greater— their pace mounting in speed
since both men strove, not for a sacrificial beast
or oxhide trophy, prizes runners fight for, no,
they raced for the life of Hector breaker of horses.
Like powerful stallions sweeping round the post for trophies,
galloping full stretch with some fine prize at stake,
a tripod, say, or woman offered up at funeral games
for some brave hero fallen— so the two of them
whirled three times around the city of Priam,
sprinting at top speed while the gods gazed down.43
Other such crucial events in the cultural action lack the descriptive language 
of athletic events, which is used in this passage contrastively to highlight the 
high stakes of the competition, but they still possess a transparently athletic or 
physical dimension, along with the critical assessment of invested spectators. 
The cultural action of the Israelites begins when God changes Abram’s name 
to Abraham and makes his covenant with him:
And when Abram was ninety years old and nine, the LORD appeared to 
Abram, and said unto him, I am the Almighty God; walk before me, and be 
thou perfect. (Gen 17:1)
Henceforth, Abraham’s gait and that of his progeny will be viewed and 
assessed by their God according to the most rigorous standard of perfection. 
In contrast to this global view of the cultural action of the Israelites in Genesis, 
the Roman poet Virgil zooms in on a moment preceding the hunt under-
taken by Aeneas’s Trojans and Dido’s Carthaginians. The manner in which 
the poet establishes Aeneas’s ascendency, as he leads the Trojans’ procession 
into view, suggests that significant outcomes can be momentary and hinge on 
 43. Homer, Iliad, 546–47. Rossi observes the “dynamic connection” between athletic con-
tests and war in Achilles’s pursuit of Hector (Contexts of War, 98–100).
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intangibles such as physical beauty, superior aloofness, contagious confidence, 
well- coiffed hair:
Resplendent above the rest, Aeneas walked to meet her,
To join his retinue with hers. He seemed—
Think of the lord Apollo in the spring
When he leaves wintering in Lycia
By Xanthus torrent, for his mother’s isle
Of Delos, to renew the festival;
Around his altars Cretans, Dryopës,
And painted Agathyrsans raise a shout,
But the god walks the Cynthian ridge alone
And smooths his hair, binds it in fronded laurel,
Braids it in gold; and shafts ring on his shoulders.
So elated and swift, Aeneas walked
With sunlit grace upon him.44
Whether of global or momentary situational dimensions, assessed compe-
titions characterize the cultural action we have observed at the four cities, 
and they also characterize the relationships among the earlier and later ones. 
Virgil’s Rome- to- be, as  we have seen, finds additional value in the cultural 
resources attached to Aeneas and his band of Trojan refugees by connecting 
them with the flourishing imperial Rome of the poet’s own time. While the 
disposition and evaluation of cultural resources remains largely immediate 
and domain specific, as  it had been in the Iliad, a greater indeterminacy in 
the action is achieved by opening up the epic action onto the poet’s imperial 
present. According to the arrangement made by Jupiter and Juno near the 
poem’s end, Troy is finished, once and for all. That Troy nevertheless lives on 
in Rome is perhaps the clearest indication of the indeterminacy of the new 
arrangement, whereby whatever residual glory claimed by the once great city 
of Priam now accrues to Rome. According to the competitive dynamics of 
cultural expropriation as rendered by Virgil, all the positive resources associ-
ated with Troy are to be harnessed for the Rome of the Caesars, while all its 
negative aspects are to be left behind. Correspondingly, the cultural action 
becomes indeterminate in a way that leaves room for the transfer of cultural 
resources from Troy to Rome to occur without the vested interests of import-
ant parties, such as Juno, being unduly harmed. When Aeneas is wounded 
by an arrow at a crucial moment in the fighting near the end of Virgil’s epic, 
 44. Virgil, Aeneid, 100–101.
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we have an exceedingly rare moment in the ancient epic action when a figure 
of such great stature is wounded inexplicably, in a way that heightens suspense 
and suggests that the final outcome— despite all the prophecies— is still up in 
the air:
A winging shaft— look!—whizzed and struck the man,
Sped by who knows what hand, what spinning gust
What stroke of luck, what god won this distinction
For the Rutulians. Glory for the shot
Went afterward suppressed; no claims were made
By anyone of having hit Aeneas.45
In view of her ongoing enmity and continuing interventions against the Tro-
jans, Juno or one of her divine or mortal proxies would have to be regarded as 
the prime suspect behind this shot. But the same indeterminacy that makes it 
impossible to establish the identity of the marksman also makes room for the 
agreement between Juno and Jupiter and, beyond this, for an imperial Rome 
with Trojan roots that will rely on the benevolent favor of all the gods, includ-
ing Juno, as it pursues its universal mission.46 The forces that have led to the 
undoing of Troy, even at the moment of Aeneas’s military victory, themselves 
have to be undone, mitigated, and made indeterminate, and distancing the 
highly suspicious Juno from the wounding of Aeneas helps to achieve this 
end. An  indeterminacy consistent with universal ambitions constructively 
subsumes local vested interests, as the imperial promise of Virgil’s Rome- to- 
be is set above the fated doom of Homer’s Troy.
 In the action at Virgil’s Rome- to- be, Troy finally falls and Rome is hence-
forth in ascendency. We have seen that Pauline Christianity is also structured 
internally by a competitive relationship with its Judaic origins. Though it is the 
inheritor of much of Judaism, Christianity seemingly must outdo its prede-
cessor, and in his Epistles Paul highlights this outdoing with the terminology 
of athletic performances. For Paul, the children of the Israelites fall short of 
righteousness, “Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works 
of the law. For they stumbled at that stumbling stone” (Rom 9:32). By contrast, 
the path to be traversed by the Christian runners is clearly marked out, and 
these are exhorted by Paul to beware of all entangling obstacles as they put 
themselves into play before the watching crowds:
 45. Ibid., 125.
 46. Jupiter’s final words in the poem, Gransden notes, “promise Juno a secure and hon-
oured place in the Roman pantheon [. . .] This reconciliation of opposites is the true resolution 
of the poem” (Virgil, 87).
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Ideoque et nos tantam habentes impositam nubem testium, deponentes 
omne pondus, et  circumstans nos peccatum, per patientiam curramus ad 
propositum nobis certamen.
Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, let us 
throw off everything that hinders and the sin that so easily entangles, and let 
us run with perseverance the race marked out for us. (Heb 12:1)
Here as further above, Paul disengages the language of athletic performance 
from the domains of sports and warfare, and adapts it to the Christian engage-
ment in the cultural action generally. In Paul’s view, Christians can and will 
outrace the “stumbling” children of the Israelites, as  they can and will also 
outrun all the pagan peoples of the ancient world, Romans and Barbarians 
alike, who— from the Christian perspective— will be slowed by the various 
“stumbling stones” associated with the organization and evaluation of cultural 
resources in discrete domains with their different respective deities in charge.
 Paul’s efforts are largely devoted to staking out parameters of cultural action 
that demonstrate Christians’ ascendency over their Israelite predecessors and 
rivals. The relationship between Christian competitors and pagan Greco- 
Roman ones will be most compellingly and universally articulated some four 
centuries later. The ensuing chapter will further elaborate and exemplify some 
of the characteristics of (the indeterminacy of) the cultural action as surveyed 
in the latter part of this chapter, with a consideration of the action as orga-
nized in and around a text of seminal importance for the self- understanding 
of medieval Europeans who remain under the prevailing cultural influence 
of Rome: Augustine’s Civitas dei contra paganos— The City of God against the 
Pagans, arguably the most capacious articulation of the Christian- imperial 
parameters of cultural action in the European Middle Ages.47
 47. For Küng, Augustine is the “father of all western Latin theology” (Great Christian 
Thinkers, 6).
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THE CITY OF GOD: OTHERNESS AS A 
GLOBAL PARAMETER OF ACTION
In the previous chapter, I  considered— and began to question— the notion 
that the European Middle Ages can be viewed as static in comparison to the 
progressive dynamism of modernity. The stasis one frequently finds associ-
ated with medieval culture is connected to institutionalized communal rituals 
and the authority of foundational writings by authors such as St. Augustine of 
Hippo, which set the most important longer- term parameters for experience 
and action. By contrast, in modernity one seems to be set loose. The modern 
self as subject, freed from the authority of institutional religion as it is freed 
from “historical obligations” generally— to reiterate the words of Habermas,1 
begins to posit the parameters of its own experience and action by the time 
of the Reformation. Based on the conventional division of European cultural 
history into three epochs— antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modernity— 
modernity is also associated with a return to or rebirth of antiquity, and the 
intervening millennium is assessed as if it were of minimal value for, if not a 
 1. Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 13.
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detriment to, cultural growth. Ernst Robert Curtius once characterized the 
Latin Middle Ages as “the crumbling Roman road from the antique to the 
modern world.”2 In this chapter, I  share Curtius’s general notion of convey-
ance, but view the road as not so dilapidated and the traction for moder-
nity as not so tenuous. In keeping with my consideration of culture as action, 
I  employ a correspondingly dynamic metaphor in the title of this chapter: 
“bankroll”—the gambler’s store of resources that is suggestive of the cultural 
growth that will occur in the High Middle Ages. The present chapter picks up 
where the last one left off and further elucidates how this later crucial point in 
the European cultural action is reached.
 In the action associated with Jerusalem in the previous chapter, we  saw 
that a point was reached when people could be both absolutely the same 
in sin and absolutely other by means of faith— fides, which Paul sometimes 
cast as a competitive exertion of self, analogous to competition in an athletic 
event. We  further observed that this dynamic coincidence of sameness and 
otherness, added to and in combination with the continuing, domain- specific 
evaluations of pagan sacrificial practices and the laws of the Israelites as alter-
native possibilities, leads to an unprecedented degree of indeterminacy and 
complexity in the cultural action. In  the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo 
(354–430 ce), particularly in his Civitas Dei contra paganos— City of God 
against the Pagans (completed in 426 ce) the dynamic coincidence of same-
ness and otherness first set forth by Paul is maintained and expanded in ways 
that largely shape the parameters of cultural action in the Middle Ages. This 
authoritative patristic work, rather than constraining the potential of self for 
growth, actually increases and widens this potential by elaborating the Pauline 
speculative posture or exertion of faith and giving it patently imperial Roman 
dimensions.
 The reasons that Augustine gives for the composition of his City of God 
show him to be in competition with the pagan sacrificial culture that we 
observed at Homer’s Troy and Virgil’s Rome- to- be in the previous chapter. His 
immediate purpose in writing concerns the endangered integrity of the Roman 
empire. Augustine and his fellow Christians stand accused of having under-
mined the political integrity of imperial Rome with their uniquely Christian 
refusal to pay tribute to the multiple gods and make sacrifices to these gods 
in their various discrete domains of sovereignty. Augustine’s text allows us 
to hear the Christians’ detractors arguing that imperial Rome has hitherto 
successfully incorporated all the various gods of the peoples and territories 
it conquered. Before the advent of Christianity— and so the detractors— the 
 2. Curtius, European Literature, 19.
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multiple gods had been appeased and Rome had fared well. With the increase 
in numbers and influence of Christians, according to the pagans, a  decline 
set in, and the Visigoths’ sack of Rome in 410 ce is the result of this decline. 
Augustine is sensitive, even defensive in the face of this accusation— for 
example, in his rejoinder that the Christian God’s benevolence became man-
ifest during the sack when Christians seeking refuge in their churches were 
left unharmed by the rampaging Visigoths. Beyond such more immediate 
purposes, one of Augustine’s broader aims is to counter accusations in a com-
prehensive theological and philosophical way by setting forth the ascendancy 
of Christianity over the sacrificial rites associated with the pagan gods. With 
sarcastic reference to his detractors as “wise men,” Augustine characterizes the 
pagan culture of sacrifice in a manner that, however exaggerated it may seem, 
is consistent with our observations in the previous chapter:
Verum quia terrena ciuitas habuit quosdam suos sapientes, quos diuina 
improbat disciplina, qui uel suspicati uel decepti a daemonibus crederent 
multos deos conciliandos esse rebus humanis atque ad eorum diuersa quo-
dam modo officia diuersa subdita pertinere, ad  alium corpus, ad  alium 
animum, inque ipso corpore ad alium caput, ad  alium ceruicem et cetera 
singula ad singulos; similiter in animo ad alium ingenium, ad alium doc-
trinam, ad alium iram, ad alium concupiscentiam; inque ipsis rebus uitae 
adiacentibus ad alium pecus, ad alium triticum, ad alium uinum, ad alium 
oleum, ad alium siluas, ad alium nummos, ad alium nauigationem, ad alium 
bella atque uictorias, ad alium coniugia, ad alium partum ac fecunditatem 
et ad alios alia cetera.3
Either out of their own daydreaming or out of demonic deception these wise 
men came to believe that a multiplicity of divinities were allied with human 
life, with different duties, in some strange arrangement, and with different 
assignments: this one over the body, that one over the spirit; in  the body 
itself, one over the head, another over the neck, still others, one for each 
bodily part; in  the mind, one over the intelligence, another over learning, 
another over temper, another over desire; in the realities, related to life, that 
lie about us, one over flocks and one over wheat, one over wine, one over oil, 
and another over forests, one over currency, another over navigation, and 
 3. The Latin text of Augustine’s Civitas Dei contra paganos (abbreviated below as 
CD) is  from Avrelii Avgvstini Opera, De  Civitate Dei Libri  I–X (vol. 47)  and De  Civitate Dei 
Libri XI–XXII (vol. 48). Book, chapter, and page numbers are referenced in the notes. Here CD, 
XIX.17.684.
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still another over warfare and victory, one over marriage, a different one over 
fecundity and childbirth, so on and so on.4
Augustine counters the accusations of such “wise men” with the dualist archi-
tecture of his city, in which the multiple allegiances and sacrifices to the many 
gods correspond to a city of sin and the flesh, and the Christian belief in a 
single One corresponds to a city of the spirit: Vna quippe est hominum secun­
dum carnem, altera secundum spiritum5—“One city is that of men who live 
according to the flesh. The other is of men who live according to the spir-
it.”6 Oppositional and leveling dualist terms are clear in passages such as this, 
in  which we see Augustine’s systematic alignment of the pagan culture of 
sacrifices with man (rather than God), sin (rather than just living), and the 
flesh (rather than the spirit): Quod itaque diximus, hinc extitisse duas ciuitates 
diuersas inter se atque contrarias, quod alii secundum carnem, alii secundum 
spiritum uiuerent: potest etiam isto modo dici quod alii secundum hominem, alii 
secundum Deum uiuant7—“When, therefore, we  said that two contrary and 
opposing cities arose because some men live according to the flesh and others 
according to the spirit, we could equally well have said that they arose because 
some live according to man and others according to God.”8 The Christian 
God’s city involves what could be considered a streamlining of religious prac-
tices in the direction of a single- minded investment of self: Caelestis autem 
ciuitas <cum> unum Deum solum colendum nosset eique tantum modo seruien­
dum9—“The heavenly City, on  the contrary, knows and by religious faith, 
believes that it must adore one God alone.”10 Against the multiple dispersed 
sacrifices of pagan antiquity, Augustine opposes a very different conception of 
sacrifice that is, nevertheless, quite visibly an extension and variation of the 
same basic sacrificial principle:
Proinde uerum sacrificium est omne opus, quo agitur, ut  sancta societate 
inhaereamus Deo, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni, quo ueraciter beati 
esse possimus. Vnde et ipsa misericordia, qua homini subuenitur, si  non 
propter Deum fit, non est sacrificium. Etsi enim ab homine fit uel offer-
tur, tamen sacrificium res diuina est, ita ut hoc quoque uocabulo id Latini 
 4. Augustine, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 227.
 5. Idem, CD, XIV.1.414.
 6. Idem, City of God, Books VIII–XVI, 347.
 7. Idem, CD, XIV.4.418.
 8. Idem, City of God, Books VIII–XVI, 354.
 9. Idem, CD, XIX.17.684–85.
 10. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 227.
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ueteres appellauerint. Vnde ipse homo Dei nomine consecratus et Deo uotus, 
in quantum mundo moritur ut Deo uiuat, sacrificium est.11
There is, then, a true sacrifice in every work which unites us in holy com-
munion with God, that is, in  every work that is aimed at that final Good 
in which alone we can be truly blessed. That is why even mercy shown to 
our fellow men is not a sacrifice unless it is done for God. A sacrifice, even 
though it is done or offered by man, is something divine— which is what the 
ancient Latins meant by the word sacrificium. For this reason, a man himself 
who is consecrated in the name of God and vowed to God is a sacrifice, in as 
much as he dies to the world that he may live for God.12
Augustine reiterates and varies the ancient pagan logic of “sacrifice” in this 
dualist and universal Christian sense. Collectively (insofar as they are con-
ceived as a city) and individually (though the individual remains in a second-
ary position), Christians make themselves a sacrifice by “dying to the world” 
in order to live for God. In the heavenly city, Christians collectively become 
“God’s Temple”: Huic nos seruititem, quae λατρεία Graece dicitur, siue in quibu­
sque sacramentis siue in nobis ipsis debemus. Huius enim templum simul omnes 
et singuli templa sumus, quia et omnium concordiam et singulos inhabitare 
dignatur13—“Both in outward signs and inner devotion, we owe to Him that 
service which the Greeks call latreía. Indeed, all of us together, and each one 
in particular, constitute his Temple because He deigns to take for a dwelling 
both the community of all and the person of each individual.”14 The uniquely 
Christian form of sacrifice becomes a continual kind of dedication or service 
to God, which undoes the spiritual and material infrastructure of dispersed 
pagan altars in discrete cultural domains and articulates or integrates them 
into the whole community of believers, collectively and singly. The scattered, 
fixed temples of the multiple deities are replaced in Augustine’s postulations 
by the single, universal, and highly mobile Christian community— the mobil-
ity of which is further enhanced by this community’s adoption of the codex as 
the format for its holy scriptures.15
 11. Idem, CD, X.6.278.
 12. Idem, City of God, Books VIII–XVI, 125–26.
 13. Idem, CD, X.3.275.
 14. Idem, City of God, Books  VIII–XVI, 120; Augustine’s employment of the Greek term 
latreía—“worship” or “service to the Gods” (Liddel and Scott’s)—presents another Christian 
extension and elaboration of an originally pagan move.
 15. Christianity is mobile in the way the religion of the Israelites, as discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, was mobile. It is disengaged from the scattered sites of pagan sacrifices and goes 
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 Augustine’s theology rests largely on this dualist Christian conception of 
self- sacrifice, which involves the opposition of an evil, sinful, worldly realm 
given up to vices of the body (immorality, licentiousness, drunkenness, 
carousing16) and to vices of the soul (including idolatry, another allusion to the 
culture of sacrifice he is rejecting17), to a good, just, spiritual realm of Chris-
tians, who in this temporal life are in a state of exile and who are oriented 
toward the heavenly kingdom as their true home. This religious move has 
everlasting implications but it is also a competitive move made at a particular 
crucial moment in the history of late imperial Rome. It  is abundantly clear, 
in view of the Visigoths’ sack of Rome, that this world is a turbulent, chaotic 
place. Peace, justice, and order become with Augustine, “rewards which the 
soul is to enjoy in the blessedness which is to follow the present life,”18 which 
are described in detail in their proper place near the end of the Civitas Dei 
and rendered in terms of peace and eternal life, with the stress in both falling 
on the idea of permanence.19 It is not difficult to understand why (Christian) 
people in imperial Rome, in the years following the sack of the city in 410 ce, 
would have placed a high value on things everlasting. The more immediate 
concerns of the moment serve to reinforce the dualist elements in Augustine’s 
text and to advance otherness as an imperial, global parameter of action.
THE CITY OF GOD: SAMENESS AS A 
GLOBAL PARAMETER OF ACTION
Augustine’s dualism plays a paramount role in the religious design of his City 
of God, but elsewhere we observe a different evaluative tendency that stresses 
the sameness rather than the otherness of the heavenly and worldly cities. 
One of the ways in which the complexity of Augustine’s urban design becomes 
evident is in his evaluation of perishable worldly goods— those things corre-
sponding to man and the flesh— as  not intrinsically evil. The Christian self, 
wherever Christians go. An important aspect of this mobility, also mentioned in the previous 
chapter, was the development of holy scriptures as repositories of religion which, due to their 
portability, reinforce the fluidity of the religious action. This is especially the case with the early 
Christians, who were, according to Ian  F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton, “among the first to 
adopt a new physical format for the book, the very one we use today: the codex” (Reinventing 
Knowledge, 45–46). The new format— which needs also to be regarded as a technology— was 
faster, enabling more rapid access to passages than scrolls.
 16. Augustine, CD, XIV.2.349.
 17. See idem, City of God, Books VIII–XVI, book XIV, chapter 2.
 18. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 489.
 19. Ibid., 505–6.
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misusing its free will, can become entangled in these goods and find itself 
unwilling or unable to make its way back to God. But in a crucial passage, 
Augustine states that the failure to move in the direction of God’s heavenly 
reward has to do with the action of turning away itself, rather than with the 
lower objects or goods toward which the movement is directed: Cum enim se 
uoluntas relicto superiore ad inferiora convertit, efficitur mala, non quia malum 
est, quo se conuertit, sed quia peruersa est ipsa conuersio20—“When the will, 
abandoning what is above it, turns itself to something lower, it becomes evil 
because the very turning itself— ipsa conuersio— and not the thing to which it 
turns is evil.”21 Hence, to  the degree perishable worldly goods as God’s cre-
ations are not seen as intrinsically evil, an evaluative logic of sameness— which 
has been connected in the critical literature to the influence of Plotinus and 
Neoplatonism22—rather than an evaluative logic of otherness manifests itself. 
To  the degree perishable goods are evaluated as obstacles inhibiting or pre-
venting one from achieving one’s heavenly reward (i.e., as temptations), they 
are to be mistrusted, if not rejected, according to a leveling evaluative approach 
that opposes them as evil to the absolutely other good.
 In the previous chapter, we saw Jerusalem dualistically structured as a sin-
ful worldly city and as a divine heavenly city in the Epistles of Paul. Augustine 
reiterates Paul’s move and structures his imperial city in Civitas Dei similar-
ly.23 Both Jerusalem and Augustine’s civitas- modeled- on- imperial- Rome are 
bipartite. Each contains within it a sinful physical- material (i.e., fleshly) and a 
divine spiritual- intellectual part. While the two parts within Paul’s Jerusalem 
and within Augustine’s City of God are dualistically opposed or juxtaposed, 
Jerusalem and Rome, respectively, are nevertheless, at the same time, construc-
tions that subsume and articulate the two parts comprising them. This is to 
say, the worldly and heavenly “cities” or parts are absolutely different within 
Jerusalem and within Rome, but they also nevertheless overlap to the point of 
being virtually indistinguishable. In the newly indeterminate, global cultural 
action of Christianity as conceived by Augustine, the dualist architecture dis-
cussed above is accompanied by a kind of universal demographics according to 
 20. Idem, CD, XII.6.361.
 21. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 255; italics and Latin text added.
 22. See Bowery, “Plotinus,” 654–57. Moves of a more overtly monist evaluative tendency 
provide Augustine with the means to mitigate the kind of leveling that can occur in a stark dual-
ist arrangement of things, such as Manichaeism, which leaves no room, for example, for indi-
vidual free will. For a detailed study of Augustine’s relationship to Manichaeism, see BeDuhn, 
Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma.
 23. Augustine connects his allegorical understanding of Jerusalem to his own bipartite 
imperial city. See particularly his City of God, Books XVII–XXII, book XVII, 20–21.
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which all inhabitants can be seen in like terms. Augustine sets a universal tone 
for all the inhabitants of his bipartite city: “The simple truth is that the bond 
of a common nature makes all human beings one.”24 He puts forth the idea 
that the two opposed parts of the city are inextricably intertwined in history: 
Perplexae quippe sunt istae duae ciuitates in hoc saeculo inuicemque permixtae, 
donec ultimo iudicio dirimantur25—“linked and fused together, only to be sep-
arated at the Last Judgment.”26 With respect to the heavenly city, Augustine 
writes:
Dum apud terrenam ciuitatem uelut captiuam uitam suae peregrinatio-
nis agit, iam promissione redemptionis et dono spiritali tamquam pignore 
accepto legibus terrenae ciuitatis, quibus haec administrantur, quae susten-
tandae mortali uitae adcommodata sunt, obtemperare non dubitat, ut, quo-
niam communis est ipsa mortalitas, seruetur in rebus ad eam pertinentibus 
inter ciuitatem utramque concordia.27
As long as her life in the earthly city is that of a captive and an alien (although 
she has the promise of ultimate delivery and the gift of the Spirit as a pledge), 
she has no hesitation about keeping in step with the civil law which governs 
matters pertaining to our existence here below. For, as mortal life is the same 
for all, there ought to be common cause between the two cities in what con-
cerns our purely human living.28
The coincidence of the interests of worldly and heavenly cities visible here 
is made more inextricable by the Christians’ permitted use of all cultural 
resources throughout society, as long as this use occurs in a manner consistent 
with peaceful order and the worship of their single God:
Haec ergo caelestis ciuitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus 
ciues euocat atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non 
curans quidquid in moribus legibus institutisque diuersum est, quibus pax 
terrena uel conquiritur uel tenetur, nihil eorum rescindens uel destruens, 
immo etiam seruans ac sequens, quod licet diuersum in diuersis nationibus, 
 24. Ibid., 84.
 25. Idem, CD, I.35.34.
 26. Idem, City of God, Books I–VII, 72.
 27. Idem, CD, XIX.17.684.
 28. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 227.
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ad unum tamen eundemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si religionem, 
qua unus summus et uerus Deus colendus docetur, non impedit.29
So long, then, as  the heavenly City is wayfaring on earth, she invites citi-
zens from all nations and all tongues, and unites them into a single pilgrim 
band. She takes no issue with that diversity of customs, laws, and traditions 
whereby human peace is sought and maintained. Instead of nullifying or 
tearing down, she preserves and appropriates whatever in the diversities of 
divers races is aimed at one and the same objective of human peace, provided 
only that they do not stand in the way of the faith and worship of the one 
supreme and true god.30
Augustine grants ample leeway to Christians to make use of all cultural 
resources, in  what seems a pacifistic Christian reiteration of pagan Rome’s 
century- long incorporation of diverse peoples, realms, languages, and tradi-
tions into its empire.31 Similar thoughts are articulated elsewhere in Augus-
tine’s writings, notably in the fourth book of his Doctrina Christiana (books 
1–3 from 396/397 ce and book 4 in 426 ce), in  which he urges Christians 
to use the pagan Greco- Roman educational system for their own purposes, 
particularly the study of languages, science, history, and the liberal arts— and 
of the latter, particularly the art of rhetoric. Christians should learn to speak 
persuasively and ornately, because they have much at stake in effectively pre-
senting their gospel and should not be at a disadvantage vis- à- vis rhetorically 
accomplished opponents of their faith. In  the Doctrina, one sees Augustine 
harnessing everything in Greco- Roman antiquity that might be of use to 
Christians. As  long as it involves “no  offense against divine law,” Augustine 
does not see increased knowledge in any field as necessarily antagonistic or 
contrary to Christianity, in contrast to recurring repressive religious tenden-
cies in medieval and modern times.
 The integrative logic of sameness, according to which the culture of mul-
tiple, dispersed, fixed sacrifices is transformed into a unified, mobile, and 
global Christian culture of the Single Sacrifice, thus seems to have an inexo-
rable impetus that carries over to the relationship between the heavenly and 
 29. Idem, CD, XIX.17.685.
 30. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 228.
 31. “The City of God does not care in the least what kind of dress or social manners a man 
of faith affects, so  long as these involve no offense against the divine law. For it is faith and 
not fashions that bring us to God. Hence, when philosophers become Christians, the Church 
does not force them to give up their distinctive attire or mode of life which are no obstacle to 
religion, but only their erroneous teachings” (Ibid., book XIX, chapter 19, 229–30).
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worldly cities within Rome. The overlap or articulation of the two cities is so 
thoroughgoing that it is impossible even for the holy Augustine himself to 
disentangle them, as the Bishop confesses:
Quae cum ita sint, non tribuamus dandi regni atque imperii potestatem nisi 
Deo uero, qui dat felicitatem in regno caelorum solis piis; regnum uero ter-
renum et piis et impiis, sicut ei placet, cui nihil iniuste placet. Quamuis enim 
aliquid dixerimus, quod apertum nobis esse uoluit: tamen multum est ad nos 
et ualde superat uires nostras hominum occulta discutere et liquido examine 
merita diiudicare regnorum.32
The power to give people a kingdom or empire belongs only to the same true 
God who gives the Kingdom of Heaven with its happiness only to those who 
believe in Him, while He gives the earthly city to both believers and unbe-
lievers alike according to His Will which can never be unjust. This much 
of what I have said so far God wanted to be clear to us. However, it would 
be too much for me and beyond my powers to discuss men’s hidden merits 
and to measure in an open balance those which have been rewarded by the 
establishment of kingdoms.33
Augustine’s incapacity here is bound to his own fallibility and mortality, the 
human condition shared by just and unjust alike. Overall, the cultural action 
seems to have become more difficult to assess. In this life, during which the 
two cities comingle, those who are manifestly evil can experience good for-
tune while those who are good can be visited with all manner of calamities 
and grief. Augustine’s mortal incapacity to evaluate cultural goods, to compre-
hend the sometimes seemingly unjust fluctuations in this temporal life, seems 
to follow from the subordination of the dispersed pagan sacrifices in discrete 
cultural domains to the culture of the single, universal Christian sacrifice. The 
latter achieves uniformity and mobility in the disposition of cultural resources, 
but seemingly at the cost of the immediacy of the dispersed individual points 
of contact with the otherworld that was seen in pagan sacrificial culture to 
guarantee the efficacy of sacrifices (however doubtful this was in its own right) 
and thereby to shape the values of things. For Christians, the status or value of 
cultural resources cannot and will not be known directly and certainly until 
things are sorted out in a definitive way when final outcomes are revealed on 
Judgment Day, which Augustine sees as occurring in this way:
 32. Idem, CD, V.21.157.
 33. Idem, City of God, Books I–VII, 291.
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Cum uero ad illud Dei iudicium uenerimus, cuius tempus iam proprie dies 
iudicii et aliquando dies Domini nuncupatur: non solum quaecumque tunc 
iudicabuntur, uerum etiam quaecumque ab initio iudicata et quaecumque 
usque ad illud tempus adhuc iudicanda sunt, apparebunt esse iustissima. Vbi 
hoc quoque manifestabitur, quam iusto iudicio Dei fiat, ut nunc tam multa 
ac paene omnia iusta iudicia Dei lateant sensus mentesque mortalium, cum 
tamen in hac re piorum fidem non lateat, iustum esse quod latet.34
When we come to that judgment of God the proper name of which is “judg-
ment day” or “the day of the Lord,” we shall see that all His judgments are 
perfectly just: those reserved for that occasion, all those that He had made 
from the beginning, and those, too, He is to make between now and then. 
Then, too, it will be shown plainly how just is that divine decree which makes 
practically all of God’s judgments lie beyond the present understanding of 
men’s minds, even though devout men may know by faith that God’s hidden 
judgments are most surely just.”35
The timeless certitude of Judgment Day, whereby the otherness of the Chris-
tian elect is confirmed and the providential master plan behind history 
revealed, is set off from the indeterminate sameness of the mortal, temporal 
cultural action leading up to it. In this life, it remains impossible to know— 
except indirectly or virtually via faith— who will be rewarded in the afterlife 
for their various wagers and investments. In Augustine’s City of God, the vir-
tual status of the Christian self— considering itself via faith to be in possession 
of something it does not yet have and might not in the end receive— is reit-
erated throughout a Christian cultural action of imperial Roman dimensions. 
In view of the tendency of a certain disposition of self to underlie the dispo-
sition of cultural resources generally, referenced in the previous chapter,36 the 
status of things not destined for eternal life corresponds to the unfinished, 
virtual condition of the Christian self:
Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam sunt et ideo habent modum suum, speciem 
suam et quandam secum pacem suam, profecto bonae sunt; et cum ibi sunt, 
ubi esse per naturae ordinem debent, quantum acceperunt, suum esse custo-
diunt; et quae semper esse non acceperunt, pro usu motuque rerum, quibus 
 34. Idem, CD, XX.2.701.
 35. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 253.
 36. Again, see Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 20, and my related discussion in the 
previous chapter.
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Creatoris lege subduntur, in  melius deteriusue mutantur, in  eum diuina 
prouidentia tendentes exitum, quem ratio gubernandae uniuersitatis inclu-
dit; ita ut nec tanta corruptio, quanta usque ad interitum naturas mutabiles 
mortalesque perducit, sic faciat non esse quod erat, ut non inde fiat conse-
quenter quod esse debebat.37
All natures are good simply because they exist and, therefore, have each its 
own measure of being, its own beauty, even, in a way, its own peace. And 
when each is in the place assigned by the order of nature, it best preserves 
the full measure of being that was given to it. Beings not made for eternal 
life, changing for better or for worse according as they promote the good and 
improvement of things to which, by  the Law of the Creator, they serve as 
means, follow the direction of Divine Providence and tend toward the par-
ticular end which forms a part of the general plan for governing the universe. 
This means that the dissolution which brings mutable and mortal things to 
their death is not so much a process of annihilation as a progress toward 
something they were designed to become.38
Cultural goods for Augustine can only be comprehended as things in flux that 
are headed towards their providential end. From God to humanity, animals, 
plants, and inanimate objects, all cultural resources are related by their com-
mon participation in God’s overarching master plan. People dispose freely of 
themselves, others, and all things as they proceed toward their final status or 
true value, which remains yet to be conclusively determined.
 Final outcomes will hinge on whether a given self or thing is oriented 
toward the creator or creation. But since there is no way to know things con­
clusively before Judgment Day, a wide range of dispositions of self and cultural 
resources is enabled within the parameters of otherness and sameness laid out 
by Augustine. The most important development for the purposes of this study 
is a Christian self that disposes freely of resources in all cultural domains: 
an integrated, mobilized self with single- minded purpose that is supposed to 
give itself up absolutely as a sacrifice, or die to the world in the interest of the 
heavenly afterlife. However, as we already know, it might not. Liberated from 
the immediate demands of pagan sacrificial practices as well as from the laws 
of the Israelites, the Christian has greater potential to try out new moves with 
cultural resources, the values of which are now also in flux according to the 
dynamic Christian conception of things. St.  Augustine’s imperial Christian 
 37. Augustine, CD, XII.5.359.
 38. Idem, City of God, Books XVII–XXII, 252–53.
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parameters of otherness and sameness, themselves speculative, will invite fur-
ther speculations. Christians are pointed in the direction of the other, abso-
lutely other ventures that we shall observe in later chapters.
LOSS, REITERATION, GROWTH
By means of the division of his identifiably imperial Roman City of God into 
two opposed yet thoroughly intertwined cities, Augustine counters pagan crit-
ics and puts Christianity and Christians beyond reproach in the time following 
the Visigoths’ sack of the city in 410 ce. Of longer- term cultural consequence 
is that Augustine’s bipartite civitas- modeled- on- imperial- Rome fashions the 
historical city of his time into a new, real Rome, the spiritual and intellec-
tual characteristics of which allow for the disengagement of the city from its 
perishable physical- material infrastructure and suit it to continuity during 
the turbulent centuries to come. The expression dark ages aptly describes the 
overall energy level of the cultural action of the early Middle Ages. Curtius’s 
above- referenced designation of the Middle Ages as a “crumbling road” is jus-
tified by the rapid fall away from the standards of the physical- material infra-
structure of imperial Rome in the centuries after Augustine. In stark contrast 
to the continuing quality and intensity of cultural developments in Byzantium 
and the eastern Mediterranean, the maintenance of the imperial infrastruc-
ture throughout much of the former Western Roman empire is largely discon-
tinued. As  time passes, it  becomes increasingly difficult to find people who 
know how to maintain the physical- material infrastructure or make necessary 
repairs to it. The cultural light becomes discontinuous and dim at best. The 
action slows and becomes more localized. During long periods in large areas, 
the imperial Roman parameters of action are limited to those of the “spiritual 
city” cultivated in bishoprics and the narrow confines of scattered cloisters, 
which remain intermittently under siege by various different enemies of the 
faith. Perhaps not surprisingly, medieval people begin to make their own new 
cultural marks at those points where they understand themselves to rise again 
to a level of action that they regard as in some way comparable to that of 
imperial Christian Rome.
 Where such marks are made, we observe the lasting influence of Augus-
tine’s writings. The rule of the Carolingian Charlemagne (742–814 ce), tradi-
tional originator of the holy Roman empire, aligned conquest and Christianity 
in the forced conversion of pagan peoples, but he also cultivated pacifistic 
Roman religious, intellectual, and artistic pursuits at the ruler’s court in Aachen 
and at monasteries (which soon began to be reorganized along Benedictine 
THE MEDIEVAL SELF AS BANKROLL ∙  47
lines throughout the Carolingian realm39). On Charlemagne’s favored reading 
material, his biographer Einhard notes, “The subjects of the readings were the 
stories and deeds of olden time: he  was fond, too, of  St.  Augustine’s books, 
and especially of the one entitled The City of God.”40 Charlemagne’s military 
action establishes a domain in Europe that begins again to approach the West-
ern European dimensions of the ancient Roman empire, but he and his con-
temporaries are unable to reiterate an administrative and physical- material 
infrastructure of sufficient effectiveness and dimensions that could begin to 
provide the Carolingian Roman empire with comparable longevity. Cultural 
action according to identifiably Augustinian parameters is again visible during 
the reign of the Saxon emperors, notably Otto I (912–73 ce), whose employ-
ment of his court as an educational institution for the training of imperial 
bishops accompanies and reinforces the ascendency he achieves by means of 
military victories.41 Bishops- in- training at Otto’s court later become heads of 
imperial archbishoprics with their distinctively medieval combination of reli-
gious and worldly authority, a medieval iteration of the Augustinian overlap 
of heavenly and worldly cities that we observed above. Besides being beholden 
to Otto and acquiring needed administrative skills, these bishops- in- training 
have the opportunity to familiarize themselves more generally with the liter-
ary culture of antiquity, which begins to hone some of the intellectual skills 
that will be needed for the scope and intensity of the cultural action at Euro-
pean courts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
 In the midst of the twelfth- century cultural action is the Bishop of Freising 
Otto, half- brother of Emperor Konrad III, uncle of Konrad’s successor Fred-
erick I (“Barbarossa”), and trusted advisor of both. Around the middle of this 
century, Otto authors two chronicles (the latter together with his continuator 
Rahewin) that are already highly regarded in his own lifetime, the Chronicle of 
Two Cities (Chronica de duabis civitatibus) and the Deeds of Emperor Frederick 
(Gesta Friderici Imperatoris), of  which the former especially merits discus-
sion in this context because of its manifest indebtedness to Augustine’s City of 
God. This chronicle is a universal history beginning with Adam and Eve and 
ending in his own time, but in the prologues of the eight books comprising 
 39. See Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism, 66–82.
 40. “Einhard tells of Charlemagne’s great admiration for the writings of St.  Augustine, 
above all for his City of God. That Charlemagne could have conceived of a higher role than 
that of a mere earthly king is not at all improbable. He may have seen himself as God’s directly 
appointed agent, with a delegated authority that transcended that of every other Christian, pope 
included, but an authority he must use to fulfill God’s purpose” (Dahmus, Seven Medieval Kings, 
113).
 41. See Jaeger, Origins of Courtliness, passim and 121.
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his chronicle, Otto puts forth his view of history and the bipartite status of 
cultural resources in a way that shows his book to be a specifically medie-
val iteration of the Augustinian cultural parameters that we observed ear-
lier in this chapter. Otto first sets forth a view of worldly and heavenly cities 
which, like that of Augustine, is starkly dualist. Otto— de rerum temporalium 
motu ancipitique statu— pondering the “changes and vicissitudes of temporal 
affairs,” concludes based on the guidance of his reason, Proinde quia tempo­
rum mutabilitas stare non potest, ab ea migrare, ut dixi, sapientem ad stantem 
et permanentem eternitatis civitatem debere quis sani capitis negabit?42—“Since 
things are changeable and can never be at rest, what man in his right mind 
will deny that the wise man ought, as I have said, to depart from them to that 
city which stays at rest and abides to all eternity?”43 The two cities posited by 
Otto here at the beginning of his chronicle, una temporalis, alia eterna, una 
mundialis, alia caelestis, una diaboli, alia Christi—“the one of time, the other 
of eternity; the one of the earth, earthly, the other of heaven, heavenly; the one 
of the devil, the other of Christ,” are rendered according to the dualist, global, 
cultural parameter of otherness that is familiar to us from Augustine. Else-
where, though, Otto is inclined to reiterate the opposing evaluative tendency 
of Augustine in underscoring the thoroughgoing interconnectedness of the 
two cities in this temporal life. In the prologue to the third book, for example, 
Otto’s dualist discourse gives way to the idea of the single, all- encompassing 
imperial civitas of Rome:
Hic iam, quod supra distuli, solvendum puto, quare unius urbis imperio 
totum orbem subici, unius urbis legibus totum orbem informari Dominus 
orbis voluerit. Primo, ut dixi, ut ad maiora intelligenda promptiores ac capa-
tiores essent mentes hominum. Secundo, ut  his modis unitis unitas com-
mendaretur fidei, quatinus unius urbis terrore ad unum hominem colendum 
homines universi constricti unam quoque fidem tenendam caelestemque in 
ea non hominem tantum, sed auctorem omnium colendum ac adorandum 
Deum addiscerent.44
I think I ought to answer the question why the Lord of the universe wished 
the whole world to be subject to the dominion of one city, the whole world 
to be moulded by the laws of one city. In the first place He wished it, as I 
have said, that the minds of men might be more ready to understand, more 
 42. Otto, Ottonis Episcopi, 6.
 43. Idem, Two Cities, 93.
 44. Idem, Ottonis Episcopi, 133.
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capable of understanding great matters. Secondly, He wished it that unity of 
faith might be recommended to them after they had been united in this way, 
in order that all men, being constrained by their fear of a single city to revere 
one man, might also learn that they ought to hold to one faith, and through 
that faith might learn that God must be revered and adored not merely as a 
celestial being but as the Creator of all.45
Otto here addresses the importance of the emergence of the Roman empire, 
of which he views the medieval imperial house of the Hohenstaufen to which 
he belongs as the contemporary continuation.
 Otto’s views on the constitution of imperial Rome manifest his under-
standing and continuation of Augustine’s merging of heavenly and worldly 
cities. Nothing may be outside of or lost to Christianity in its imperial Roman 
form: all cultural resources not at cross- purposes with faith have to form a 
meaningful, positive part of it. In the prologue of his fourth book of Two Cit­
ies, Otto further seems to mitigate if not overturn his initial dualist evaluation 
of cultural resources in addressing the propriety of churchmen such as himself 
holding worldly authority, or  hanc gloriam honoremque temporem46—“tem-
poral glory and honor,”47 as he puts it. Otto first concedes the validity of the 
dualist argument that could be made on the basis of holy scriptures for strictly 
differentiating the sacerdotalis et regalis48—“the priestly and the kingly,”49 along 
with the various cultural domains with which they are associated. But he then 
points out that historical practice has diverged from such a strict dualist dif-
ferentiation and that there is a divine purpose in this divergence:
Preterea probatae sanctitatis viri inveniuntur, qui haec habuisse, qui cum 
his regnum Dei acquisisse creduntur. His ergo aliisque modis, quos lon-
gum est exequi, probatur et Constantium ecclesiae iuste regalia contulisse 
et ecclesiam licite suscepisse. Dum enim ab eis querimus, quo iure reges id 
habeant, respondere solent: ex ordinatione Dei et electione populi. Si ergo 
Deus ordinando, quod regibus predictus honor impenderetur, iniuste non 
fecit, quanto magis et id ordinando, ut ab illa persona ad ecclesiasticam tra-
duceretur, iniustus dicendus non est?50
 45. Idem, Two Cities, 220–21.
 46. Idem, Ottonis Episcopi, 180.
 47. Idem, Two Cities, 272.
 48. Idem, Ottonis Episcopi, 181.
 49. Idem, Two Cities, 272.
 50. Idem, Ottonis Episcopi, 182.
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Men of established sanctity are found who are believed to have had kingly 
honors, to have won the kingdom of God in addition to those kingly hon-
ors. By  these arguments, therefore, and by others which it would take too 
long to recount, it is shown that Constantine properly bestowed royal pow-
ers upon the Church, and that the Church legitimately accepted them. For 
when we inquire of kings by what sanction they have their powers, they are 
accustomed to reply, “By the ordination of God and election by the people.” 
If, therefore, God did not act unrighteously in ordaining that the aforesaid 
honor should be conferred upon kings, how much more surely is He not 
to be called unrighteous for ordaining this also, that the honor should be 
transferred from that role to the ecclesiastical authority?51
Otto’s strategic employment of the possibilities afforded by the indeterminately 
juxtaposed parameters of otherness and sameness in Augustine’s bipartite civi­
tas here serves the interests of imperial archbishops and bishops as principes 
imperii, or Reichsfürsten, in whose authority temporal and heavenly cultural 
resources overlap. After centuries of decline and (only intermittently success-
ful) reiterations of the Roman imperial idea, we find ourselves with Otto in 
the midst of the period of cultural growth upon which this study focuses in 
subsequent chapters.
 The next chapter will examine in greater detail the medieval cultural 
action as it occurs among some of Europe’s most resourceful political play-
ers (i.e., princes), aspects of which these passages from Otto’s The Two Cities 
already provide some glimpses.
THE NEW MEDIEVAL MOVE EXEMPLIFIED
In the remainder of this chapter, I illustrate what I mean by the term “bank-
roll,” in order to exemplify the new medieval move introduced in the previ-
ous chapter and to demonstrate how the speculative posture of faith as we 
have observed it above— as a dynamic relation of otherness and sameness— 
is extended and varied in romance poetry of the High Middle Ages. I turn for 
this purpose to two significant episodes in courtly romances from the first 
decades of the thirteenth century, Wolfram von  Eschenbach’s Parzival and 
Gottfried von Strassburg’s Tristan.
 Near the end of Wolfram’s romance, Parzival has already won the grail and 
has been accompanied to the grail kingdom by his pagan half- brother Feirefiz, 
 51. Idem, Two Cities, 273.
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who shares Parzival’s European father, but was born of an African mother. 
Feirefiz consequently has a black- and- white speckled complexion and, accord-
ing to Wolfram’s universal conception of chivalric culture, he  is, along with 
his brother Parzival, one of the world’s best knights. His life is dedicated to 
chivalric adventuring in the interest of earning love’s reward. Upon arriving 
at the grail court, Feirefiz observes a procession in which the grail is carried 
before him by Parzival’s beautiful maternal aunt, Repanse de Schoie. Feirefiz 
is unable to see the grail because he is not a Christian, but he is stricken by the 
sight of Repanse de Schoie and falls immediately in love with her, forgetting 
the love of the pagan woman Sekundille that he had previously sought to win. 
We  observe all the characteristic symptoms of love’s exertions, though as a 
consequence of Feirefiz’s unique complexion in Wolfram’s poetic idiom, only 
the lighter parts of the African knight’s complexion pale. Feirefiz wants to gain 
possession of his beloved and his desire has a patently erotic aspect. When 
told by Parzival that he must be a Christian and baptized in order to marry 
and possess his new beloved, Feirefiz declares himself to be willing:
Parzivâl zuo sîm bruoder dô
sprach “wiltu die muomen mîn
haben, al die gote dîn
muostu durch si versprechen
unt immer gerne rechen
den widersaz des hôhsten gotes
und mit triuwen schônen sîns gebotes.”
“Swâ von ich sol die maget hân,”
sprach der heiden, “daz wirt gar getân,
und mit triuwen an mir erzeiget.”52
(816.24–817.3)
“If you want my aunt,” Parzival told his brother, “you must forswear all your 
gods for her sake and be always ready to fight the Adversary of God on high, 
and faithfully observe God’s Commandments.” “Whatever will assure me of 
winning that maiden shall be done, fully and faithfully,” answered the Infidel.53
Parzival frames the baptism in starkly dualist terms as the acceptance of a 
single deity that has superseded all other deities and stands opposed to a 
 52. Wolfram von  Eschenbach, Parzival (Lachmann); italics added. Numbers of Middle 
High German verses here and elsewhere are cited paranthetically in text.
 53. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto) 405; italics added.
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single diabolical adversary, and Feirefiz agreeably responds with his equally 
stark investment of self in the perishable, fleshly love of a woman. As if Wol-
fram wanted to make sure his audience has fully understood the nature and 
direction of Feirefiz’s self- investment in this baptism, he has Feirefiz elaborate 
it shortly later, when a priest joins the two brothers to carry out the baptism 
proper:
Feirefîz zem priester sprach
“ist ez mir guot vür ungemach,
ich gloube, swes ir gebietet.
ob mich ir minne mietet,
sô leiste ich gerne sîn gebot.
bruoder hât dîn muome got,
an den geloube ich unt an sie
(sô grôze nôt enphieng ich nie):
al mîne gote sint verkorn.”
(818.1–9)
“If it will soothe my anguish, I shall believe all you tell me,” said Feirefiz to 
the priest. “If  her love rewards me, I  shall gladly fulfill God’s Command-
ments. Brother, if your aunt has God, I believe in Him and her— never was 
I in such need! All my gods are foresworn.”54
Once baptized, Feirefiz is married to Repanse de  Schoie and receives love’s 
reward from her. Wolfram’s grail romance ends with one brother (Parzival) 
winning the grail, and the other (Feirefiz) the woman by whom the grail is 
carried in procession, in a way that suggests an inextricable interrelation or 
congruence of divine and fleshly allegiances. The circumstances of Feirefiz’s 
baptism, which is situated at a crucial point near the end of Wolfram’s grail 
narrative, seem strikingly at odds with dualist aspects of the Augustinian cul-
tural parameters, particularly the dictate that impermanent (fleshly) things 
have only to be used in order to make one’s way back to God as the true 
reward and object of enjoyment. These circumstances seem to invert the dual-
ist Augustinian terms, in making the love of Repanse de Schoie with its clearly 
fleshly inspirations the reason for Feirefiz’s becoming a Christian. At the same 
time, Wolfram’s text leaves no doubt that the baptism is efficacious in all 
senses. The Christianized Feirefiz is now able to see the grail, indicative of a 
 54. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 406.
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thoroughgoing transformation of his perceptive faculties, and he is also able 
to take possession of Repanse de Schoie, following through with his venture 
for love in which the baptism plays an instrumental role.55 The new cultural 
move occurring at high medieval courts in the imaginary action of the courtly 
romances, and the cultural growth in which these moves can result, is  con-
cretely and succinctly stated in the above- cited words with which Feirefiz 
invests himself: “I believe in him and her” (italics added).
 A comparable exemplary case of the medieval self as a “bankroll” occurs in 
the Tristan of Wolfram’s principal poetic rival, Gottfried von Strassburg. The 
episode in question involves the ordeal of the glowing hot iron undergone by 
Isolt.56 Again charged with maintaining an adulterous relationship with the 
King’s nephew Tristan, Queen Isolt is pressured to submit to the ordeal. She 
must take the glowing iron in her hand without burning herself in order to 
prove her innocence. At the appointed time and place, Isolt arrives in a boat 
on the bank of the Thames, where the Archbishop of Canterbury awaits to 
oversee the proceedings. Tristan, supposed by all to be in exile, has already 
been in contact with Isolt, and they have together devised another of their 
joint deceptive maneuvers. He now awaits Isolt on the river bank, disguised as 
a pilgrim in rags. Declaring with feigned sarcasm that if she allows any man 
of rank to carry her to shore, tongues will again begin to wag and accuse her 
of untoward activity, Isolt requests that the poor pilgrim— whom nobody sus-
pects is Tristan— bear her through the shallow water from the boat onto the 
bank. The selection of the humble pilgrim for this purpose seems to be safe 
to the unsuspecting assembly, and there is general consent. While carrying 
Isolt onto the bank, the pilgrim— on a secret signal from Isolt— stumbles, falls, 
and lands with the lady lying in his arms. A brief tumult ensues, the pilgrim 
is rebuked for his carelessness and allowed to go on his way, and the trial by 
ordeal continues. Isolt is now in a position to propose the wording of the oath 
that she will swear to her husband Marke and the assembled clergy and nobil-
ity in this way, manifesting remarkable poise under pressure and presence of 
mind as she does so:
 55. As striking as it is, the final episode involving Feirefiz goes unmentioned in many criti-
cal studies. Henry Kratz addresses the episode in this way, in his comprehensive study Wolfram 
von Eschenbach’s “Parzival”: “Feirefiz [. . .] takes on the complexion of a comical character in 
this last book, the demon lover who is so obsessed with his love that he has thoughts for noth-
ing else, and will do anything to obtain his gratification” (410). However “comical” this episode 
may be, it nonetheless remains remarkable that Wolfram can craft an imaginary world in which 
a “demon lover” can get what he wants via baptism.
 56. For a more detailed consideration of Isolt’s ordeal in the broader context of ordeals in 
history and literature, see Ziegler, Trial by Fire, 123–32.
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vernemet, wie ich iu sweren wil:
daz mînes lîbes nie kein man
dekeine künde nie gewan
noch mir ze keinen zîten
weder ze arme noch ze sîten
ane iuch nie lebende man gelac
wan der, vür den ich niene mac
gebieten eit noch lougen,
den ir mit iuwern ougen
mir sâhet an dem arme,
der wallaere der arme.
sô gehelfe mir mîn trehtîn
und al die heiligen, die der sîn,
ze saeden und ze heile
an disem urteile!57
(15706–20)
Hear the oath which I mean to swear: “That no man in the world had carnal 
knowledge of me or lay in my arms or beside me but you, always excepting 
the poor pilgrim whom, with your own eyes, you saw lying in my arms.” 
I can offer no purgation concerning him. So help me God and all the Saints 
that be, to a happy and auspicious outcome to this judgment.58
Isolt and Tristan have thus far relied on their own strategic ingenuity in the 
various ploys with which they have prevented their illicit love from being 
exposed, with occasional recourse to only two confidants, the maidservant 
Brangaene and Tristan’s servant Curvenal. This time the lovers’ actions involve 
the speculation that God will also be complicit and become an instrument 
whereby their adulterous love might be preserved and continued.
 The speculative stratagem pays off. Isolt swears according to the wording 
she has proposed, grasps the glowing iron, and does not burn herself, prov-
ing the truth of her oath. Gottfried explains how such a thing could happen, 
thereby seeming to extend the Augustinian cultural parameter of sameness to 
utmost lengths:
dâ wart wol g’offenbaeret
und al der werlt bewaeret,
 57. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Ranke).
 58. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 247.
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daz der vil tugenthafte Crist
wintschaffen alse ein ermel ist.
er vüeget unde suochet an,
dâ man’z an in gesuochen kan,
alse gevuoge und alse wol,
als er von allem rehte sol.
erst allen herzen bereit,
ze durnehte und ze trügeheit.
ist ez ernest, ist es spil,
er ist ie, swie sô man wil.
daz wart wol offenbâre schîn
an der gevüegen künigîn.
die generte ir trügeheit
und ir gelüppeter eit,
der hin ze gote gelâzen was,
daz s’an ir êren genas.
(15733–50)
Thus it was made manifest and confirmed to all the world that Christ in His 
great virtue is pliant as a windblown sleeve. He falls into place and clings, 
whichever way you try Him, closely and smoothly, as  He is bound to do. 
He is at the beck of every heart for honest deeds or fraud. Be it deadly earnest 
or a game, He is just as you would have Him. This was amply revealed in the 
facile Queen. She was saved by her guile and by the doctored oath that went 
flying up to God, with the result that she redeemed her honour.59
In a most striking way, Christ is put into play here by the poet Gottfried, via his 
character Isolt, in the interest of doctored oaths, fraud, and games.60 The out-
come of the trial- by- ordeal involves both veracity and guile, and by rewarding 
both, it  suggests that truth has shifted in the direction of the efficacy of the 
lovers’ strategic moves and shown itself as something made by enterprising 
individuals in their own interest, rather than as something other, preexisting, 
unchanging, or essential in the scheme of things— such as a dualistic truth at 
odds with the lovers’ machinations.
 In different ways, but directed toward love as the same perishable end, 
Wolfram and Gottfried operate according to the indeterminate cultural 
 59. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 248.
 60. Nigel Harris offers a perceptive consideration of religion in Gottfried’s romance in his 
“God, Religion, and Ambiguity.”
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parameters that we observed with Augustine earlier in this chapter. Reli-
gious and worldly resources are strictly separated and hierarchically arranged 
according to a dualist logic. The God that helps Feirefiz see the grail and 
receive his reward of love from the grail bearer is the One who must be rec-
ognized and accepted as superior and opposed to the many gods of polythe-
ism. The God to whom Isolt swears her oath hands down His unquestioned 
Judgment from on high in the form of the lady’s unburned flesh. At the same 
time, heavenly and worldly resources are so thoroughly interconnected as to 
be indistinguishable. Christian divinity pervades all cultural resources in these 
two episodes— as it is “bound to do”—sanctifying a fleshly (and, in the case of 
Isolt and Tristan, adulterous) love, making it holy. Judging by these two cases 
in the imaginary action of the courtly romances, a point in the cultural action 
seems to have been reached where the Christian self, having sufficiently inte-
grated and concentrated its various capacities, is willing and able to put itself 
into play again, tapping in new and different ways into the dynamic potential 
of sameness and otherness that is in the speculative posture of faith. As Feire-
fiz and Isolt show us, striking new moves at court involve the speculation that 
Christians will experience growth and joy by investing themselves absolutely 
in the perishable cultural resources of this world. These investments of self 
might seem to us somewhat like Augustine’s view of the evil will as a “turn” 
away from God to lower things, but the players at courts of nobility in the 
High Middle Ages seem to be confident that they will be agile enough to avoid 
stumbling and keep themselves on course— and that their new moves will pay 
off in the end.
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Rules of the House
COURTLY REPRESENTATION AS 
ARISTOCRATIC COMPETITION
The medieval risk- reward society is situated at the courts of competing house-
holds of nobility, where the action unfolds according to the global parame-
ters elucidated in the previous chapters and where the tone is set at the high-
est political levels for new cultural moves. In  the consideration of medieval 
courtly culture presented in this chapter, I align my view of culture as com-
petitive action with Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the public domain 
in the Middle Ages as one of representation— a  repräsentative Öffentlichkeit 
or “representational public”—to  which no private domain is as yet juxta-
posed.1 I assume there is no domain or aspect of courtly culture— such as 
a private or autonomous sphere or self— that can be cordoned off from the 
representational cultural action of courtliness,2 because this action needs to be 
 1. See Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, 17–25. One of the principal charac-
teristics of medieval representation, distinguishing it for Habermas from both antiquity and 
modernity, is the lack of a rigorous distinction between public and private spheres.
 2. Also belonging to this action is the material infrastructure of the unfolding of imperial 
representation: cathedrals, great halls, etc. See, for example, Niehr, “Herrscherliche Architektur.”
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understood in an imperial Christian sense, and as competition. I differ from 
a tendency in the critical literature on courtly culture to place emphasis on 
something apart from, outside of, or opposed to the court as constituted via 
representation.3 In my view, nothing is exempt from the all- inclusive “public” 
in which courtly representation unfolds as action and in which things become 
real and receive their true values for medieval courtiers. Representation is 
the definitive game at medieval courts, and it affects cultural trends generally, 
even for those excluded from direct access to it.4 What  I call the “Rules of 
the House” become manifest as the best cultural players— best in the sense 
of the Greek αριςτος (best) and the Latin princeps (first)5—set the tone for 
the cultural action by establishing and maintaining their ascendency competi-
tively. Events of different kinds at court— for example, coronations, weddings, 
festivals, tournaments, and literary performances, as well as effective military 
leadership— involve standards that princely competitors need to be seen to 
achieve or surpass. By successfully embodying an absolute, divine authority 
in the competitive action of representation, princes demonstrate and reinforce 
 3. An example of this critical tendency, to which I also turn in other contexts, is Bumke’s 
Courtly Culture. Bumke considers that the brutality of everyday medieval life, particularly that 
of incessant feuds and warfare, shows the cultural action associated with festivals, tournaments, 
and literary performances at court to be unrealistic and, in the latter case, fictional in the sense 
of unreal or untrue. For Bumke, reality itself is at odds with courtly culture. Though my view of 
them is different, I am grateful to Bumke for the wealth of primary sources his Courtly Culture 
makes available. Horst Wenzel, in his Höfische Repräsentation, considers courtly culture to be 
qualified if not criticized by secret, quasiprivate, more strictly individual moments, subsumed 
by the Middle High German term heinlîche, which seem to go in the direction of a kind of 
privacy, if not private sphere.
 4. Though the results of courtly representation may be of consequence throughout society, 
the direct participation of non- nobles in it is generally precluded. The courtly sources show 
that non- noble people endeavoring to engage in the courtly chivalric action typically appear 
ridiculous and tend to end badly (in  the “summer songs” of the poet Neidhart, peasant- like 
characters make a rare appearance in court literature, but in a way that can be read as a satire 
of the courtly love tradition; by contrast, der guote Gêrhart of the poet Rudolf von Ems is the 
story of a merchant who seems to have the wherewithal to fare well in courtly surroundings). 
See also Bumke, who observes that courts exclude “villains” (Courtly Culture, 58). The “Rules of 
the House” tend to exclude peasants and burghers from the action at court, though the latter to 
a somewhat lesser degree according to their relatively greater command of cultural resources. 
With few exceptions, courtly representation is mostly a closed game of nobility, because of the 
resources required to participate at this level of the cultural action. Contests in and among 
courts thus involve a narrow spectrum of elite cultural players of nobility.
 5. Principes is a group that becomes ever larger in the Middle Ages. In  antiquity the 
title princeps was exclusively reserved for Augustus and subsequent Roman emperors, while in 
the Middle Ages, it becomes more broadly available. See Ehlers, “Die Reichsfürsten,” 199–209; 
especially 199.
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their own power and joyfully benefit and enrich all those with a stake in it.6 
I focus below on some of the principal features of medieval courtliness as 
the dynamic, competitive unfolding of the representational culture of noble 
households. In the final part of this chapter, a brief diachronic view is offered 
of the political action of medieval popes, emperors, and rival princes, particu-
larly of the increasingly intense and complex competitions from the late elev-
enth to the early thirteenth century, in which my focus will be on innovative 
new cultural moves with global implications.
 A sacrosanct status adheres to medieval emperors, kings, and princes.7 
As the foremost of a select group of rival peers of nobility, emperors are posi-
tioned to achieve via representation the best possible embodiment of divine 
authority that can be achieved in this temporal, mutable world. It  is as if 
emperors were most perfectly aligned with the otherness of the heavenly king-
dom that we observed in the previous chapter.8 Augustine points the way for 
rulers when he writes in his City of God that those emperors are truly happy 
who successfully transfer to this temporal life the guiding principles of the 
heavenly kingdom:
Sed felices eos dicimus, si  iuste imperant, si  inter linguas sublimiter hon-
orantium et obsequia nimis humiliter salutantium non extolluntur, et  se 
homines esse meminerunt; si  suam potestatem ad Dei cultum maxime 
dilatandum maiestati eius famulam faciunt; si Deum timent diligunt colunt; 
 6. The early thirteenth- century advice Thomasin von Zirclaria gives to herren (which can 
be rendered as “lords” or as “noblemen”) provides contemporary corroboration for the quasi-
divine ascendancy of which I speak: Nu wil ich râtn den herren allen / daz siz lieht nien lâzen 
vallen, / wan si suln uns liuhten vor, / uns si uns bringent vür daz tor / dâ immer sunne schîn: / 
si mugen gern dâ inne sîn (Der Welsche Gast, [Rückert], vv.8241–46)—“Now I propose to advise 
all the noblemen not to drop the lantern, for they should show the way ahead for us until they 
bring us to the gate where is always sunshine. They would very much like to be inside” (Thom-
asin von Zirclaria, Der Welsche Gast [The Italian Guest] [Gibbs and McConnell], 152).
 7. See Friedrich Heer’s observations on sacral kingship in the context of his discussion of 
Charlemagne, which seem relevant here: “In Europe, as in all ages whenever sacral royal power 
has developed [. . .], monarchy has its roots in archaic, magical depths. At  bottom, the king 
is a magus (the kings of ancient Egypt wear an imitation lion’s tail, like the master magicians 
in prehistoric cliff and cave drawings). He  is a ‘god’ on earth, high priest (like Melchizedek). 
He bears the power and attributes of divinity, of priests, of magicians” (Holy Roman Empire, 15).
 8. Benjamin Arnold puts things in these terms: “Ideologically, the empire was the terres-
trial manifestation of a lordly hierarchy encompassing heaven and earth, from the Holy Trinity 
which was its protector, and in whose name the imperial letters were therefore issued from 
the chancery, through the saints who were the patrons and legal owners of the cathedral and 
monastic churches and their lands, to the emperor and pope as temporal and spiritual heads of 
the Christian Church and the Roman Empire” (German Knighthood, 9–10).
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si  plus amant illud regnum, ubi non timent habere consortes; si  tardius 
uindicant, facile ignoscunt; si  eandem uindictam pro necessitate regendae 
tuendaeque rei publicae, non pro saturandis inimicitiarum odiis exerunt; 
si eandem ueniam non ad impunitatem iniquitatis, sed ad spem correctio-
nis indulgent; si, quod aspere coguntur plerumque decernere, misericordiae 
lenitate et beneficiorum largitate compensant.9
We call those Christian emperors happy who govern with justice, who are 
not puffed up by the tongues of flatterers or the services of sycophants, but 
remember that they are men. We call them happy when they think of sover-
eignty as a ministry of God and use it for the spread of true religion; when 
they fear and love and worship God; when they are in love with the kingdom 
in which they need fear no fellow sharers; when they are slow to punish, 
quick to forgive; when they punish, not out of private revenge, but only when 
forced by the order and security of the republic, and when they pardon, not 
to encourage impunity, but with the hope of reform; when they temper with 
mercy and generosity the inevitable harshness of their decrees.10
We see here that the Christian emperor’s high political authority is to be an 
anticipation of God’s authority in the heavenly kingdom, scaled to the virtual 
status of selves and things in this world. Accordingly, Augustine continues 
the passage above as follows: Tales Christianos imperatores dicimus esse felices 
interim spe, postea re ipsa futuros, cum id quod expectamus aduenerit—“We say 
of such Christian emperors that they are, in this life, happy in their hope, but 
destined to be happy in reality when that day shall come for which we live in 
hope.” Implicit in this final line from Augustine is that emperors, kings, and 
princes, however divine their associations and inspirations may be, also are 
mortal like everybody else. They are also subject to the indeterminate muta-
bility and perishability of things in this temporal life. Kings form part of a 
hierarchical structure according to which court society and medieval soci-
ety seem to be organized somewhat as pagan societies of antiquity had been, 
as  the latter were observed in the first chapter of this study. One’s position 
and value hinge on the greater or lesser resources at one’s disposal. However, 
weighing against the hierarchical manner of appraising things and immedi-
ately evaluating more as better— which is perhaps nowhere more tangible than 
in the sacrosanct status of emperors and kings— is the sinful sameness of the 
 9. Augustine, Avrelii Avgvstini Opera, De Civitate Dei Libri I–X. Book, chapter, and page 
numbers are referenced in the notes; here, Book 24, chapter V, 160.
 10. Idem, City of God, Books I–VIII, 296–97.
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human condition, which results in a more indeterminate cultural action. The 
approach to things at courts of nobility tends to be bullish overall with regard 
to the value invested in perishable resources, as we shall see exemplified below 
in the sources, but the availability of dualist, leveling moves in the represen-
tational culture of courts— visible as poetic elaborations of Ecclesiastes 1:2, 
Vanitas vanitatum omnia vanitas, “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity”—enables 
courtiers at all levels to hedge their bets.11
 Medieval emperors and princes actively perform courtly culture in repre-
sentational events that reveal competition among imperial rivals, its critical 
assessment, and—“with the nod of a God who exchanges kingdoms”12—the 
outcomes that structure the cultural action among the highest potentates. One 
such event in which lords of noble households may be seen to excel is the 
festive procession, an example of which is provided by King Philip of Swabia 
and his wife, the Byzantine Princess Irene. The King and Queen engage them-
selves on Christmas Day 1199 in Magdeburg, and the action of the momen-
tous occasion— which underscores the above- discussed sacrosanct status of 
the imperial dignity— is recorded by the poet Walther von der Vogelweide in 
this way, step by imperial step:
Ez gienc eines tages als unser hêrre wart geborn
von einer maget dier im ze muoter hât erkorn
ze megdeburc der künic philippes schône
dâ gienc eins keisers bruoder und eins keisers kint
in einer wât swie doch die namen drîge sint
er truoc des rîches zepter. und die krône
Er trat vil lîse im was niht gâch
im sleich ein hôh geborniu küneginne nâch
rôse âne dorn ein tûbe sunder gallen
diu zuht was niener anderswâ
die düringe und die sahsen dienten alsô dâ
daz ez den wîsen müeste wol gevallen.
There went forth once— it was the day our Lord was born / of a maid, the 
mother whom his choice alighted on—/ at Magdeburg, Philip the King in 
 11. The strongest criticisms of worldly elements and aspects of courtliness and courtly 
representation tend, not surprisingly, to come from more or less starkly dualist monastic, cler-
ical, or  ecclesiastical perspectives; see Bumke, Courtly Culture, 415–23; and Jaeger, Origins of 
Courtliness, 176–94. It is important to recognize that such criticisms of worldliness do not stand 
outside courtly representation, but represent alternative possibilities within it.
 12. Otto, Two Cities, 370.
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lordly splendor. / There walked a Kaiser’s brother and a Kaiser’s son / in one 
raiment, though the names are three upon this one. / He bore the Empire’s 
crown and the Empire’s scepter. / He strode in gentle cadence, he knew no 
haste;  / and after him a high- born Queen serenely paced,  / rose without 
thorn, dove without gall, in stately leisure. / Ceremony, grace, decorum never 
were elsewhere. / The Saxons and Thuringians wrought such service there, / 
it must have brought the wise ones all deep pleasure.13
Walther’s gnomic poetry provides invaluable insights into the cultural action 
of the highest households of the imperial nobility in the late twelfth and early 
thirteenth century. This poem shows the procession of Philip and Irene, and 
the celebratory occasion of which it is a part, to be a closely scrutinized per-
formance with a clearly physical, even quasi-athletic dimension. The emphasis 
placed on the pace and grace of movement renders the procession akin to 
a choreographed performance. The imperial insignia of crown and scepter 
borne by Philip manifest the political dimension of his authority, not only 
symbolically or abstractly but concretely and visibly in the solemn yet elegant 
bearing of them. The connection between political and religious authority is 
clear in the initial verses, in which Philip— as brother of an emperor, son of 
an emperor, and himself— is cast as a religious- political enactor of the Trinity. 
Queen Irene performs effectively in tandem with her husband with her serene 
and stately pace, also joining the political and the religious, and inspiring Wal-
ther’s descriptive use of Marian tropes (“rose without thorn,” “dove without 
gall”). Walther’s poetic likening of Philip to the Trinity and of Irene to the Vir-
gin reveals the fluid interconnection of political, religious, and poetic dimen-
sions of medieval emperorship within the dynamic, physical accomplishment 
of emperorship as a representational performance.
 In the final verse of this passage, Walther brings his poetic perspective 
into alignment with the assessment of the wîsen—“wise,” which is connected 
to the immediately preceding verses extolling the high standard of service 
provided by the Thuringian and Saxon hosts. The procession is the key part of 
a broader festive occasion, the preparation of which is also subject to scrutiny 
and judgment. All those present, from the Emperor to servants and guests, 
make possible and participate in this representational action in their own way. 
If  the transitional verse, Diu zuht was niener anderswa—“Ceremony, grace, 
decorum never were elsewhere,” can be regarded structurally as an apo koinu 
connecting and applying both to the preceding verses and the following ones, 
 13. Walther von der Vogelweide, Single- Stanza Lyrics, 148–49. This edition includes Wal-
ther’s lyrics and English translations on facing pages.
RULES OF THE HOUSE ∙  63
then Walther’s status as a spokesperson for the wise judges is associated with 
the procession proper. Wise judges— Walther seems to be saying in solidarity 
with them— conclude that all aspects of this representational performance are 
of an appropriately high level, exceeding those of any such event elsewhere.
 Critically comparing the different processions of potentates on different 
occasions, the judges mentioned by Walther effectively determine which ones 
most successfully manage to bring the mutable, variable things of this tempo-
ral life into their most joyful imperial Christian alignment. The manifest joy 
of a representational event such as this is the best indication of the optimal 
political management of the risky and potentially painful mutability of things. 
In  the cited verses by Walther, one of the variant manuscripts has the word 
vreude—“joy,” instead of zuht—“courtliness.”14 Either term aptly illustrates an 
important outcome of such an event, but the former more directly exempli-
fies what can be regarded as one of the main “Rules of the House.” One can 
and should expect joy to mark the outcome of a successful, well- accomplished 
representational event. A  Latin chronicle of the same procession judged by 
Walther confirms his positive assessment and underscores joy as the marker 
of this particular successful outcome:
Omnesque qui aderant, quorum inconprehensibilis exstitit numerus, corde 
gaudentes, animis exultantes, manibus applaudentes, vocibus perstrepentes, 
opera vigilantes huic sollemnitati uniformiter arriserunt, ipsam per omnia 
debite devotionis tripudio peragentes.
All those who were there in inconceivably large numbers, were joyous in 
their hearts and exulted in their souls, they applauded, cheered loudly, and 
were incessantly active; all found great pleasure in this celebration, which 
they attended to the end with devoted exultation.15
Joy is supposed to accompany effective political leadership in representational 
events, such as this procession. It helps to make religious and political author-
ity in this mutable life real and tangible to medieval courtiers. While this tem-
poral joy is an infinitesimal measure of the bliss God will bestow upon his 
elect in the afterlife, it seems to be sufficiently substantial to serve as a point 
of reference around which the representational cultural action of courts can 
be organized.
 14. Ibid., 148.
 15. By the author of the Halberstädter Bischofschronik, Latin text and English translation 
cited from Bumke, Courtly Culture, 611.
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 Elsewhere in Walther von der Vogelweide’s gnomic poetry, we  observe 
another of the important ways in which imperial performers need to ensure 
that their political engagements bring about what amounts to a joyous con-
gruence of heavenly and worldly concerns. Emperors and princes are sup-
posed to be bounteous, as God will be in the hereafter with his elect.16 Largesse 
is viewed by contemporary judges as one of the expected features of effective 
leadership. Two poems directed by Walther to the same Philip of Swabia show 
the gifts of a ruler also to be an investment occurring in an imperial contest 
among rulers past and present, in  which standards have been set and con-
tinue to be set. The following passage from the first of these poems shows 
that a shrewd emperor does well to emulate the approach of Alexander the 
Great, who was renowned in the Middle Ages for his gift- giving generosity. 
The ancient emperor’s legendary largesse is viewed by Walther, and needs to 
be seen by Philip according to the following verses, as an investment that will 
yield an immense return, seemingly heavenly in its dimensions:
nû hâst dû guot und êre.
daz ist wol zweier künige hort
die gib der milte beide
Diu milte lônet sam diu sât
diu wünneklîche wider gât
dar nâch man si geworfen hât.
wirf von dir milteklîche
swelh künig der milte geben kann
si gît im daz er nie gewan
wie alexander sich versan
der gap und gap und gap sim elliu rîche.
In your keeping now are wealth and honors, / treasure ample for two kings. / 
Give both to Generosity. / Her wage is like the seed cast down / that rises up 
in glory again / in what measure it was sown. / Then cast away with generous 
freedom! / To the king who gives her all he can / Generosity gives what he 
never won. / That Alexander, how wise that man! / He gave, and gave, and 
she gave him every kingdom.17
 16. Richard Kaeuper sees largesse as an aspect of the “social dominance of knights,” and 
as one of the means whereby knights endeavored to maintain a difference between themselves 
and the increasingly prosperous merchant classes as of the twelfth century (Chivalry and Vio-
lence, 193–98). Kaeuper’s view of largesse in terms of competitions with a rival class is generally 
consistent with my approach to cultural action in terms of competitions.
 17. Walther von der Vogelweide, Single- Stanza Lyrics, 152–53.
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In a manner consistent with the triune description of him at the procession 
at Magdeburg, the emperor may be expected to be bounteous and shower his 
courtly elect with the blessings of his largesse. On the earthly, temporal plane, 
an important tone is being set for the medieval risk- reward society: the emperor 
may expect that resources thus bestowed are a material investment that will 
yield future returns far in excess of the initial outlay. In the second poem, the 
economics of largesse are phrased with more contemporary references:
Philippes künic die nâhe spehenden zîhent dich
dun sîst nicht dankes milte des bedunket mich
wie dû dâ mite verliesest michels mêre
dû möhtest gerner dankes geben tûsent pfunt
danne drîzec tûsent âne danc dir ist niht kunt
wie man mit gâbe erwirbet prîs und êre
Denke an den milten salatîn
der jach daz küniges hende dürkel solten sîn
sô wurden si erforht und ouch geminnet
gedenke an den künig von engellant
wie tiure man den lôste dur sîne milten hant
ein schade ist guot der zwêne frumen gewinnet.
King Philip, close observers all complain of you: / it seems you do not gladly 
give; and I think, too, / you lose far more by acting in that manner. / Give a 
thousand pounds with pleasure: better so / than thirty thousand grudgingly. 
You do not know / how one, by giving, gains renown and honor. / Think of 
Saladin, poised to give. / It was he who said, the hands of a king should be 
a sieve:  / then men would fear that hand, and men would love it.  / Think 
of him, late of England, / ransomed— and at what cost— for his great, free- 
giving hand. / It is a handsome loss that brings a double profit.18
As in the previous passage, but this time employing models from recent his-
tory, Walther here shows that a certain standard has been set by princes— such 
as the famous Sultan Saladin and King Richard I of England (“Lionheart”)—
that Philip needs to try to match if not exceed. Walther’s advice to Philip 
regarding largesse in the above- cited cases amounts to courtly investment 
counseling. It shows that the efficacy of an emperor’s gifts qua investments is 
assessed competitively in relation to the level of performance of one’s aristo-
cratic peers, past and present.
 18. Ibid., 150–51.
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 The maximum representational investment of medieval emperors, kings, 
and princes, outside of warfare and ransoms (such as that paid for Richard I of 
England, referenced above), is made to underwrite court festivals, in view of 
the lavish manner in which these are depicted. Festivals are seminal in courtly 
representation as they provide the most conspicuous stage for displays of lar-
gesse and often subsume other representational events of smaller dimensions 
(e.g.,  processions, tournaments, literary performances, etc.). The joy associ-
ated with court festivals is significant enough to make it a structural marker in 
the Arthurian romances, as we see in Chrétien de Troyes’s detailed description 
of the festival in celebration of Erec and Enide’s marriage, which marks the 
successful outcome of the first part of this romance:
Quant la corz fu tote asanblee,
N’ot menestrel an la contree
Qui rien seüst de nul deduit
Qui a la cort ne fussent tuit.
An la sale mout grant joie ot.
Chascuns servi de ce qu’il sot:
Cil saut, cil tunbe, cil anchante,
Li uns sifle, li autres chante,
Cil flaüte, cil chalemele,
Cil gigue, li autres vïele
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Li rois Artus ne fu pas chiches:
Bien comanda as penetiers
Et as queuz et aus botelliers
Qu’il livrassent a grant planté,
Chascun selonc sa volanté,
Et pain et vin et veneison.
Nus ne demanda livreison
De rien nule, que que ce fust,
Qu’a sa volanté ne l’eüst.
Mout fu granz la joie el palés.19
(1997–2029)
 19. Chrétien de Troyes, Érec et Énide (Poiron). Porion’s edition includes both Old French 
editions and modern French translations of all of Chrétien’s romances. Interestingly, in view of 
the parameters of my study, this edition endeavors to grasp the poet’s narrative art, “dans son 
évolution et sa globalité” (lv). Numbers of Old French and Middle High German verses from 
the romances here and elsewhere are cited parenthetically in text.
RULES OF THE HOUSE ∙  67
When all the court was assembled, every minstrel in the land who knew any 
kind of entertainment was present. In the hall there was great merriment; 
each contributed what he could: one jumped, another tumbled, another per-
formed magic, one told stories, another sang, one whistled, another played, 
this one the harp, that one the rote, this one the flute, that one the reed pipe, 
the fiddle or the Vielle [. . .] King Arthur was not parsimonious; he ordered 
the bakers, cooks, and wine- stewards to serve bread, wine, and game in great 
quantity to each person— as much as he wished. No one requested anything, 
whatever it might be, without receiving all he wanted. There was great joy 
in the palace.20
This passage and others like it in the later romances show court festivals to be 
investments in joy.21 These verses also suggest the degree to which, in court 
festivals of the twelfth century, politics, poetry, and performance arts inter-
mingle. The French poet’s King Arthur, “not at all niggardly,” achieves the 
standard of generosity that Walther von der Vogelweide admonishes Philip 
of Swabia to strive for. A couple of generations later, in the early years of the 
thirteenth century, the German poet Hartmann von Aue bases himself on the 
romances of Chrétien at the beginning of his own Iwein (ca. 1210) with a simi-
lar depiction of a festival at King Arthur’s court. There has never been one like 
it before or since, Hartmann tells us in his prologue.22 Never before or since 
has there ever been so many exemplary ladies and knights as there. Hartmann 
concludes his description of the Arthurian festival with the lament that the 
level of joy experienced by Arthur and his courtiers at that festive event can no 
longer be achieved in his own time. Hartmann here reiterates descriptions of 
court festivals that would have been familiar to knowledgeable members of his 
audiences from Chrétien’s romances, but his performance of Iwein also occurs 
about a generation after another great festival that marks a singular moment in 
the cultural action of the twelfth century that would have been just as familiar.
 On Pentecost of the year 1184, Emperor Frederick I (“Barbarossa”) staged 
a three- day festival in Mainz to mark the occasion of the knighting of his two 
sons, the future Henry  VI and Frederick, Duke of Swabia.23 Contemporary 
 20. Chrétien de Troyes, Erec and Enide (Carroll), 62.
 21. On the connection between joy and historical festivals, Bumke notes that the chronicler 
Rolandinus Patavinus characterizes a festival held in Treviso, north of Venice, as “a court feast 
of pleasure and joy” (Courtly Culture, 220).
 22. Hartmann von Aue, Iwein (Benecke and Lachmann), vv. 1–58.
 23. A detailed description of this three- day festival is provided by Bumke, Courtly Culture, 
203–7; see also the essay of Josef Fleckenstein, “Friedrich Barbarossa.”
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witnesses record the number of guests from different countries and speak-
ing different tongues to be in the tens of thousands and to include as many 
as seventy imperial princes. Accommodations, food, and gifts were distrib-
uted lavishly by Frederick, his sons, and other high princes. A gyrus, or war 
game, was played in which as many as twenty- thousand participate,24 including 
Barbarossa himself, and the festival also included entertainment that would 
have resembled that described by Chrétien in the passage above. The festival 
as rendered poetically by Chrétien in the previously cited passage seems to be 
brought to life by Barbarossa in the political action at Mainz, as if the histori-
cal emperor has resolved he will not be outdone by the fictional King Arthur 
and his imaginary knights and ladies.25 Taking part in the culturally produc-
tive convergence of politics and poetry in court festivals, the poet Heinrich 
von Veldeke— who was himself present at Barbarossa’s festival and writes about 
midway between Chrétien and Hartmann— makes use of this historic festival 
in his description of the wedding festivities at the end of his Aeneid- romance 
(the Eneit), one of the medieval vernacular reiterations of Virgil’s epic poem:
ich enuernam uon hohzeiten
in allen weilen maere,
div als groz waere,
alsam do het Eneas,
wan div ze Meginze da was,
die wir selbe sahen,
dez manige ueriahen,
daz si waere vnmaezleich,
da der chaiser Fridereich
gap zwein seinen sunen swert,
da manich tausint marche wert
verzeret wart vnd uergeben
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dem cheiser Fridereiche
geschach so manich ere,
daz man immer mere
wunder da uon sagen mach
vncz an den iungisten tach
an lugene fur war.
 24. Bumke, Courtly Culture, 205.
 25. “Those who hosted the great feasts were often driven by the desire to outdo all previous 
feats through the most extravagant lavishness” (Ibid., 4).
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es wirt noch uber hundert iar
von im gesaget vnd geschriben.26
(347.14–348.3)
I never knew of a celebration anywhere else that was as large as that held 
by Aeneas except the one at Mainz where Emperor Frederick knighted his 
sons. We don’t need to ask about that for we saw it ourselves. It was match-
less: goods worth many thousand marks were consumed or given away [. . .] 
It brought Emperor Frederick such honor that one could indeed keep saying 
more wondrous things about it until doomsday, without lying. Over a cen-
tury from now they will still be telling and writing accounts of it.27
Heinrich appends this reference to Barbarossa’s court festival to Aeneas’s 
moment of ascendency in Italy, when the Trojan exile weds Lavinia after 
defeating his rival Turnus, which confers upon the imaginary event some 
of the residual joy that occurred at the Pentecost festival in Mainz. When 
Hartmann composes his Iwein decades later, the fame of Barbarossa’s festival 
would long have formed part of the cultural associations and expectations 
connected to festivals as representational events. By the time Hartmann ren-
ders his imaginary Arthurian festival in the early thirteenth century, the levels 
achieved in the past by Chrétien’s King Arthur in poetry and by Frederick I in 
politics are well- known standards that buttress Hartmann’s lament about the 
diminished quality of the courtly culture in his own time but that also serve 
to inspire him and his audience to rise to a higher level.28
 Frederick’s court festival at Mainz shows this emperor to be an exemplary 
investor in joy more than a generation before Walther’s advice to Philip of 
Swabia regarding standards of largesse. Contemporary judgments about the 
related action in political and poetic domains show us that it is incumbent on 
high medieval imperial performers to commit their considerable resources in 
a way that courtly joy will be achieved and political authority consolidated, if 
not expanded. We observe that the cultural action is continually about rising 
to or surpassing standards set by illustrious emperors, kings, and other rulers 
 26. Heinrich von Veldeke, Eneasroman.
 27. Idem, Eneit, 150.
 28. While Walter Haug’s consideration of Hartmann’s Iwein- prologue stresses the idea of 
the development of fiction as an “autonomus medium,” which remains difficult to the degree 
that the idea of “autonomy” seems to disengage poetry from its courtly setting and thereby to be 
culturally premature, I agree with Haug’s idea that Hartmann is interested in romance poetry as 
something dynamic and in the present, or what Haug elsewhere calls a “literary and intellectual 
process” (see Vernacular Literary Theory, 118–31, and especially 126).
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of the distant or recent past, as well as of the present. To be sure, courtiers 
are quite aware that the joy realized by exemplary performances in represen-
tational events cannot be fixed and lasting in this mutable world. Criticisms 
of the efficacy of representational efforts at court, especially reiterations of 
monastic- dualist perspectives, are numerous and form part of courts’ self- 
representation, for example in the well- worn phrase, Liep âne leit mac niht 
gesîn—“There can be no love without pain.” The murder of Walther von der 
Vogelweide’s imperial patron Philip of Swabia in 1208 is one of the many vicis-
situdes seemingly at odds with the joy achieved in representational events. But 
the availability and use of the monastic contemptus mundi theme by courtly 
poets indicates room is made within the representational action at court for a 
dualist evaluation of physical- material cultural resources as worthless, if not 
as a great liability. The alternative grace/sin provides a more appropriate cri-
terion for the evaluation of events in medieval courtly culture than the (mod-
ern looking) alternative ideal/reality.29 The allegorical figure of Dame World, 
a beautiful lady in front and maggot- infested carcass behind, strikingly brings 
home the dualist leveling evaluation of physical- material cultural resources. 
Medieval courtiers know well that the value of things can vary significantly 
from that accomplished and joyfully experienced in the conspicuous, pomp-
ous events of courtly representation, such as processions and festivals.
 A broad view of courtly representation— which considers this not only as 
discrete representational events at court, but more generally as the success-
ful incorporation, cultivation, and exhibition of imperial authority— needs to 
include potentates’ very public engagements in the warfare and feuding that 
is endemic to medieval society. The joyful ordered harmony visible in festive 
representational events at court is not undone or disproven by military action, 
but rather is contingent on it. My final example of representational courtly 
culture, which provides a transition to the intermittently bellicose cultural 
action discussed in the next section of this chapter, is military commander-
ship.30 In the prologue of his Deeds of Emperor Frederick  I— Gesta Friderici 
imperatoris— Otto of Freising views the ability to wage war as a necessary 
characteristic of imperial leadership and arranges this ability alongside the 
four Socratic virtues as a divinely inspired personal characteristic that sets 
Barbarossa apart from Roman emperors of the past:
 29. Bumke builds the murder of Philip by Otto von  Wittelsbach into his introductory 
oppositional juxtaposition of the romantic image of the Middle Ages, which developed in the 
nineteenth century, to what Bumke calls “medieval reality” (see Courtly Culture, 1–3).
 30. With regard to the activities of emperors, Arnold writes: “Military commandership 
was their original business, and this did not change throughout the Middle Ages” (German 
Knighthood, 6).
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Inter omnes enim Romanorum principes tibi pene soli hoc reservatum est 
privilegium, ut, quamvis a prima adolescentia bellicis desudasse cognoscaris 
officiis, obscenum tibi nondum vultum fortuna verterit. Sic etiam temperans 
in prosperis, fortis in adversis, iustus in iudiciis, prudens et acutus in 
causis esse cognosceris, ut non solum ex convictu haec tecum coaluisse, 
sed tamquam divinitus inspirata et a Deo tibi ob universale totius orbis 
emolumentum concessa fuisse videantur.31
Because for you almost alone, of all the princes of the Romans, has this priv-
ilege been reserved that, although you are known to have exerted yourself 
since early youth in the duties of war, not yet has Fortune turned upon you 
her malign aspect. You are known to be temperate in prosperity, brave in 
adversity, just in judgment, and prudent and shrewd in courts of law, not 
merely from daily habit but as though divinely inspired and granted you by 
God for the general advantage of the whole world.32
Otto’s assessment of Barbarossa’s successes in his various endeavors draws 
attention to the variety of skills involved in the superlative representation of 
imperial authority. This passage suggests that success in one endeavor is likely 
to be connected with success in others, that the prince who prevails in military 
contests on the battlefield will successfully embody authority in representa-
tional events at court (such as Barbarossa’s involvement in the court festivals 
of Mainz that we observed above), and vice versa.33
 In its medieval manifestation, the Roman empire continues to be a domain 
in which peace and order have to be maintained by the successful implemen-
tation of military force— and presumably will be a “divinely inspired ruler” 
(tamquam divinitus inspirata). The medieval Roman empire follows the one 
of antiquity with respect to the basically military status and function of the 
imperial office as generalship. The most illustrious early medieval emperors, 
Charlemagne and Otto I, respectively responsible for the revival of the Roman 
empire under the Franks in the ninth and tenth centuries and its more spe-
cifically German- Italian continuation under the Saxon emperors in the tenth 
 31. Otto, Gesta Friderici Imperatoris, page 11, lines 29–30.
 32. Idem, Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, 27.
 33. In a letter to Otto written by Frederick in 1157, the emperor himself arranges his war-
like activity alongside the pleasures of religious edification that he receives from reading in his 
uncle’s Chronicle of the Two Cities: “After the sweat of war we ardently desire from time to time 
to delight ourselves therein and to be instructed in the virtues by the magnificent achievement 
of the emperors” (Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, 17). Though the latter (religious edification) 
represents a welcome respite from the former (warfare), there is no reason to oppose the two 
activities. They need rather to be regarded as complementary.
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and eleventh centuries, set the tone for the later medieval imperial action in 
important respects. Einhard’s biography of Charlemagne shows this emper-
or’s military engagements to have consisted largely of campaigns against rival 
peoples, many of them pagan: Bretons, Hungarians, Lombards, Saxons, and 
others. Widukind, chronicler of the Saxons in the eleventh century, connects 
military success with the imperial dignity more directly in reporting that Otto 
I’s army proclaimed him, pater patriae, rerum dominus imperatorque—“father 
of the fatherland, lord of the world and emperor”—after a victory over the 
pagan Hungarians in 933.34
 In these earlier medieval cases, political and religious efforts coincide 
in the military performances of emperors. This also remains the case later 
on, though the cultural action of principes becomes more complicated from 
the late eleventh century onward, as the increasingly intense ideological and 
military competitions among emperors and popes overlap with the emper-
ors’ ongoing military struggles for ascendancy over noble rivals.35 During this 
entire period, the ability of emperors and princes to wage war as no one else 
tends to place them in the most advantageous positions with respect to the 
overall disposition of cultural resources. The successes of Henry  IV against 
Gregory VII in the late eleventh century and those of Frederick I against his 
various papal adversaries in the twelfth century are largely based on emperors’ 
possession and implementation of military resources that their papal and lay 
rivals do not possess— part of the same general store of resources that is also 
invested in festivals, tournaments, and literary performances. In the following 
section, I focus more closely on the increasingly complex religious- political 
contests occurring at the highest political levels among popes and emperors, 
with particular focus on innovative global moves made from the late eleventh 
to the early thirteenth century.
INVESTITURES: A DIACHRONIC VIEW 
OF THE POLITICAL ACTION
In this section, I understand the term investiture not just in the narrower 
medieval sense as the ceremonial investment of another imperial official 
such as a bishop with the insignia of office but also in a broader sense as 
investments of authority in the highest imperial Christian officers in the Holy 
Roman Empire by the holders of those offices themselves and their supporters. 
 34. See Schieffer, “Konzepte des Kaisertums,” 49.
 35. See also the historical overview presented by Michael Frasetto, “History of Emperors.”
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During the time of Charlemagne and the Carolingian revival of the Roman 
empire, the stage is first set for the relative status of heavenly and worldly 
cultural resources, and the concomitant investitures of authority over these 
resources, to become a contentious issue in later centuries. When Pope Leo III 
takes his initiative and places a crown on Charlemagne’s head on Christmas 
day in Rome in 800, investing him with imperial authority as Imperator 
Romanorum—“Emperor of the Romans”—he makes a move that introduces a 
new consideration into politics at the highest level: from whom other than the 
pope might an emperor henceforth expect to receive his status as such? What-
ever Leo’s precise intentions may have been, the possibility that popes make 
emperors becomes tangible, with all its attendant implications regarding the 
status and alignment of cultural resources in the empire.36 For many centuries, 
until about the mid- eleventh century, the papacy shows little inclination or 
capacity to take advantage of Leo’s initiative in order to shape outcomes in 
the religious- political arena. Emperors tend to dominate in their interactions 
with popes, and by virtue of the imperial dignity they are also set above their 
aristocratic peers and competitors.
 The ascendancy of emperors eventually begins to depend on investitures 
in the narrower and better- known sense of the word, that is, on emperors’ 
ability to elect imperial bishops and invest them with the insignia of their 
office. As the imperial church takes shape in the tenth and eleventh centuries, 
bishops are the supreme spiritual shepherds of their flocks, sovereign lords 
over archbishoprics as temporal political domains, and invariably beholden in 
a personal way to the emperor who selected them. In the previous chapter, we 
saw that Otto, Bishop of Freising, specifically addresses and justifies this over-
lap of spiritual and temporal authorities in his Chronica de duabis civitatibus— 
Chronicle of Two Cities— which was patently modeled on Augustine’s City of 
God. By means of their selection of imperial bishops, emperors effectively put 
on display the high religious- temporal authority of their office that empowers 
them to make such investitures. Also, by means of the loyal imperial bishops, 
emperors place themselves in an advantageous position vis- à- vis their rival 
noble peers who, though nominally subservient according to the official elec-
toral rules of the imperial power game, show themselves continually as com-
petitors interested in maintaining and expanding the resources of their own 
households and occasionally in making plays for the imperial dignity itself. 
The competitions begin to become especially keen and complex in the latter 
eleventh century, during which time popes begin to question the ascendancy 
 36. Some of the possible reasons behind Leo’s coronation of Charlemagne are addressed in 
Joseph Dahmus, Seven Medieval Kings, 112–13.
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of emperors that had long been in place and insist on their own very different 
assessment of the status of cultural goods in the Holy Roman Empire.
 Among the more competitive and influential popes in the High Middle 
Ages are Gregory VII in the latter eleventh and Innocent III in the early thir-
teenth centuries. In competition with his main imperial rival, Henry IV, Greg-
ory reiterates, varies, and expands the move of his papal predecessor Leo III 
centuries earlier in claiming for the papacy the right to invest the imperial dig-
nity in kings and also the right to depose kings and release their vassals from 
their vows of fealty in the event a king is deemed not “suitable.” I. S. Robinson 
writes: “The king must be ‘suitable’ (idoneus) for the duties prescribed by the 
Church. He must be ‘obedient, humbly devoted and useful to holy Church’; 
he must serve the pope as his feudal lord.”37 Somewhat paradoxically, the way 
to this ambitious papal move has also been prepared by the efforts of earlier 
emperors such as Henry  III and his predecessors to reform the Church by 
rooting out abuses pertaining to simony and celibacy.38 These earlier reformer- 
emperors contributed to a reformed, spiritualized, and energized Church that 
now in turn begins to censure the involvement even of emperors in religious 
matters. The reform of the Church carried out by Gregorius that comes to 
bear his name includes, but eventually goes far beyond, his assertion that cler-
ical offices cannot be conferred by a layperson, which results in the famous 
“contest” concerning the emperor’s investiture of imperial archbishops. A full 
appreciation of the implications of the reforms initiated by Gregory and car-
ried out intermittently by his papal successors involves understanding ecclesia 
in a universal, religious- political sense, consistent with the bipartite global 
parameters of imperial Christianity as articulated by Augustine. However, we 
observe with Gregory that the tables have been turned on the emperors, and 
the papacy is now supposed to be playing the leading role.39 In a letter to 
Henry dated September 8, 1075, Gregory admonishes the king to “recognize 
the empire of Christ above you” and informs him that the imperial coronation 
will take place only if Henry promises to obey the apostolic see.40 The Grego-
rian reform movement thus arranges the medieval equivalents of Augustine’s 
religious city of the Christian ecclesia—“elect”—and the fallen temporal city 
of the flesh hierarchically so that the popes— as recognized sovereigns over the 
 37. Robinson, Papacy, 441.
 38. See Frasetto, History of Emperors, 10–11.
 39. “Gregory’s vision of politics— the king of the Germans as the vassal of the pope— would 
continue (albeit intermittently) to influence the curia’s view of the relations of empire and 
papacy throughout the Middle Ages” (Robinson, Papacy, 411).
 40. Ibid., 402. Gregory made the imperial coronation contingent on Henry making this 
concession.
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superior, religious domain— possess supreme power. In effect, a pope’s dualist 
postulation of the inherent superiority of the spiritual otherness, of which he 
claims to be the chief representative, is pitted against the emperor, though the 
pope is clearly making a play for cultural resources across the board. Henry 
is threatened by Gregory’s move with a vast diminishment, including the 
imperial and royal dignities themselves, the loyalty of the noble vassals above 
whom he is placed by virtue of these dignities, and the cultural resources of 
which emperors traditionally disposed by way of their designation and invest-
ment of archbishops.41
 Henry counters by insisting emperors are made directly by God and by 
endeavoring to depose Gregory and invest in a more cooperative antipope, 
employing to his advantage the military resources available to him. Rivals of 
Henry observe the ongoing contest closely, formulate strategies to better their 
own positions, and put forward antikings to advance their interests. Loosened 
from their oaths of fealty to Henry after his excommunication by Gregory, the 
rival princes plan a diet in Augsburg in early 1077 to discuss deposing Henry. 
Gregory is on his way to preside over this diet on the invitation of the princes 
when he is intercepted by Henry at Canossa in late January 1077. Standing in 
a hair coat and barefoot in the snow outside the castle, in the posture of the 
penitent, Henry makes a political play that resonates through the centuries 
and results in the popular German expression “Gang nach Canossa.”42 Fore-
going for a while the military approach he has used earlier and will use later 
in his contests with the papacy, Henry forces Gregory’s hand in a different 
way, effectively using the rules of the ecclesia against his papal rival. Henry’s 
conspicuous act of penitence compels Gregory— as it evidently must— to for-
give him his sins and restore him to communion and the community of God’s 
elect. The emperor’s room for action is thereby temporarily increased, though 
the competition remains ongoing and he will eventually be excommunicated 
again. Henry’s tactical victory at Canossa preempts the move of rival princes 
against him, but it might be regarded as a strategic mistake over the longer 
term, for his penance signals acquiescence to the Gregory’s postulation of 
papal supremacy.43
 41. Disengaging the princes from their obligation to be loyal to the king was an original 
cultural play on the part of Gregory. Robinson notes, “It was unprecedented for a pope to use 
the power of binding and loosing to depose a king and absolve his vassals from their fealty to 
him” (Ibid., 403).
 42. The expression “Gang nach Canossa” can be still be applied today as a description of 
any endeavor to acquire forgiveness that is experienced as uncomfortable and humbling.
 43. See Robinson, Papacy, 407.
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 Gregory VII and Henry IV open up new possibilities in the ongoing con-
tests between emperors, popes, and princes that continue into the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. For a long time, the competition is less keen, owing largely 
to the strong starting position of the Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick I (“Bar-
barossa”), and to the papacy’s willingness to back away from the “hierocratic” 
Gregorian position of papal ascendancy. Popes instead begin to adopt a “Gela-
sian” position according to which religious and worldly domains and their 
corresponding cultural resources are to be assessed as “separate, but equal.”44 
The plays for power made by Gregory nevertheless remain available and are 
employed again in the early thirteenth century by Innocent III, following the 
sudden death of Barbarossa’s son Henry VI. During the minority of Henry’s 
son Frederick (the future Frederick II), Innocent exploits the imperial power 
vacuum and reasserts for the papacy and himself the role of kingmaker in the 
rivalry between Philip of Swabia— the prince advised by Walther von der Vogel-
weide in the passages cited earlier in this chapter— and Otto of Brunswick.45 
As a poetic performer in different imperial households at different times, it is 
perhaps not surprising Walther considers that God alone makes kings.46 In the 
verses below, Walther bitterly renders Innocent’s endeavor to play kingmaker in 
imperial affairs— based on the hierocratic postulation of the superiority of the 
religious over the worldly domain— as a power play, pure and simple:
Ahî wie kristenlîche nû der bâbest lachet
swanne er sînen walhen seit ich hanz alsô gemachet
daz er dâ seit des solt er niemer hân gedâht
er gihet ich hân zwêne allamân under eine krône brâht
Daz siz riche stoeren unde brennen unde wasten
ie dar under wüelen in ir kasten
ich hân si an mînen stok gemennet, ir guot ist allez mîn
ir tiuschez silber vert in mînen welschen schrîn
ir pfaffen ezzent hüenr und trinkent wîn
und lânt die tiutschen vasten.
 44. See Ibid., 480–82. The Concordat of Worms in 1122—a compromise between imperial 
and Gregorian positions regarding the investiture of bishops and abbots— also had a temporar-
ily calming effect.
 45. In 1198, there is a situation that favors a comeback of the Gregorian idea: Henry VI dies 
suddenly, and Frederick II, as a minor, becomes ward of the pope as his feudal lord: “Now at last 
it was practicable to speak of the pope’s ‘investing’ the emperor with the empire; to attribute to 
the pope the right to depose a monarch and to choose his successor according to the principle 
of suitability’ (idoneitas)” (Robinson, Papacy, 522).
 46. Walther begins one of his gnomes with the pronouncement, Got gît ze künige swen er 
wil—“God gives to whom He will the kingdom of men” (Single- Stanza Lyrics, 166–67).
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Oh how the Pope laughs now, so like a Christian, / as he tells his Italians, 
“I’ve got it all arranged, Listen!” / The things he says down there he never 
even should have thought.  / “Two tedeschi beneath one crown,” he says: 
“that’s what I have wrought. / Let them lay waste the Empire, burn it, bring 
it under—/ we rummage in their chests while all that’s going on there. / I’ve 
goaded them to my big pole there, all their goods are mine, / their German 
silver emigrates to my Italian shrine.  / Eat chicken, churchmen— all you 
priests, drink wine, / and let the Germans fast up yonder.”47
With their German resentment toward Rome, these verses regarding the 
“waste” of imperial resources caused by the pope anticipate moves Martin 
Luther will make centuries later.48 However, the resource- saving disengage-
ment of Christians as individuals from the (wasteful) imperial Church is not 
yet available as a move in the cultural action, as it will have become by Luther’s 
time. According to the prevailing cultural parameters, Innocent’s move for 
cultural resources, here excoriated by Walther, is a necessarily imperial and 
religious one with global implications.49 No imperial competitor in the early 
thirteenth century action is in a position to match Innocent’s resources, and 
the papacy nears the apogee of its ascendancy. But it does so by putting into 
play a new scenario, as Hauck observes: “The highest bishop of the church was 
the absolute ruler in secular affairs. But, at the same time, the transformation 
of the papacy to a primarily secular power was accomplished.”50
 What goes around comes around. The papacy will have only intermit-
tent success as a secular player in the cultural action over the longer term. 
The worldly resources to which Innocent lays claim for his imperial ecclesia 
will seldom provide the papacy with adequate military means to compete 
effectively with emperors and kings. Eventually, these resources will be 
considered— for example, from the Lutheran perspective centuries later— to 
have thoroughly sullied and corrupted the papacy and Rome. The moves of 
Luther and others, which later will effectively invest the (subjective) individual 
with an absolute religious authority and disengage it from the imperial Chris-
tianity of the Middle Ages, are not yet available in the time of Walther, but 
popes such as Gregory VII and Innocent III are preparing the way for them. 
 47. Ibid., 174–75.
 48. I will look at some of these moves in the final chapter of this study.
 49. Albert Hauck observes in his pointedly titled article, “Innocent  III Desired to Rule 
the World,” “To Innocent, the essence of papal power was in the union of the priestly and the 
imperial dignity. In conformity with its origins and purpose, the imperial power belonged to 
the pope” (16).
 50. Ibid., 16–17.
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In making their global move for ascendancy by arguing for the contiguous 
alignment of spiritual- intellectual and physical- material cultural resources, 
with the former above the latter, these popes strengthen the tendency to assess 
cultural resources as universally integrated or articulated. As a consequence, 
potentially, the global play made for worldly resources by representatives of 
the spiritual ones (on the basis of the supposed superiority of the latter) might 
be reiterated, varied, and employed for different purposes. At culturally bullish 
courts, poets might be seen to vary the global plays of popes and emperors 
when they sanctify physical- material resources by investing them with abso-
lute value.51 Innocent III and other imperial performers in the High Middle 
Ages jointly shape a dynamic stage of the European cultural action in which 
new global plays manifestly made in the interest of perishable goods become 
increasingly prominent and consequential.52 The poetic action on which I 
focus in the next chapter contributes in its own conspicuous ways to this cul-
tural trend that will have longer- term consequences. Much later, when the 
individual Christian self is definitively set loose from the imperial Christian 
church in the early Reformation, this will occur as a global move par excellence 
by means of which the individual becomes a kingdom unto itself.
 51. This may happen most pointedly in Gottfried von Strassburg’s romance of Tristan and 
Isolt, with its rendering of an adulterous love of the flesh as a quasireligious summum bonum.
 52. Also contributing to the mentioned dynamism of the European cultural action during 
this time is the reception and processing of hitherto unknown works by Aristotle and the 
gradual rise of universities, which impart their own distinctively intellectual momentum to the 
assessment of perishable goods. See, for example, Richard E. Rubenstein’s Aristotle’s Children.
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C H A P T E R  4
The Poetic Action
WARS, TOURNAMENTS, VERSES: 
THE PLACE OF POETRY AT COURT
Manuscript illuminations such as those preserved in the Codex Manesse 
suggest poetry needs to be viewed as analogous to other kinds of competi-
tive cultural action in and among noble households, and not as the discrete 
or autonomous object of investigation as it is treated by some scholars.1 The 
illumination of the poet- performer Gottfried von Strassburg renders him in 
action in the midst of spectators who observe him with indications of joyful 
interest that shine through the medieval conventions of pictorial representa-
tion.2 Gottfried’s effort is arrayed in the codex alongside illuminations of other 
 1. For example, see Haug, Vernacular Literary Theory, which discusses court poetry in 
terms of literary autonomy.
 2. The Library of the University of Heidelberg has made the Manesse Codex illumina-
tions available online at http:// digi .ub .uni -heidelberg .de /diglit /cpg848 ? & ui _lang = eng (accessed 
July  1, 2015). The illumination of Gottfried von Strassburg is 364r. Gottfried holds a diptych, 
likely a reference to his learned status (Codex Manesse, 246). While it is difficult to know if the 
performance depicted in the illumination is a poetic one— the visual organization of the male 
figures in this illustration also suggests an academic disputation— it  is situated among many 
other illuminations depicting representational events at court, including the composition and 
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kinds of performances that are of value for courts, such as tournaments and 
warfare. The action depicted in the codex illuminations frequently includes 
onlookers, whose close attention to the various performances suggests the 
importance of their ongoing assessment. The view of poets’ performances as 
analogous to competitive performances in tournaments and on the battlefield 
is more than a product of the imagination of patrician burghers in Zurich, 
who produced the Codex Manesse around 1300 and are looking back to the 
flourishing of courtly culture in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. 
The Manesse illuminations, as  well as historical and poetic sources such as 
those documenting the court festival of Frederick I in Mainz in 1184,3 suggest 
that the courtly poets’ performances need to be viewed not only according to 
their own specific poetic characteristics— as these become particularly evident 
in prologues, narrative excurses, and epilogues4—but also according to char-
acteristics they share with other kinds of competitive performances that are 
involved in the representational culture of medieval courts.
 In the poetic action to be examined in this chapter, we observe medieval 
poet- performers with an increasing diversity of characteristics, interests, and 
strategies, engaging themselves competitively with pagan and Christian writ-
ers of antiquity. The medieval performers show themselves to be aware that 
the poetic action has been shaped by illustrious great poets of the past but also 
that they can and should be expected to hold their own. They are cognizant 
that their own efforts will be closely scrutinized and that they will have to 
show themselves up to the task. The manner of their engagements tends to 
combine respect for the luminaries of the past with a very tangible sense of the 
need to rise at least to a comparable level. The competitive dynamics visible 
diachronically in the engagement of medieval poets with those of antiquity 
and the earlier Middle Ages also characterizes contests among medieval poets 
synchronically. Here, too, one finds poet- performers lauding great contempo-
raries, even as they engage in the poetic action in ways that suggest they will 
try to do as well or better.
 The poetic competitions occur in ways that are consistent with the global 
parameters of cultural action as elaborated in the writings of St. Augustine. 
performance of poetry (Ibid., xviii). The context provided by the Codex, which contains lyric 
poetry besides the many illuminations of the poets themselves, seems to invite a reading of the 
illustration of Gottfried in particular as a representational performance, even if this is rendered 
with visual conventions drawing attention to learnedness. Interestingly, a similar visual orga-
nization of figures is employed in the illumination of Klingsor von  Ungarland (219v), which 
depicts the competition of singers at the Wartburg castle and therefore much more clearly 
references a poetic performance (Ibid., 246).
 3. See Fleckenstein, “Friedrich Barbarossa.”
 4. See Haug’s introductory remarks, Vernacular Literary Theory, 1–6.
FIGURE 1. The poet Gottfried in Action— Cod. Pal. germ. 848, Große Heidelberger Liederhandschrift 
(Codex Manesse), 364r. Used with permission of the Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg.
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We have seen that Augustine places many of the educational structures, as well 
as much of the poetic and literary action associated with pagan Rome, in the 
service of Christianity. This occurs as an outgrowth or elaboration of Augus-
tine’s global conception of Christianity in terms of sameness that endeavors 
to account for everything possible as serving a higher, heavenly purpose, 
as  belonging in some sense to God’s providential master plan.5 Augustine 
consequently makes room in his bipartite conception of the Christian life for 
pagan things with an originally non- Christian function to assume a Chris-
tian value, thereby culturally clearing the way for refitting lower things with 
higher purposes.6 In the medieval poetic action, the indeterminate relation-
ship between high and low things as shaped by Augustine leaves room for the 
articulation of literary, Latin- based narrative traditions and the high things 
associated with them, with orally transmitted, vernacular, performance- based 
modes of poetic presentation and their correspondingly lower concerns. Iso-
lated endeavors to involve vernacular (oral) narrative traditions in the literary 
poetic action occur already in Carolingian times, as  we shall see, but their 
continuous involvement in the literary poetic action of Europe begins first 
with the flourishing of vernacular poetry in the twelfth century.
 At noble courts in the High Middle Ages, with their basically military ori-
entation and interests, the involvement of the vernacular languages in the liter-
ary poetic action enables the literary emergence of Celtic and Germanic heroic 
narrative materials, such as those about Arthur, Siegfried, Brunhilt, and the 
Nibelungs, that had originally relied for their transmission on oral preservation 
and presentation. As  the lower— because originally non- Christian, vernacu-
lar, and orally transmitted narrative materials come into play in the literary 
poetic action at the courts of noble households, the indeterminacy of the action 
and concomitant potential for innovative moves increases. For example, the 
pagan Roman heroic narrative material preserved in the Latin- based culture of 
Christianity— such as Virgil’s Aeneid— can appear alongside the literary new-
comers in new ways. Virgil’s epic poem, which gives tribute to the greatness of 
Rome in the time of the “divine” Augustus becomes, in Heinrich von Veldeke’s 
vernacular romance reiteration of it, a  vehicle for the praise of the medie-
val Rome of emperor as well as divus Frederick Barbarossa and his imperial 
 5. In the latter part of the second book of his On Christian Doctrine, Augustine surveys 
much of pagan Roman culture and undertakes what might be regarded as a kind of salvaging 
operation, declaring many things to be consistent with Christian belief and rejecting other 
things as evil (53–78).
 6. An important example of such refitting is Augustine’s Christian appropriation of the 
art of rhetoric in the fourth book of On Christian Doctrine (117–69).
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chivalric host,7 whom medieval audiences would have been as likely to asso-
ciate with (the originally vernacular and orally transmitted accounts of) King 
Arthur and his courtiers as with anything Roman in the stricter sense. Perhaps 
the most significant new move in the poetic action at courts is romance nar-
rative with its principal concerns of adventure and love, which manifest new 
global dispositions of self that we will observe in detail in the subsequent chap-
ters. In the twelfth century, with epics, romances, and songs of love, court poets 
emerge as competitors in the literary poetic action alongside the authors and 
scribes of monasteries and cathedral schools. Their commandeering of vernac-
ular languages and narrative traditions in the literary poetic action deserves to 
be regarded as a cultural game changer, which sets a new course for literary and 
cultural developments in Europe in the coming centuries.8
 Thus, the competitive engagements of court poets and audiences’ assess-
ments of these engagements are dynamically situated at medieval courts of 
nobility between high and low things; Latin and the vernacular languages; lit-
erary and oral modes of presentation and reception; the grace bestowed by 
God from on high and the honor won by courtiers for their chivalric efforts 
in the world; divine love and the fleshly love of a lady or knight. The poetic 
action at courts unfolds, as well, between the timeless, unchanging truth of an 
“epic past” (i.e., the biblical one) and the mutability of the open- ended pres-
ent.9 The valuation of things in poetry becomes correspondingly more fluid 
 7. I discussed Heinrich’s homage to Frederick Barbarossa’s court festival in Mainz in the 
previous chapter. In  the introduction of his translation of The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, 
Mierow notes that the term divus, the ancient designation for the divinity of the original Cae-
sars, is  used in references to Frederick both by his biographer Rahewin and by the emperor 
himself, and Mierow explains his translation of this term: “There is some question regarding 
the meaning of divus as used by a writer of the twelfth century. But it has been rendered, quite 
literally, ‘divine’ in the thought that this best reflects the growing sense of the sacrosanct char-
acter of the person of the emperor” (13).
 8. See also the remarks with which Sarah Kay begins her study Courtly Contradictions: 
“The apparently irresistible advance of courtly literature [. . .] is  an elite movement, firmly 
invested in the social and moral gulf defining the refined (courtois) from their antithesis (the 
vilain); but the lure of exclusivity seems to have ensured that the class of the self- styled courtois 
would ineluctably expand, so  that courtliness spilled out further and further from the small 
local courts that first fostered it and eventually merged with the broad stream of Western cul-
ture” (1).
 9. See Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel.” It  seems valid to suggest that the moments of Resur-
rection and Crucifixion seem, to some degree, to constitute an “absolute past” or a “valorized 
temporal category” for the Middle Ages that would be consistent with Bakhtin’s understanding 
of the term “epic past” as used in the cited chapter (15 and passim). Romance poetry would 
move things in the direction of what Bakhtin calls the “inconclusive present” (27), which the 
novel as modern artistic form will apprehend most capably. In this study, I suggest that Chris-
tianity, for all the absoluteness of its past, nevertheless also pervades time in a way that provides 
an avenue for eventually experiencing the present as something “inconclusive.”
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and has to be sorted out in the ongoing competitive action within these wid-
ened and increasingly indeterminate parameters. The German poet Wolfram 
von  Eschenbach tells us something along these lines with the verses of his 
Parzival- prologue,10 which apply as well to the increasingly indeterminate 
parameters of the poetic action generally as they do to the proper assessment 
of this particular romance:
ouch erkante ich nie sô wîsen man,
ern möhte gerne künde hân,
welher stiure disiu maere gernt
und waz sî guoter lêre wernt.
dar an si nimmer des verzagent,
beidiu si vliehent unde jagent,
si entwîchent unde kêrent,
si lasternt unde êrent.
swer mit disen schanzen allen kan,
an dem hât witze wol getân,
der sich niht versitzet noch vergêt
und sich anders wôl verstêt.11
(2.5–16)
I have yet to meet a man so wise that he would not gladly know what guid-
ance this story requires, what edification it brings. The tale never loses heart, 
but flees and pursues, turns tail and wheels to the attack and doles out blame 
and praise. The man who follows all these vicissitudes and neither sits too 
long nor goes astray and otherwise knows where he stands has been well 
served by mother wit.12
As one of the premier poet- performers of his time, Wolfram conveys here a 
general impression of the dynamics of the poetic action at courts in the early 
thirteenth century. The correct assessment of the value of poetic performances 
is increasingly showing itself to involve a lêre—“edification”—that is not a 
static truth, but rather a nimble mastery of schanzen—“vicissitudes.” More 
than anything else, we observe that the poetic action at courts in the twelfth 
 10. Kathryn Starkey’s study, Reading the Medieval Book, endeavors to negotiate the afore-
mentioned fluid cultural parameters in the case of Wolfram von Eschenbach’s other significant 
romance, Willehalm.
 11. Wolfram von  Eschenbach, Parzival (Lachmann). Numbers of Middle High German 
and Old French verses from the romances here and elsewhere are cited parenthetically in text.
 12. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 15.
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and thirteenth centuries is a collective endeavor made by poets and audiences 
to arrive at new assessments of mutable, perishable goods, such as honor and 
love, the interest in which necessarily involves “vicissitudes” and the ability to 
“follow” them. The next two chapters examine the specific characteristics of 
adventure and love, respectively, as absolute investments in finite, perishable 
goods, as  such investments occur in the imaginary action of the romances. 
In  the poetic action of composing and performing poets to be examined in 
this chapter, my  focus will be on the parameters of poetry as competition, 
the various resources different poets put into play (especially including the 
vernacular and its narrative traditions), and a few of the more striking moves 
employed by some of the poetic luminaries.
BENCHMARKS OF PERFORMANCE
An especially appropriate passage for exemplifying the parameters of the 
poetic action at courts in the High Middle Ages is a lengthy excursus in the 
Tristan romance of Gottfried von  Strassburg (composed ca.  1215), which is 
inserted into the poem at the moment Tristan is about to be made a knight.13 
The imaginary occasion Gottfried is about to depict is correspondingly fes-
tive, evocative of the festival in Mainz in 1184 at which Barbarossa’s sons were 
knighted. The splendor of the festive event that Gottfried needs to describe for 
his audience is such that he fears his talent may not be equal to the task, or at 
least so he says. The rhetorical profession of incapacity is well- worn. In actu-
ality, audiences and rivals do well to be skeptical toward poetic professions of 
incapacity and to assume these may merely be the prelude to a high- quality 
effort, which turns out to be the case here. Gottfried prefaces his critical 
review of the poetic action by stating that other great poets have already set 
a standard so high that, even if he had twelve times his own capacity to think 
and speak, he would still not be able to rise to a comparable level.14 Gottfried’s 
reference to past great poetic efforts, the level of which he fears his own effort 
will not reach, opens the door to laying out past performances and assessing 
them in terms that are familiar to us:
jâ ritterlîchiu zierheit
diu ist sô manege wîs beschriben
 13. For alternative interpretations of this passage, see Mark Chinca, Gottfried von Strass-
burg: Tristan, 58–69; and Christoph Huber, Gottfried von Strassburg: Tristan and Isolde, 53–65.
 14. See Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Ranke), vv. 4589–620.
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und ist mit rede alsô zetriben,
daz ich niht kan gereden dar abe,
da von kein herze vröude habe.15
(4616–20)
Knightly pomp, I declare, has been so variously portrayed and has been so 
overdone that I can say nothing about it that would give pleasure to anyone.16
We saw in the previous chapter that the measure of success for events in the 
political action at court is the experience of pleasure or joy, and Gottfried here 
indicates— though feigning the posture of someone too discouraged to exert 
himself— that the realization of vröude, pleasure, joy— would also be the way 
to assess whether a poetic performance has risen to the necessary level.
 Gottfried’s profession of incapacity is a rhetorical ploy, and the perceptive 
audience member perceives it as such. It  provides the prelude to a lengthy 
excursus that involves the assessment of other vernacular poet- performers 
and subsequently an invocation of Apollo and his muses. In  this excursus, 
Gottfried clearly accomplishes what he claims in the beginning to have no 
hope of accomplishing. While he continues to profess that he is unequal to 
the challenge and daunted by the competition, Gottfried parades his detailed 
knowledge of the vernacular poetic action and his familiarity with the sources 
of poetic inspiration in Greco- Roman antiquity. As  he does this, he  shows 
indirectly but quite tangibly that he is, after all, putting forth an extraordinary 
effort— perhaps indeed harnessing many times his normal narrative powers— 
in the interest of joy.
 Gottfried’s review begins with his predecessor in the performance of 
romance poetry, Hartmann von  Aue. Gottfried lavishes praise upon Hart-
mann, above all on account of that poet’s cristallînen wortelîn (v. 4629)—“crys-
tal words”17—a stylistic feature the verses of Gottfried not surprisingly share. 
Hartmann capably adorns his tale with well- crafted, transparent verses, which 
Gottfried considers will inevitably have a pleasing effect on knowledgeable 
observers and thus lead to joy: Si  koment den man mit siten an,  / si tuont 
sich nâhen zuo dem man  / und liebent rehtem muote (vv. 4631–33)—“Gently 
they approach and fawn on a man, and captivate right minds.”18 Subsequently, 
 15. Gottfried’s Middle High German verses are cited from Tristan (Ranke).
 16. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 105.
 17. Ibid.
 18. Ibid.
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Gottfried disparages his principal rival and competitor, Wolfram von Eschen-
bach, whose stylistic inclinations— from Gottfried’s perspective— go  too far 
in the direction of the unpredictability of the “vicissitudes” Wolfram is inter-
ested in following. Gottfried does not deign to mention his rival by name, but 
the substandard performer he has in mind is quite clearly Wolfram. Gottfried 
considers that the poet in question jumps around too much with his story and 
does so to such a degree that courtiers are left in the dark.19 The verses of the 
unnamed poet- performer, according to Gottfried, fall short of fulfilling the 
principal purpose of the poetic action at court: Ob man der wârheit jehen sol, / 
dâne gât niht guotes muotes van, / dâne lît niht herzelustes an (vv. 4678–80)—
“To speak the truth, no pleasurable emotion come from it, there is nothing in 
it to delight the heart.”20 Even if not named, Wolfram is of such stature that 
people will know whom Gottfried is criticizing here, whether they agree with 
his criticism or not. Gottfried reckons with this and may well hope that leav-
ing his famous rival unnamed will be perceived as a snub to Wolfram, rather 
than as an indirect way of drawing attention to his fame.
 Gottfried’s review of romance performers also goes on to include positive 
assessments of other romance poets such as Bligger von Steinach and Heinrich 
von Veldeke, but the winner of the contest is clear to Gottfried from the begin-
ning, despite any claims Wolfram might want to make.21 There is no compet-
itor at Hartmann’s level, so Gottfried confers the prize for romance poetry to 
him, with the complicity of the wise ones among his audience22:
swer guote rede ze guote
und ouch ze rehte kan verstân,
der muoz dem Ouwaere lân
sîn schapel und sîn lôrzwî.
(4634–37)
Those who esteem fine language with due sympathy and judgment will allow 
the man of Aue his garland and his laurels.23
 19. See Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Ranke), vv. 4638–90.
 20. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 105.
 21. See, in particular, Ibid., vv. 4642–44.
 22. The “wise ones” were involved in a similar way in the political action discussed in the 
previous chapter, in particular that involving the imperial procession at Magdeburg recorded 
poetically by Walther von der Vogelweide.
 23. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 105.
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In regarding Hartmann as the rightful winner of the laurels, Gottfried ren-
ders the poetic action in the competitive manner appropriate to it. As  has 
happened since Greco- Roman times, the laurel wreath goes to the winner of a 
contest. Laureates include athletes, poets, conquering generals, and— in more 
recent European history— scientists and peacemakers. In his review of other 
poetic performances artfully integrated into his own, Gottfried awards the 
laurel wreath to his predecessor Hartmann, even as he himself assumes the 
role of supreme poetic arbiter and lays out for his audiences and for us a view 
of the poetic action as competition.24
 Gottfried’s review provides benchmarks for the assessment of poetic per-
formances at court. It shows these performances to share important basic fea-
tures, some of which are already familiar to us from our survey of the political 
action in the previous chapter. The poetic performances, as the political ones, 
are supposed to realize joy for those involved in them. The realization of joy as 
an outcome for the court depends, as Gottfried’s review shows, on the ability 
of individual poet- performers to harness the resources available to them and 
put them effectively on display for their audiences. In my further consider-
ation of the poetic action in this chapter, I  endeavor to see things accord-
ing to the competitive benchmarks employed by Gottfried in his review, and 
I focus particularly on developments associated with increases in the value 
of poetry in the vernacular languages. We  shall observe that success in the 
poet- performers’ competitive endeavors at court has particularly to do with 
their ability to articulate the higher and lower cultural resources mentioned 
above, and— as  we shall see below— with their ability to discover things of 
value among the latter. In order to see the poetic action in its broader literary- 
cultural context, we shall first consider a few noteworthy initial achievements 
involving vernacular poetry in the centuries leading up to its great flourishing 
at French- and German- speaking courts in the twelfth and thirteenth centu-
ries. We focus then on some significant moments in the performances of some 
of the premier poets in this flourishing: Marie de France, Chrétien de Troyes, 
Hartmann von  Aue, Wolfram von  Eschenbach, and our self- styled arbiter, 
Gottfried von Strassburg.
 24. Gottfried’s review also includes the performers of love lyrics, or  the nahtegalen 
(v. 4751)—“nightingales,” as he calls them. According to the specific musical and metric char-
acteristics of their art, the performers of the love lyrics also pursue joy, the same goal as that 
of the performers of romance poetry (vv. 4759–69). In  the pursuit of joy via the love lyrics, 
a  certain poet from “Hagenouwe,” whom we know to be called Reinmar, was once supreme 
among the German poet- performers and “carried their banner,” as Gottfried puts it; but since 
the death of Reinmar, the leader among the singers of love has been Walther von der Vogel-
weide (vv.  4802–12), the same one whose gnomic poetry provided insights into the political 
action that we observed in the previous chapter.
THE POETIC ACTION ∙  89
THE VERNACULAR AS POETIC RESOURCE
Consideration of poetic action involving vernacular languages and the narra-
tive traditions associated with them takes us back to the Carolingian revival 
of the Roman empire in the early ninth century, when a monk named Otfried 
von  Weissenburg— the first poet working in the German vernacular whose 
name is known to us— composes a harmonization of the Gospels in Old High 
German verses and presents it to his probable lord Liutbert, the Archbishop 
of Mainz, with a prefatory letter in Latin asking him to appraise the style of it. 
The letter to Liutbert lays out Otfried’s purpose in composing his Evangieli-
enharmonie and enables an understanding of the monk’s literary activity as a 
competitive effort in at least two ways.
 First, concerning himself with matters of style, Otfried begins his letter 
with the rhetorical profession of inability to accomplish the poetic task that 
is already familiar to us and then predictably rises to the occasion. Corre-
sponding to the Carolingian ambition to align itself with the glory of Rome 
and be enduring competitors of renown in the ongoing imperial action, there 
is a need to compete in the literary poetic action. This means the Franks must 
engage the poets of antiquity, and Otfried shows us the elite company to which 
he thinks his Germanic brethren must aspire:
Virgilius, Lucanus, Ovidius caeterique quam plurimi suorum facta decora-
rent lingua nativa, quorum jam voluminum dictis fluctuare cognoscimus 
mundum, nostrae etiam sectae probatissimorum virorum facta laudabant, 
Juvenci, Aratoris, Prudentii ceterorumque multorum, qui sua lingua dicta et 
miracula Christi decenter ornabant; Nos vero, quamvis eadem fide eadem-
que gratia instructi, divinorum verborum splendorem clarissimum proferre 
propria lingua, dicebant pigrescere.25
Virgil, Lucan, Ovid and many others, embellished their deeds in their native 
language— with the sayings of whose works we know the world to be now 
awash and that they even praised the deeds of the most- tried men of our 
religion— of Juvencus, Arator, Prudentius and many others, who embellished 
the sayings and miracles of Christ properly in their own tongue; whereas we, 
although instructed by grace in that same faith, were, they said, lazy in putting 
forth the most brilliant splendor of the divine words in our own language.26
 25. Otfried von Weissenburg, Otfrids Evangelienbuch, 4.
 26. Citing James Marchand’s online translation of Otfried von Weissenburg, “Ohtfrid’s Let-
ter to Liudbert.”
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Otfried here invokes the high poetic level of antiquity in order to show how 
far short of it the Franks are languishing. The problem has not been the lack of 
knowledge, ability, or skill, but rather the lack of effort, and Otfried sets forth 
to remedy this. With his Old High German vernacular rendering of the Gos-
pels in verses, Otfried proceeds with a vigor that belies his initial profession of 
incapacity. Thanks in part to Augustine’s harnessing of imperial Rome’s educa-
tional and literary resources for Christian purposes, pagan poets such as Vir-
gil, Lucan, and Ovid serve as inspirations for Otfried, even if their importance 
for his Christian purposes pertains primarily to the high standard of stylistic 
excellence they have established. Otfried is aware of the high level of com-
petition into which he is entering on behalf of the Franks, just as he is aware 
that there is no longer any alternative to competition other than the shame of 
inaction, the fault of “laziness.” The stakes are also high in view of Otfried’s 
petition to have his own stylistic effort judged at the highest episcopal level 
in Mainz. In view of subsequent literary history, the outcome in this case is 
success. Otfried’s harmonization of the gospels will come to be regarded as 
an important early moment in the literary history of the European vernacu-
lar languages, suggesting that the assessment of Luitbert— and probably also 
those of the “worthy brothers and the reverend lady Judith” who inspired him 
to write (discussed below)—were positive.
 The second manner in which Otfried’s poetic efforts need to be appreciated 
as competitive concerns content rather than style. With his biblical poetry, 
Otfried also involves himself in a cultural competition that fully deserves the 
designation rivalry. In his letter to the archbishop, this rivalry constitutes the 
first and foremost reason for undertaking his effort:
Dum rerum quondam sonus inutilium pulsaret aures quorundam 
probatissimorum virorum eorumque sanctitatem laicorum cantus inquietaret 
obscenus, a  quibusdam memoriae dignis fratribus rogatus, maximeque 
cujusdam venerandae matronae verbis nimium flagitantis, nomine Judith, 
partem evangeliorum eis Theotisce conscriberem, ut  aliquantulum hujus 
cantus lectionis ludum saecularium vocum deleret; et  in evangeliorum 
propria lingua occupati dulcedine, sonum inutilium rerum noverint 
declinare.27
Wherefore, since at times the sound of useless things have beat on the ears of 
some men of highest quality, and the obscene song of laymen disturbed their 
sanctity, I was asked by certain brothers worthy of memory— and especially 
 27. Otfried von Weissenburg, Otfrids Evangelienbuch, 4.
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through the words of a certain reverend lady named Judith who strongly 
urged me on— to write for them in German part of the Gospels, so  that a 
small amount of the reading of this song might cancel out the play of worldly 
voices; and, occupied with the sweetness of the Gospels in their own lan-
guage, they would be able to forego the sound of useless things.28
The poet’s literary effort is being made to counter the deleterious effect of 
sonus inutilium—“useless sounds,” in  particular, cantus obscenus—“obscene 
songs.” Much about the parameters of this rivalry remains unclear, but some 
things can be surmised. The probatissimorum virorum—“men of highest 
quality” are presumably of the highest political and social rank, and these 
men, to  Otfried’s dismay, occupy themselves with an “obscene” poetry that 
is beneath their dignity.29 Though the attempt to identify Otfried’s “obscene” 
poetic rival for the attention of such men remains speculative, the rival’s 
general characteristics are consistent with orally transmitted poetry in the 
vernacular. The unspecified songs are presumably “obscene” in dealing with 
something other than divine Christian truths, indeed in dealing with anything 
at all— such as events heroic, amorous, or erotic— that might be deemed erro-
neous, distasteful, or disgusting from a Christian perspective. Whatever the 
exact parameters of this competition may have been, it seems Otfried’s literary 
effort is largely motivated by the perceived need to occupy the minds of “men 
of highest quality” with vernacular poetic words of the highest quality, both in 
style and content. Otfried has no doubt that the sweet vernacular sound of the 
Gospels— evangeliorum propria lingua dulcedine sonum— will prevail in the 
competition for the attention of these important men and strengthen them in 
their sanctity, thus countering the effect of “obscene songs.”
 If Otfried is aware of any risk involved in his engagement in the poetic 
action— besides not rising to the necessary poetic level— he shows no sign of it 
in his letter to Liutbert. Looking forward to the High Middle Ages, uses of the 
vernacular languages will range far beyond the Carolingian verse reiterations 
of Holy Scriptures. The vulgar languages will be available as a literary resource 
throughout the poetic action at courts, and it is instructive to consider the 
role Otfried’s early efforts may already be playing in this. Otfried’s initial and 
relatively modest (i.e., in view of what is to come) extension of the Christian 
 28. Marchand, “Ohtfrid’s Letter to Liudbert.”
 29. Haug considers that Otfried’s intended audience is monastic (Vernacular Literary The-
ory, 31), but there is no way to know with certainty, based on the letter alone, whether the poet’s 
use of the superlative “probatissimorum virorum” referred to “tested men” among an exclusively 
monastic audience. His global ambition on behalf of the Franks suggests the possibility that his 
poetic efforts might refer to monastic, clerical, and lay communities alike.
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and Latin- based cultural apparatus of books and book- learning to include the 
vernacular languages as a literary resource extends the cultural reach of God’s 
word, but something else is simultaneously achieved: God’s word and “obscene 
songs” become associates and competitors on the same cultural playing field. 
As  the holy words of God are fashioned in the vernacular in order to con-
tend with competitors, the means are also made available for the originally 
“obscene” verses to become literary. As this occurs, the “obscene” verses seem 
to acquire a different value or status. Their literary inscription preserves them 
and the deeds they celebrate— even if in the context of a cultural apparatus 
originally foreign to them— from the oblivion into which they might fall if the 
oral transmission of them through the generations weakens and ultimately 
lapses. The involvement of “obscene” verses in the literary poetic action lifts 
them into a cultural sphere heretofore occupied by holy scriptures, patristic 
writings, and the poetry of pagan antiquity as refitted to Christian purposes. 
As  high, literary Latin poetry engages low, originally oral, vernacular nar-
rative traditions, the poetic action will necessarily become less determinate 
and more varied. The relative values of things— such as that of Latin vis- à- vis 
the vernacular languages with their various associated concerns— will come 
increasingly into flux.
 There are already indications of new valuations of cultural resources in 
the time of Otfried von Weissenburg. In Einhard’s biography of Charlemagne, 
we learn that the emperor had a collection of songs set down in writing for 
posterity about the deeds and wars of ancient kings. With the exception of a 
single Germanic heroic lay (the Hildebrandslied), accidentally preserved on 
the front and back inside covers of a religious manuscript, no such songs in 
the German vernacular have survived. Some of the cultural resources asso-
ciated with the “useless sounds” against which Otfried competes are never-
theless making headway in the literary poetic action and thereby inevitably 
achieving a different value. The other significant harmonization of the Gos-
pels composed in the ninth century in the German vernacular, in roughly the 
same cultural (i.e., monastic) situation in which Otfried worked, is  the Old 
Saxon Heliand. The Heliand gives Holy Scriptures a Germanic- heroic form 
and content, in  a manner one suspects would have made Otfried, his holy 
brothers, and the reverend lady Judith cringe if they ever chanced to read or 
hear it. The anonymous author of the Heliand tells the story of Christ in the 
alliterative long- lines of heroic epics such as Beowulf. Correspondingly, Christ 
is depicted, as Francis Gentry observes, using the “typical Germanic terminol-
ogy for chiefs like drohtin (lord), uualdand (ruler), uualdandes barn (child of 
the ruler), thiodo drohtin (lord of the peoples), and mildi mundboro (generous 
protector), and the Apostles with the exception of Judas, are characterized 
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as excellent thanes.” Gentry draws attention specifically to the Heliand’s 
Germanic- heroic iteration of Matthew 5:6:
“Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they 
shall be filled.” This is rendered as: “Those too are fortunate who desired to 
do good things here, those fighting men who wanted to judge fairly. With 
good things they themselves will be filled to satisfaction in the Chieftain’s 
kingdom for their wise actions; they will attain good things, those fighting 
men who judged fairly here.”30
The heroic rendering of the story of Christ tailors the Word of God to a specific 
strategic purpose. In the ninth century, the continental Saxons are among the 
last of the pagan peoples long settled in northern Europe. Charlemagne has 
endeavored to overcome them in a series of long and bloody wars and to con-
vert them to Christianity from their polytheistic pagan beliefs. The Heliand is 
generally consistent with this Carolingian effort, but instead of proceeding with 
military force— the method for which Charlemagne is perhaps best known— its 
aim is to proselytize with words rather than at the point of a sword. This poem 
competes in its own way for the minds “of most proven men” (probatissimorum 
virorum), as Otfried puts it, but the minds in question belong to Saxons who 
seemingly do not yet possess the requisite spiritual- intellectual capacity for the 
apprehension of the basic tenets of Christianity, even if these were rendered in 
a Germanic vernacular as Otfried does.31 Instead, Christ’s life is cast in terms 
with which a Germanic warrior culture can identify to some degree. As this 
occurs, some of the “useless sounds” against which Otfried is competing seem-
ingly make inroads into the literary cultural action, to be sure, not in the form 
of “old rude songs,” but rather in a very heroic- looking vernacular rendering of 
the Gospels. The poetic action is visibly widened as it involves low (potentially 
“obscene”) cultural resources in high Christian ways, which in turn seemingly 
affects the values of things generally. In the introduction to his translation of 
the Heliand, Ronald Murphy writes that its author, “created a unique synthesis 
between Christianity and Germanic warrior- society— a synthesis that would 
 30. Gentry, “German Literature to 1160,” 72.
 31. In the introduction of his edition of Hêliand, John E. Cathey offers a concrete example: 
“The Germanic ethic required behavior that with Christian sensibility was understood as super-
bia. To  the traditional Germanic, and thus Saxon, mind- set the egocentric goal of achieving 
fame in this world as an individual (and proper status for one’s family) was all that would live on 
after one’s death. Tales told of dead heroes constituted the only transcendent realm in a world 
defined merely by what is here and now” (13).
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ultimately lead to the culture of knighthood and become the foundation of 
medieval Europe.”32 We have observed such a “synthesis” occurring by means 
of the literary involvement of new poetic competitors and the concomitant 
availability of new cultural resources associated with the vernacular languages. 
Over time, vernacular sounds and the things associated with them will increase 
in literary and cultural value, especially during the widening and intensifica-
tion of the poetic action that occurs in the High Middle Ages.
 In the centuries after the period of cultural growth under the Carolingians, 
there is little evidence of sustained literary action in the vernacular languages. 
In  the tenth and eleventh centuries, available cultural resources seem to be 
invested in other ways— for example, in defending and preserving Christen-
dom against pagan aggressors such as Vikings and Magyars— and literature 
reverts almost exclusively to Latin as the holy language of Augustine’s heav-
enly City of God. During this time, the literary action seems scarcely shaped 
by vernacular narrative traditions. In the exceptional case of the Waltharius 
epic (ca.  920), Germanic- heroic material negotiates the transition to liter-
ary Latin culture according to circumstances that are now difficult to recon-
struct.33 When the vernacular languages again begin to be employed as literary 
resources in the High Middle Ages, we observe interesting new developments. 
Sometime during the first decades of the twelfth century, Frau Ava, the first 
woman poet writing in the German vernacular who is known to us by name— 
the female counterpart to Otfried von Weissenburg in this regard— composes 
four works of biblical poetry based on the redemptive value of Christ’s life. 
Ava’s literary engagements suggest the parameters of the poetic action in 
the coming century will be different and more varied than those in which 
Otfried and the anonymous Saxon author of the Heliand were engaged. Gen-
try observes that Ava’s efforts forego rhetorical moves, such as the professions 
of incapacity we have seen elsewhere, and engage holy scriptures in a direct, 
personal way.34 The earliest vernacular poetry in the High Middle Ages is a 
continuation of the biblical poetry that we saw during the Carolingian period, 
but the efforts of poets such as Frau Ava indicate that the poetic action to 
come will involve a broader spectrum of voices, concerns, and approaches.
 32. See the commentary of G. Ronald Murphy in his edition of Heliand, xiii.
 33. See Kratz, “Waltharius.”
 34. “Her work is a song of praise by a pious Christian of Christ’s act of Redemption. She 
does not take the rhetorical approach of lamenting the modest poetic gifts she, as a woman, 
possesses; the humility formulas that one frequently encounters in the writings of other medi-
eval poets are not found in Ava’s writings. She considers her poetic activity a natural outcome 
of her beliefs, and this view was no doubt shared by the audience that she addresses as ‘lieben 
mîne herren’ (my dear lords)” (Gentry, “German Literature to 1160,” 112).
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STARS IN COMPETITION
The culturally most significant performances in the vernacular poetic action 
of the High Middle Ages are the courtly romances.35 The poetic action asso-
ciated with the romances arguably reaches its greatest complexity and widest 
cultural range, drawing upon and articulating high and low cultural resources 
in the interest of joy. Writing sometime in the second decade of the thirteenth 
century, Gottfried von Strassburg looks back over a couple of generations of 
romance poetry in the German vernacular in his literary review and judges 
outcomes based largely on an aesthetic and stylistic standard of elegant clarity. 
The descriptive survey of the poetic action to be offered below extends the 
review to include the French beginnings of romance poetry, and seeks also to 
draw attention to the diverse cultural resources involved in the poetry, as well 
as to some of the noteworthy characteristics of the poetic action as competi-
tion. As we saw in Gottfried’s review, and will see in greater detail below, the 
parameters of the poetic action at court become most tangible in prologues, 
epilogues, and excursuses, in  which the best poet- performers— the stars of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries— step forward to provide their medieval 
audiences and us with perspectives of the poetic action and of the standards 
according to which the action needs to be assessed.
 The performances of the French poet named Marie provide instructive 
views of the narrative action at noble courts in the latter half of the twelfth 
century, around the same time Chrétien de  Troyes begins to undertake his 
own innovative performances.36 Marie’s lais share some of the characteristics 
of longer courtly romances, in  particular their rhymed octosyllabic cou-
plets, their investment in love, and their apparent provenance from orally 
 35. I understand performance as a process that includes both the composition of romance 
poetry as well as its presentation to a courtly audience (the latter understood either as spec-
tators or readers). Though little is known about the specifics of individual performances, it is 
commonly accepted that the courtly poets performed their works live before courtly audiences 
(which does not exclude the possibility that individual reading might also already have been 
making some inroads). Evelyn Birge Vitz explores the connections between oral performance 
and the early development of the French verse romances in her Orality and Performance in 
Early French Romance.
 36. In the foreword of their translation of Marie’s Lais, Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante 
write: “Marie de France was perhaps the greatest woman author of the Middle Ages and cer-
tainly the creator of the finest medieval short fiction before Boccaccio and Chaucer” (1). More 
recently, R. Howard Bloch describes Marie as “a writer more deeply embedded in surrounding 
culture, both learned and popular, than heretofore acknowledged and as a complex figure that 
is just the opposite of the simple, natural, spontaneous, and moderate image that has flourished 
since the eighteenth century” (Anonymous Marie de France, 315).
FIGURE 2. Marie de France writing Fables. MS 3142 Folio 256. Bibliotheque Nationale de France (BnF). 
© BnF, Dist. RMN- Grand Palais/Art Resource, NY.
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transmitted (i.e., vernacular) narrative traditions.37 Also, we observe signs in 
the prologue with which she prefaces her lais— though subtle ones— that she 
conceives of the poetic action as competition:
Ki Deus ad duné escïence
E de parler bon eloquence
Ne s’en deit taisir ne celer,
Ainz se deit volunters mustrer.
Quant uns granz biens est mult oïz,
Dunc a primes est il fluriz,
E quant loëz est de plusurs,
Dunc ad espandues ses flurs.
Custume fu as ancïens,
Ceo testimone Precïens,
Es livres ke jadis feseient,
Assez oscurement diseient
Pur ceus ki a venir esteient
E ki aprendre les deveient,
K’i peüssent gloser la lettre
E de lur sen le surplus mettre.38
(1–16)
Anyone who has received from God the gift of knowledge and true elo-
quence has a duty not to remain silent: rather should one be happy to reveal 
such talents. When a truly beneficial thing is heard by so many people, 
it  then enjoys its first blossom, but if it is widely praised its flowers are in 
full bloom. It was customary for the ancients, in the books which they wrote 
(Priscian testifies to this), to express themselves very obscurely so that those 
in later generations, who had to learn them, could provide a gloss for the text 
and put the finishing touches to their meaning.39
Marie begins this passage with a reiteration of a conviction we have seen else-
where in the cultural action, such as with Otfried von  Weissenburg above. 
If  one possesses the necessary resources to engage oneself poetically, one 
 37. Romance proper is, of course, a longer narrative form than the lai. But the two poetic 
forms are close enough that Hanning and Ferrante refer to them as a “collection of short 
romances and tales” (Marie de France, Lais, 1).
 38. Old French verses are cited here from Marie de  France, Lais de  Marie de  France 
(Micha).
 39. Marie de France, Lais (Burgess and Busby), 41; italics added.
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should do so. The floral analogy, to which the involvement of capable poet- 
performers in the poetic action is linked in the ensuing verses, underscores the 
necessity of engagement at the same time as it suggests parameters for assess-
ing Marie’s efforts. Successful engagement in the action for Marie is analogous 
to the full blossoming of granz biens—“a truly beneficial thing.” Such a full 
blossoming is associated with the pleasing visual and olfactory sensations of 
a naturally unfolding process, and it is also contingent on consensus. It takes 
the praise of many people, and consequently a process of evaluation, for the 
full blossoming of a truly beneficial thing to occur. With her ensuing reference 
to the ancients and their books, Marie provides additional details regarding 
the criteria according to which the evaluations leading to praise are made. 
Marie views the previous poetic action as something unfinished. The ancients 
with their books have left something obscure that is still in need of com-
pletion. Medieval poet- performers possessing the necessary resources have 
the obligation to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the ancient books, 
to hone their own skills with their help, and to involve themselves directly in 
the poetic action in order to finish something that has been left incomplete. 
The move of which Marie avails herself as a medieval poet- performer with her 
reference to the books of the ancients— to “put the finishing touches to their 
meaning”—can be seen as corresponding to the “full bloom” of “a truly benefi-
cial thing” that is referenced in her likening of the poetic action to the bloom-
ing of flowers. In  its association with the floral imagery, the medieval com-
pletion of something left incomplete in the books of the ancients amounts to 
the flourishing of whatever good things those ancient books contained before 
the engagements of medieval poet- performers. In contrast to Otfried, Marie 
articulates the medieval relationship to antiquity in less overtly competitive 
terms, underscoring instead its collaborative aspect. But the twelfth- century 
courtier, like the ninth- century monk, views the ancients both as a model 
to be studied and emulated, and as a standard to which one must endeavor 
to rise. Marie’s use of the word surplus—“finishing touches”—also casts the 
ancients’ standard as something unfinished that is in need of completion, pos-
sibly hinting— however subtly— that medieval poet- performers may in some 
sense surpass it if they proceed knowledgably and skillfully enough.40
 40. Logan Whalen, in  Marie de  France and the Poetics of Memory, includes among the 
implications of these verses “the justification for taking preexisting material and adapting it to 
the concerns at hand” (41). Here Whalen also surveys the extensive critical literature seeking an 
explanation of these verses by pursuing Marie’s reference to Priscian. Bloch approaches Marie’s 
surplus somewhat differently, connecting it by way of gloser and sens to a joy with patently erotic 
characteristics (Anonymous Marie de France, 47).
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 In the remainder of her prologue, Marie provides further important infor-
mation about her vernacular verses. Her own poetic engagement will not 
be about finishing an incomplete ancient book or even about rendering an 
ancient Latin book in the vernacular, adding her “surplus” as she does so, but 
rather about certain lais:
Des lais pensai, k’oïz aveie.
Ne dutai pas, bien le saveie,
Ke pur remambrance les firent
Des aventures k’il oïrent
Cil ki primes les comencierent
E ki avant les enveierent.
Plusurs en ai oï conter,
Nes voil laisser ne oblier.
Rimé en ai e fait ditié,
Soventes fiez en ai veillié.
(33–42)
I thought of the lays which I had heard and did not doubt, for I knew it 
full well, that they were composed, by those who first began them and put 
them into circulation, to  perpetuate the memory of adventures they had 
heard. I myself have heard a number of them, and do not wish to overlook 
or neglect them. I have put them into verse, made poems from them, and 
worked on them late into the night.41
The lais Marie is crafting form part of the so- called matière de Bretagne that 
seems to be conveyed by the same storytellers to whom we see Chrétien 
de Troyes making reference below.42 A reason why it would be important to 
preserve the lais, as Marie is doing, is because they belong to orally transmit-
ted poetry that could be forgotten and lost if not set down in writing. This 
view is supported by the repetition in the cited verses of the verb “to hear,” 
and the stated interest in not wanting the aventures—“adventures”—to be for-
gotten. Marie’s vernacular verse rendering of possibly oral narrative material 
for her courtly audiences seems to bring us far from her introductory views of 
the poetic action as the consensus- or- praise- contingent flowering of a “truly 
 41. Marie de France, Lais (Burgess and Busby), 32.
 42. On similarities in the approaches of Marie and Chrétien to the poetic action, especially 
regarding the status of the Celtic matière de Bretagne, see K. Sarah- Jane Murray, From Plato to 
Lancelot, xvii– xviii.
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beneficial thing,” or as placing the “finishing touches” on the Latin books of 
the ancients. Yet a possibility Marie seems to leave open is that the vernacular 
lais amount to a specifically medieval and vernacular “fruition” or “comple-
tion” of the poetic action of the ancients. While this possibility remains specu-
lative, one more immediate goal is clear. At  the end of her prologue, Marie 
reveals her principal reason for engaging in the poetic action in the ways we 
have observed thus far. She hopes her involvement with the lais might please 
the king, a ki tute joie s’encline—“to whom all joys pay homage.” If this hap-
pens, it will in turn bring great joy to Marie herself: Si vos les plaist a receveir, / 
Mult me ferez grant joie aveir (vv. 51–52)—“If it pleased you to accept them, 
you would bring me great joy.” Marie’s prologue ends by underscoring a joy 
that is both an individual one of the poet and a general courtly one vouchsafed 
by the king to whom the lais are dedicated. The full blossoming of poetry and 
its “completion,” joyfully realized, are the aim of Marie’s poetic investment of 
self and the reason behind those late nights working on her lais.43
 In what counts as the first of the Arthurian romances,44 Chrétien de 
Troyes’s Érec et Énide, we observe in the prologue many of the moves we see 
with Marie, even if Chrétien shapes the action more sharply in aligning him-
self more squarely with the ancients and in placing emphasis on the com-
petition with contemporary poet- performers. Each part of this memorable 
inauguration of the Arthurian romance tradition is significant with respect 
to the parameters of action that we have been considering, so the prologue is 
cited here in its entirety:
Li vilains dit an son respit
Que tel chose a l’an an despit
Qui mout valt mialz que l’an ne cuide.
Por ce fet bien qui son estuide
Atorne a bien quel que il l’ait;
Car qui son estuide antrelait,
Tost i puet tel chose teisir
Qui mout vandroit puis a pleisir.
Por ce dist Crestiens de Troies
Que reisons est que totevoies
Doit chascuns panser et antandre
 43. This is another rhetorical commonplace, but one which can of course also be true in 
fact.
 44. A claim to fame that continues to be underscored in the critical literature, for example 
in the article by Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm Maddox, “Érec et Énide: The First Arthurian 
Romance.”
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A bien dire et a bien aprandre;
Et tret d’un conte d’avanture
Une mout bele conjointure
Par qu’an puet prover et savoir
Que cil ne fet mie savoir
Que s’escience n’abandone
Tant con Dex la grasce l’an done.
D’Erec, le fil Lac, est li contes,
Que devant rois et devant contes
Depecier et corronpre suelent
Cil qui de conter vivre vuelent.
Des or comancerai l’estoire
Qui toz jorz mes iert an mimoire
Tant con durra crestiantez:
De ce s’est Crestiens vantez.45
(1–26)
The peasant in his proverb says that one might find oneself holding in con-
tempt something that is worth much more than one believes; therefore 
a man does well to make good use of his learning according to whatever 
understanding he has, for he who neglects his learning may easily keep silent 
something that would later give much pleasure. And so Chrétien de Troyes 
says that it is reasonable for everyone to think and strive in every way to 
speak well and to teach well, and from a tale of adventure he draws a beauti-
fully ordered composition that clearly proves that a man does not act intel-
ligently if he does not give free reign to his knowledge for as long as God 
gives him the grace to do so. This is the tale of Erec, son of Lac, which those 
who try to live by storytelling customarily mangle and corrupt before kings 
and counts. Now I shall begin the story that will be in memory for evermore, 
as long as Christendom lasts— of this does Chrétien boast.46
Chrétien’s performance is about finding value in something that one might 
initially be inclined to hold in contempt, thereby making the most of what 
Marie would call a “truly beneficial thing.” As with Marie, finding such value 
involves the engagement of performers in command of the requisite resources. 
Chrétien’s reference to the skills associated with the art of rhetoric— A bien dire 
et a bien aprandre— brings the Latin books of the ancients and a familiarity 
 45. Chrétien de Troyes, Érec et Énide (Dembowski).
 46. Idem, Erec and Enide (Carroll).
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with them into play as resources in his own performance. In contrast to the 
more subtle and varied approach taken by Marie, Chrétien considers that it is 
the literary resources of antiquity that will bring out the full potential of the 
contemporary storytellers’ tales (in  the form of his mout bele conjointure),47 
rather than vice versa. As with Marie, Chrétien’s performance envisions a joy 
or pleisir—“pleasure”—that will be a general, courtly one, and Chrétien also 
clearly puts his own qualifications and efforts on display as he discusses these 
matters. But the more pointed way in which his effort is made, and the mark-
ers whereby he aligns himself with the books and learning of the ancients 
and against the crudeness of the vernacular narrative material as previously 
handled, distinguishes his performance markedly from hers. In  contrast to 
Marie’s relatively humble reference to her working late into the night, Chrétien 
ends his Érec et Énide prologue with the boast that his work will be remem-
bered tant con durra crestiantez—“as long as Christianity endures.” This boast, 
besides its self- referential worth, has the effect of aligning the value of Chré-
tien’s learned treatment of the subject matter with the high political and social 
status of “kings and counts,” before whom the story has been “mangled and 
corrupted” by inferior performers until now.
 Chrétien’s speculation on the romances and the value of his mout bele 
conjointure—“beautifully ordered composition”—lives up to his claim and 
turns out to be an immensely successful poetic move.48 The joy that courtiers 
and later populations will find in this new kind of poetic action and its later 
permutations continues to the present day, but in our context, it is important 
to appreciate the initial parameters of this immensely successful and fruit-
ful poetic speculation. Chrétien is engaged in a rivalry with or competition 
against “those who wish to make their living by storytelling in the presence of 
counts and kings.” To a much greater degree than Marie, Chrétien emphasizes 
the possibly low, and hence suspect, value of the vernacular tales of adventure 
as performed by poets who, it  would seem, lack the necessary resources to 
realize their full value. The tales are justifiably held “in contempt,” regarded as 
“useless” to use the term of Otfried, or as in need of “finishing” to use that of 
 47. Murray’s above- cited preface to Chrétien de Troyes understands conjointure according 
to its Old French significance: “to unite, to assemble” (From Plato to Lancelot, 183). The term 
thus serves well to illustrate the conjoining of ancient and medieval Celtic poetic traditions that 
is occurring in the poetry of Chrétien, by virtue of his rhetorical accomplishment.
 48. Matilda Bruckner writes on the medieval reception of Chrétien: “His most successful 
stories and heroes, Lancelot and Perceval, supply the kernels for enormous romance cycles in 
prose, where they are completely absorbed and rewritten for readers whose voracious appetite 
for more leads to compilations like the Vulgate cycle, combining Arthurian and Grail history” 
(“Chrétien de Troyes,” 93–94).
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Marie, as long as they are not leveraged by the cultural resources a performer 
such as Chrétien can bring to bear.49
 The romance action of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries largely 
occurs according to the dynamic parameters set forth by Marie and Chrétien 
in their prologues. From the start, we observe an indeterminacy— an “unfin-
ished” condition— that enables and calls for moves and variations by sub-
sequent poet- performers. These moves are most conspicuously preserved in 
prologues and in increasingly lengthy and complex excursuses, in which the 
poets competitively place their own efforts and the criteria for the adequate 
assessment thereof on display. A  noteworthy example from the romance 
action in German is provided by Hartmann von Aue, the same poet to whom 
Gottfried conferred the laurel wreath for romance poetry in his literary review 
at the beginning of this chapter. Basing himself on Chrétien’s Érec et Énide, 
Hartmann composes and performs his Erec about a generation later (ca. 1180), 
and he takes the occasion of the description of Enite’s second horse— the one 
given to her after her happy reconciliation with her husband near the end of 
the romance— to  highlight his own poetic engagement and to unveil inter-
esting new poetic moves.50 Hartmann’s description of the horse, saddle, and 
saddle cloth, which occupies some five hundred verses, in comparison to the 
fifty or so lines in Chrétien’s text upon which it is based, would today most 
aptly be considered creative fiction. Hartmann’s competitive elaborations take 
their cue from those of Chrétien, and he indirectly claims to base himself on 
the French author, but Hartmann himself is the source of the elaborations, as a 
closer look at the specific moves he makes reveals.
 Chrétien already recognized the importance of the narrative moment in 
which Enide receives the second of two horses given to her as gifts. Follow-
ing her steadfast loyalty to her husband in the many difficult adventures they 
have faced together, Enide is now reconciled with him, jointly with him in 
command of her world again, and she must be given an appropriately grandi-
ose horse to ride. Chrétien gives her a palfrey with marvelous characteristics 
befitting the occasion. One side of the palfrey’s head is white, the other black, 
and the two sides are separated by a green line running down the middle. 
In addition, the bridle, breast strap, and saddle with which the horse is fitted 
are boene et bele (v. 5330)—“fine and beautiful.”51 The breast strap is studded 
with emeralds, the saddle is covered with precious cloth, and episodes from 
 49. See Lawrence Harf- Lancer’s essay, “Chrétien’s Literary Background.”
 50. For a more detailed consideration of Enite’s second horse and its gear as a literary- 
theoretical reflection, see my article “Theorizing German Romance.”
 51. Chrétien de Troyes, Erec and Enide (Carroll), 102.
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the story of Aeneas are carved on the ivory saddlebows. Chrétien assures us 
that the craftsmanship of the Breton sculptor was soutix—“delicate”—his carv-
ings bien tailliee—“fine” and tote a fin or apareilliee—“all embellished with 
gold”—and that he dedicated seven years of labor exclusively to this work.
 Hartmann varies and significantly extends Chrétien’s description of these 
things, beginning with the horse, which he renders as entirely black on one 
side and white on the other. The German poet also provides a brief account of 
the horse’s provenance, stating that its strange characteristics can be explained 
by the fact it was not bred in any real geographical place, but rather in an 
imaginary landscape of adventure in which the dwarf- like king Guivreiz— 
the host of Erec and Enite at this point in the romance— took it away from 
a savage dwarf in front of a mountain cave. Hartmann’s description of the 
horse and its trappings elaborates and distinguishes itself from that of Chré-
tien by underscoring the value of these things in its own singular way, accord-
ing to what might be called a gold standard. The dispossessed dwarf calls 
after Guivreiz and offers him three thousand marks of gold for returning the 
horse, which the latter refuses, suggesting the imaginary animal’s even greater 
worth. The same gold standard is visible in Hartmann’s rendering of the saddle 
which, beyond the gold embellishments, precious stones, and ivory mentioned 
by Chrétien, would be worth more than its own weight of the precious metal. 
Hartmann spins out Chrétien’s rendering of the physical- material charac-
teristics of the horse and its gear, and of their value, and he does the same 
with the literary- artistic work of the French poet’s unnamed Breton sculptor, 
for whom the German poet invents the name “Umbriz.” Hartmann’s Umbriz 
renders things on a grander scale than Chrétien’s unnamed craftsman. His 
carvings of daz lange liet von Troiâ (v. 7546)—“the long song of Troy”52—for 
example, in contrast to the French version, linger on the siege and destruc-
tion of the city (overlapping some events in Homer’s Illiad). As in the French 
version, Aeneas’s subsequent journeys are etched in images on the saddle 
(i.e.,  those events corresponding to Virgil’s poem), but Hartmann includes 
a saddlecloth on which are depicted the four elements and the diverse beasts 
inhabiting them, as  well as Jupiter and Juno enthroned in the heavens. The 
saddlecloth is also decorated, in the fine work of Umbriz, with images of the 
story of Thisbe and Pyramus, reinforcing the images of the story of Dido from 
the Aeneid and driving home the point that Enite is rising above the problems 
associated with the kind of love that leads to ruin rather than joy, the kind of 
love Enite and Erec themselves have managed to overcome. Hartmann’s many 
 52. Middle High German verses are cited from Hartmann von Aue, Erec (Cramer). English 
translations are from Hartmann von Aue, Erec (Vivian); here 136.
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elaborations, only the most significant of which have been mentioned here, 
place his knowledge of the books of the ancients very much on display. As the 
divergence from his story proper becomes ever wider and more elaborate, 
it becomes more difficult to ignore that the creative digressions are as much 
about Hartmann’s literary qualifications as they are about the characteristics 
of the imaginary horse he is describing.
 The manner in which Hartmann displays his literary qualifications 
includes the effort to provide parameters for critically assessing these qualifi-
cations. In a striking poetic move, Hartmann fashions an imaginary rival, one 
who resembles a know- it- all show- off among the members of his audience, 
who presumes to take over the poetic performance at the moment Hartmann 
is discussing how challenging an adequate and competent description of the 
saddle will be:
“nû swîc, lieber Hartman:
ob ich ez errâte?”
ich tuon: nû sprechet drâte.
“ich muoz gedenken ê dar nâch.”
nû vil drâte: mir ist gâch.
“dunke ich dich danne ein wîser man?”
jâ ir. durch got, nû saget an.
(7493–99)
“Now keep quiet, dear Hartmann, and see if I can guess.” “I shall, but speak 
quickly.” “I have to think about it first.” “Then very quickly. I’m in a hurry.” 
“Do  you think I’m a smart man?” “Certainly, but tell me now, for God’s 
sake.”53
As the ensuing exchange occurs, we may need to imagine Hartmann facing 
in one direction as himself, and in the opposite direction as his upstart rival, 
in his live performance of this confrontation before his courtly audience. In the 
ensuing back- and- forth between Hartmann and his imaginary rival, the lat-
ter advances, point by point, a plausible description of a real saddle, but his 
approach is plodding and tentative at best, likely based on practical experience 
with saddles, and it lacks the kind of polish and flair that would need to come 
from book learning and a full appreciation of the role this saddle has to play 
in Hartmann’s narrative. The attempts on the part of the rival to describe the 
saddle are met, point by point, with skepticism and ridicule by Hartmann. 
 53. Hartmann von Aue, Erec (Vivian), 136.
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When the rival finally asks if he got the description right, Hartmann responds 
and resumes control over his story in this way:
“sô hân ichz doch errâten?”
jâ, dâ si dâ trâten.
“ich hân lîhte etewaz verdaget?”
jâ enwizzet ir hiute, waz ir saget.
“enhân ich danne niht wâr?”
niht als grôz als umbe ein hâr.
“hân ich danne gar gelogen?”
niht, iuch hât sus betrogen
iuwer kintlîcher wân.
ir sult michz iu sagen lân.
(7516–25)
“So I did guess then?” “Yes, you hit it right on the head.” “Have I perhaps 
forgotten something?” “Right now you don’t know what you’re saying.” 
“So  I’m not right?” “Not by a mile.” “Did  I lie then?” “No, your childish 
fancy betrayed you. You should let me tell you.”54
The imaginary rival put into play by Hartmann in this staged stichomythia 
falls woefully short of the mark and is silenced in the end, not without a bit of 
“contempt” on the part of Hartmann (citing the term used by Chrétien). With 
this poetic move, Hartmann finds another way to place his performance on a 
higher level, corresponding to the high value of the events and things as he has 
been describing them. The engagement with his imaginary rival demonstrates 
that the value of the story as rendered by Hartmann has little to do with a 
standard of empirical probability, as a plodding “childish fancy” might have 
us believe. It has much to do with the capable and expeditious realization of 
narrative potential in the context of performance, staying poised and graceful 
under pressure, putting the “finishing touches” on parts of the story that can 
be made better. This is what Hartmann endeavors to do with his extensive 
original elaborations of the description of the horse as one finds it with Chré-
tien. Relying heavily on the Latin books of the ancients and the systematic 
learning associated with them, the same cultural resources into which Marie 
and Chrétien were tapping, Hartmann gives Enite a mount truly worthy of the 
occasion, and he gives his audience an artistic tour- de- force that magnifies the 
joy of the moment of Enite’s ascendancy after her many troubles.
 54. Ibid.
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 Hartmann von Aue’s competitive relationship to Chrétien leaves the latter 
unquestioned as the originator of the story, even as the German author’s creative 
additions extend, diverge from, and “finish” his French predecessor’s work, as the 
example of the description of Enite’s second horse shows. Wolfram von Eschen-
bach, the poet- performer disparaged in Gottfried’s literary review, proceeds quite 
differently as he works in the first decade of the thirteenth century, in ways that 
sharpen the poetic competition significantly. Wolfram differs from poets such 
as Marie, Chrétien, and Hartmann, especially in the ways he underscores his 
performance as an unlettered and chivalric poet, rather than as a learned and 
clerical one.55 Wolfram’s chivalric orientation is underscored in a famous excur-
sus that scholars have called the Selbstverteidigung—“self- defense”—in which the 
poet aggressively holds his own against the anger of unnamed ladies, whose ire 
he seems to have incurred by accusing one among their number of infidelity. The 
excursus is situated between the rendering of the birth of Parzival and his mother 
Herzeloyde’s departure with her infant son into the wilderness. In  the story 
proper at this point, as in the “self- defense,” the main theme is fidelity— a quality 
Herzeloyde possesses in overabundance, but which is contrastively lacking in 
the lady Wolfram has chastised here. Wolfram pointedly states that his anger is 
directed at one woman alone, but that if ladies choose to attack him collectively, 
they can expect to encounter strong resistance: Doch sulen si sich vergâhen niht / 
mit hurte an mîn hâmît: / si vindent werlîchen strît (vv. 114.26–28)—“They should 
not gallop ahead of themselves and charge at my palisade, they will meet stiff 
opposition there!”56 In the following verses, Wolfram highlights the resistance 
aggressors against him will encounter by presenting his chivalric qualifications:
Schildes ambet ist mîn art:
swâ mîn ellen sî gespart,
swelhiu mich minnet umbe sanc,
sô dunket mich ir witze cranc.
ob ich guotes wîbes minne ger,
mag ich mit schilde und ouch mit sper
verdienen niht ir minne solt,
al dar nâch sî si mir holt.
vil hôhes topels er doch spilt,
der an ritterschaft nâch minnen zilt.
(115.11–20)
 55. Wolfram’s unlettered chivalric approach is very much at odds with the great amount of 
book learning in his romance; see Arthur Groos, Romancing the Grail.
 56. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 68.
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My hereditary Office is the Shield! I should think any lady weak of under-
standing who loved me for mere songs unbacked by manly deeds. If I desire 
a good woman’s love and fail to win love’s reward from her with shield and 
lance, let her favour me accordingly. A man who aims at love through chi-
valric exploits rolls the dice for high stakes.57
The final verses of the cited passage establish an important connection between 
the performance of the poet Wolfram and those of the imaginary knights and 
ladies in his story. Adventure, understood both as a narrative performance 
(i.e., a story of adventures) and as the chivalric pursuit of honor and love in 
the imaginary action of the romances, is a high- risk game of chance in which 
one wagers oneself. The reference here to the chivalric profession and deeds- 
in- arms underscores the basic orientation of Wolfram’s poetic engagements. 
It gradually becomes clear that the poet in his “self- defense” is not only criti-
cally juxtaposing the infidelity of the lady he has chastised to the great fidelity 
Herzeloyde manifests in the imaginary action of his romance, but he is also 
warning the unnamed ladies whose wrath he has incurred that they should 
not underestimate his fortitude. He is also positioning himself vis- à- vis rivals 
in the poetic action. Common to the poet’s investment of himself on these dif-
ferent fronts— on behalf of the imaginary knights and ladies in his romance, 
against the ladies who are angry at him, vis- à- vis his poetic rivals— is that he is 
a knight, and a tested and confident one judging by his swagger. The chivalric 
resources he can commit to any one of these purposes can also be brought to 
bear for the others. Apparently, Wolfram’s audiences, unnamed ladies nursing 
a grudge, and poetic rivals would do well to respect his accomplishments as a 
chivalric performer, be this in battle, tournaments, or poetry.58
 Wolfram profiles himself as a knight in a manner that distinguishes him 
markedly from his German predecessor Hartmann von Aue, who also called 
himself a knight in two of his narrative works but aligned his chivalric sta-
tus with a clerical position of literacy and indebtedness to the books of the 
ancients.59 Wolfram contrastively elaborates the characteristics of his own chi-
valric profile in an unprecedented way in the final verses of his “self- defense”:
 57. Ibid. The Middle High German topels refers specifically to dice, so I have slightly mod-
ified Hatto’s rendering “gambles” with the italicized words.
 58. In the forward of his Parzival- translation, Hatto offers remarks on Wolfram’s chivalric 
posture in these verses that are consistent with my observations here: “In his Apology, inserted 
between the second and third chapters, Wolfram takes his stand not as a poet but as a knight, 
and in such bold and definite terms that he would have been howled down by the roughnecks 
of Thuringia had he not been a crack- jouster” (10).
 59. For example, in the prologues of his religious narrative Der arme Heinrich and of his 
Arthurian romance Iwein, Hartmann presents himself as a learned knight.
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hetens wîp niht vür ein smeichen,
ich solte iu vürbaz reichen
an disem maere unkundiu wort,
ich spraeche iu die âventiure vort.
swer des von mir geruoche,
der enzel si ze keinem buoche.
ichne kan deheinen buochstap.
dâ nement genuoge ir urhap:
disiu âventiure
vert âne der buoche stiure.
(115.21–30)
Unless the ladies thought it flattery, I should go on offering you things as yet 
unheard of in this story, I would continue this tale of adventure for you. But 
let whoever wishes me to do so, not take it as a book. I haven’t a letter to my 
name! No few poets make their start from them: but this story goes its way 
without the guidance of books.60
Wolfram’s not knowing a single letter of the alphabet is consistent with the 
lack of explicit references in his poetry to ancient books, which the poetry of 
Marie, Chrétien, Hartmann, and Gottfried contains. It is not consistent with 
his extensive depictions of medical procedures, the properties of gems and 
other stones, and astronomical bodies and occurrences— to  mention only 
some of the many things in Wolfram’s romance that indicate his familiarity 
with the contents of ancient books or medieval versions of them.61 It seems 
improbable if not impossible that Wolfram was illiterate, but this is the way he 
proudly engages himself in the poetic action.62 By diverging from other recent 
poet- performers and their habitual affiliation with the Latin books of ancient 
authors, Wolfram possibly appeals to the unlearned among “the most proven 
men and women” among his audience (elaborating the phrase of Otfried 
von Weissenburg), and perhaps also to the learned among them who might be 
amused and entertained by the unlearned pose of a performer whom they are 
 60. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 68–69.
 61. G. Ronald Murphy’s Gemstone of Paradise explores the connections between the (gem)
stones that are so pervasive in Wolfram’s romance and the poet’s conception of the Holy Grail. 
Wolfram’s extensive knowledge of science, medicine, and other cultural domains is also treated 
by Arthur Groos.
 62. The term literacy of course involves a variety of different capacities that may be present 
in different degrees in a single individual poet- performer; see Groos’s comments pertaining to 
literacy in the High Middle Ages (Romancing the Grail, passim and especially 33–35).
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in a position to know is not so. The latter, with some suspension of disbelief, 
might also find value in the unlettered chivalric posture for its intrinsic char-
acteristics, which more closely approximate the core military functions of the 
chivalric profession and noble courts than book learning and the polish and 
flourishes of rhetorical schooling (which some knights might regard as frills).
 In Hartmann’s depiction of Enite’s wonderful horse, we saw him flush out the 
corresponding passage in Chrétien’s Érec et Énide significantly. One of the cre-
ative elaborations of this description was the name “Umbriz,” which Hartmann 
gave to the craftsman, who can therefore be regarded as the imaginary creator 
of Hartmann’s many additions to the description of the saddle and saddle blan-
ket. We also saw with Hartmann that the value of the narrative additions he 
makes depends not on anything factual or probable, but rather on “finishing” 
the potential of the story— such as that of the moment when Enite rides forth in 
appropriate style toward a happy ending with her husband. Hartmann’s efforts in 
this particular description exemplify his engagement in the poetic action more 
generally, helping us to understand the relationship between his Erec (and Iwein) 
and the French poet’s Érec et Énide (and Yvain) in terms of an ongoing compe-
tition in which the attempt is always being made by the best poet- performers to 
realize more fully and completely the potential of a given story. Similarly, in the 
performance of his grail romance, Wolfram surveys the previous poetic action 
and engages it, with Chrétien de Troyes and Hartmann von Aue serving both 
as resources and rivals.63 Wolfram’s pointedly chivalric approach to the action, 
as visible in his “self- defense,” places him much more at odds with his illustrious, 
learned, clerically trained predecessors, not to mention with his consummately 
learned contemporary Gottfried von Strassburg, than they are from each other 
as a consequence of their common foregrounding of that training. Two more 
examples from Wolfram’s Parzival underscore this point.
 One of Wolfram’s striking moves involves pointedly addressing poetic 
rivals in the interest of his characters. An  important moment in Wolfram’s 
story occurs when the uncouth Parzival first arrives from his mother’s wilder-
ness at Arthur’s court to become a knight. Wild, unlettered, full of energy and 
potential, and completely forthright (though still inexperienced and naïve), 
Parzival is here cast much as Wolfram has cast himself in his “self- defense”—
someone whom one suspects the poet- performer would happily take under his 
wing. At this important juncture, comparable in significance to the moment in 
 63. Basing himself on concepts elaborated by Bakhtin, Groos sees Chrétien de  Troyes 
and Hartmann von Aue as representative of a “monologic” clerical variety of narrative, while 
Wolfram’s narrative manifests a “heterogenic pluralism” that is “highly unusual for a medieval 
narrative around 1200” (Ibid., 25).
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which Enite receives her horse with Hartmann’s clerically trained flourishes, 
Wolfram steps out of his story into a brief excursus in which he engages poetic 
rivals on behalf of his hero:
mîn hêr Hartman von Ouwe,
vrou Ginovêr iuwer vrouwe
und iuwer hêrre der künc Artûs,
den kumt ein mîn gast ze hûs.
bitet hüeten sîn vor spotte.
ern ist gîge noch diu rotte:
si sulen ein ander gampel nemen:
des lâzen sich durch zuht gezemen,
anders iuwer vrouwe Enîde
unt ir muoter Karsnafîde
werdent durch die mül gezücket
unde ir lop gebrücket.
sol ich den munt mit spotte zern,
ich wil mînen vriunt mit spotte wern.
(143.21–144.4)
Sir Hartmann of Aue, I  am sending a stranger to the palace to visit your 
lord and lady, King Arthur and Queen Ginover. Kindly shield him from 
mockery. He is no fiddle or rote. In the name of all that is seemly let people 
find something else to strum on!–otherwise your Lady Enite and her mother 
Karsnafite will be dragged through the mill and their reputations lowered! 
If I am to twist my mouth to jibes, with jibes I will defend my friend!64
Only a few verses later, Wolfram seeks to defend his hero on a different front. 
To  those who might be inclined to find fault with the young and inexperi-
enced Parzival because they compare him negatively with the fine courtly 
bearing of Gottfried’s Tristan when the latter first arrives at Marke’s court, 
Wolfram has this to say:
in zôch dehein Curvenâl:
er kunde curtôsîe niht,
als ungevarnem man geschiht.
(144.20–22)
 64. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 83.
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No Kurvenal had reared him, he knew nothing of fine manners as is often 
the case with a stay- at- home.65
The peasants’ proverb cited by Chrétien in his Érec and Énide- prologue seems 
pertinent at this moment: “What you scorn may be worth much more than 
you think.” Wolfram’s aggressively defensive posture toward poetic rivals sug-
gests indirectly that Parzival’s worth may be much more than it may seem to 
be at this moment, that the derision he soon receives at Arthur’s court from 
Keie will be more than sufficient. Poetic rivals should not take advantage of 
Parzival’s inexperienced condition at this vulnerable moment, Wolfram seems 
to say, and thereby add insult to injury. In this brief excursus, Wolfram artic-
ulates the competitive action among poet- performers with the imaginary per-
formances of the knights and ladies in their stories. The former can become 
advocates, allies, and supporters of the latter, and motivating the alliance in 
this case is a standard of chivalric excellence that Parzival has not yet achieved 
(though he will), rather than anything associated with “fine manners.”
 The move with which Wolfram perhaps most pointedly distinguishes him-
self from poetic rivals involves his posture toward his predecessor and source, 
Chrétien de Troyes. By means of additions such as his challenge to Hartmann 
(and also implicitly to Gottfried, with his Curvenal- reference), Wolfram 
increases the dimensions of the grail story significantly beyond that of Chré-
tien’s unfinished Perceval. The similarities of Parzival to Perceval show that the 
latter was a source for the former, but Wolfram brashly brushes Chrétien off as 
his source and claims instead to base himself on the story of a mysterious and 
otherwise unknown Provençal “master,” whom he calls “Kyot.”66 Somewhat 
like Hartmann’s “Umbriz,” but in a much more encompassing way, Kyot stands 
in for a later poet- performer’s creative elaborations of an earlier one.67 As an 
 65. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 83.
 66. “Kyot” possibly points in the direction of a historical Guiot, but no scholarly consensus 
has ever coalesced in this regard, which still leaves us with an imaginary Kyot as the most likely 
explanation for Wolfram’s extensive elaborations.
 67. “Kyot” provides a possible way of understanding the enigmatic lines that follow 
Wolfram’s claim that his story proceeds without the guidance of books: ê man si hete vür ein 
buoch, / ich waere ê nacket âne touch, / sô ich in dem bade saeze, / ob ich des questen niht ver-
gaeze (vv. 116, 1–4)—“Rather than that it be taken as a book, I  should prefer to sit naked in 
my tub without a towel— provided I had my scrubber!” (Wolfram von  Eschenbach, Parzival 
[Hatto], 69). Remembering that Wolfram is performing in front of a live audience, he might 
well be saying he would rather be standing stark naked in front of his audience than have his 
tale understood as book based, as long as he has a little bush (questen) to cover up his nakedness 
(i.e., the fact that the story is his own creation). In a certain sense, Wolfram is naked: what the 
audience is hearing and seeing is him and his story. The “Kyot” that he will later introduce as 
his source would seem to function well as such a questen—“scrubber,” by means of which the 
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important element in his own chivalric finishing of the story, Wolfram crowds 
Chrétien out of the picture and claims to share credit only with the unknown 
and probably invented Provençal. In his prologue, Wolfram had already indi-
cated the lengths to which he would have to be able and willing to go in his 
performance:
nu lât mîn eines wesen drî,
der ieslîcher sunder pflege
daz mîner künste widerwege:
dar zuo gehôrte wilder vunt,
ob si iu gerne taeten kunt
daz ich iu eine künden will.
(4.2–7)
Grant there were three of me, each with skill to match mine: there would 
still be need of unbridled inspiration to tell you what, single- handed, I have 
a mind to tell!68
The inspiration will not be lacking. Wolfram follows through with his initial 
boast and successfully brings his principal heroes Parzival and Gawan to the 
joyful ends of their respective adventures. The rich transmission of Wolfram’s 
grail romance, and the esteem in which he was held by later poet- performers, 
suggests his speculation regarding the value of a strongly chivalric “finishing” 
of Chrétien’s unfinished grail story was a quite successful one.69
 Near the beginning of this chapter, we considered Gottfried von Strass-
burg’s “literary review,” and we turn now to the performance from which this 
review was taken, the romance Tristan, which predictably adds more super-
lative poetic moves to the ones we have already seen. We observed above that 
Gottfried thinks little of Wolfram’s pointedly unlettered chivalric approach, 
and that he prefers instead a clerical, rhetorical standard of stylistic clarity and 
formal elegance, which he sees most joyfully realized by Hartmann von Aue, 
the winner of his laurel wreath for narrative poetry. Gottfried takes a bookish 
poet- performer covers this nakedness, though people still clearly see and know who is standing 
in front of them.
 68. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 16.
 69. Unfinished, both in the way that any and every previous work is unfinished and in 
need of completion by later poets, but also unfinished in the conventional sense: Chrétien’s 
story breaks off in the middle of Gauvain’s adventures following Perceval’s stay with the hermit. 
On Wolfram’s extraordinary impact in the subsequent poetic action in the German vernacular, 
see Bumke, Wolfram von Eschenbach, 29–32; and Dallapiazza, Wolfram von Eschenbach, 28–29.
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approach to questions of narrative style, organization, and adornment, but 
this approach is no less strikingly novel in its own way than that of Wolfram, 
perhaps necessarily so in view of the subject matter. How can the maximum 
possible courtly joy be gained from a story about an adulterous love affair in 
which a king is cuckolded by his wife and nephew? What good to the court is 
the love between the bravest, handsomest, and most effective knight and the 
most beautiful and resourceful lady, when the lady is married to another? The 
answers to these questions, as suggested by Gottfried in his prologue, amount 
to an unprecedented speculation on the value of a love that can only be fully 
appreciated by a smaller population of courtiers with very special characteris-
tics, to which the poet addresses himself here more specifically:
ein ander werlt die meine ich,
diu samet in eime herzen treit
ir süeze sûr, ir liebez leit,
ir herzeliep, ir senede nôt,
ir liebez leben, ir leiden tôt,
ir lieben tôt, ir leidez leben.
dem leben sî mîn leben ergeben,
der werlt wil ich gewerldet wesen,
mit ir verderben oder genesen.
(58–66)
I have another world in mind which together in one heart bears its bitter- 
sweet, its dear sorrow, its heart’s joy, its love’s pain, its dear life, its sorrowful 
death, its dear death, its sorrowful life. To this life let my life be given, of this 
world let me be part, to be damned or saved with it.70
Later in this study, we shall see that investments in love in the High Middle 
Ages have primarily imperial or universal rather than individual parameters. 
Even as an individual experience, love is supposed to be joyful for the court as 
a whole, that is, for the noble households of principes. Love serves as a resource 
and a reward on account of the universal value it has beyond individuals and 
couples. The individual experiences love as something universal without yet 
being positioned to harness, contain, or otherwise lay claim to it as something 
purely or strictly individual. Gottfried nevertheless seems to take steps in the 
direction of a love of more differentiated, possibly individualized dimensions 
(i.e., at least in terms of different individual communities at court). The good 
 70. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 42.
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and the joy in the love of Tristan and Isolt is not for everybody at court, he tells 
us in the cited passage, but for a more limited and specific group, the edele 
herzen—“noble hearts.” This poetic move intends not to exclude anyone at 
court, but rather to identify, cultivate, and extol a more limited population 
that is capable of accomplishing something of value for everyone. The noble 
hearts are capable of realizing a special, higher joy in love, because they are 
prepared to accept the pain that always goes along with it, which makes love 
all the more joyful and sweet:
diz leit ist liebes alse vol,
daz übel daz tuot sô herzewol,
daz ez kein edele herze enbirt,
sît ez hie von geherzet wirt.
(115–18)
This sorrow is so full of joy, this ill is so inspiriting that, having once been 
heartened by it, no noble heart will forego it!71
Gottfried invests in a higher love— a love that only a specialist courtly popu-
lation of noble hearts is able to appreciate— and thereby gives high a new and 
very different sense (vis- à- vis the Christian parameters of love). But he also 
hedges his bets by conceding vröuden—“courtly joys,” though doubtless less 
refined and valuable ones than those to which the noble hearts have access, 
to  the “world of the many” (see vv.  45–53). The two populations with their 
different levels of joy in love remain connected by virtue of a consequential 
poetic move that Gottfried makes in the very first verses of his romance:
Gedaehte mans ze guote niht
von dem der werlde guot geschiht,
sô waere ez allez alse niht,
swaz guotes in der werlde geschiht.
(1–4)
If we failed in our esteem of those who confer benefits on us, the good that 
is done among us would be as nothing.”72
 71. Ibid.
 72. Ibid., 41; I will return to this passage from Gottfried’s prologue in chapter six, where the 
focus falls more squarely on the proper appraisal of the efforts of the lovers Tristan and Isolt in 
the imaginary action.
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In these beginning verses, before the more specific terms of Gottfried’s poetic 
performance (i.e., the story of adulterous love) have become clear, the court 
as a whole is being addressed and asked to accept a general accounting. Every-
thing done for the good of the court needs to be valued, presumably even a 
good that some or even many might not be in a position to understand or 
recognize as such. Gottfried thereby establishes at the outset parameters that 
he regards as appropriate for the accurate assessment of the value of Tristan 
and Isolt’s love— and for the assessment of his own poetic performance of it.73
 The balance Gottfried strikes in his poetic performance between the 
capacities and preferences of the noble hearts and those of the “world of the 
many,” in  order to realize the greatest possible value in love for the court, 
seems to be precarious. The medieval continuators of Gottfried’s unfinished 
romance will heap praise on him for the rhetorical, stylistic standard of his 
verses, without endeavoring to reiterate, critically engage, or  elaborate the 
moves whereby Gottfried preserves the absoluteness of (adulterous) love and 
confers the task of competently evaluating and experiencing it to specialists 
at court best equipped to accomplish this. The continuators of Gottfried’s 
unfinished romance seem to speculate that their own audiences are not likely 
to have edele herzen among them who will respond joyously to such moves, 
or they perhaps doubt that their own ability to adorn such a challenging sub-
ject matter beautifully and pleasingly will be up to the task.74 The value of love 
for later medieval poet- performers and audiences is thereby set accordingly. 
The assessments of modern poets, artists, and audiences will be individual-
ized and varied. Negative appraisals include that of the famous philologist and 
editor Karl Lachmann in the early nineteenth century, who considered that 
Tristan contains little more than Üppigkeit oder Gotteslästerung— “voluptuous-
ness or blasphemy.”75 Richard Wagner, quite differently, finds in the absolute 
love of Gottfried’s performance an artistic move worth reiterating for his indi-
vidualized modern audiences (just as he also finds value in Wolfram’s Parzi-
val). We observe that the standard set by Gottfried’s poetic moves in the sec-
ond decade of the thirteenth century is not again reached in the Middle Ages 
and remains a challenge and inspiration to modern audiences. One might 
therefore be tempted to maintain that Gottfried earns the role of supreme 
arbiter that he plays in the poetic review with which we began this chapter. 
 73. Compare Haug, who, based on a detailed analysis of Gottfried’s prologue, states the 
poet is developing what amounts to an “ethics of love” (Vernacular Literary Theory, 196–227).
 74. Monika Schausten’s Erzählwelten presents detailed considerations of the medieval 
continuations of Gottfried’s unfinished poem by Ulrich von  Türheim (201–50) and Heinrich 
von Freiberg (251–86).
 75. Lachmann, Kleinere Schriften zur Philologie, 159. The English rendering is mine.
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We must of course bear in mind that Gottfried’s review includes only the prin-
cipal German poets (i.e.,  the French poets were first, and the German poets 
have the disadvantages and advantages associated with their retrospective 
positions vis- à- vis their predecessors) and that his assessment of Wolfram— 
in view of the latter’s lasting record of success— is harsh and indicative of the 
intensity of the competition between these two luminaries of very different 
poetic inclinations.
 We have seen in this chapter that poet- performers at noble courts in the 
High Middle Ages regard the poetic action as something that can and must be 
made better, or finished, and poets do so with varying degrees of capacity and 
flair. Poet- performers engage each other with reference to standards that have 
been set, which they hope at least to equal if not surpass with their own inno-
vative moves. The joy of the court seems largely to depend on the competitive 
efforts of the poet- performers, so those with any poetic talent should engage 
themselves— work late into the night, as Marie tells us she did— to maintain 
or improve their own position and to help insure that the action at court is 
moving in a fruitful and gratifying direction. We have also observed, in the 
competitive give- and- take among the medieval poet- performers, that new 
standards are continually being set by tapping into the potential of the ver-
nacular languages and their associated narrative traditions. The poetic action 
at medieval courts is largely about achieving an optimal, joyful convergence of 
the high cultural resources associated with the language of God since Roman 
antiquity and the lower ones associated with the emerging vernacular lan-
guages of European peoples in the Middle Ages. In  the next two chapters, 
we turn to the imaginary action of the romances and to its principal specula-
tive concerns: adventure as a play for the regard in which one is held by one’s 
courtly peers and love as the investment of oneself in another.
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C H A P T E R  5
Adventure as a Cultural Wager
DYNAMICS OF ADVENTURE
Rendered in the verse romances by the Old French âventure and its Middle 
High German derivative âventiure, the term adventure designates both the 
narrative performances of poet- performers such as Marie de France, Chrétien 
de Troyes, Hartmann von Aue, and Wolfram von Eschenbach, as well as the 
efforts of figures such as Erec, Enide, and Parzival in the imaginary action of 
the romances. The poets in their performances of the romances before courtly 
audiences as well as the imaginary characters with their chivalric deeds before 
the eyes of their own courtly peers in the romances are jointly engaged in 
adventure as a competitive move. As  we saw in the previous chapter, top 
romance performers compete with each other at the courts of noble house-
holds, mustering the resources available to them in order to rise to the highest 
level. In the imaginary action of the romances, adventure as a cultural move 
occurs as the questing self engages another mutable self or thing in this tem-
poral world in a newly indeterminate way in the interest of growth. We shall 
observe in this chapter that this move happens competitively as a speculative 
wagering of self.
 The imaginary adventuring of knights and ladies in the romances has 
dynamics that are specific to it and others— such as the interest in joy as 
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outcome and the understanding that one has to engage oneself if one pos-
sesses the necessary resources— that it shares with competitive performances 
in other cultural domains. Since the adventuring of the knights and ladies 
in the romances is imaginary— a  specific kind of action occurring as men-
tal simulations and their accompanying physiological sensations— it seems to 
be at the farthest remove from any kind of embodied, real cultural practice.1 
Imagining something seems to be different, possibly categorically different, 
from actually doing something. Hence, the pretend or make believe status of 
adventures in romance poetry tends to be what is definitive of them in some 
scholarly views.2 The times and places at court in which people occupy them-
selves with imaginary adventures— such as the moment when the live per-
former Wolfram defends his Parzival when the latter first arrives at Arthur’s 
court3—might also be considered pretend in the same way as the imaginary 
action in the romances. However, as the understanding of adventure as some-
thing unreal is widened to include the embodied poetic action of live perform-
ers and audiences at real historical courts, it is on a slippery slope. When and 
where do pretend events stop and real ones begin? If  the actual live perfor-
mances of rival poets at courts were to be understood in some way as unreal, 
would the same not be true of chivalric tournaments (as pretend warfare along 
the lines of chivalric contests in the romances), or perhaps also of courtly fes-
tivals such as Barbarossa’s in Mainz in 1184 (as a staged show of imperial unity 
under the banner of chivalry that seems in many ways to bring the action of 
the romances to life)?4
 Close scrutiny of the dynamics of the physical- material infrastructure of 
imaginary action makes it more difficult for us to fix or isolate this action 
as something unreal. Research using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) into brain activity that occurs when people read fictional narratives 
 1. All courtiers have an interest in adventure, and ladies frequently share with knights the 
direct involvement in the vicissitudes of adventuring, as  in the cases of Antikonie and Enide 
to be examined in this chapter.
 2. I again cite as an example Bumke, who writes: “The courtly poets constructed an image 
of society that lacked everything that made life difficult and oppressive” (Courtly Culture, 4). 
Alternately, Rüdiger Schnell has argued for a “free space” within which court poetry needs to 
be see as operating (“Kirche, Hof, und Liebe”).
 3. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Lachmann), here vv. 143.21–144.4; this passage was 
discussed in the previous chapter.
 4. Bumke aligns court festivals with court poetry, conceding some reality to them, but 
maintaining that the festival, just as poetry, lacks “the gloomy aspects of daily life” (Courtly 
Culture, 4). The discrepancy between a more or less explicitly unrealistic poetry and festive con-
text, on the one hand, and the “gloomy” reality of medieval life, on the other, shapes Bumke’s 
conception of courtly culture in general. On the relationship of Barbarossa’s festival in Mainz 
and the ideals of knighthood, see Fleckenstein, “Friedrich Barbarossa.”
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suggests that all imaginary action is physiologically embodied.5 The mental 
simulation of events involved in the apprehension of fictional narratives pro-
duces measurable activity in the brain and hence is real in this respect. Regions 
of the brain involved in the understanding of imaginary actions in stories and 
those involved in actually carrying out such actions largely overlap, suggesting 
that the apprehension of language more generally is grounded in visual and 
motor simulations. Reading the words run or kick, for example, involves men-
tal simulations in the same regions of the brain that are involved in running 
and kicking. Extending the insights of this modern scientific research to past 
times, it seems to follow that medieval people who watch and listen to a poet- 
performer relating an account of chivalric action would neurologically simu-
late the hoofbeats of a galloping horse and the impact of swords on shields in 
their comprehension of a story about chivalric deeds- in- arms as it progresses. 
In modern readers of a medieval romance, these actions also are simulated, 
though presumably with less vividness and accuracy, corresponding to the 
lack of a live performer and their relatively diminished experience in the life 
domains to which the narrative events corresponded in medieval culture.6
 Research suggests that neural simulations of imagined actions go beyond 
discrete simple events like running, kicking, or  galloping. An  fMRI- based 
study by Speer, Reynolds, Swallow, and Zacks of brain activity during read-
ing shows that the apprehension of far more complex fictional narratives— 
involving imaginary interactions with characters and objects, the spatial 
and temporal layouts of situations, and goals and intentions— activates the 
same regions of the brain that are active when such matters are negotiated in 
embodied, real- world action:
Readers dynamically activate specific visual, motor, and conceptual features 
of activities while reading about analogous changes in activities in the con-
text of a narrative: regions involved in processing goal- directed human activ-
ity, navigating spatial environments, and manually manipulating objects in 
the real world increased in activation at points when those specific aspects of 
the narrated situation were changing. For example, when readers processed 
changes in a character’s interactions with an object, precentral and parietal 
areas associated with grasping hand movements increased in activation.7
 5. See Yarkoni, et al., “Pictures of a Thousand Words”; and Speer, et al., “Reading Stories.”
 6. See Mar and Oatley, “Function of Fiction”: “Personal experience plays an important 
role in how transported or immersed in a piece of narrative fiction a reader becomes” (here 
178).
 7. Speer, et al., “Reading Stories,” 995–96.
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Narrative action involving purposeful, goal- directed movement and the 
manipulation of objects is thus neurologically embodied, whether such action 
involves a person walking through a room and pausing to pick up a shiny 
object from a table along the way, the Pauline- Augustine self moving through 
the world toward its heavenly reward without letting itself be distracted by 
the attractive people and things beckoning to it, or a knight fighting his way 
through a wasteland in search of the Holy Grail. One of the conclusions of the 
cited study is that “the use of sensory and motor representations during story 
comprehension may reflect a more general neural mechanism for grounding 
cognition in real- world experience.”8 Scientific evidence supports the idea that 
imaginary actions associated with chivalric adventuring in the romances is 
grounded in neurological processes in regions of the brain that are involved 
in observing or carrying out the same actions in one’s life experience, such as 
encountering opposition in the pursuit of one’s goals, dealing with the death 
in combat of a loved one, and balancing supremely important life priorities. 
Another study has suggested that fictional narratives, understood as simula-
tive models, provide a manner of rehearsing what I have been calling different 
dispositions of self:
Story engagement is the structured recreation of an abstracted social inter-
action. This supplies advantages beyond spontaneous imagination. When 
reading, we are also recipients of a narrator’s or protagonist’s construal of 
the situation and its solution, and such a contribution may provide us with 
new perspectives and possibly new solutions. Narratives allow us to try out 
solutions to emotional and social difficulties through the simulation of these 
experiences, as we try to comprehend the actions of protagonists and pon-
der how our own responses may compare were we presented with the same 
situation.9
It seems to follow that medieval courtiers, having elsewhere imagina-
tively rehearsed a certain disposition of self by reading or hearing treatises 
by St.  Augustine or stories of eremitic saints, would find their brains simi-
larly exercised by the simulations generated by the chivalric romances— for 
example, the visual and motor simulations of the violent struggles of knights 
against chivalric opponents, giants, or dragons, which would overlap some-
what with those of saints against demons. But different activations would need 
to occur in the simulation of the dynamics and purposes of adventure, that 
 8. Ibid., 998.
 9. Mar and Oatley, “Function of Fiction,”183–84.
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is, those involving the orientation of self toward mutable things as opposed to 
the otherworldly reward of the saints’ striving. By way of their involvement in 
the imaginary action of the romances, courtiers would become accustomed 
to and practiced in the spatial and temporal twists and turns of things that 
are involved in new kinds of absolute investments of self. If narratives such as 
the saints’ lives or Augustine’s City of God against the pagans can be assumed 
to activate regions of peoples’ brains and bodies in ways that help them live 
holy lives and turn away from the temptations of temporal cultural goods, 
then the chivalric romances might be expected to help people in the complex 
engagements with mutable selves and things that are involved in adventuring 
and loving. The simulative models involved in imaginary adventuring prepare, 
rehearse, reinforce, and otherwise enable adventurous (and amorous) action, 
understood here as the competitive endeavor to derive optimal enjoyment 
from the temporal, perishable resources of this world.10
 Imaginary adventuring is construed in this chapter— as  it is construed 
generally in this study— as a cultural move, a disposition of self that remains 
available throughout the cultural action. In  this chapter, the dynamics of 
imaginary adventuring will be illustrated in two related ways, with the help 
of verses from significant courtly chivalric romances produced in the late 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. First, the focus in the continuation of 
this section below will be on the dynamics of adventure as a cultural wager. 
Adventure is set forth in the romances as a new disposition of the Pauline- 
Augustine self, in which spiritual- intellectual and physical- material resources 
 10. A passage from the didactic work of Thomasin von Zirclaria, Der Welsche Gast [Rück-
ert], from the second decade of the thirteenth century, provides medieval corroboration of 
the broader applicability of the imaginary action of the romances: Wâ  ist Êrec und Gâwân  / 
Parzivâl und Îwân? / ich weiz si ninder. Daz geschiht / dâ von daz wir haben niht / Artûs inder 
imme lant.  / lebt er, wir vunden sâ zehant  / in der werlde rîter gnuoc  / die sô vrum sint und 
gevuoc / daz mans möht heizen Îwæn, / als mich dunkt und als ich wæn. / vür wâr ich ez iu sagen 
wil, / man vunde noch der rîter vil, / daz si an der tugende wec / uns möhten wol erstaten Êrec 
(vv. 6325–38)—“Where are Erec and Gawain, where are Parzival and Iwein? I don’t know that 
they are anywhere, and this has come about because we do not have Arthur in this country. 
If he were alive, we could immediately find plenty of knights in the world who were so decent 
and just that people could call them Iwein or so it seems to me or so I believe. Indeed, I want 
to say to you that many knights could still be found who through their virtues could easily take 
the place of Erec” (Der Welsche Gast [The Italian Guest] [Gibbs and McConnell], 130). In their 
commentary on this passage, the translators Gibbs and McConnell arrive at an observation 
similar to mine: “Thomasin highlights his despondence at the apparent absence of virtuous 
people by this lament for the central heroes of Arthurian romance and for King Arthur himself. 
The message would be very clear to an audience conversant with the tales of Chrétien de Troyes, 
and, in German, of Hartmann von Aue and Wolfram von Eschenbach. Yet his final comment 
here shows that, for him, these are the representatives of courtly values, which could still be 
revived by others” (239).
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have been articulated by means of faith. Beyond its Christian disposition in 
the interest of the heavenly reward, the medieval self in adventure is opened 
up to and absolutely invested in another, temporal, worldly good— honor, the 
regard in which one is held by one’s courtly chivalric peers. Pending circum-
stances and outcomes, this novel disposition of self leads to joy and growth 
in the event of success, to pain and decline in the event of failure.11 Character-
istic of the adventurous disposition of self are the indeterminate movements 
of selves and things through time and space, which occur in a manner akin 
to the movements of rolling dice or knights in a melee. Not coincidentally, 
where adventures are being depicted in the first significant verse romances by 
poet- performers such as Chrétien de Troyes, Hartmann von Aue, and Wol-
fram von Eschenbach, the descriptive language of choice is that of games and 
particularly games of chance.
 After considering the dynamics of adventure as a cultural wager based 
on individual examples from different romances, I  look more closely at two 
of the most illustrious verse romances, Chrétien’s Érec et Énide and Wolfram 
von  Eschenbach’s Parzival. My  main focus will be on highlights from these 
romances that show the adventurous wagering of self to be the principal con-
cern. I  also look at the role played by an important narrative design of the 
early verse romances, the “mout bele conjointure” of Chrétien de Troyes, as a 
poetic arrangement of adventures in Chrétien’s Érec et Énide, and— though 
significantly varied and extended— in  Wolfram von  Eschenbach’s Parzival. 
This narrative design presents itself as a poetic move whereby adventures in 
the imaginary world of the knights and ladies of King Arthur’s court are con-
veyed to medieval courtly audiences in an optimally joyful way. In the bipar-
tite arrangement of adventures begun by Chrétien (and reiterated and varied 
by later poet- performers such as Wolfram), as in adventures as single efforts, 
we continue to observe that the action occurs competitively. The manner in 
which adventures are arranged in series creates imaginary worlds that are in 
competition with one another— as well as with monastic views of the world of 
a more sharply dualistic bent. These competing imaginary worlds of adven-
ture have ideological values and implications (i.e., monastic, clerical, courtly 
chivalric), as a consideration of the contrasting evaluations of adventuring by 
Chrétien, Wolfram— and of the famous Cistercian monastic writer Bernard of 
Clairvaux— will show.
•
 11. For a wide- ranging study of pain in the works of the poet Hartmann von Aue, see Scott 
Pincikowski, Bodies of Pain.
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The orientation of self in adventure is succinctly stated by the knight Kalo-
greant at the beginning of Hartmann von Aue’s Iwein (ca. 1205). Having left 
the court of Arthur in search of adventure, Kalogreant finds himself in the 
wilds of the forest Breziljân, where the going is arduous. The wild space of 
Kalogreant’s purposeful adventurous movement resembles a chivalric reiter-
ation of the departure into the desert of eremitic saints. The chivalric forest 
and the eremitic desert are remote from the comforts of the world and charac-
terized by difficulty of movement and the value attached to engagements with 
the spirits, people, and objects inhabiting them. Compared to the heavenly 
purpose of the eremite, for whom the wilderness is usually a one- way route 
leading irrevocably away from the things of the world, the aim of Kalogreant’s 
staking of self is very different. When the knight comes to a clearing, he finds 
a wild man to whom he explains that he is seeking adventure. When the wild 
man fails to understand and asks him what adventure is— âventiure? waz ist 
daz?—Kalogreant replies:
ich heize ein riter und hân den sin
daz ich suochende rîte
einen man der mit mir strîte,
der gewâfent sî als ich.
daz prîset in, und sleht er mich:
gesige aber ich im an,
sô hât man mich vür einen man,
und wirde werder danne ich sî.12
(530–37)
I am called a knight, and my purpose is to ride in search of a man who is 
armed like me and will fight with me. He will gain fame by defeating me, 
while if I win the victory, I shall be thought a valiant warrior and esteemed 
more highly.13
What is at stake in adventure as defined here by Kalogreant is the value of the 
courtly chivalric self.14 The principal term for the growth of self in question is 
 12. Hartmann von Aue, Iwein (Benecke and Lachmann). Numbers of Middle High Ger-
man and Old French verses from the romances here and elsewhere are cited parenthetically in 
text.
 13. While I cite Richard Lawson’s more recent translation of Hartmann’s Iwein elsewhere, 
in this case I prefer the more literal rendering of J. W. Thomas, 61.
 14. I differ from those scholarly appraisals that have viewed Kalogreant’s definition of 
adventure as an indication of his shortcomings or of a flawed approach. See, for example, 
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honor (Old French enor, Middle High German êre), understood as the regard 
in which one is held by one’s courtly peers. The fluctuating value of self that 
is evident in Kalogreant’s definition contrasts with the determinate value of 
self that we observed in the first chapter of this study. In the cultural action 
at Troy, the status of figures such as Achilles and Hector was relatively fixed 
and not subject to the variability associated by Kalogreant with the outcomes 
of the most proximate individual contests. The warrior (Achilles) wins all the 
battles, the lover (Paris) loves the most beautiful woman, the trickster (Odys-
seus) outwits his adversaries, the sage (Nestor) has the best overview of the 
action based on its history. In the cultural action at a place like Troy, the out-
comes of individual contests are largely fixed from the start by the status of 
the contestants engaged in them and by the decisions of higher- ups. In  the 
high medieval chivalric action as rendered by Kalogreant in his definition of 
adventure, the value of self is relatively indeterminate, variable, and dependent 
on the most recent outcomes and the immediately upcoming ones.
 The variability of the value of self in adventuring corresponds to an increas-
ingly indeterminate, fluid cultural action based on adventurous elaborations 
of the Pauline- Augustine bipartite self. This Christian self, as we observed in 
earlier chapters, is  already indeterminate or virtual because of the different 
orientations of the cultural resources articulated in and by it. Resources such 
as spirit and intellect tend toward the immutable heavenly kingdom as the 
highest and greatest principle of integrity, while resources such as flesh and 
matter tend toward the often painful disorder associated with mutability and 
disintegration (= evil, from a leveling, dualist perspective). These contrasting 
orientations are joined together in a self that is racing, like Paul’s Christian 
athlete in 1 Corinthians 9:24, for the heavenly prize of the afterlife. The final 
outcome of the race is not yet decided, but it is clear that the outcome will be 
based on the articulation of these resources and, particularly, on  how indi-
viduals dispose of the physical- material ones. Since the definitive criteria for 
deciding winners and losers are unknowable in this life and will not be com-
pletely clear until Judgment Day, there is wide latitude for the Christian self 
to try out different cultural moves such as adventure. Adventure increases the 
indeterminacy of the Christian’s involvement in the cultural action by adding 
to the uncertainty of the race for the heavenly prize another level of inde-
terminacy connected to placing oneself at risk in the interest of a mutable 
worldly good such as honor, as we see in the case of Kalogreant. If the status of 
Jaeger, Origins of Courtliness, 245. However flawed Kalogreant himself might be, the idea that 
his approach is flawed is not supported by the chivalric action as Hartmann renders it, or as it 
tends to be rendered in the verse romances generally.
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the Pauline- Augustine Christian athlete racing for the otherworldly prize was 
already indeterminate, corresponding to God’s outstanding final judgments 
concerning ultimate winners and losers, the adventurous turn toward and 
investment in mutable things adds additional major hurdles to the race.
 Kalogreant’s definition of adventure underlies what is generally called 
knight errantry. A knight risks what he is and has by putting himself in motion 
and riding from the comforts of the court into a forest full of challenges. 
He knows that other knights are doing so, for which reason he may not remain 
idle (as we shall see in Érec et Énide below), and he knows that opportunities 
to engage one or another of these knights will come. The possibility of increas-
ing the value of self, referenced above by Kalogreant, is always accompanied 
by the inverse possibility of a decreased value of self in the case of defeat. 
Kalogreant does not mention the latter eventuality, but he soon experiences 
and later reports it in the continuation of Hartmann’s narrative. Exposing one-
self to risk in adventure is not limited to chivalric contests, because there are 
numerous other opponents against whom adventuring knights have to con-
tend, such as beasts, giants, and demons. But the status accruing to adven-
turing knights based on successful engagements with such creatures is negli-
gible compared to the honor to be gained from prevailing against a qualified 
knight. This honor is usually directly proportional to the regard in which the 
opponent is held upon entering a given contest. In this respect, the dynamics 
of knight errantry somewhat resemble those of a zero- sum game (an idea to 
which I return below). Knights engage in this game as contestants for honor as 
a cultural resource that tends to be regarded as limited. The honor of knights 
in this ongoing chivalric action is variable and continually in flux. Some 
knights have more of it than others, and the relative positions of knights are 
continually contingent on the most proximate outcomes, recent and upcom-
ing. The ongoing importance of the most proximate outcomes makes knight 
errantry look like an extended venture. Whatever one’s status might be at a 
given moment, there is always the possibility of growth if one can figure out 
how to engage oneself successfully, or of the inverse if one fails to do so.
 The twists and turns of knight errantry— experienced physiologically by 
audiences of the romances, as we saw at the outset of this chapter— vary sig-
nificantly from the action of eremitic saints, despite some similarities between 
romance poetry and hagiographical literature. The saints occasionally vie with 
each other in holiness, but their principal purpose is to overcome the temp-
tations of the world as embodied by the devils and demons against which 
they frequently contend. There is no evident limit to the grace bestowed 
upon the saints as they move toward their heavenly reward, so the endeavors 
in which they are involved cannot be regarded as zero- sum— based on the 
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assumption that there is an infinite supply of grace. Similarly, single one- off 
outcomes along the way— Antony’s victory over a particular demon or beast, 
for example— do  not seem to be as definitive of the saintly action as victo-
ries in combat are in the chivalric action. The saints’ struggles with demonic 
adversaries and their occasional holier than thou engagements among them-
selves always seem to have more to do with who they are from the start than 
with how they perform at specific times and places. Saints are all winners and 
can be so because the resource they strive to possess is seemingly limitless and 
timeless. The adventurous pursuit of honor, in contrast to the saintly pursuit of 
grace, structures the temporal world in a different and more complicated way, 
which is shaped by the supposition that the coveted reward is available only 
in a limited supply. In  the imaginary action of the romances, we  see ladies 
and knights endeavoring to master their world in a way that maintains their 
interest in the heavenly reward at the same time as they strive for limited and 
variable resources such as honor and love. As  they open themselves up to 
and engage the twists and turns of mutable worldly things as opportunities 
for growth, something new and different is happening: ladies and knights are 
becoming players and thereby setting a new cultural trend.
 The romances show the dynamics of adventure as defined and undertaken 
by Kalogreant, and as I have descriptively elaborated these dynamics above in 
connection to knight errantry, to underlie other chivalric contests for honor 
among knights. These include chivalric action in tournaments and trials- by- 
combat at court. We saw in our survey of the poetic action in the previous 
chapter that the poet- performer Wolfram von Eschenbach likened chivalric 
exploits in pursuit of love to a high- stakes game of dice. In  the imaginary 
action of Chrétien de Troyes’s Lancelot, we find the same gaming analogy used 
by the knight Gauvain when Meleagant has appeared at Arthur’s court for a 
trial- by- combat with Lancelot. As often occurs in the chivalric action under 
certain circumstances, one knight can stand in for another, and Gauvain vol-
unteers to do this for the absent Lancelot with these words:
Bien me cuit a vos aquiter;
Mes se vient a plus poinz giter
Et g’en giet plus que ne façoiz,
Si m’aist Dex et sainte Foiz,
Quan qu’avra el geu tot an tasche
Prendrai, ja n’en avrai relasche.15
(6759–65)
 15. Chrétien de Troyes, Lancelot ou le Chevalier.
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I am confident that I will acquit myself well. It is like casting dice; and with 
God and Saint Foy on my side, I shall cast more points than you, and before 
it’s over I shall pocket all the wagers.16
Gauvain’s likening of his intended chivalric action to a throw of the dice 
underscores the indeterminacy of outcomes in chivalric combat. Despite his 
confidence and hope that God and Saint Foy will stand by him, there is no way 
to know what the final result will be. Based on Meleagant’s homicidal track 
record to this point, combat with him— were it to occur— might well result 
in death, so Gauvain’s play must be regarded as an absolute wagering of self.17
 In Wolfram’s own grail romance, Parzival, chivalric engagement is depicted 
with a variety of playful imagery to underscore the indeterminacy of adven-
turing. The below- cited passage describes a moment when the knight Gawan 
and the lady Antikonie jointly contend against the inhabitants of the castle 
of Bearosche.18 Antikonie and Gawan are attacked because they have been 
caught in a moment of physical intimacy. Gawan’s actions are considered a 
violation of the trust of his host, King Vergulaht (Antikonie’s brother), and his 
actions are presumed to have dishonored Antikonie, though Wolfram stresses 
in his depiction of the amorous activity that the lady is a willing participant, 
and the poet continues to express the view that nothing dishonorable has 
occurred. In the ensuing engagement with the angry castle residents, Gawan 
and Antikonie retreat into a tower of the castle, which they use as a defensive 
position. Antikonie initially takes charge of the joint defense and gives Gawan 
a heavy chess board to use as a shield to defend himself. The lady then pro-
ceeds to make use of the chess pieces in this way:
ez waere künec oder roch,
daz warf si gein den vîenden doch:
ez was grôz und swaere.
man sagt von ir diu maere,
swen dâ erreichte ir wurfes swanc,
der strûchte âne sînen danc.
diu küneginne rîche
streit dâ ritterlîche,
 16. Idem, Knight of the Cart, 290.
 17. Gauvain’s speculative engagement of himself in this episode is all the more significant 
if, as Emmanuèle Baumgartner maintains, this knight can be regarded as a “role model for new 
knights” at this stage of the history of romance poetry (“Chrétien’s Medieval Influence,” 217).
 18. Wolfram here relates an adventure based on a similar one in Chrétien’s Perceval, but he 
elaborates it extensively.
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bî Gâwân si werlîche schein,
daz diu koufwîp ze Tolenstein
an der vasnaht nie baz gestriten:
wan si tuontz von gampelsiten
unde müent ân nôt ir lîp.
swâ harnaschrâmec wirt ein wîp,
diu hât ir rehtes vergezzen,
sol man ir kiusche mezzen,
sine tuonz dan durch ir triuwe.
(408.29–409.15)
The pieces were large and heavy. Yet king or rook, she hurled them at the 
enemy. And it is narrated that whoever was hit by her throws was toppled, 
despite himself. The puissant Princess acquitted herself there like a true 
knight, she was seen fighting at Gawan’s side with such spirit that the huck-
stresses at Dollenstein never fought better of a Shrovetide, except that they 
do it at a frolic and exert themselves without cause. If  one were asked to 
judge of their modesty, women who begrime themselves with armour forget 
their nature, unless loyal affection inspires them.19
Gawan and Antikonie— with Wolfram backing them up— have established that 
they have much to gain from each other in love, and they had begun to invest 
themselves in this when they were first assaulted by the castle residents. They 
now defend the honorability of their intentions with this spirited resistance. The 
contest of Antikonie and Gawan against the inhabitants of the castle precedes 
the scheduled single contest against Kingrimursal, whom Gawan had come 
to Vergulaht’s land to find for the purpose of settling a dispute. As a prelude 
to the chivalric contest that is supposed to ensue, the action of Antikonie and 
Gawan against their adversaries resembles chivalry— which Wolfram explicitly, 
though clearly also quite playfully, states in the cited passage— and this action 
endeavors to preserve their honor intact.20 In the case of Gawan, his honor has 
already been impugned by the accusation made much earlier in the romance 
that his father slew Kingrimursal’s father in a cowardly way.21 Gawan’s honor 
 19. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 210.
 20. Compare Michael Dallapiazza, who considers that Antikonie (among other female 
figures crafted by Wolfram) conducts herself in a way that is remarkably self- conscious and 
self- determining, despite the patriarchal structures in which the figure is imbedded (Wolfram 
von Eschenbach, 112).
 21. See Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 212. This accusation is later revealed 
not to be true.
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is now further impugned by the accusation that he has dishonored Vergulaht’s 
sister. Overall, Gawan and Antikonie stand to decline in status if the various 
accusations against them can be made to stand. Wolfram’s unconventional 
chess- based variation of adventure involves a diverse array of performers in 
the action, ranging from the lady and knight themselves to the “huckstresses” 
of the German village of Dollenstein— apparently a reference to a local cus-
tom in which the village women playfully mimic chivalric contests as part of 
a Shrovetide procession.22 With this reference, Wolfram playfully extends the 
corresponding episode in Chrétien’s earlier grail romance in the direction of 
Shrovetide merrymaking, though the joyful antics of the “huckstresses” also 
serve as a point of contrast. Antikonie’s spirited defense of Gawan and herself, 
in contrast to the action in Dollenstein, has more serious implications.
 The complex indeterminacy of this multifaceted, imaginary chivalric 
action is oriented toward the serious consideration articulated in the final four 
verses of the cited passage. Wolfram first pronounces a general rule accord-
ing to which a woman immodest enough to wear armor has forgotten her 
“nature,” only to overturn it in the case of women such as Antikonie who are 
motivated by loyalty. Antikonie is hereby aligned with other significant female 
characters in Wolfram’s romance, most notably Parzival’s mother Herzeloyde 
and cousin Sigune.23 The association of Antikonie with Herzeloyde and Sigune 
as exemplars of great loyalty, which is suggested by Wolfram’s use of the term 
triuwe—“loyal affection”—lends a more serious tone to this otherwise play-
ful adventure and provides a view of Antikonie’s “chivalric” engagement with 
chess pieces as something more real and consequential in its own imaginary 
way than the Shrovetide playacting of the village women. The joint adven-
ture of Antikonie and Gawan brings together the finest qualities and utmost 
exertions of a woman and a man who both engage themselves in the valorous 
manner of knights, a cross section of medieval life ranging from castles to vil-
lages, and a chivalric contest that mixes together unconventional chess moves 
and the tumultuous gyrations of Shrovetide play- acting— all in the import-
ant interest of framing and underscoring the great loyalty of the “puissant 
princess.”
 In another noteworthy and influential case of the dynamics of adventure, 
we  observe another of the ways in which Chrétien de  Troyes— the reputed 
inventor of Arthurian romance— is a trendsetter. The giving and receiving of 
blows with lance and sword is like rolling dice and chess pieces in motion, 
 22. See Bumke, Wolfram von Eschenbach, 84.
 23. My view of Antikonie is consistent with that of Marions Gibbs in her article, “Ideals of 
Flesh and Blood,” 24–25.
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but it is also like speculative lending and borrowing with a view to making a 
profit. We see this in the poet’s depiction of the battle between Cligès and the 
Duke of the Saxons:
Molt sont andui li vasal large
De cos doner a grant planté,
S’a chascuns boene volanté
De tost randre ce qu’il acroit,
Ne cil ne cist ne s’an recroit,
Que tot sanz conte et sanz mesure
Ne rande chetel et ousure
Li uns a l’autre sanz respite.24
(4064–71)
Both knights were generous in giving blows aplenty, and each was quite will-
ing to return what he was given. Neither of them grew weary of repaying, 
without accounting and without measure, both capital and interest to his 
enemy unceasingly.25
Doubtless informed and inspired by earlier passages such as this one, the Ger-
man poet Hartmann von Aue elaborates chivalric adventuring as speculative 
moneylending with greater differentiation and detail in his description of 
the trial- by- combat between the knight with the lion (Iwein incognito) and 
Gawein near the end of his Iwein.26 The initial verses of Hartmann’s depiction 
of the combat between these two knights reiterates the basic terms of Kalogre-
ant’s definition of adventure near the beginning of this same romance, but 
with a manifestly entrepreneurial gist:
Wer gerne lebet nâch êren,
der sol vil starke kêren
alle sine sinne
nâch etelîchem gewinne,
dâ mit er sich wol bejage
und ouch vertrîbe die tage.
also heten sî getân:
 24. Chrétien de Troyes, Cligès (Dembowski).
 25. Idem, Cligès (Kibler), 172.
 26. W.  H.  Jackson offers a perceptive analysis of this episode in his Chivalry in Twelfth- 
Century Germany, 267–70.
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ir leben was niht verlân
an dehein müezekheit.
in was beiden vil leit
swenne ir tage giengen hin
daz sî deheinen gewin
an ir koufe envunden,
des sî sich underwunden.
(7175–88)
He who likes to acquire honor has to direct all his thoughts to some type of 
livelihood, so that he can achieve something and pass the time acceptably. 
They had done so. They had not spent their lives in idleness. Both were 
unhappy when days passed without their finding any profit in the trade to 
which they had devoted themselves.27
The adventurous desire to increase the value of self that we saw with Kalogre-
ant is here rendered as a prescriptive orientation to life. In  the pursuit of 
greater worth, or  êren—“honor”—knights have to engage themselves in a 
speculative cultural action analogous to the profit- seeking give- and- take of 
moneylenders and investors. As chivalric competitors at the top of their game, 
Iwein and Gawein best exemplify that one has to engage oneself if one has the 
resources to do so. There is a chivalric imperative to be entrepreneurial and the 
realization of this imperative is here appropriately depicted with the terminol-
ogy and imagery of investment and profit seeking, which Hartmann develops 
further in the ensuing verses:
sî wâren zwêne maere
karge wehselaere
und entlihen ûz ir varende guot
ûf einen seltsaenen muot.
sî nâmen wuocher dar an
sam zwêne werbende man.
(7189–94)
The two, well known as clever moneylenders, made loans from their stock in 
trade in a strange way. They made a profit from it, like two entrepreneurs.28
 27. Hartmann von Aue, Iwein (Lawson), 311.
 28. Ibid. According to James Aho in his Confession and Bookkeeping, the Christian merchant 
first becomes visible based on business records preserved from the early fourteenth century. 
This episode in Hartmann’s romance documents the existence of the Christian merchant— or at 
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The action of knights resembles that of moneylenders both in the logic of 
exchange and in the quest for gain. The knights’ investments are “strange,” 
however, because of the deadly extremes to which they are willing to go in 
pursuit of their reward. What is being lent and borrowed here are the poten-
tially lethal blows of lances and swords. It seems likely that Hartmann bases 
himself here on the cited depiction of the battle between Cligès and the Duke 
of the Saxons in Chrétien’s Cligès, or a similar depiction elsewhere, and trans-
fers the speculative economics of that contest to this one. The longer and 
more detailed rendering of Hartmann, from which the above- cited passages 
are taken, corresponds to the inherent descriptive potential for chivalric pur-
poses of the terminology of speculative moneylending, which the German 
poet finds worthy of extensive elaboration. It corresponds as well to the great 
significance of the narrative moment in which the combat between Iwein and 
Gawein occurs.
 Acting in a manner consistent with Kalogreant’s definition of adventure, 
which he heard with his own ears at the beginning of this romance, Iwein has 
set forth in pursuit of honor and has experienced many vicissitudes along the 
way before this moment. By putting himself in the position to engage Gawein, 
Iwein now stands to earn a huge reward, but the great prowess of the com-
batants prevents either knight from being able to overcome the other. The 
quality of their actions is deemed so high that an outcome in favor of one or 
the other would be unjust, and when their identities are finally revealed, the 
combat is halted because the combatants are friends. The inheritance dispute 
is resolved by King Arthur in a separate legalistic maneuver, and the combat 
between Iwein and Gawein remains undecided in a way that demonstrates and 
confirms the great chivalric worth of both contestants.29 This adventure never-
theless continues to manifest a zero- sum logic, because neither knight is able 
to expropriate any honor from the other, that is, the conflict is resolved in a 
manner that does not involve one knight overcoming or yielding to the other. 
We  thus observe, under certain circumstances, that competitive chivalric 
exchanges perceived to be of a sufficiently high level or quality— as one tends 
to find them in close proximity to Arthur’s court, where the overall quality of 
least a “strange” (= seltsaene) chivalric permutation thereof— somewhat earlier (by  implica-
tion, the more conventional merchant upon which the chivalric permutation was based must 
also have been around). If profit- seeking is stigmatized in Christian religious contexts, as Aho 
maintains, this does not always seem to be the case in the courtly chivalric context of romance 
poetry.
 29. Compare the reading of Christoph Cormeau and Wilhem Störmer in Hartmann 
von  Aue, which states that the outcome of the day- long battle is the absolute equality of the 
combatants (216).
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knights improves— occasionally end in such a way that the value of both con-
testants is maintained, if not enhanced. In his successful chivalric transactions 
with Gawein as the exemplar of Arthurian chivalry, Iwein demonstrates in a 
conspicuous way before the eyes of Arthur’s assembled court that his initial 
speculative pursuit of honor has paid off in the end, despite the many vicissi-
tudes he has had to manage.
 The final exemplary individual case of the dynamics of adventure that I 
would like to present is noteworthy in placing the chivalric wagering of self in 
a clear relationship to its broader social purpose. Joie de la Curt—“Joy of the 
Court”—is the name given to the last adventure in Hartmann von Aue’s Erec- 
romance, which occurs after the happy culmination of the joint adventures 
of Erec and Enite.30 In this adventure, Erec engages the knight Mabonagrin, 
who on account of a vow made to his lady lives with her in isolation from the 
court. Because he is the best knight in the realm, Mabonagrin’s self- imposed 
isolation is experienced by the court and by the knight himself as detrimen-
tal and painful. This situation is somewhat analogous to Erec’s earlier loss of 
courtly chivalric status and the associated loss of courtly joy as a consequence 
of his self- imposed isolation in the intimate company of Enite earlier in the 
romance. Mabonagrin’s isolation from the court accompanies an extraordi-
nary kind of chivalry, in which this knight has been able to maintain the high-
est reputation even while engaged in uncommonly brutal practices, such as 
beheading his defeated opponents and placing them on stakes surrounding 
the secluded garden where he resides with his beloved. The “Joy of the Court” 
will be restored by the knight who is able to overcome Mabonagrin in combat. 
The latter will be freed by defeat from his vow to live in isolation (and thus 
presumably also freed from the brutal kind of fighting he employs during this 
isolation) and allowed to rejoin the court; the court in turn will rejoice again 
in being able to count their greatest knight among their number.
 When the “Joy of the Court”-adventure first presents itself, Erec pursues 
it relentlessly, as if to demonstrate that he has grasped in his own joint adven-
tures with Enite that one can never rest on one’s laurels or close oneself off to 
an opportunity to increase one’s worth, however difficult the chance may be. 
In response to the last of many attempts to dissuade him from an adventure 
that nearly everyone assumes will result in his death, Erec persists in his 
resolve to risk himself and articulates his resolve with the characteristic ter-
minology of a wager:
 30. See Jackson’s observations on this episode (Chivalry in Twelfth- Century Germany, 
126–27). The episode is also at the end of Chrétien’s Érec et Énide, but Hartmann lengthens and 
elaborates the speculative imagery that is of special interest to us.
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dô sprach der künec Êrec:
“ich weste wol, der Saelden wec
gienge in der werlde eteswâ,
rehte enweste ich aber wâ,
wan daz ich suochende reit
in grôzer ungewîsheit,
unz daz ich nû vunden hân.
got hât wol ze mir getân
daz er mich hât gewîset her,
dâ ich nâch mines herzens ger
vinde gar ein wunschspil,
dâ ich lützel wider vil
mit einem wurfe wâgen mac.
ich suochtez unz an disen tac:
gote lob, nû hân ichz vunden
dâ ich wider tûsent phunden
wâge einen phenninc.
diz sint genaedeclîchiu dinc,
daz ich hie vinde solh spil.”31
(8520–39)
Then King Erec replied, “I knew well that the road to Salvation passed some-
where in the world, but I did not know exactly where, so in great uncertainty 
I rode out seeking until I found it here now. God has treated me well by 
directing me here, where I may find, according to my heart’s desire, the ideal 
game where with one throw I can wager a little to win a lot. Until today I have 
been seeking it. Praise God, now I have found it, where I can wager a penny 
against a thousand pounds. It is a fortunate thing to find such a game here.”32
The significance of the Middle High German term Saelde—“Salvation”—as well 
as of the related term genaedeclîchiu—“fortunate”—is  here indeterminately 
positioned between Christian salvation and the more chancy good fortune 
of Lady Luck. Erec’s postulation that the path of Saelde leads eteswâ—“some-
where”—through this temporal world is generally consistent with observed 
aspects of Augustinian thinking (in particular the global parameter of same-
ness that we observed in chapter two of this study) in assuming that heavenly 
 31. Hartmann von Aue, Erec (Cramer). I have added italics in the Middle High German 
verses and in the English translation to underscore the spatial and temporal specificity and 
uniqueness of Erec’s wagering of self.
 32. Hartmann von Aue, Erec (Vivian), 146–47; italics added.
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and worldly spheres overlap. Erec’s questing posture is also consistent with the 
disposition of the Christian cultural athlete coursing toward his otherworldly 
prize, a movement that is the dynamic manifestation of the indeterminacy of 
the overlap of heavenly and worldly cities, of the spirit and the flesh, which are 
bound together dynamically (i.e., indeterminately)—in this case as motion— 
as  long as final outcomes remain undecided.33 Erec engages any eventuality 
along the way as a dynamic, integrated Christian self, as he indicates in saying 
that God has guided him to this auspicious time and place. Yet Erec’s dispo-
sition of self in the “Joy of the Court”-adventure clearly directs him toward 
an outcome and reward that is very different from the otherworldly Christian 
one. Erec’s adventurous orientation is that of Kalogreant (note particularly the 
common use of the adverb suochende—“seeking”—in  their respective state-
ments) and he has arrived at a unique place and time (the singularity of which 
is underscored in the above- cited verses by the temporal and spatial modifiers 
placed in italics), in which it is possible to wager himself utterly in the interest 
of a worldly reward that approaches heavenly dimensions (i.e., the thousand 
pound payoff on the penny wager).
 The most appropriate way for Erec to describe his competitive engage-
ment of self for the “Joy of the Court” is with the terminology and dynamics 
of high- risk gambling. In the ensuing lengthy passage (vv. 8540–75), in which 
this speculative imagery is further elaborated, Erec continues to liken his 
engagement in this adventure to participation in a game of chance, and it 
becomes clear that his investment of self— just as that of Kalogreant— is  in 
something worldly, temporal, and hence evanescent, though it remains an 
absolute investment nonetheless. In this zero- sum action for high stakes, the 
competitors put their honor as the currency of adventure at stake and then 
contend for it, winner take all, whereby their lives as well as their honor are 
also at risk. The outcome of the coming contest determines whether Erec 
achieves “great fame” and is praised universally and fully— daz ich vol ze lobe 
stê (v. 8558)—or whether his honor and thus his chivalric self will be “entirely” 
lost— oder daz si gar zegê (v. 8559). In  either case, despite the invocation of 
God (v. 8560)—which serves again to remind us that he enters the fray both 
as a Christian and as a chivalric competitor— the outcome will be the result 
of Erec’s individual engagement at this particular time and place. It  will be 
the result of a unique, singular application of strength, skill, and experience, 
 33. A more religious view of Erec’s speculative action in this adventure is suggested by 
W. H. Jackson, with reference to crusading propaganda: “Erec’s view of the combat as wager, 
in which he has little to lose and much to gain, invites comparison with the crusading metaphor 
of the battle against the heathens as an easy purchase of salvation, which any ‘prudent merchant’ 
(i.e., any wise knight) should grasp” (Chivalry in the Twelfth- Century Germany, 131–32.)
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and of intangibles ranging from God’s favor to the luck of a winning throw of 
the dice.34
 We have observed that adventure adds to the indeterminacy already asso-
ciated with God’s inscrutable plan another layer of indeterminacy connected 
to the wagering of self for some other mutable self or good. In their adven-
turous moves, knights and ladies in the imaginary action of romance poetry 
seem to be exploring how much there may be to gain between the good use 
and the sinful enjoyment of temporal goods— here adapting terms developed 
by Augustine in his De Doctrina Christiana.35 As they do so, the absolute pos-
ture of faith seems to be reoriented speculatively in a different direction and 
to a different end. In the early twelfth century, the influential Cistercian abbot 
and author Bernard of Clairvaux provides a view of worldly knighthood in his 
De laude novae militiae—“In Praise of the New Knighthood” addressed to the 
Knights Templar, which provides a competing monastic view of the risks and 
rewards involved in worldly knighthood, and hence of those involved in the 
imaginary adventuring of the romances:
Quis ergo, o milites, hic tam stupendus error, quis furor hic tam non ferendus, 
tantis sumptibus ac laboribus militare, stipendiis vero nullis, nisi aut mortis, 
aut criminis? Operitis equos sericis, et  pendulos nescio quos panniculos 
loricis superinduitis; depingitis hastas, clypeos et sellas; frena et calcaria auro 
et argento gemmisque circumornatis, et cum tanta pompa pudendo furore et 
impudenti stupore ad mortem properatis [. . .] Super haec omnia est, quod 
armati conscientiam magis terret, causa illa nimirum satis levis ac frivola, 
qua videlicet talis praesumitur et tam periculosa militia. Non sane aliud inter 
vos bella movet litesque suscitat, nisi aut irrationabilis iracundiae motus, aut 
inanis gloriae appetitus, aut terrenae qualiscumque possessionis cupiditas. 
Talibus certe ex causis neque occidere, neque occumbere tutum est.36
O knights, what is this error so stupendous, what is this madness so unac-
ceptable, to fight at such great cost and effort, with no rewards other than 
those of death or crime? You cover your horses in silks and put over your 
 34. See Cormeau and Störmer’s analysis of the Joie de la curt- episode (Hartmann von Aue, 
189–90), which stresses, as other scholars have done, that this episode has a special status in 
Hartmann’s romance by virtue of standing out in a conspicuous way after the apparent end 
of the difficult challenges Erec and Enite have faced. They also posit a change on the part of 
Erec— he is not the same knight as the one at Karnant— with which I concur, even if Cormeau 
and Störmer give little emphasis to the wager that is being made.
 35. See particularly the first book in Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, where the proper 
uses and enjoyment of things is laid out in detail.
 36. Bernard of Clairvaux, “Liber ad Milites Templi,” 216.
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coats of mail I know not what sort of cloth hangings; you paint your spears, 
shields and saddles; you decorate your bridles and spurs with gold, silver and 
jewels, and you hurry to your deaths with such great pomp, with shameful 
madness and shameless rashness [. . .] Over and beyond these points, if the 
cause for which such a dangerous service is undertaken is really quite friv-
olous and lacks seriousness, then this has the effect of bringing fear to a 
soldier’s conscience. The only things that cause conflicts and start wars are 
feelings of irrational anger, the pursuit of vain glory, or the desire for some 
piece of land. It is certainly not safe to kill or be killed for such causes.37
For Bernard, the basic orientation of worldly knights is evil and foolish 
because the entire Christian self— body and soul— is being risked for no good 
reason. Worldly knights fight on account of “frivolous” things that are no 
more substantial than “vain glory” (= “honor,” in the romances) and land, and 
when knights kill or are killed on account of such things they lose themselves 
utterly in crime and death. The path to the otherworldly prize is thus closed 
off completely from worldly knights, according to Bernard’s view. In this view, 
there is no room for a courtly God who might smile upon the skillful efforts 
of knights and ladies in action, or for a God who might be inclined to open 
the doors of paradise to a knight who has been killed in a joust for reputa-
tion, land, or love. Bernard’s monastic view forms part of an ongoing compe-
tition between monastic and courtly chivalric cultural players in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, in which there are rival conceptions of the risks and 
rewards involved in worldly chivalric action. An  important point on which 
Bernard and courtly chivalric players seem to agree is that worldly knight-
hood places the Christian self absolutely and utterly at risk. Beyond this jointly 
held assumption concerning the absolute initial investment risked in chivalric 
action, monastic and courtly chivalric views diverge sharply with respect to 
possible outcomes. In  the monastic view, no  good can come from worldly 
chivalry. In the courtly chivalric view advanced in the romances, as we have 
seen, chivalry in the form of adventure is an opportunity to increase one’s 
individual honor and contribute as well to the general “Joy of the Court.” 
In adventuring, knights seem to consider— in pointed contrast to the view of 
Bernard— that they will be able to enjoy some other temporal, mutable self or 
thing utterly and completely without giving up their position in the Christian 
race toward the otherworldly prize— which Bernard would deny them as soon 
as the twists and turns of adventure begin. Correspondingly, the courtly poet- 
performers pointedly differ from Bernard by finding great value in things 
 37. Idem, “In Praise of the New Knighthood,” 218–19.
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associated with worldly knighthood that are repugnant to the monk: horses 
covered in silks, coats of mail covered with cloth hangings, painted spears, 
shields and saddles, bridles and spurs decorated with gold, silver and jewels, 
long hair, delicate hands, long flowing robes with voluminous sleeves— the 
very stuff of romance poetry.38 Bearing Bernhard’s monastic and starkly dual-
istic assessment of the value of worldly chivalry in mind as a point of contrast 
and comparison, I  turn now to a consideration of conspicuous features or 
highlights in two of the most illustrious verse romances, with particular focus 
on the manner in which individual adventures in them are arranged.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM CHRÉTIEN 
DE TROYES’S ÉREC ET ÉNIDE
The first courtly chivalric verse romances order individual adventures accord-
ing to different narrative designs. One of the more influential of these is the 
mout bele conjointure— the “beautifully ordered composition”—accomplished 
by Chrétien de Troyes in what is considered to be the first Arthurian romance, 
Érec et Énide.39 This pleasing narrative design is reiterated by Chrétien in his 
Yvain, and it serves as a model that is employed, adapted, and elaborated by 
later poet- performers such as Hartmann von Aue and Wolfram von Eschen-
bach, whose Parzival we shall examine below. As  a “beautiful” narrative 
arrangement designed to be “pleasing” to courtly audiences, Chrétien’s con-
jointure is the poetic equivalent of the silks, paints, jewels, and other frivo-
lous aesthetic things condemned by Bernard of Clairvaux, who associates such 
things with the sinful orientation of worldly knights. Bernard never mentions 
courtly poetry or romances in the cited treatise (the latter predates the former 
by about a half- century), but it seems safe to assume Bernard would have dis-
approved just as strongly of romance performances designed to be “beautiful” 
and “pleasing” to their audiences for aesthetic rather than spiritual- religious 
reasons. Further, it would be consistent with Bernard’s position to condemn 
romance performances because of the basic orientation of the individual adven-
tures within them toward some mutable self or thing. From a dualist monastic 
perspective, individual adventures would have to be considered evil in their 
orientation, and romance as a “beautifully ordered composition” of individual 
adventures would necessarily take matters from bad to worse. From the courtly 
 38. These things are all referenced in the broader context from which the above- cited pas-
sage is excerpted.
 39. Chrétien de Troyes, Érec et Énide (Dembowski); the mout bele conjointure is in v. 14.
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chivalric perspective, the posture of self that is visible in adventure corresponds 
to a new openness toward and involvement in the mutability of worldly things, 
and romances as broader narrative arrangements of individual adventures com-
petitively endeavor to maximize courtly joy with specifically poetic means.
 Scrutiny of the mout bele conjointure of Chrétien’s Érec et Énide shows 
that the features we observed in individual adventures— the speculative 
self- investment, painful effort, and joy involved in adventure as a successful 
competitive engagement of self— also serve as structural markers of longer 
narrative segments. The action of Chrétien’s romance begins at the court of 
Arthur where the King calls for renewing the tradition of the hunt for the 
white stag. The ensuing discussion between Arthur and his nephew Gauvain 
shows this hunt to be a competition in two different ways. The knight who 
succeeds in bringing down the white stag will have conducted himself with 
the greatest fortitude and expertise in the highly prized and definitively aris-
tocratic cultural action of the hunt, engagement in which is meritorious in its 
own right. Besides this, the winner gains the right to bestow a kiss on the lady 
of his choice, who will henceforth be regarded as the most beautiful of all. 
The parameters of the hunt as a contest of the knights’ skill and of their ladies’ 
beauty become clear as Gauvain questions the advisability of such a compe-
tition. More than five hundred ladies are served by knights at Arthur’s court, 
Gauvain points out. Each will regard his own beloved lady as most beautiful. 
When the knight who wins the contest by bringing down the stag exercises his 
right to bestow the kiss on his own beloved (which Gauvain seems to regard 
as inevitable), all the other knights and ladies will be unhappy. The possibility 
of discord or conflict is not raised explicitly, but Gauvain seems to be con-
cerned that the court will be an unhappier place at the end of the hunt than 
it is at the beginning. Having already determined that the hunt will go for-
ward, Arthur carries through with his intention despite Gauvain’s reservations. 
The first narrative segment of Chrétien’s romance is marked by the action of 
the hunt and by the differing speculations of Arthur and Gauvain concern-
ing its value for the court. Arthur’s position is consistent with the consider-
ation that the skill, strength, speed, and luck manifested by the winner of the 
hunt, combined with the revelation of the beauty inspiring such a high level 
of performance, must be brought to the fore and cultivated as the resources 
upon which Arthur’s courtly order is based. By contrast, Gauvain’s approach is 
bearish. No vicissitude in the hunt- less future preferred by Gauvain is likely to 
affect the court as negatively as he believes the outcome of the hunt itself will 
do, so he argues— though without success— that one should stand pat.
 The action involving Erec is arranged alongside that of Arthur’s hunt and 
involves some of the hunt’s difficult issues, in particular the risk of conflict in 
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competitions involving the courage, skill, and luck of knights and the associ-
ated beauty of their ladies.40 The manner in which Erec engages himself has 
the effect of separating these difficulties from Arthur’s courtly entourage until 
the successful conclusion of Erec’s adventures and Arthur’s hunt. As the hunt 
is beginning elsewhere and the sounds of it are still within earshot, we behold 
Erec galloping along on a charger to join Queen Guenievre and one of her 
maids. Though their common destination remains unstated, the movement 
of this party alongside the action of the hunt suggests that they have been set 
in motion by King Arthur’s resolution and intend to join the hunting party. 
Erec’s initial status as described by Chrétien at this point corresponds to the 
regard in which he is held at court:
De la Table Reonde estoit,
An la cort mout grant los avoit.
De tant com il i ot esté,
N’i ot chevalier si loé,
Et fu tant biax qu’an nule terre
N’estovoit plus bel de lui querre.
(83–88)
He was of the Round Table and had received great honor at court: as long as 
he had been there no knight had been so highly praised.41
A knight distinguished by such praise always needs to be in play for more, 
as we have been able to observe, even if Erec is not at this moment among 
those involved in the hunt. Instead of engaging the hazards of the hunt, the 
queen, her maidservant, and Erec come unexpectedly upon a trio of travelers. 
The ensuing interactions with the unknown knight, his lady, and their dwarf, 
turn out to be hazardous in a way that causes Erec’s path to diverge from that 
of the other knights of Arthur’s court. First, the efforts of the queen to dis-
cover the identities of the strangers results in an affront when the dwarf lashes 
her inquiring maidservant with his whip. Sent by the queen to succeed where 
the maidservant failed, Erec receives the same shameful treatment. Since 
Erec wears no armor and is armed only with his sword, he resists responding 
aggressively to the lashing that he receives from the dwarf. He fears the dwarf ’s 
master, the fully armed unknown knight, will kill him if he retaliates. In this 
 40. Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm Maddox, in their “Érec et Énide” also draw attention to 
the ways in which Erec’s adventures and the Arthurian hunt for the white stag are intertwined.
 41. Chrétien de Troyes, Erec and Enide (Carroll), 38.
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first encounter, the honor with which Erec entered the action has thereby been 
diminished. Under the circumstances (i.e., lacking the arms he needs in order 
to fight), Erec must regard what has occurred as merely the first exchange in 
an ongoing contest, a chivalric repeated game, and he informs the queen that 
he resolves to pursue the unknown knight, lady, and dwarf with a view to win-
ning back the honor he has lost: Itant bien prometre vos vuel / Que, se ge puis, 
je vangerai  / Ma hontë, ou  la crestrai! (vv. 244–47)—“But I want to promise 
you that, if I can, I will either avenge my shame or increase it!”42
 Erec’s strategy is consistent with the variable status of the courtly chivalric 
self that we observed in the first part of this chapter. The enterprising, specu-
lative posture Erec adopts in pursuit of honor is that of other adventuring 
knights and ladies.43 The extended adventurous action in which Erec’s dispo-
sition of self results is now arranged alongside the hunt in the foreground of 
the first structural segment of Chrétien’s romance. The possibility of a painful 
diminishment of self, but also of joyful growth, is  central in both narrative 
strands. It  remains latent in the hunt as the ominous possibility of discord 
about which Gauvain was concerned, and it is much more tangible and overt 
in the extended competitive action in which Erec is involved. The ladies in 
whose company Erec initially appears are painfully slighted by the actions of 
the unknown knight’s party. Later on, in the contest for the sparrow hawk, the 
unknown knight slights other ladies and knights when he endeavors to claim 
the prize for his own companion. By this time, Erec’s speculative approach has 
put him in a position to contest the unknown knight’s claim. He has acquired 
the armor he needs for battle without losing his opponent from view, and in 
Enide and her great beauty, he has acquired the means to contest the knight’s 
perennial claim to the sparrow hawk. When the knight claims the prize on the 
day of the contest, it is already abundantly clear to the assembled spectators 
that Enide is the most beautiful lady by far and that Erec has the looks of a 
knight of the highest category. The rival knight’s claim to the sparrow hawk 
is therefore a tangible slight to Erec and Enide, and on the occasion of this 
confrontation, as opposed to the earlier one, Erec has the means to respond. 
He does so successfully in the ensuing fierce battle, the outcome of which is 
rendered in this way by Chrétien after Erec’s victory:
 42. Ibid., 41.
 43. In his analysis of this romance, Jean- Paul Allard underscores the quest for honor in 
a manner consistent with my understanding of the Kalogreant episode earlier in this chapter, 
as well as what Allard calls a “Noblesse de la force et force de la noblesse” (L’ initiation royale, 
98). Allard further considers that Erec’s adventures and the honor they bring him serve to 
demonstrate his worthiness to be king.
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Onques, ce cuit, tel joie n’ot
La ou Tristanz le fier Morhot
An l’isle Saint Sanson vainqui,
Con l’an feisoit d’Erec iqui.
Mout feisoient de lui grant los
Petit, et grant, et gresle, et gros.
Tuit prisent sa chevalerie,
N’i a chevalier qui ne die:
“Dex, quel vasal, soz ciel n’a tel.”
(1245–53)
I don’t believe there was such joy on the isle of Saint Sanson, where Tristan 
defeated the savage Morholt as there was around Erec. He  was greatly 
praised and honored by short and tall, by thin and fat; everyone esteemed 
his knightly prowess. There wasn’t a knight there who did not say: “God, 
what a vassal! He has no equal under the heavens.”44
This is the first strong indication that the first part of Chrétien’s romance, 
in which the action at the outset seemed dicey, will have a joyful culmination. 
In  the cited passage, Chrétien captures the joy of the moment of Erec and 
Enide’s ascendancy, and he preserves this until their arrival at Arthur’s court, 
where the couple’s joy leads to and becomes part of a general courtly joy.
 By the time of their arrival at Arthur’s court, the hunt has long since been 
completed, Arthur himself has brought down the white stag, and everyone 
has agreed to wait for the bestowal of the kiss until Erec’s return. The defeated 
knight, whose name turns out to be Yder, has by this time already arrived at 
Arthur’s court and carried out his promise to Erec to convey his apologies to 
the queen and her maidservant. When Arthur finally bestows the kiss upon 
the most beautiful lady at court, the discord or conflict about which Gauvain 
was initially concerned now seems inconceivable. The lady in question is 
Enide, who is universally acclaimed as the most beautiful. The kiss is bestowed 
with unanimous consent, and the hunt is joyfully concluded on the basis of 
Erec’s engagements, which have recovered his lost honor and then some at the 
expense of Yder, and acquired the person of Enide— whose full value is only 
beginning to become clear at the moment of the kiss. Arthur’s resolution to 
undertake the hunt for the white stag shows itself, in the end, to have been a 
highly successful speculation for one and all.
 44. Chrétien de Troyes, Erec and Enide (Carroll), 53.
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 When Arthur has bestowed the kiss upon Enide, Chrétien tells us the first 
part of his romance is finished— Ici fenist li premiers vers (v. 1808)—“Here ends 
the first movement.”45 His “beautifully ordered composition” now continues 
with a second, longer narrative segment that reiterates the basic parameters of 
the first, though beginning at the higher level of honor won by Erec in the first 
segment, which is described in this way at the culmination of the tournament 
following his marriage with Enide:
Or fu Erec de tel renon
Qu’an ne parloit se de lui non:
Nus hom n’avoit si boene grace
Qu’il sanbloit Ausalon de face
Et de la lengue Salemon,
Et de fierté sanbla lyon,
Et de doner et de despandre
Refu il parauz Alixandre.
(2223–30)
Now such was Erec’s renown that people talked of no one else; no man had 
such exceptional qualities, for he had the face of Absalom and resembled 
Solomon in his speech. For ferocity he was like a lion, and in giving and 
spending he was like Alexander.46
In the second part of the romance, Erec is unable to maintain this high sta-
tus for long. After returning to his homeland from Arthur’s court, he invests 
himself so completely in Enide’s intimate company that he neglects everything 
else. Erec falls away from his position of high honor without realizing it, until 
he overhears a sigh of lament from Enide. When Erec compels her to tell him 
the reason for her sigh, she reveals his lapse in these stark terms:
Vostre pris est mout abessiez:
Tuit soloient dire l’autre an
Qu’an tot le mont ne savoit l’an
Meillor chevalier ne plus preu;
 45. Ibid., 60. Glyn Burgess writes about the occasion of this verse: “Enide has just received 
the Kiss of the White Stag. The Arthurian court is becalmed after threats of disorder and dis-
sension. The various threads of the lengthy introduction to the romance have been brought 
together satisfactorily” (Chrétien de Troyes, 15).
 46. Chrétien de Troyes, Erec and Enide (Carroll), 65.
ADVENTURE AS A CULTURAL WAGER ∙  145
Vostres parauz n’estoit nul leu.
Or se vont tuit de vos gabant,
Jeusne et chenu, petit et grant;
Recreant vos apelent tuit.
(2560–67)
Your renown has greatly declined. Previously everyone used to say that there 
was no better or more valiant knight known in all the world: your equal was 
nowhere to be found. Now everyone holds you up to ridicule, young and old, 
high and low; all call you a recreant.47
Enide’s words remind us that honor is never lasting but has continually to be 
maintained. The only way to do this is to engage oneself again, which Erec 
immediately proceeds to do, this time in the company of his wife: Erec s’an va, 
sa fame an moinne, / Ne set ou, mes en avanture (vv. 2778–79)—“Erec rode off 
leading his wife, knowing not where but open to adventure.”48
 Erec and Enide begin their joint adventures that make up the second part 
of Chrétien’s romance in a condition of estrangement from one another.49 
Though traveling together and engaging challenges jointly, they do not jour-
ney as man and wife. Erec maintains a distance from Enide and commands 
her not to speak, no matter what she sees. As they make their way through all 
these difficult adventures, Erec repeatedly manifests the prowess for which he 
has previously been praised, and Enide— besides her resourcefulness, which 
enables the couple to elude numerous mortal dangers— demonstrates her loyal 
love for Erec, despite his neglectful and abusive treatment of her, by warning 
 47. Ibid., 68.
 48. Ibid., 71.
 49. The second part of the Chrétien romance consists of two distinct series of adventures, 
which I recapitulate here in the interest of furnishing a complete view of the structure of this 
romance. In the first series, the couple contends with (1) robber knights (whom Erec kills or 
disperses); (2)  a first count, who endeavors to take Enide from Erec (whom Enide outwits); 
and (3)  the chivalric adversary King Guivret (whom Erec defeats and makes his vassal after 
suffering grievous wounds). In  the second series of adventures, the couple engages (4)  two 
giants (both killed by Erec, though the fighting causes his wounds to open); (5) a second count, 
who endeavors to take Enide from Erec (who is held off by Enide and later killed by the tem-
porarily revived Erec); and (6) Guivret, a second time (who has come to help the couple, fights 
unknowingly against Erec, and then helps the couple once he has recognized them). The two 
series of adventures are divided by an interlude in the company of Arthur’s knights and ladies. 
This interlude, to which the narrative design gives special emphasis, is characterized above all 
by Erec’s reluctance to accept any comfort and his eagerness to put himself back into action as 
soon as possible, despite his injuries.
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him repeatedly of impending dangers and thereby risking his anger by break-
ing his command not to speak.50 In their joint adventures, each finds the way 
to the other, and they are reconciled not long before Erec’s second fight against 
Guivret. The reward they give and receive shortly thereafter, during their stay 
in Guivret’s castle, is the first marker of the joyful culmination of the second 
narrative segment of Chrétien’s romance:
Or ot sa joie et son delit.
Ansanble jurent an un lit,
Et li uns l’autre acole et beise:
Riens nule n’est qui tant lor pleise.
Tant ont eü mal et enui,
Il por li et ele por lui,
C’or ont feite lor penitance.
Li uns ancontre l’autre tance
Comant il lui puise pleisir:
Del sorplus me doi bien teisir.
(5245–54)
Now she was embraced and kissed; now she had everything she wished; now 
she had her joy and her delight. They lay together in one bed, and embraced 
and kissed each other; nothing else pleased them as much. They had endured 
much pain and trouble, he for her and her for him, that now they had done 
their penance. They vied in finding ways of pleasing each other; about the 
rest I must keep silent.51
Chrétien here characterizes the adventurous engagements of Enide and Erec 
in the second part of his romance as a “penance,” but the manner in which 
its conclusion is marked seems only very precariously Christian. The joy of 
the couple’s conjugal love is manifestly physical to a degree that causes the 
narrator to desist from further detailed description. As such, the love achieved 
again by the couple hardly seems distinguishable in its intensity from the one 
in which Erec earlier lost himself and his reputation. The crucial difference 
here is that Erec will not linger long and exclusively with the reward of love, 
but returns in a timely way to chivalric action. By  the end of the romance, 
after Erec’s victory in the “Joy of the Court”-adventure (Hartmann von Aue’s 
 50. Per Nykrog considers, with good reason, that the “qualités exquises d’Enide”—“the 
exquisite qualities of Enide”—which include clear- headedness, good judgment, courage, and 
patience, are what save Erec in the end (Chrétien de Troyes, 79).
 51. Chrétien de Troyes, Erec and Enide (Carroll), 101.
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version of which we observed above), the couple again possesses honor in 
plenitude to match the joy of love they find in the above- cited verses. The 
ongoing adventurous engagements of Enide and Erec enable them to optimize 
their status while simultaneously expanding courtly joy to places in need of it. 
The ensuing coronation of the couple at Arthur’s court in Nantes gives appro-
priate political dimensions to the joy with which the adventurous action of 
this romance concludes.52
 It is important to recognize that the love in which Enide and Erec invest 
themselves at the end of the second structural segment— and had invested 
themselves before at Carnant— is absolute in the same way that Erec’s engage-
ment in the “Joy of the Court”-adventure will be. Erec and Enide do not hold 
any part of themselves back from their engagement in chivalric action in the 
interest of honor, or from their engagement in love. They indicate, however, 
by the end of the romance that they are managing these different absolute con-
cerns more capably.53 The most visible indication of this increased capacity is 
their awareness of the necessity to keep themselves in action. Honor and love 
can bring joy to knights and ladies, but only as long as they continue to be 
engaged and successful. As soon as they close themselves off from the oppor-
tunity of gain, their status painfully decreases, as we saw earlier with Erec.
 The need to keep oneself in play for the sake of growth and joy is articulated 
by the structural characteristics of Chrétien’s narrative design, that is, by  the 
poet’s arrangement of individual adventures. The bipartite structure of Chré-
tien’s romance, consisting of the two longer narrative segments (with the second 
one itself divided into two corresponding parts), has been regarded as similar 
to the typological relationship of the Old to the New Testament.54 Analogous 
 52. Similarly to Allard, Donald Maddox places emphasis on the coronation of Erec, 
in which the romance culminates, and sees this narrative in terms of a “process” that leads in 
this direction: “The principle of nobility as ‘an aptitude and a process’ would admirably describe 
the adventures of Erec and Enide, whose beauty both individually and as a couple repeatedly 
indicates their moral and spiritual qualities. Likewise, the above principle applies equally well 
to the idea of monarchy as the product, not of accidental circumstances of birth, wealth, pres-
tige, or election, but rather of the process by which one demonstrates a particular aptitude to 
reign” (Structure and Sacring, 176). The idea of kingship as something that has to be performed 
is consistent with my view of the political cultural action as developed in the third chapter of 
this study.
 53. Compare the summation of Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm Maddox, who write that 
Chrétien’s overriding concern in this romance “has been with intimately relating, in  increas-
ingly nuanced and profound ways, the story of the eponymous couple and the socio- political 
issues that were adumbrated in the initial segment” (Érec et Énide, 116).
 54. Hugo Kuhn drew attention to this bipartite structure in his seminal article “Erec” (133–
50). My own observations are indebted to those of Kuhn, especially the following: “It is not the 
advent of a new ‘worldliness’ or ‘immanence’ of a ‘courtly classicism,’ or a direct unification of 
service to the world and service to God, in which the new courtly ideal of living that becomes 
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to the way that the New Testament both fulfills and supersedes the Old Testa-
ment according to a Christian allegorical understanding of the Bible, the status 
achieved by Erec and Enide by the end of the romance’s second part might be 
seen as fulfilling and superseding the status they achieved in the first. The pres-
ence in this romance of the bipartite structure of biblical typology as an organiz-
ing narrative principle would amount to a new and original artistic reiteration 
of an older cultural move. The bipartite relational logic of prefiguration and ful-
fillment found in the Christian typological understanding of the bible possibly 
becomes for Chrétien a structural design according to which adventures can be 
arranged in a beautiful and pleasing way. Assuming the bipartite design of this 
romance reiterates the typological relationship between Old and New Testament 
as a poetic move in the interest of courtly joy, the significance of the bipar-
tite structure in its poetic, courtly chivalric reiteration would become newly 
indeterminate. For example, in the poetic reiteration of the religious typological 
structure, it becomes more difficult to say exactly how the Erec and Enide of the 
second part of the romance have fulfilled and superseded the Erec and Enide of 
the first part, even if something presumably remains of the religious relational 
logic. More important than any sort of religious lesson for Chrétien, for later 
poets reiterating the bipartite design, and for their courtly audiences, would 
likely have been the tested potential of the typological structure— assuming this 
indeed underlies Chrétien’s mout bele conjointure— to maximize the experience 
of joy. In any case, the content of the bipartite structure in Chrétien’s poetic iter-
ation of it is the courtly chivalric content of adventure, and the first of Arthurian 
romances is manifestly about a joy that is courtly chivalric.
 Chrétien’s bipartite narrative arrangement of adventures in his Érec et 
Énide is as innovative as it is beautiful and pleasing on account of its balanced 
visible here is grounded, but rather a connection of both by means of the same inner structure 
that is present both here and there: an  analogia entis in the truest sense of the word” (150; 
my English rendering of Kuhn’s German). Kuhn’s recognition of this bipartite structure has con-
tinued to occupy an important position in the scholarly understanding of romance structure, 
according to D.  H.  Green, even as attention has been increasingly drawn to other structural 
devices that suggest what Green calls the “double cycle” was one narrative possibility— albeit 
an important one— among many (Beginnings of Medieval Romance, 131–32). Implicated in the 
possible religious typological underpinnings of romance design is the question of change, which 
Carolyn Walker Bynum considers in her book, Metamorphosis and Identity. Bynum regards 
change, first, in terms of radical change (i.e.,  the replacement of one thing by another that is 
completely different) and, second, in terms of the evolution of a given self or thing that remains 
largely identical. Interestingly for the purposes of this study, the romances are composed at a 
time in the late twelfth century when a new understanding of change is occurring, according 
to Bynum: “In a quite stunning shift of intellectual paradigms, people were increasingly fasci-
nated by change of the first sort I sketched above— radical change, where an entity is replaced 
by something completely different“ (25).
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bipartite proportions and correspondences. In what is presumed to be his final 
romance, the unfinished Perceval, the French poet continues his innovations 
by including a second chivalric protagonist (Gauvain) alongside his principal 
one, in a narrative arrangement that is also pleasingly proportioned and iden-
tifiably bipartite as far as the unfinished narrative goes. In the first decade of 
the thirteenth century, the German poet Wolfram von  Eschenbach engages 
the grail romance of his illustrious French predecessor in his composition and 
performance of Parzival, which adopts the two- protagonist model and con-
tinues the preexisting tendency toward narrative innovation and the bipartite 
organization of the imaginary action.55 The imaginary action of Chrétien in 
Érec et Énide shows us that knights and ladies have much to gain in honor 
and love, whereas Bernard of Clairvaux— as we saw earlier in this chapter— 
considers they can only be diminished if not completely bankrupted in such 
pursuits. From the monk’s perspective, adventuring inevitably and irrevocably 
leads to a reduction or loss of self, whereas for Chrétien and his courtly audi-
ences, it holds forth the promise of adding immeasurably to it in a manner 
that is both individually and collectively beneficial and joyful. The compe-
tition between the former approach to things and the latter, which can be 
inferred on the basis of the monk’s treatise “In Praise of the New Knighthood” 
and the French poet’s first romance, becomes much more tangible with the 
grail romance of Wolfram, who raises the stakes considerably on previous and 
contemporary monastic and courtly chivalric rivals.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM WOLFRAM 
VON ESCHENBACH’S PARZIVAL
Many of the narrative moves Wolfram makes reiterate earlier ones by Chré-
tien, but the German poet is clearly intent on outdoing his predecessor wher-
ever he can.56 Outdoing takes the form of creative recasting and embellishing, 
which the German poet takes so far that he even playfully asserts that his 
romance is not based on that of Chrétien at all, but rather on the writings of 
 55. Bumke’s Wolfram von  Eschenbach presents a comprehensive overview (in  German) 
of the scholarship on Wolfram’s Parzival and his other poetic works. With respect to Wolfram’s 
adaptation of the two- hero model, see Marianne Wynn, “Parzival and Gâwân: Hero and 
Counterpart.”
 56. On Wolfram’s elaborations of Chrétien more generally, see Hatto’s “Introduction to 
a Second Reading” in his translation of Wolfram’s Parzival (412–38). Dallapiazza provides a 
synopsis of Wolfram’s romance that also includes considerations of how it differs from the grail 
romance of Chrétien (Wolfram von Eschenbach, 31–82).
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a certain mysterious “Kyot,” as we observed in the previous chapter. One of 
the noteworthy consequences of Wolfram’s many creative elaborations of the 
tale as he found it with Chrétien is that his narrative arrangement, although 
still identifiably bipartite, cannot in the same way be regarded as pleasingly 
proportional. Wolfram’s famously dark, sprawling style corresponds to the 
complex indeterminacy of the imaginary action he renders, the tone of which 
is established in the first verses of his romance:
Ist zwîvel herzen nâchgebûr,
daz muoz der sêle werden sûr.
gesmaehet unde gezieret
ist, swâ sich parrieret
unverzaget mannes muot,
als aglestern varwe tuot.
der mac dennoch wesen geil:
wande an im sint beidiu teil,
des himels und der helle.
der unstaete geselle
hât die swarzen varwe gar,
und wirt ouch nâch der vinster var:
sô habet sich an die blanken
der mit staeten gedanken.
(1.1–14)
If vacillation dwell with the heart the soul will rue it. Shame and honour 
clash where the courage of a steadfast man is motley like the magpie. But 
such a man may yet make merry, for Heaven and Hell have equal part in 
him. Infidelity’s friend is black all over and takes on a murky hue, while the 
man of loyal temper holds to the white.57
From the outset, the German poet frames the imaginary action in the broad-
est possible, global terms. The terms zwîvel, sêle, himel, and helle—“vacilla-
tion,” “soul,” “heaven,” and “hell,” respectively— introduce a patently religious 
dimension that is indeterminately juxtaposed to a more general one of central 
importance in Wolfram’s romance: unverzaget mannes muot—“the courage of 
a steadfast man,” which is as descriptive of the ideal posture of enterprising 
knights and ladies as it is of the Christian soul persevering in the face of the 
mutability of things. In the face of such mutability in the world and within, one 
 57. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 15.
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must not waver. Wolfram’s initial statements seem to be that one must forge 
ahead despite all the variability and resistance one will inevitably encounter. 
The initial verses of Wolfram’s prologue urge upon courtly chivalric audiences 
a posture of unbending resolution. Whereas the monk Bernard of Clairvaux, 
as  we have seen, urges people to turn away from investing themselves in 
mutable things, Wolfram conversely urges them to move boldly forward with 
“loyal temper.” Looking forward to the content of his story, Wolfram’s prepares 
his audience to reckon with the possibility that the temporal joys one achieves 
in honor and love, if one proceeds steadfastly, will be favorably regarded by 
the Almighty when final rewards are distributed. Wolfram adopts the chivalric 
posture that we saw in the Érec et Énide of Chrétien and intensifies it as an 
unwavering adventurous approach to the world. At the same time, he widens 
the scope of the imaginary action in which this newly focused adventurous 
approach is tested to an unprecedented degree. The indeterminate juxtapo-
sition of religious and worldly things and the unwavering approach to them 
mentioned in the romance’s first verses are manifested in the adventures of 
the two principal protagonists, which are structured according to Wolfram’s 
elaboration of Chrétien’s bipartite structural design.58
 The first narrative segment of Wolfram’s romance is devoted to the adven-
tures of Parzival and leads in the direction of an exemplary standard of 
knighthood.59 The second structural segment of Wolfram’s grail romance is 
 58. My previous observations on the possible novel employment of the typological struc-
ture for courtly chivalric purposes in the case of the French poet would apply as well to 
Wolfram’s romance.
 59. As with the romance of Chrétien above, I render these adventures here schematically 
in order to furnish a structural overview. Following Wolfram’s vastly longer and quite different 
version of the story of Parzival’s mother Herzeloyde and father Gahmuret (in  relation to the 
corresponding part of Chrétien’s grail romance), Parzival has resolved that he wants to become 
a knight and has departed from the wilderness settlement of his mother in search of Arthur’s 
court. Unbeknownst to him, his departure causes his mother Herzeloyde to perish of grief. 
His subsequent moves bring him to (1)  the duchess Jeschute, from whom he forcefully takes 
kisses and tokens of “love” (as he naively and mechanically follows the advice his mother has 
given him), which later causes the duchess’s husband Orilus to believe she has entertained a 
lover and to inflict a severe punishment upon her; (2) his cousin Sigune, with her recently slain 
lover, Schionatulander, in her lap, from whom he discovers his name; (3) Arthur’s court, where 
Parzival becomes a knight, at least in name and appearance, by slaying the “Red Knight” Ither 
with a javelin, stripping his body of the armor, and donning it himself (at which point Parzival 
himself becomes known as the “Red Knight”); (4)  the castle of the sage knight Gurnemanz, 
who provides Parzival with the courtly chivalric instruction he has been lacking on account of 
his upbringing in the wilderness; (5)  the beautiful Condwiramurs, Queen of Brobarz, whom 
Parzival marries after freeing her castle from a siege and defeating a rival for the love of Cond-
wiramurs, the knight Clamide; (6) the Grail castle, where he beholds the Grail, the marvelous 
procession in which it is borne before him, and the great suffering of his host, without opening 
up his mouth to ask the redeeming Question that would end the Grail host’s suffering and turn 
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devoted mainly to the adventures of the knight Gawan— Parzival’s Arthurian 
friend, supporter, and admirer— and leads in the same direction.60 While the 
adventuring of Parzival clearly has a religious import, that of Gawan largely 
occurs in the more familiar courtly chivalric world of knights and ladies such 
as Erec and Enide that is the setting of the majority of the verse romances. 
The engagements of Gawan in the second part of the romance culminate in 
a grand festival in which the most important people he has engaged in his 
various adventures are joyously integrated into the company of Arthur by way 
of numerous marriages. Parzival’s adventuring ends when he learns he has 
been called to the Grail. Parzival subsequently rides to the Grail castle with his 
infidel brother Feirefiz and brings joy to the long suffering company by asking 
the Question that heals his ailing uncle Anfortas’s festering wound. Thereafter 
he is reunited with his wife, thoughts of whom have inspired him— at least as 
much as the Grail— during his many long years of adventuring.
 The global implications of Wolfram’s romance that are touched upon in 
the prologue come to the fore in the adventures of Parzival, who is first put 
into play in a way that casts him as a chivalric redeemer figure. Underscor-
ing Parzival’s future chivalric capacity, Wolfram tells us upon the boy’s birth, 
that: er  wart mit swerten sît ein smit,  / vil viures er von helmen sluoc:  / sîn 
herze manlîch ellen truoc (vv. 112, 28–30)—“In the course of time he grew to 
pain to joy (because he remembers the teachings of Gurnemanz, who advised him not to ask 
too many questions); (7) his cousin Sigune, a second time, still with her slain lover, who con-
demns Parzival for having failed to ask the Question; (8) the duchess Jeschute, a second time, 
this time in the company of her husband, Orilus, who loses a single combat to Parzival and is 
compelled by the Red Knight to end his severe punishment of the duchess and restore her to 
his favor; and, finally, (9) the court of Arthur, a second time, where Parzival engages and defeats 
Sagramor and the seneschal Keie (who had insulted Parzival’s honor during his first visit to 
Arthur’s court), and is later celebrated for his many deeds of chivalric prowess when the Grail’s 
emissary Cundrie, the “destroyer of joy,” arrives and publicly rebukes Parzival for having failed 
to ask the Question at the Grail castle. Parzival’s high repute, and that of Arthur’s court by virtue 
of its association with him, is brought low at this moment. He must set out again, as Erec had 
to do in the company of his wife Enide, to regain his honor and possibly increase it.
 60. Gawan’s most significant accomplishments, besides the joint engagement with 
Antikonie discussed above, are his liberation of the “Castle of Marvels” from the magical spell 
placed upon it by the sorcerer Cinschor, and his acquisition of the beautiful Duchess Orgeluse 
during the course of a joint adventure with her in which he defeats numerous chivalric rivals, 
and in which she heaps verbal abuse upon him in order to test him (in a manner somewhat 
reminiscent of Erec’s abusive treatment of Enide, albeit with the gender roles reversed). In the 
middle of this second segment of Wolfram’s romance, the narrative focus returns to Parzival, 
to the circumstances under which he finds his way to his hermit uncle, Trevrizent (who hap-
pens to be the brother of the ailing grail king, Anfortas), and to the religious guidance he 
receives from him. The action of the second narrative segment culminates joyfully, as had that 
of the first (but for the continuing suffering of the Grail contingent and those held captive in 
the Castle of Marvels).
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be a smith— with swords!—and he struck many sparks from helmets, since 
his heart was of manly mettle.”61 In the ensuing verses, Parzival’s mother Her-
zeloyde demonstrates her own unwavering dedication and love by taking her 
newborn son to her own breast and uttering words that seem to shape Parzi-
val’s future course as much as Wolfram’s chivalric qualifications of him:
[vrou] Herzeloyde sprach mit sinne
“diu hoehste küneginne
Jêsus ir brüste bôt,
der sît durch uns vil scharpfen tôt
ame criuze mennischlîche enpfienc
und sîne triuwe an uns begienc.
swes lîp sîn zürnen ringet,
des sêle unsanfte dinget.”
(113.17–24)
“The Queen of Heaven gave her breasts to Jesus,” Herzeloyde said pensively, 
“who in the fullness of time received a bitter death on the Cross in human 
shape for love of us and thereby proved His devotion. Whoever makes light 
of His anger, his soul will fare ill at the Judgment.”62
By extension, Herzeloyde’s emulation of the posture of the Virgin is suggestive 
of the view of her son as a redeemer figure. The qualities of Christ as redeemer, 
here framed by Herzeloyde as unwavering loyalty and anger toward doubters, 
will also be those of Parzival, though they are merged in Wolfram’s imaginary 
action with his status as “a smith— with swords!” The striking words and ges-
tures of Herzeloyde, which follow immediately upon Wolfram’s reference to 
the knightly mettle the boy will have, suggest Parzival’s future engagements 
in the action will amount to a chivalric reiteration of the redemptive career of 
Christ.63 Such a view is consistent with the unwavering and frequently angry 
attitude Parzival will maintain toward any and all obstacles, even those that 
seem divinely ordained. When Parzival becomes angry at God for outcomes 
he cannot fathom, he does so as a knight engaged in and following through 
with a redemptive mission that possesses both the courtly chivalric and the 
Christian parameters visible at the moment of his birth (as  well as in the 
 61. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 66.
 62. Ibid., 66.
 63. For a consideration of the story of Parzival’s parents and its importance for the romance 
as a whole, see Francis G. Gentry, “Gahmuret and Herzeloyde.”
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prologue). As Parzival progresses toward the final joyful outcome, it is as accu-
rate to say that he unwaveringly puts things into their best possible order as 
it is to say that he continually manifests his shortcomings and endeavors to 
overcome them as part of an ongoing courtly and religious education.64
 Parzival’s unwaveringly bullish chivalric approach is evident from the 
moment he decides to become a knight. He pursues this ambition relentlessly, 
applying at every step all the resources available to him. Though always well- 
intentioned, Parzival’s approach nevertheless causes significant pain and suf-
fering to others— his mother, Jeschute, the Red Knight Ither and his many 
admirers, the grail contingent (all mentioned in the structural overview of 
narrative events referenced above).65 Parzival occasionally expresses regret 
about earlier missteps, as soon as he is in a position to recognize them as such, 
but they never seem to slow him down or deter him. His adventurous posture 
is relentless, and he tends to reframe any pain caused by his chivalric approach 
as an adventurous challenge to be met. This is most evident in Parzival’s pos-
ture and words following Cundrie’s public condemnation of him before the 
assembled Arthurian host for his failure to ask the Question at the grail castle. 
When Gawan tells Parzival, as  they embark on their respective adventurous 
paths, that he hopes God will help them with their coming challenges, the 
latter responds angrily to this proposition and insists on a different source of 
support:
nu will ich (got) dienst widersagen:
hât er haz, den will ich tragen.
vriunt, an dînes kampfes zît
dâ neme ein wîp vür dich den strît:
diu müeze ziehen dîne hant;
an der du kiusche hâst bekant
unt wîplîche güete:
ir minne dich da behüete.
(332.1–14)
Now  I will quit (God’s) service! If  he knows anger I will shoulder it. 
My friend, when your hour of combat is at hand, let a woman join issue in 
 64. A recent view of Parzival’s adventures in terms of an education is presented by Murphy, 
Gemstone of Paradise, 207–14; especially 208.
 65. The question of Parzival’s guilt, or  Schuld, has played a significant role in scholarly 
views of this romance; see, for example, Wolfgang Mohr, “Parzival’s Knightly Guilt”; and Dal-
lapiazza, Wolfram von Eschenbach, 85–86 and 90–93.
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your stead, let her guide your hand! Let the love of one whom you know to 
be modest and given to womanly virtues watch over you there.66
At this crucial point in the romance, the point of transition between the first 
and second narrative segments, Parzival states in stark terms that he will carry 
forward with his unwavering chivalric approach to the action. Parzival’s specu-
lative move forward is all the more striking because he here sees the painful 
mutability of things that will be his next and greatest challenge as a God who 
finds fault with him rather than rewards him as his chivalric peers have done. 
At this moment, as before, Parzival moves boldly forward, angrily resolved to 
win the grail, if necessary without or even despite God and banking on the value 
of love. His investment in love has paid off for him in the past, and he continues 
to believe it will sustain him and Gawan in the future at those decisive stressful 
moments— with which we may assume members of Wolfram’s audiences would 
have been viscerally familiar— when the “hour of combat is at hand.”
 Parzival’s chivalric anger at God is addressed again in detail during his 
sojourn with his hermit uncle Trevrizent, which occurs near the middle of the 
second narrative segment of Wolfram’s romance (at the moment correspond-
ing to Erec and Enide’s brief stay at Arthur’s court in the second structural seg-
ment of Chrétien’s romance). Trevrizent, once himself a knight, has decided 
to become a hermit in the mold of religious eremites after the wounding of 
his brother, the grail king Anfortas, and now lives in the wilderness where 
the exchanges between him and his still belligerent nephew occur. His assess-
ment of Parzival’s anger toward God is correspondingly monkish and critical. 
Parzival’s conviction that he will achieve his goals with his angry approach 
demonstrates for Trevrizent that he is an den witzen crank (463.3)—“weak of 
understanding.”67 The contrasting positions of Parzival and Trevrizent become 
manifest in the following especially illustrative exchange. Parzival first artic-
ulates the courtly chivalric orientation that he believes will enable him to 
join the grail company, and Trevrizent responds with his conviction that his 
nephew is drifting precariously in the direction of hôchvart, superbia—“sinful 
pride”—and away from the attitude of humility that he thinks would be more 
appropriate for the grail company:
“ich streit ie swâ ich strîten vant,
sô daz mîn werlîchiu hant
 66. Wolfram von  Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 172. I  have parenthetically altered the 
Middle High German passage and Hatto’s rendering, which are excerpted from a longer pas-
sage, in order to make clear whose service Parzival is quitting.
 67. Ibid., 236.
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sich naehert dem prîse.
ist got an strîte wîse,
der sol mich dar benennen,
daz si mich dâ bekennen:
mîn hant dâ strîtes niht verbirt.”
dô sprach aber sîn kiuscher wirt
“ir müest aldâ vor hôchvart
mit senftem willen sîn bewart.
iuch verleit lîht iuwer jugent
daz ir der kiusche braechet tugent.
hôchvart ie seic und viel.”
(472.5–17)
“I fought wherever fighting was to be had, so that my warlike hand has glory 
within its grasp. If God is any judge of fighting He will appoint me to that 
place so that the Company there know me as a knight who will never shun 
battle.” “There of all places you would have to guard against arrogance by 
cultivating meekness of spirit,” replied his austere host. “You could be misled 
by youthfulness into breaches of self- control.—Pride goes before a fall!”68
Pride versus humility as the appropriate attitude for the Grail kingdom con-
tinues to be at issue in the ensuing exchanges between Parzival and Trevri-
zent. The current grief and suffering of the Grail kingdom, Trevrizent later 
informs his young guest, stems from Anfortas’s adventuring for the love of 
a lady despite the Grail’s message that knights of the Grail kingdom are for-
bidden to fight for love. The war cry of Anfortas as he jousted for love was 
“Amor!,” which for Trevrizent is contrary to the humility required of the Grail 
king: Der  ruoft ist zur dêmuot  / iedoch niht volleclîchen guot (vv. 479.1–2)—
“That shout is not quite right for humility.”69 Trevrizent’s quasimonastic view 
of Parzival’s aggressive chivalric approach to the Grail as prideful and his rec-
ommendation of humility as the more appropriate attitude is joined with a 
correspondingly monkish rejection of fighting in the interest of love. His own 
chivalric background prevents Trevrizent from being as rigorous as someone 
like Bernard of Clairvaux in criticizing chivalric action for its investments in 
frivolous things, but the monkish posture he recommends is similar. Trevri-
zent would have Parzival stand down from his aggressive chivalric approach, 
place his trust in clergymen, and cultivate “meekness of spirit.” The underlying 
 68. Ibid., 240–41.
 69. Ibid., 244.
ADVENTURE AS A CULTURAL WAGER ∙  157
monastic orientation is directed away from all the things— the elaborate 
courtly pageantry, jousts for love, swordplay for honor, charging horses, col-
orful shields and pennants, costly pavilions, and the like— that have been the 
stuff of Wolfram’s romance to this point.
 In contrast to Chrétien’s Perceval, who manifests tearful regret and read-
iness for penance at this juncture of the story,70 Parzival’s approach does not 
visibly change in the face of Trevrizent’s criticisms and exhortations. His sub-
sequent chivalric engagement after the sojourn with Trevrizent continues 
that which went before it, though there is a strong indication that one of the 
hermit’s points has made a lasting impression. Close to the end of Wolfram’s 
romance, Parzival’s most difficult “hour of combat” comes: a  battle against 
his heathen half- brother Feirefiz whose identity and relationship Parzival 
does not yet know. When the fighting becomes most intense, Wolfram tells 
us Parzival has been sustained by his trust in God since leaving Trevrizent: 
der getoufte wol getrûwet gote / sît er von Trevrizende schiet (vv. 741.26–27)—
“The Christian had placed his full trust in God since leaving Trevrizent.”71 
Parzival has internalized one of Trevrizent’s important lessons: God will help 
those in need of help and prepared to receive it. Such trust doubtless prepares 
the way for Parzival’s ascension to the Grail, but it seems just as significant 
that nothing else about Parzival’s approach has changed. The reference to Par-
zival’s trust in God during his battle with Feirefiz is juxtaposed to Parzival’s 
thoughts of his wife Condwiramurs and the strength her love provides him at 
this crucial moment. Parzival’s killing of Ither was counted by Trevrizent as 
a sin because the “Red Knight” was Parzival’s kinsman. The present combat 
between Parzival and Feirefiz threatens a repetition of the same sin, and noth-
ing in Wolfram’s romance suggests Feirefiz’s status as an infidel mitigates this 
danger. However, a catastrophic repetition of sin does not occur. As Parzival’s 
sword strikes the top of Feirefiz’s helmet in what might be a lethal blow, God 
causes the sword to shatter. The combat halts, the brothers engage in courte-
ous conversation, discover their kinship, renounce their unfortunate conflict, 
and disaster is averted. Shortly thereafter, Parzival is summoned to the Grail 
by Cundrie.
 Along with medieval audiences, we are left to assess this final outcome. Has 
Parzival adventurously forced God’s hand? By trusting in God’s willingness to 
help, Parzival has made an adjustment that has enabled a happy, rather than 
catastrophic and sinful outcome in this conflict between brothers— assuming 
 70. See Chrétien de Troyes, Story of the Grail, 458–61. Dallapiazza also observes remarkable 
differences between how Wolfram and Chrétien proceed in this part of the work, noting in 
particular that Parzival in contrast to Perceval is not transformed into a penitent (63).
 71. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 369.
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God’s causing the sword to shatter is based on Parzival’s regained trust in Him. 
Parzival makes room for God to help him, but he has also maintained his 
aggressive approach to chivalric adventuring in the interests of honor and love, 
and he has done this despite Trevrzent’s admonitions to adopt an attitude of 
(monastic) humility. Parzival’s regained trust in God cannot be mistaken for 
“meekness of spirit.” Regained trust in God does not reduce the level or inten-
sity of Parzival’s chivalric effort, but rather becomes a constituent part of it, 
and it is this approach that forces the issue. Parzival’s approach— think of the 
instant his sword strikes the top of Feirefiz’s helmet— seems to leave no room 
for a solution other than the one God provides. God sides with Parzival and 
the sword shatters. Parzival maintains his approach until the end of Wolfram’s 
romance. He  goes on to take possession of the Grail, and when he comes 
across Trevrizent near the end of the romance, the hermit seems to confirm 
what he— and perhaps we also— may at first have been reluctant to believe:
Trevrizent ze Parzivâle sprach
“groezer wunder selten ie geschach,
sît ir aber got erzürnet hat
daz sîn endelôsiu Trinitât
iuwers willen werhaft worden ist.”
(798.1–5)
Trevrizent spoke to Parzival: “A greater marvel never occurred, in that, after 
all, with your defiance you have rung the concession from God that His 
everlasting Trinity has given you your wish.”72
According to Trevrizent’s presumably sage and religiously informed perspec-
tive, Parzival has had his way.73 His nephew has not modified his approach 
along the lines of a monastic dualist perspective, according to which the pain 
and suffering of this mortal life stem from our investment in the frivolous 
things of this world from which we must disengage ourselves more or less com-
pletely (the “more or less” demarcating the range of dualist positions among 
Bernard of Clairvaux, Chrétien’s Perceval, and Trevrizent). Instead, Parzival has 
wagered on being able to have it all— honor, love, the Grail, and presumably the 
heavenly kingdom to come— and the wager pays off in a manner that is con-
cretely demonstrative of growth. The same would seem to be true of the adven-
turous approach of Parzival’s staunchest advocate, Wolfram von Eschenbach 
 72. Ibid., 96.
 73. See also Dallapiazza, Wolfram von Eschenbach, 63.
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himself, who puts Parzival into play as a role of the dice— hie ist der âventiure 
wurf gespilt (v. 112.9)—“With this the story has made its cast”74—and at the end 
of his romance claims success in terms that are familiar to us:
swes leben sich sô verendet,
daz got niht wirt gepfendet
der sêle durch des lîbes schulde,
und der doch der werlde hulde
behalten kan mit werdekeit,
daz ist ein nütziu arbeit.
guotiu wîp, hânt die sin,
deste werder ich ein bin,
ob mir deheiniu guotes gan,
sît ich diz maere volsprochen hân.
ist daz durch ein wîp geschehen,
diu muoz mir süezer worte jehen.
(827.19–30)
When a man’s life ends in such a way that God is not robbed of his soul 
because of the body’s sinning and who nevertheless succeeds in keeping his 
fellows’ good will and respect, this is useful toil. If I have any well- wishers 
among good women of discernment I shall be valued the more for my having 
told this tale to its end. And if this was done to please one in particular, she 
must own I said some agreeable things.75
Wolfram’s own poetic adventure has ended well, and he considers himself of 
greater worth on account of it, in a manner entirely consistent with Kalogreant’s 
definition of adventure with which we began this chapter. The ladies who have 
attacked the poet- performer Wolfram, causing the poet to defend himself— 
as  we observed in the previous chapter— would seemingly do well now to 
set aside their anger if not reward him for his unwavering approach to the 
poetic action, just as his hero Parzival has been rewarded. Moves and expected 
outcomes here visibly make the transition from the imaginary world of King 
Arthur and the grail kingdom to the poetic action of the poet- performer 
Wolfram in the social setting of his performance, and potentially beyond.76
 74. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 66.
 75. Ibid., 410–11.
 76. Bumke considers that, in the end, all conflicts are resolved and a condition of beautiful 
harmony appears to have been established, though disruptions loom on the horizon via the 
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 The ending verses of Wolfram’s romance suggest that the successful cul-
mination of adventuring occurs as a joyful balance of worldly and religious 
concerns.77 Based on our consideration of Chrétien’s Érec et Énide and Wol-
fram’s grail romance Parzival, we know that such a balance is not occurring as 
a static harmonious closure, but rather as a dynamic and even potentially vol-
atile juxtaposition and maintenance of different absolute investments of self— 
investments in honor, love, and one’s heavenly reward.78 The difficulty and 
potential volatility of this balance of absolute concerns becomes clear with the 
damage and pain that occurs when any one absolute investment is neglected 
in favor of another, as  when Erec loses his interest in honor on account of 
his absolute self- commitment to the love of Enide at the outset of the sec-
ond part of Chrétien’s romance, or when Parzival causes pain to others and 
alienates God and his closest representatives with his total investment in chi-
valric honor in the first part of Wolfram’s romance. Maintaining and exploit-
ing one’s investments involves, as we have seen via the cited highlights from 
these romances, new dispositions of self in the finite times and spaces of this 
world in which the investments are being made. New strategies and touches 
are needed. Seemingly, one must always be on one’s toes, continually aware 
of one’s position vis- à- vis the positions of others, and thinking ahead to the 
degree possible no matter how demanding the concerns of the moment. One 
must be able to give oneself over completely to worldly joys, but also know 
when the moment has come to take pain upon oneself in order to make the 
joys possible, always bearing in mind the supreme importance of winning 
the heavenly afterlife. The balance referenced by Wolfram in the final verses 
of his grail romance needs to be understood dynamically as an expansion of 
the cultural action, an enrichment that occurs as an overall increase in the joy 
resulting from successful religious and worldly investments of self. Adventure 
involves, as we have seen, the wagering of oneself in the interest of the regard 
in which one is held by other courtiers. Love involves wagering oneself for 
the absolute dedication for and of a single other person. We have already seen 
a few of the characteristics of love in this and previous chapters. In the next 
chapter, love as a cultural wager is in the focal point.
references to the Lohengrin and Prester John legends, which indicate Wolfram’s narrative is 
open ended, and the action will be ongoing (Wolfram von Eschenbach, 189).
 77. The idea of establishing a balance of life- concerns is by no means new. It has played 
a central role in scholarly appraisals of the romances. I share this idea, but add considerations 
that underscore and give substance to the dynamism of the balance.
 78. If the idea of different absolute investments seems illogical or paradoxical, I recall here 
from the first two chapters of this study that the way for such an action has been prepared by 
and follows from the virtual constitution of the Christian self, which already is both what it is 
and absolutely other.
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Love as a Cultural Wager
DYNAMICS OF LOVE
Love as an absolute investment of self is a novel cultural move in the High 
Middle Ages.1 For the first time, at  European courts in the twelfth century, 
the Pauline- Augustinian self with its indeterminately conjoined spiritual- 
intellectual and physical- material resources— while still striving for its heav-
enly prize— invests itself completely in another mortal self. In  so doing, the 
individual might seem to be acting in a manner at odds with the Chris-
tian understanding of love, as  articulated for example by Augustine in his 
De Doctrina Christiana:
Haec enim regula dilectionis diuinitus constituta est: Diliges, inquit, pro-
ximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, deum uero ex toto corde, ex  tota anima, 
ex tota mente, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem uitam et omnem intel-
lectum in illum conferas, a quo habes ea ipsa, quae confers. Cum autem ait: 
toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, nullam uitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae 
 1. See Peter Dinzelbacher’s article, “Über die Entdeckung.” Walter Haug terms this 
moment “die Geburtsstunde der modernen Liebesidee”—“the birth hour of the modern idea of 
love” (Die höfische Liebe, 34).
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uacare debeat et quasi locum dare, ut alia re uelit frui, sed quidquid aliud 
diligendum uenerit in animum, illuc rapiatur, quo totus dilectionis impetus 
currit. Quisquis ergo diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse 
toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat deum. Sic enim eum diligens tam-
quam se ipsum totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem dei, 
quae nullum a se riuulum duci extra patitur, cuius deriuatione minuatur.2
This is the divinely instituted rule of love: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself,” He said, and “Thou shalt love God with thy whole heart, and with 
thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.” Thus all your thoughts and all 
your life and all your understanding should be turned toward Him from 
whom you receive these powers. For when He said, “With thy whole heart, 
and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind,” he did not leave any 
part of life which should be free and find itself room to desire the enjoyment 
of something else. But whatever else appeals to the mind as being loveable 
should be directed into that channel into which the whole current of love 
flows. Whoever, therefore, justly loves his neighbor should so act toward him 
that he also loves God with his whole heart, with his whole soul, and with 
his whole mind. Thus, loving his neighbor as himself, he refers the love of 
both to that love of God which suffers no stream to be led away from it by 
which it might be diminished.3
As a cultural wager at high medieval courts, love seems either to be contrary 
to this fundamental Christian orientation of love (consistent with the dualistic 
condemnation of “the enjoyment of something else”), or  to be a reiteration 
that speculatively elaborates and reorients the global orientation in the interest 
of gain.4 The court poetry examined in this chapter suggests that both these 
possibilities are in play. Of these alternative assessments of love’s value vis- à- 
vis divine love, which appear to mark new parameters of indeterminacy in 
the cultural action at courts, the latter possibility will be of particular inter-
est to us. The courtly self that is speculatively invested in love loves with “its 
whole heart,” “its whole soul,” and “its whole mind,” it  concentrates “all its 
 2. The Latin text is from Avrelii Avgvstini Opera, De Doctrina Christiana, book I, chapter 
22, 17–18; italics in original. Note that the Latin variants dilectio and diligo employed here by 
Augustine seem to avoid the perils of amor while retaining the meanings of joy/pleasure and 
devoted attachment/love.
 3. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 19.
 4. Regarding the latter possibility, I recall again here, based on the first two chapters of 
this study, that if the idea of different absolute investments of self seems illogical or paradoxical, 
the way has been prepared by and follows from the virtual constitution of the Christian self, 
which already is both what it is and absolutely other.
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thoughts” and “all its life and understanding.”5 If, in courtly love, the beloved 
toward which this concentration of all the capacities of self is oriented is not 
God, this does not necessarily mean that the way to God is closed, at least not 
for courtiers. Pauline- Augustinian cultural athletes are already engaged in the 
speculation that they will obtain their heavenly prize by means of a sufficiently 
concentrated, capable, and persistent exertion of self.6 Ladies and knights now 
further speculate that the way to God might include— or might not exclude— 
one’s absolute investment in another mortal self; that the bliss of one’s heav-
enly reward might be anticipated by the joys of a worldly, even fleshly love; 
that the “current” of love referenced by Augustine might be sufficiently broad 
and strong to encompass and convey the interest in one’s neighbor as lover.7
 We have seen in earlier chapters of this study that the experience of indi-
vidual enrichment in love might not always be joyful for the court as a whole. 
Correspondingly, one of the challenges posed by the interest in love is the 
optimally joyful mediation between individual and collective experiences of 
it. Achieving such mediation involves strategic exertions that necessitate the 
full use of the spiritual- intellectual and physical- material resources of lov-
ers as courtiers.8 In love, all the capacities of courtiers must come into play 
(i.e.,  intelligence, strength, patience, poise under pressure, well- timed open 
 5. My focus is on the amorous orientation of males to females and of females to males 
(i.e., on how love occurs in the romances). This is not to say that “amorous orientation” is the 
same as “sexual orientation” in the modern sense, as James Schultz reminds us in his study Courtly 
Love (xviii). We observe in this chapter that love tends to occur and be described in religious 
and imperial terms, consistent with the parameters observed in the initial chapters of this study. 
Schulz makes similar observations in his book; see, in particular, the chapter titled “Aristophilia” 
(79–98). For a study of a variety of other manifestations of medieval love, which finds love’s 
“ennobling” effect to be a common characteristic, see C. Stephen Jaeger, Ennobling Love.
 6. I base my view of the Christian athlete on passages such as Heb 12:1 and 1 Cor 9:24, 
which I cite in my first chapter.
 7. Hannah Arendt makes the following observation on Augustine’s conception of caritas 
in her Love and Saint Augustine: “what we cannot understand is how, through this love by 
which we deny both ourselves and the world, another person can still be considered our neigh-
bor, that is, as someone specifically connected to us” (95). Arendt here draws attention to the 
indeterminacy of Augustine’s conception of love in a different way than I am doing, though she 
arrives at a question similar to the one that I also suggest is left open: how can one love one’s 
neighbor? Love as rendered in the romances may be regarded as an answer to this question.
 8. In Love and the Idea of Europe, Luisa Passerini writes, “Love constitutes a unifying force 
that works in a similar way whether it is keeping a couple together or laying the foundation 
stones of a cohesive society” (1). On  the importance of love for courtly culture, see Albrecht 
Classen’s introduction to his edited collection of essays, Discourses on Love: “Courtly culture 
relied heavily on the theme of love in its myriad manifestations, and our modern fascination 
with medieval literature in turn draws from this particular phenomenon [. . .] [T]he medieval 
world, perhaps more than any other cultures, focused on courtly love as its most appropriate 
medium for self- identification” (6–7).
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and covert moves). This is particularly the case because love may be at odds 
with the ways in which relationships in households of nobility are controlled 
for political purposes, most visibly by means of arranged marriages in the 
political interest of maintaining patrilineal bloodlines and producing legiti-
mate heirs. The characteristics of the imaginary action involving love some-
times seem to contrast sharply with prevailing political practices, just as they 
may seem to contrast sharply with the characteristics of the loving posture 
recommended to Christians by Augustine.9 However, given the predomi-
nantly religious- imperial rather than individual- autonomous parameters of 
medieval culture, as we have seen, moves made in any given cultural domain 
remain available for reiteration and variation throughout a cultural action of 
corresponding dimensions. Love occurs religiously and imperially. It  is reli-
gious and imperial in its implications and reach, and remains so even when 
and where it seems at odds with religion and politics. With respect to the 
availability of love as a cultural move, it seems appropriate to reckon with an 
open- ended dynamic that includes moments of friction as well as moments of 
congruence among the interests of different cultural domains such as religion, 
politics, and poetry, rather than to endeavor to determine or fix this open- 
ended dynamic in any particular way.10
 We considered evidence at the outset of the previous chapter that narration 
and its understanding involves sensory and motor simulations— physiological 
action, and the dynamics of such adventurous action as we observed them 
there are applicable here. In love, as in adventure, courtiers pursue new cul-
tural interests that inform and are informed by moves being made elsewhere 
in the cultural action. I regard love in this chapter as a new cultural disposition 
of self, as  an absolute wager, that is occurring in the imaginary competitive 
action of the romances. As in the previous chapter, I continue in this section 
below with some exemplary illustrations of love as a cultural wager that show 
love’s absolute stakes, its global dimensions, and the tendency to render the 
interest in love with imagery borrowed from warfare, politics, and games.11 
 9. Associated with the idea of a division or tension between marriage as a political instru-
ment and love as an individual passion is the argument of Denis de Rougemont in his Love in 
the Western World, who posits an oppositional relationship of passionate love and marriage. 
However, many of the examples observed in this chapter suggest there is passion (or, at least, 
a total commitment of the self) in marriage, and Christianity (or, at least, Christian dimensions 
and imagery) in passionate, adulterous love.
 10. For example, in terms of some kind of autonomy. Haug goes in this direction when he 
posits for poetic treatments of love a “Freiraum” or “free space” (Die höfische Liebe, 34).
 11. Love as art, struggle, or game is consistent with depictions of it in antiquity, such as 
those of Ovid. However, the absolute stakes of love at medieval courts distinguish it from 
love in antiquity. On this point, see de Rougemont (Love in the Western World, 60) and, more 
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In the final sections of this chapter, in order to consider how love as a cultural 
wager is narrated at greater length, we shall consider highlights from the action 
of two great stories of courtly love: Marie de France’s tale of Lanval and his 
otherworldly lady, and Gottfried von Strassburg’s romance of Tristan and Isolt.
•
In the previous chapter, we  observed the interest in love in Wolfram 
von Eschenbach’s Parzival to be aligned in the end with the quest for the grail 
and trust in God, and to be regarded as equally valuable. Outside of Parzival’s 
adventuring for love and for the grail, the absolute value of love is underscored 
in other conspicuous ways in Wolfram’s romance. For example, this is how 
much the love of the lady Condwiramurs is worth to the knight Clamide, who 
has lost any possibility of ever obtaining it by the time he utters these words:
Pilâtus von Poncîâ,
und der arme Jûdas,
der bî eime kusse was
an der triuwelôsen vart
dâ Jêsus verrâten wart,
swie daz ir schepfaer raeche,
die nôt ich niht verspraeche,
daz Brôbarzaere vrouwen lîp
mit ir hulden waer min wîp,
sô daz ich sî umbevienge,
swie ez mir dar nâch ergienge.12
(219.24–220.4)
Whatever the punishment their Maker has in store for Pontius Pilate and 
that wretched Judas who joined the traitors with a kiss when Jesus was 
betrayed, I  would gladly accept their torment if only the lady of Brobarz 
were my wife by her consent, and I could hold her in my arms— come what 
might thereafter!13
recently, Haug, who states there is “kaum etwas Vergleichbares”—“scarcely anything compa-
rable” to medieval courtly love in antiquity (Die höfische Liebe, 33).
 12. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Lachmann); Clamide offers this assessment of his 
love’s dimensions before King Arthur and his retinue at court not long after his defeat by Par-
zival. Numbers of Middle High German and Old French verses from the romances here and 
elsewhere are cited parenthetically in text.
 13. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 118.
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Having fallen short in his chivalric play for the love of Condwiramurs by los-
ing a single combat against Parzival, Clamide now contemplates the desper-
ate company of Pontius Pilate and Judas Iscariot. The biblical proportions of 
Clamide’s suffering serve inversely as a measure of the love that he has lost 
to Parzival, which seemingly would more than offset the suffering of damna-
tion. The love Clamide forlornly continues to desire is not patently adulterous, 
though the stark terms he uses seem as audacious as those used to describe the 
love of Clamide’s more famous imaginary contemporaries, Isolt and Tristan.14 
The embrace for which Clamide yearns is not elaborated in further detail, but 
it has a clearly fleshly component. For this love, he would be willing to place 
body and soul at risk. In the cited verses, there is a programmatic alignment of 
the rhyming phrases umbevienge—“hold in my arms”—and ergienge—“come 
what might.” The latter phrase shows Clamide’s forlorn wish to be a specula-
tion that leaves the final outcome undecided. What indeed might come there-
after? Would the same punishment be given to a knight for loving a lady as 
that which was given to those who betrayed and condemned Christ? These 
words underscore Clamide’s willingness to accept the suffering of Judas and 
Pontius Pilate in exchange for Condwiramurs, while at the same time leaving 
open whether this would necessarily be the case if his wish to possess the 
lady— to “hold her in his arms”—could somehow be fulfilled. The importance 
given to Clamide’s statement in Wolfram’s grail romance is modest, corre-
sponding to this knight’s limited role. Its primary function seems to be as an 
inverse marker of the value of the love of Condwiramurs that Parzival has 
obtained with his victory over Clamide. Yet it also serves as a demonstration 
of the absolute value of creaturely love, of the extremity of dimensions such 
creaturely love can have. The stark manner in which Clamide gives expression 
to what he has lost and to what he continues against all hope to aspire seems 
to leave little room to render the absoluteness of his investment in love in any 
greater terms.
 Clamide’s evaluation of his love for Condwiramurs explores the limits of 
absolute creaturely love in a manner that is consistent with Wolfram’s broader 
poetic assessment, according to which the adventurous pursuit of love and 
the acquisition of God’s favor weigh about equally in the scale. Elsewhere 
in Wolfram’s romance, the possibilities of creaturely love are explored in a 
similarly striking way in the case of Parzival’s cousin Sigune and her lover, 
the knight Schionatulander, who has been slain in a joust while serving for 
 14. Cundwiramurs and Parzival are married and completely devoted to one another’s love, 
so the adulterous implications of Clamide’s words— though these seem to articulate this knight’s 
heartfelt wish— remain much more hypothetical and lack the power to provoke those around 
him.
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her love. The scenes involving Sigune and Schionatulander render the lady 
holding the lifeless body of her beloved in a manner analogous to the biblical 
Pietà, thus seemingly appropriating the religious model for courtly chival-
ric use. The lady Sigune is an exemplar of fidelity, and her posture shows us 
creaturely love rendered in a comparably absolute way.15 Sigune’s grief over 
her lover’s death in chivalric action is profound, but she does not take what 
has occurred as a warning to turn away from creaturely love, as  she would 
doubtless be advised to do by the likes of Bernard of Clairvaux. Based on his 
view of worldly knighthood, surveyed in the previous chapter, the famous and 
influential monk would doubtless point out that Sigune’s present painful state 
is the inevitable result of a basically sinful orientation that has invested too 
much value in “frivolous” things.16 However, Sigune herself shows no signs of 
questioning her approach. She continues to invest herself absolutely in love, 
even after her lover’s death. Wolfram tells us that her love, rather than being 
cut short by death, continues: Durch minne diu an im erstarb,  / daz er der 
vürste niht erwarb, / si minnete sînen tôten lîp (vv. 436.1–3)—“For the sake of 
the love that had died with this prince without his having enjoyed her, she 
now loved him dead as he was.”17 Love’s reward for chivalric action occurs 
even in this extraordinary case, as Sigune tells us in her own words:
Mîner jaemerlîchen zîte jâr
wil ich im minne geben vür wâr.
der rehten minne ich bin sîn wer,
wand er mit schilde und ouch mit sper
dâ nâch mit ritters handen warp,
unz er in mîme dienste erstarb.
magetuom ich ledeclîche hân:
er ist iedoch vor gote mîn man.
ob gedanke wurken sulen diu werc,
sô trage ich niender den geberc
der underswinge mir mîn ê.
mîme leben tet sîn sterben wê.
der rehten ê diz vingerlîn
vür got sol mîn geleite sîn.
(440.1–14)
 15. On the figure of Sigune, see Marion Gibbs, “Ideals of Flesh and Blood,” 14–17.
 16. See Bernard of Clairvaux’s “Praise of the New Knighthood,” which was also considered 
and cited in the previous chapter.
 17. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival (Hatto), 223.
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I shall give him love through the joyless days that remain to me. It is true love 
that I shall bestow on him, for he strove to win it in chivalric style with shield 
and lance till he died in my service. I am a virgin and unwed: yet before God 
he is my husband. If thoughts could produce deeds, then I have no hidden 
reservation that could impede my marriage. His death wounded my life. And 
so this ring, token of true wedlock, shall assure my safe passage to God.18
As inopportune as it may seem, the continuing love of Sigune upon the death 
of her lover is a worldly, courtly chivalric one, extended in the direction of the 
heavenly afterlife. She bestows it upon her lover because he has served her as 
knights are supposed to do, with lance and shield. Schionatulander has died in 
his effort to win her love, and the reward bestowed by Sigune is correspond-
ingly varied. The spiritual and physical love and marital bond, which often 
mark the outcomes of successful chivalric endeavors in the romances, must be 
replaced here by intentions. With thoughts standing in for deeds, Sigune gives 
herself to Schionatulander as the proper reward for his chivalric investment 
in her, and she regards herself as his wife. Her love for Schionatulander is in 
this way absolute, as  is her suffering, and by the end of Wolfram’s romance, 
she will have perished of it. In what one might regard as Wolfram’s retort to 
the wagging finger of Bernard of Clairvaux, the poet has Sigune express in the 
final verses of the above- cited passage her faithful assurance that absolute ded-
ication to her lover and husband in thought will open heaven’s gates for her.
 With Clamide and Sigune, Wolfram finds different ways of showing 
what Parzival’s love for Conwiramurs accomplishes in the foreground of the 
imaginary action of his grail romance. The pain and suffering of Sigune and 
Clamide and the joy of Parzival and Condwiramurs mark new ways of scaling 
the courtly chivalric interest in love. This interest is already absolute in a more 
conventionally chivalric romance such as Chrétien de Troyes’s Érec et Énide, 
but the religious standards that form part of Wolfram’s grail romance enable a 
relatively greater assessment of its depth and scope. The pain of Clamide and 
Sigune resulting from their absolute investment in love is an extreme version 
of the anguish experienced elsewhere in the romances by lovers because of 
love’s mutability. In the interest of love, one wagers oneself for something of 
absolute value, but the way to the goal remains unpredictable. Receiving the 
reward of love hinges on many variables, foremost among them the inclina-
tions of the other who might not be willing to bestow it, as  in the case of 
Clamide. Even when love is mutual, it eventually ends or is transformed in a 
fundamental way upon the death of the beloved, as in the case of Sigune.
 18. Ibid., 225.
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 In the pursuit of love’s reward, the variability and mutability of things can 
be influenced but never be entirely fixed or controlled by one’s strategic inter-
ventions. The physical disorientation and malaise associated with love is one 
of the most prominent and enduring manifestations of courtiers’ interest in it. 
The turbulent dynamics of love, experienced as a physical condition (i.e., love 
sickness), also correspond to those in the give- and- take of jousting and sword-
play as well as in the tumbling of dice, which Wolfram combines in his own 
memorable rendering of action undertaken for love: vil hôhes topels er doch 
spilt,  / der an ritterschaft um minne zilt (vv. 115.19–20)—“A man who aims 
at love through chivalric exploits rolls the dice for high stakes.”19 In love, the 
dynamics of the Pauline- Augustinian move are reiterated, the self is invested 
absolutely in another in the hope of gain, but in the reiteration— when the 
beloved is a lady or a knight— the move increasingly comes into view as such, 
analogous to plays in competitions, contests, and games. It can also be ren-
dered as analogous to warfare, competition’s most brutal form. This occurs 
in the case of Riwalin and Blancheflor in Gottfried von Strassburg’s romance 
about the famous adulterous lovers Tristan and Isolt (to  which I return at 
greater length later in this chapter). Conquest provides the appropriate imag-
ery for describing the initial stages of the action in which Tristan’s parents, 
Riwalin and Blancheflor, are involved in the interest of love:
er was ir in ir herze komen;
er truoc gewalteclîche
in ir herzen künicrîche.
den cepter und die crône.20
(726–29)
He had come into her heart, and in the kingdom of her heart wore crown 
and sceptre with despotic sway.21
When Blancheflor and Riwalin speak to each other shortly thereafter for the 
first time, the lady indicates love has involved injurious force, when she tells 
the knight that he has caused her discomfort on account of a “dear friend”: 
Sî sprach: “an einem vriunde mîn, / dem besten den ich ie gewan, / dâ habet ir 
mich beswaeret an” (vv. 754–56)—“You have oppressed me through a friend of 
 19. Ibid., 68. The Middle High German topels more clearly references a game of dice. As in 
my fourth chapter, where I also cited these very illustrative verses, I modify Hatto’s translation 
here, replacing “gambles” with the italicized words.
 20. Gottfried’s Middle High German verses are cited from Tristan (Ranke).
 21. Ibid., 51.
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mine, the best I ever had.”22 The friend, it turns out, is Blancheflor’s own heart, 
over which Riwalin holds “despotic sway.”23 Riwalin is eventually able to per-
ceive the possibility of love, because he has begun to wager himself for hers as 
she has for his, and because he applies all the intellectual resources at his dis-
posal. In the cited verses below, the knight gives Blancheflor’s demeanor and 
the meaning of her words close critical consideration and begins to under-
stand the sense in which she has been “oppressed” by him. He proceeds then, 
in his thoughts, to take possession of what she has already made available to 
him for the taking:
er trahte maneger slahte,
waz Blanschefliure swaere
und dirre maere waere
ir gruoz, ir rede betrahte er gâr,
ir sûft, ir segen, al ir gebâr
daz marcte er al besunder
und begunde iedoch hier under
ir siuften unde ir süezen segen
ûf den wec der minne wegen
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
daz enzunte ouch sîne sinne,
daz sî sâ wider vuoren
und nâmen Blanschefluoren
und vuorten sî mit in zehant
in Riwalînes herzen lant
und crônden sî dar inne
im z’einer küniginne.
(794–812)
He pondered from many sides why Blancheflor should be oppressed, and 
what lay behind it all. He considered her greeting, her words; he examined her 
sigh minutely, her farewell, her whole behavior, and so doing began to con-
strue both her sigh and her sweet benediction as manifestations of love [. . .] 
 22. Ibid.
 23. See also James A. Schultz’s observations on the love of Blancheflor and Riwalin in his 
article, “Why Do Tristan and Isolde Make Love?” (73–79). Of particular importance is Schulz’s 
observation that love (and the ensuing urge to engage in sexual activities) is internal, but not 
innate: “Love takes over one’s heart, thereby becoming an internal force that impels the indi-
vidual to engage in sexual activities. But although it is internal, it  is not innate: it  is always 
provoked by something outside the lover” (79).
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This fired his spirit too, so that it returned and took Blancheflor and led her 
straightway into the land of his heart and crowned her there as his Queen.24
Here the indeterminate cultural action in which love is at stake is rendered 
with imagery suggestive of the painstaking reconnoitering of challenging and 
potentially hostile terrain, followed by assault, conquest, and the eventual cor-
onation of a new queen in Riwalin’s “kingdom of the heart.” In love as in war, 
the self is wagered in a risky action in which possible outcomes range from 
the utter ruin of Clamide to the absolute joy of Parzival and Condwiramurs, 
from the difficulty and pain of the paramilitary maneuvering of Riwalin and 
Blancheflor to the joy they later experience for a short while in their “king-
dom of love,” the value of which is said to equal or surpass that of any other 
heavenly kingdom: Sî enhaeten niht ir leben / umb kein ander himelrîche gege-
ben (vv. 1371–72)—“They would not have given this life of theirs for any other 
heavenly kingdom.”25
 Decades earlier, in his romance Cligès (ca. 1176), Chrétien de Troyes sets 
forth the action undertaken by knights and ladies in the interest of love over 
a period of two generations. Love is a highly indeterminate and tumultuous 
undertaking, as indistinguishable in its effects from a bitter draught or from 
the pitching and turning of a boat at sea, as the sound of the Old French l’amor 
is from the words amer—“bitter,” and la mer—“sea.”26 In the case of Cligès’s 
parents, Alexander and Soredamors, we can already see the importance placed 
on close scrutiny, analysis, and reflection in the interest of love.27 In contrast 
to the bellicose imagery employed in rendering the amorous action of Riwalin 
and Blancheflor, Alexander’s considerations about the goal he has set for 
himself— the love of Soredamors— show the action for love’s reward to involve 
both physical infirmity (i.e., love sickness) and the dynamics of a game:
Donc n’est mervoille se m’esmai
Car molt ai mal et si ne sai
Quex max ce est que me justise,
Ne sai don la dolors m’est prise.
Nel sai? Si faz. Jel cuit savoir:
 24. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan, 52.
 25. Ibid., 58–59. The Middle High German word ander means “other,” so I have taken the 
liberty of inserting this word, italicized, into Hatto’s English rendering here.
 26. See Chrétien de Troyes, Cligès (Dembowski), cited below, vv. 539–57. I discuss the same 
play on words in Gottfried’s romance later in this chapter.
 27. For perceptive views of the amorous relationships of Alexandre and Soredamors, and 
of Cligès and Fenice, see Joan Tasker Grimbert, “Cliges and the Chansons,” 120–36.
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Cest mal me fet Amors avoir.
Comant? Set donc Amors mal faire?
Don n’est il dolz et debonaire?
Je cuidoie que il eüst.
En Amor rien qui boen ne fust,
Mes je l’ai molt felon trové.
Nel set qui ne l’a esprové,
De quex jeus Amors s’antremet.
Fos est qui devers lui se met,
Qu’il vialt toz jorz grever les suens.
Par foi, ses geus n’est mie buens;
Malvés joer se fet a lui,
Je cuit qu’il me fera enui.
Que ferai donc? Retrerai m’an?28
(664–77)
This malady comes from Love. How can that be? Can Love do harm? Is he 
not gentle and high- born? I thought that there was only good in Love, but I’ve 
found him to be a great traitor. You cannot know all of Love’s games until you 
have tried them. One is a fool to side with him, because he is always trying to 
harm his own. Upon my word, his game is a bad one. It’s not good to play with 
him, for his game will cause me grief. So what shall I do? Shall I back away?29
Love personified seems as violently whimsical as the capricious deities at 
Homer’s Troy, but we continue to observe that the absolute stakes in play are 
specifically medieval. At the moment of these reflections, Alexander considers 
love’s game to be rigged in such a way that he is bound to lose and experience 
painful diminishment. The cited verses and the episode from which they are 
taken show that, in  the interest of love, one is simultaneously played and a 
player. One is played— in a manner reminiscent of the gods’ manipulation of 
the lives of mortals in the action around Troy that we observed in the first 
chapter of this study— insofar as love is something overpowering that hap-
pens to people and is experienced negatively and painfully. Medieval people 
understand themselves in love to be like dice, jostled and moved by a force 
largely beyond their control.30 The painful sense of being played by love cor-
 28. Chrétien de Troyes, Cligès (Dembowski).
 29. Idem, Cligès (Kibler), 131.
 30. Along these lines, Grimbert leaves Alexander in the overpowering clutches of love 
(“Cliges and the Chansons,” 127). I  give greater importance to Alexander’s whole- hearted 
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responds to the experience of being at stake, to being absolutely invested in 
something mutable and unpredictable. On the other hand, in the however dif-
ficult torments of absolute love, courtiers such as Alexander are also making 
love their interest and managing to find their way. If courtiers frequently come 
to grips with the adverse effects of being played by love, it is because they are 
able— as  players— to  turn things to their advantage. Like most lovers in the 
romances, Alexander will not “back away,” as we see in the resolve with which 
his lengthy reflections about love conclude:
Or face de moi tot son buen,
Si com il doit feire del suen,
Car je le vuel et si me plest,
Je ne quier que cist max me lest.
Mialz vuel qu’ainsi toz jorz ne teingne
Que de nelui santez me veingne,
Se de la ne vient la santez
Dont est venue l’anfertez.
(863–70)
Let Love do with me what he will, as he should do with his subject, for such 
is my wish and desire; I hope this malady will never leave me. I would rather 
linger on like this forever than be healed by anyone, unless it be by her from 
whom my illness came.31
Here Alexander wholeheartedly accepts that he is absolutely in play, as every 
true lover must eventually do, because the pain of the risk is worthwhile in 
view of the reward. In absolute terms, the knight here commits himself to love, 
toz jorz—“forever.”
 Later in this romance, Cligès along with his beloved Fenice will participate 
in the same difficult game. A move that Chrétien makes in rendering this love 
of the second generation addresses the relationship of poetry and politics that 
was touched upon at the beginning of this chapter. Like his father before him, 
Cligès resolves to journey from Greece to Arthur’s court in Britain to test his 
chivalric mettle among the ranks of the very best knights. By the time of his 
departure, an exchange of hearts between the lovers has occurred— a recurring 
acceptance of the idea that he has to be a player, and that, as  such, he may be able to shape 
things to his own ends.
 31. Chrétien de Troyes, Cligès (Kibler), 133.
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convention in the poetic depiction of love in the romances.32 Left behind in 
Constantinople, Fenice reflects that her own heart has left her in order to 
remain with her beloved Cligès, but she decides that her heart, that is, her 
absolute investment in Cligès, should stay where it is, with its new “master.” 
Fenice’s reflections are worth citing at length for their meticulous, critical ren-
dering of politics at court in relation to love:
La soit! Ja nel quier remuer,
Einz voel qu’a son seignor remaingne,
Tant que de lui pitiez li praigne;
Qu’ainçois devra il la que ci
De son sergent avoir merci,
Por ce qu’il sont an terre estrenge.
S’or set bien servir de losenge,
Si com an doit servir a cort,
Molt iert riches, einz qu’il s’an tort.
Qui vialt de son seignor bien estre
Et delez lui seoir a destre,
Si com il est us et costume,
Del chief li doit oster la plume,
Neis quant il n’en i a point.
Mes ici a un malvés point:
Car il aplaigne par defors,
Et se il a dedans le cors
Ne malvestié ne vilenie,
Ja n’iert tant cortois qu’il li die,
Einz fera cuidier et antendre
Qu’a lui ne se porroit nus prandre
De proesce ne de savoir,
Si cuide cil qu’il dïe voir
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Qui les corz et les seignors onge
Servir le covient de mançonge.
Autel covient que mes cuers face,
S’avoir vialt de son seignor grace;
Loberres soit et losengiers.
Mes Cligés est tex chevaliers,
 32. See Grimbert’s discussion of Cligès and Fenice and their exchange of hearts (“Cliges 
and the Chansons,” 131–34).
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Si biax, si frans et si leax
Que ja n’iert mançongiers ne fax
Vers moi, tant le sache lober,
Qu’an lui n’a riens que amander.
(4506–56; italics added)
Let it stay where it is! I have no wish to disturb it, but let it remain with its 
lord until he deign to take pity on it. He is more likely to have pity on his 
servant there than here, since they are in a foreign land. Whoever wishes to 
be in his lord’s good graces and sit at his right hand, as  is the custom and 
habit of our days, must pick the feather from his head, even when there isn’t 
one. But there is a contrary side to this: even after he has smoothed down 
his lord’s hair the servant does not have the courtesy to tell his lord of any 
wickedness and evil within him, but lets him believe and understand that no 
one is comparable to him in valour and in knowledge, and his lord believes 
he speaks the truth [. . .] Anyone who frequents courts and lords must be 
ready to serve with lies. My heart, too, must be ready to cajole and flatter! But 
Cligès is so handsome, noble, and true a knight that no matter how it praised 
him, my heart could never be false or deceitful: for in him there is nothing 
to be improved upon.33
In the interest of love, a heart must be prepared to cajole, flatter, and engage in 
any and every kind of dissimulation with which an ambitious courtier would 
curry the favor of a powerful lord. Fenice’s reflections here, in particular in 
the italicized verses, show us that in the absolute wager of self for love, one 
must be prepared to do and say anything. Politics at court provide— along with 
warfare, games, and physical infirmity— a manner of illustrating the lengths to 
which a loving heart must be prepared to go in the pursuit of its interest. While 
the intricacies of politics at court provide a different manner of rendering the 
action undertaken for love, in this case, the interest in love also inversely offers 
a perspective from which courtly politics can be laid open to critical scrutiny. 
Based on the matter- of- fact manner in which the dissimulations of courtly 
politics are rendered here in the reflections of Fenice, one might surmise that 
a lord truly deserving of all the flattery and fawning of courtiers— as deserv-
ing as Cligès is of her loving heart’s ministrations— is scarce, if at all extant. 
In Fenice’s thoughts about her heart’s relationship to Cligès, love, even as it is 
being rendered in political terms, seems to possess a standard of excellence 
that is lacking in politics. Here and elsewhere, as in the narratives about love 
 33. Chrétien de Troyes, Cligès (Hatto), 178; italics added.
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that I examine in greater detail below, love seems to establish a level of courtly 
accomplishment to which all lords and courtiers would do well to aspire.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM MARIE DE FRANCE’S LANVAL
At the beginning of Marie’s lay Lanval, the situation of the eponymous knight 
seems anything but propitious in terms of the potential for growth.34 Scots 
and Picts have invaded England and are laying waste to it. Arthur has sought 
refuge in his stronghold at Carduel, where he holds court and has distributed 
rich gifts, wives, and lands to his counts and barons, with the exception of 
Lanval. Most of Arthur’s men envy Lanval’s valor, generosity, beauty, and brav-
ery, and only feign affection for him. Though he is the son of a king, the knight 
is far from his homeland, without resources and dependent as a member of 
Arthur’s household on the king’s generosity, which in his sole case is not forth-
coming. Apparently without any recourse, Lanval is in dire straits. Resources 
are aplenty at Arthur’s court, but despite Lanval’s fine qualities— or perhaps 
because of envy of them— the latter experiences no enrichment. These fine 
qualities, possibly the source of his predicament at a court where the best 
is not being rewarded, nevertheless enable Lanval to take an initiative that 
changes everything. Despite the adverse circumstances at court in which he 
finds himself, Lanval engages himself in a manner that will help. Marie tells us:
Ore est Lanval mut entrepris,
Mut est dolent, mut est pensis!
Seignurs, ne vus esmerveillez:
Hum estrange descunseillez,
Mut est dolenz en autre tere,
Quant il ne seit u sucurs quere!
Le chevalier dunt jeo vus di,
Ki tant aveit le rei servi,
Un jur munta sur sun destrer,
Si s’est alez esbaneer.35
(33–42)
 34. Lanval is frequently assessed in its poetic associations with Marie’s other lays, for 
example in the studies of R. Howard Bloch (Anonymous Marie de France) and Glyn S. Burgess 
(Lais of Marie de France). Its Arthurian content, amorous interests, and verse form also make 
this lay appropriate for the different framework in which I am considering it.
 35. Marie de France, Lais (Micha).
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Now Lanval was in difficulty,  / depressed and very worried.  / My lords, 
don’t be surprised: / a strange man, without friends, / is very sad in another 
land, / when he doesn’t know where to look for help. / The knight of whom 
I speak, / who had served the king so long, / one day mounted his horse / 
and went off to amuse himself.36
The term s’esbanïer—“amuse oneself ”—is used here and elsewhere in Marie’s 
story to designate moments when knights and ladies put themselves into 
play for love. Other courtiers will later “amuse themselves” at Arthur’s court, 
but this option is apparently not available to Lanval at this point. Instead, 
he resolves to “amuse himself ” in a landscape beyond Arthur’s court, the same 
landscape Marie has already told us is being destroyed by Scots and Picts. 
Even if this were the only danger lurking in the open countryside beyond 
Carduel, Lanval’s play for love— which his initiative progressively reveals itself 
to be— involves opening himself to new possibilities that also expose him to 
risk, as we see in the ensuing narrative. Lanval’s move shows itself to be a risky 
enterprise that eventually enables him to overcome his difficulties and acquire 
the resources he needs, though the challenges he has to overcome in order to 
experience love’s reward will be difficult and many.37
 As he lies by a river absorbed by worries, two unknown maidens arrive to 
tell him he has been summoned by their lady. They lead him to their lady’s 
pavilion, the description of which provides detailed indications of the global 
parameters of the cultural resources that Lanval will soon gain in love:
Treskë al tref l’unt amené,
Ki mut fu beaus e bien asis;
La reïne Semiramis,
Quant ele ot unkes plus aveir
E plus pussaunce e plus saveir,
Ne l’emperere Octovïan,
N’esligasent le destre pan.
Un aigle d’or ot desus mis;
 36. In this chapter, I cite the verse translation of Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante, Lais of 
Marie de France, which best brings out the features of Marie’s Old French text to which I wish 
to draw attention in this chapter (here 105–6).
 37. Bloch suggests that “Lanval’s wandering off into the countryside and his encounter 
with the fairy lady represent a dream of possession” (Anonymous Marie de  France, 69). In  a 
sociopolitical direction, Bloch suggests Lanval can be seen as representative of desire for a 
greater share of cultural resources on the part of economically disadvantaged lower nobility 
and younger sons (68–71).
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De cel ne sai dire le pris,
Ne des cordes ne des peissuns
Ki del tref tienent les giruns:
Suz ciel n’ad rei kis esligast
Pur nul aver k’il i donast!
Dedenz cel tref fu la pucele;
Flur de lis e rose nuvele,
Quant ele pert al tens d’esté,
Trespassot ele de beauté.
Ele jut sur un lit mut bel—
Li drap valeient un chastel—
En sa chemise senglement.
Mut ot le cors bien fait e gent!
(80–100)
They led him up to the tent, / which was quite beautiful and well placed. / 
Queen Semiramis, / however much more wealth, / power, or knowledge she 
had, / or the emperor Octavian / could not have paid for one of the flaps. / 
There was a golden eagle on top of it, / whose value I could not tell, / nor 
could I judge the value of the cords or the poles / that held up the sides of the 
tent; / there is no king on earth who could buy it, / no matter what wealth 
he offered. / The girl was inside the tent: / the lily and the young rose / when 
they appear in the summer  / are surpassed by her beauty.  / She lay on a 
beautiful bed—/ the bedclothes were worth a castle—/ dressed only in her 
shift. / Her body was well shaped and elegant.38
The Roman Empire of Octavian/Augustus Caesar provides the best measure 
of the scale of the goods Lanval finds here. The imperial scaling of things is 
maintained as Marie’s description moves from the tent as a whole, to the flaps 
whereby Lanval enters it, to  the coverings of the bed, where the richness of 
the material surroundings merges with the body of the woman lying upon it. 
Empire comes closest to encompassing the dimensions of the resources Lanval 
finds here, but Marie’s verses make it clear that the wealth and splendor of any 
temporal, historical empire falls far short of providing an adequate bench-
mark. The resources now within Lanval’s reach seem to possess otherworldly 
dimensions, seemingly closer to those of the heavenly kingdom of Christi-
anity than to those of any temporal realm. In her first words to Lanval, the 
 38. Marie de France, Lais (Hanning and Ferrante), 107.
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lady offers her love to him, reiterating as she does so her love’s superimperial 
parameters:
Se vus estes pruz e curteis,
Emperere ne quens ne reis
N’ot unkes tant joie ne bien,
Kar jo vus aim sur tute rien.
(113–16)
If you are brave and courtly, / No emperor or count or king / will ever have 
known such joy or good; / for I love you more than anything.39
Lanval readily agrees to love her absolutely40—Jeo ferai voz comandemenz;  / 
Pur vus guerpirai tutes genz (vv. 127–28)—“I shall obey your command; / for 
you, I shall abandon everyone”41—in terms reminiscent of the allegiance Jesus 
required of his disciples. In  exchange for his vow, he  experiences a joyful 
expansion of self that is twofold: the lady gives herself to him physically with 
the promise she will continue to be with him whenever he wishes to enjoy her 
love, and he receives access to the kind of material resources that assuredly 
caught his eye when he first entered her tent:
Un dun li ad duné aprés:
Ja cele rien ne vudra mes
Que il nen ait a sun talent;
Doinst e despende largement,
Ele li troverat asez.
Mut est Lanval bien assenez:
Cum plus despendra richement,
E plus avra or e argent!
(134–42)
Afterward she gave him a gift:  / he would never again want anything,  / 
he  would receive as he desired;  / however generously he might give and 
 39. Ibid., 108.
 40. Philippe Ménard stresses love as an “absolute” in Marie’s poetry: “L’amour représente 
le bien supreme, le vrai Bonheur, la valeur absolue”—“Love represents the supreme good, true 
happiness, the absolute value” (Les Lais de Marie, 137).
 41. Marie de France, Lais (Hanning and Ferrante), 108.
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spend, / she would provide what he needed. / Now Lanval is well cared for. / 
The more lavishly he spends, the more gold and silver he will have.42
Out of the blue, Lanval has struck it rich in love. The terms for keeping his 
newly found wealth are straightforward. Even as the benefits of his love 
become provocatively clear at Arthur’s court, Lanval will have to keep the 
source of his sudden affluence a secret. Upon conferring her various gifts to 
him, the lady tells him he will lose everything if he divulges the secret of their 
love to anyone.
 Back at Arthur’s court, Lanval makes generous use of all the resources 
newly at his disposal via love. He summons his lady when he is alone so that 
their love remains undiscovered, and he employs his new riches in a manner 
befitting an emperor or king:
Lanval donout les riches duns,
Lanval aquitout les prisuns,
Lanval vesteit les jugleürs
Lanval feseit les granz honurs.
N’i ot estrange ne privé
A ki Lanval n’eüst doné.
Mut ot Lanval joie e deduit:
U seit par jur u seit par nuit,
S’amie peot veer sovent,
Tut est a sun comandement.
(209–17)
Lanval gave rich gifts, / Lanval released prisoners, / Lanval dressed jongleurs 
(performers),  / Lanval offered great honors.  / There was no stranger 
or friend  / to whom Lanval didn’t give.  / Lanval’s joy and pleasure were 
intense; / in the daytime or at night, / he could see his love often; / she was 
completely at his command.43
The same fine characteristics underscored by Marie at the beginning of the 
poem, which later qualified him in the eyes of his otherworldly beloved, now 
cause Lanval to spend his new wealth lavishly and indiscriminately, in marked 
contrast to King Arthur’s treatment of him at the outset of this poem. Not too 
long after his return, the expansion of the resources of self that Lanval has 
 42. Ibid., 108–9.
 43. Ibid., 110–11.
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experienced in love changes the parameters of the action at Arthur’s court. 
Previously ignored by the king and envied by courtiers, he becomes the focal 
point of attention after the feast of St.  John, when about thirty knights s’ie-
rent alé esbanïer (v. 222)—go to “amuse themselves”—in an orchard beneath a 
tower in which Arthur’s queen is staying. Noting they have neglected to bring 
Lanval, ki tant est larges e curteis / e sis peres est riches reis (vv. 231–32)—“who 
is so generous and courtly, / and his father is a rich king”44—they return to his 
lodging and persuade him to join them. Standing with her ladies in a window 
of the tower, the queen sees the group of knights, and her gaze comes to rest 
on Lanval: La maisniee le rei choisi, / Lanval conut e esgarda (vv. 240–41)—“She 
saw the king’s retinue, / recognized Lanval and looked at him.”45 Upon seeing 
him, the queen resolves to make a play for love. She surrounds herself with the 
court’s loveliest and most refined maidens so that the number of maidens cor-
responds roughly to the number of knights, and od li s’irrunt esbanïer / La u 
cil erent el vergier” (vv. 245–46)—“together they went to amuse themselves / in 
the orchard where the others were.”46 With love in the air around him, Lanval 
yearns for his own beloved, but he cannot summon her before so many eyes. 
In his state of yearning, Lanval separates himself somewhat from the knights 
and maidens. When the queen sees Lanval standing alone, perhaps sensing 
his yearning without knowing its source, she approaches and offers him all 
her love:
Al chevaler en va tut dreit;
Lunc lui s’asist, si l’apela,
Tut sun curage li mustra:
“Lanval, mut vus ai honuré
E mut cheri e mut amé;
Tute m’amur poëz aveir.
Kar me dites vostre voleir!
Ma druërie vus otrei:
Mut devez estre lié de mei.”
(260–68)
She sat beside him and spoke, / revealing her whole heart: / “Lanval, I have 
shown you much honor, / I have cherished you, and loved you. / You may 
 44. Ibid., 111.
 45. Ibid.
 46. Ibid., 111–12.
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have all my love; / just tell me your desire. / I promise you my affection. / 
You should be very happy with me.”47
Lanval is on a roll. Measured by the imperial resources being made available 
to him, he has come a long way from his starting position. Utterly deprived 
of resources and affection at Arthur’s court in the beginning, he has acquired 
the love of his otherworldly lady with her extraordinary wealth, and he has 
become popular among his knightly peers. Now, he is being offered the love of 
Arthur’s queen, the highest ranking and richest woman at court.
 The queen’s play, coming upon the knights’ decision to include Lanval 
among their number, marks a broader shift in the social and political dynam-
ics at Arthur’s court. The resources of love, combined with Lanval’s innate 
and acquired characteristics, have evidently made him— from the perspective 
of the queen— the most desirable knight at court. Her offer of love stands to 
put Lanval in a position somewhat similar to that of Tristan, but in order to 
remain true to his love and to the exemplary characteristics he has possessed 
from the beginning, Lanval must recognize this moment as a challenge and 
handle himself adroitly. He  immediately and vigorously refuses the queen’s 
offer, at first for a reason he would give even if he had never met his own lady 
love:
Dame, fet il, lessez m’ester!
Jeo n’ai cure de vus amer.
Lungement ai servi le rei;
Ne li voil pas mentir ma fei.
Ja pur vus ne pur vostre amur
ne mesferai a mun seignur.
(269–74)
“My lady,” he said, “let me be! / I have no desire to love you. / I have served 
the king a long time; / I don’t want to betray my faith to him. / Never, for 
you or your love, / will I do anything to harm my lord.”48
Despite his own poor treatment at Arthur’s hands, Lanval remains loyal to the 
king. Nothing in the imaginary action of this poem suggests Lanval would 
feign loyalty as a pretext to conceal his otherworldly love. Loyalty to the king, 
despite its past fruitlessness, is  consistent with Lanval’s exemplary courtly 
 47. Ibid., 112.
 48. Ibid.
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characteristics. It  is because of these characteristics that he has been chosen 
by his otherworldly love and has been provided with the resources that he has 
distributed at Arthur’s court so lavishly and indiscriminately. In all respects, 
Lanval maintains the highest courtly— and in his love, as we have seen— the 
highest imperial standard.
 By contrast, the queen manifests the unenviable characteristics of the vain 
courtly lord imagined by Fenice earlier in this chapter, who wants to “believe 
and understand that no one is comparable to him.” As  the highest- ranking 
female at court on an occasion when courtiers are in play for love, the queen 
has difficulty believing Lanval can refuse her offer. Either because she believes 
it to be true according to her limited understanding, or because she wants to 
goad him, the queen angrily asserts that the reason for Lanval’s rejection of 
her love is that he prefers the intimate company of males: Vallez avez bien afei-
tiez / Ensemble od eus vus deduiez (vv. 281–82)—“You have fine- looking boys / 
with whom you enjoy yourself.”49 It suddenly becomes difficult, after all, for 
Lanval to maintain the seemingly straightforward terms of his otherworldly 
love. In view of the queen’s generally unscrupulous behavior, it  seems likely 
some version of her fabrications will soon be circulated in the gossip at court 
unless Lanval puts a stop to it. Lanval must let the queen’s false statement 
regarding his amorous allegiances stand, along with her follow- up observa-
tion that the king made a mistake in keeping a vileins cüarz, mauveis failliz 
(v. 283)—“base coward, wicked recreant”—in his household, or he must refute 
it. The only mistake, as  suggested by Marie, that Lanval makes seems only 
scarcely to be a mistake: Teu chose dist par maltalent / Dunt il se repenti sovent 
(vv. 289–90)—“He said something out of spite / that he would later regret.”50 
The queen seemingly pushes him into a position where he must either reveal 
his love or betray himself. Sensing the difficulty the queen in her vanity is hav-
ing with the idea of an eligible partner refusing her advances, Lanval angrily 
plays his trump card:
Jo aim e si sui amis
Cele ki deit aver le pris
sur tutes celes que jeo sai.
E une chose vus dirai,
bien le sachez a descovert:
Une de celes ki la sert,
Tute la plus povre meschine,
 49. Ibid.
 50. Ibid., 113.
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Vaut mieuz de vus, dame reïne,
De cors, de vis e de beauté,
D’enseignement e de bunté!
(293–302)
I love and I am loved / by one who should have the prize / over all the women 
I know. / And I shall tell you one thing; / you might as well know all: / any 
one of those who serve her,  / the poorest girl of all,  / is better than you, 
my lady queen, / in body, face, and beauty, / in breeding and in goodness.51
The superimperial dimensions of Lanval’s otherworldly love here enable 
the knight to turn the tables on the queen. Not only does he, in  fact, love 
a woman, contrary to the queen’s assertion, but one whose lowliest servant 
is “better” than her in the most important courtly respects. Lanval thereby 
complicates matters for the court and for himself, not by having an adulterous 
affair with the queen, as Tristan does, but rather by refusing to do so. The stark 
terms with which he puts the queen down and confers the highest prize upon 
his own lady, even as they break his vow to the latter and presumably end their 
love and his access to further riches, do not end his struggle with the queen, 
but rather escalate it. Remaining true to character, the queen conveys a men-
dacious, distorted version of her exchange with Lanval to the king, according 
to which it was the knight who offered his love to her and, when she refused 
it, insulted her with boasts of his lady. The king, also continuing in character, 
acts on his wife’s lies and proceeds against Lanval. The neglect with which he 
treated Lanval previously now becomes anger and malice. If  Lanval cannot 
defend himself, the king will have him burned or hanged. By  this point in 
the poem at the latest, it  has become evident that the competition between 
Arthur’s queen and a lady whom no one other than Lanval has ever seen has 
much broader implications. If Arthur’s queen is not worth as much as the low-
liest servant of the beloved lady whom Lanval claims for himself, how might 
the resources of Arthur’s kingdom compare with those of Lanval’s lady more 
generally? Beyond this, if Lanval’s claim is true, then the knight has managed 
to make good despite the king’s neglectful, if  not shabby, treatment of him 
described at the beginning of the poem. King Arthur, according to Marie’s 
unflattering depiction of him, might well resent that such a thing could hap-
pen without his say, or fret that such a beautiful courtly lady of great means 
has found the knight deserving of rich rewards when he has not.
 51. Ibid.
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 Believing he has lost his lady’s love, and thus the absolute investment of 
self he has made, Lanval pines in a way resembling the suffering of Clamide 
that we observed above. Clamide would accept the fate of Judas after losing 
his bid for love if he could receive Conwiramur’s love in return, but the bib-
lical model seems more directly applicable to Lanval, whose remorse for his 
betrayal is so great that the other knights fear for his life: Mut dotouent k’il 
afolast! (v. 414)—“They were afraid he’d kill himself!”52 As hard as things get 
for him, Lanval remains true to the courtly characteristics that have brought 
him this far. When accused by the king himself of having insulted him with 
his alleged insult to the queen, Lanval gives his own version of the events. 
He discretely states that he made no advances to the queen and insists on the 
veracity of his statements regarding the beauty of his otherworldly lady:
Lanval defent la deshonur
E la hunte de sun seignur
De mot en mot si cum il dist,
Que la reïne ne requist.
Mes de ceo dunt il ot parlé
Reconut il la verité,
De l’amur dunt il se vanta;
Dolent en est, perdue l’a
De ceo lur dit qu’il en ferat
Quanque la curt esgarderat.
(371–80)
Lanval denied that he’d dishonored / or shamed his lord, / word for word, 
as the king spoke: / he had not made advances to the queen; / but of what he 
had said, / he acknowledged the truth, / about the love he had boasted of, / 
that now made him sad because he’d lost her. / About that he said he would 
do / whatever the court decided.53
By sparing Arthur the public humiliation of hearing the truth about the 
queen’s offer of love to him, Lanval remains in strict accordance with the 
words later stated by the Duke of Cornwall, who numbers among the barons 
appointed by Arthur to decide his case: A sun seignur / Deit hum partut fairë 
honur (vv. 447–48)—“A man owes his lord honor / in every circumstance.”54 
 52. Ibid., 116.
 53. Ibid., 115.
 54. Ibid., 117.
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In  spite of everything, Lanval has always conducted himself in accordance 
with this rule. Perhaps for this reason, there is a tangible sense that many at 
court— notably among them, the same Duke of Cornwall, along with Gawein 
and the other knights concerned about Lanval’s welfare— are doubtful if not 
skeptical that Lanval could be guilty of a grievous crime against the king. 
Based on their sense of justice and propriety regarding the evidence submit-
ted to them, the barons determine the case will be decided solely according to 
the veracity of Lanval’s statement concerning the greater beauty of his lady.55
 The convergences of Lanval’s otherworldly love with Arthur’s court have 
clearly stirred things up significantly. The knight’s generous distribution of the 
wealth that he obtained in his love, during a time in which he also enjoyed 
his lady’s private company and experienced “intense joy,” has changed the 
knights’ affection for him and put him in a position to attract the attention 
of the queen. The queen has turned away from her husband and offered her 
love to Lanval as an exemplary knight, courtier, and son of a king, who in his 
generous and indiscriminate disposition of resources has demonstrated that 
he knows how to conduct himself according to the highest imperial standard. 
Finally, the whole of Arthur’s court has become embroiled in a legal proceed-
ing, in which much more than the life and reputation of Lanval is at stake. 
As these things have occurred, the limitations of Arthur’s courtly order have 
been exposed as it seems to undergo a painful betterment in the direction 
of the exemplary qualities associated with Lanval’s love. Such betterment is 
suggested by the manner in which the trial of Lanval is decided and the poem 
ended. Perhaps not surprisingly, in  view of Lanval’s consistently exemplary 
courtly characteristics and conduct, and his continuing devotion to his love, 
his otherworldly lady has mercy on him in the end. In a transcendent moment 
of convergence between Arthur’s court and the otherworld of Lanval’s love, 
the lady ultimately reveals herself before the entire court. Preceded by a pro-
cession of beautiful maidens, each “more impressive than the queen had ever 
been,”56 the lady appears before Arthur and his retinue in her resplendent 
beauty, proof of the veracity of Lanval’s claim:
La pucele entra el palais:
Unkes si bele n’i vint mais!
Devant le rei est descendue,
Si que de tuz iert bien veüe.
 55. Burgess calls justice “one of Marie’s ever- present concerns,” and this concern seems 
particularly pronounced in the Lay of Lanval (Chrétien de Troyes, 19–20).
 56. Marie de France, Lais (Hanning and Ferrante), 119.
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Sun mantel ad laissié cheir,
Que mieuz la peüssent veer.
Li reis, ki mut fu enseigniez,
Il s’est encuntre li dresciez,
E tuit li autre l’enurerent;
De li servir se presenterent.
(601–10)
The lady entered the palace; / no one so beautiful had ever been there. / She 
dismounted before the king / so that she was well seen by all. / And she let 
her cloak fall / so they could see her better. / The king, who was well bred, / 
rose and went to meet her;  / all the others honored her  / and offered to 
serve her.57
As in the case of the contest won by Chrétien’s Enide, the level of the lady’s 
beauty is beyond dispute, and the issue is immediately decided. Besides the 
unprecedented level of her beauty, the lady brings something else to Arthur’s 
court that it did not previously possess. A new high standard of courtly excel-
lence is conveyed by the lady’s statement that the words of Lanval have been 
true: De la vantance ke il fist, / Si par mei peot estre aquitez, / par voz baruns 
seit delivrez! (vv. 622–24)—“And for the boast that he made  / if he can be 
acquitted through me, / let him be set free through your barons.”58 In confirm-
ing the truth of Lanval’s words, the lady also confirms the exemplary courtly 
characteristics and conduct the knight has manifested from the beginning of 
the poem. At  the end of the poem, Lanval’s interest in love diverges from 
Arthur’s court. The lady and Lanval ride away together to the beautiful island 
of Avalon, never to be seen again— but not before King Arthur and his retinue 
have experienced a comeuppance that is also an enrichment. Fittingly, in view 
of how things have proceeded in Marie’s imaginary action, Arthur is the loser 
in the end, but a “well bred” one capable of acknowledging the superiority of 
Lanval’s lady, greeting her with the appropriate style, and— possibly— changing 
the way he deals with future exemplary knights such as Lanval at court. Marie 
de France probably hopes the lord to whom she has dedicated her lais, and 
the audiences before which she performs them, have been siding with Lanval 
from the start, and that they would agree that the high standard of excellence 
achieved in love is something for which political leaders and courtiers in gen-
eral would do well to strive.
 57. Ibid., 121–22.
 58. Ibid., 122.
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HIGHLIGHTS FROM GOTTFRIED 
VON STRASSBURG’S TRISTAN
The interests of love tend to diverge from those of the court in Marie’s Lanval. 
Except for consequential moments of convergence between the otherworldly 
lady’s domain and Arthur’s court, the characteristics of the former seem 
absolutely other, as  if a reiteration of the endless bounty of the heavenly 
kingdom. The love of Lanval and his lady exists for itself in the end, but it 
has nevertheless left an indelible mark on Arthur’s court. In  the imaginary 
action, we observe that the growth occurring in love does not remain without 
broader social and political consequences. Many aspects of the interactions 
between love and politics in Marie’s lai are also present in Gottfried von Stras-
sburg’s romance of Tristan and Isolt, though in the latter, much lengthier 
narrative, matters are more complicated.59 Earlier in this chapter, we looked 
briefly at the secret love of Tristan’s parents, Riwalin and Blancheflor. Because 
the lady is sister of King Marke, lord over Cornwall and England, their son 
Tristan is born as his closest male relative. The king will consider it appro-
priate to designate Tristan as his heir upon discovering their familial rela-
tionship, long before there is any political or amorous interest in Isolt. The 
relatively greater complexity of Gottfried’s love story about Tristan and Isolt is 
due to the resulting convergence of the interests in love and political power in 
this unique case. The interests of love do not diverge from the political inter-
ests of the court in Gottfried’s romance, but rather have to be accommodated 
along with them.
 The manner in which the interests of absolute love converge with the 
broader social and political interests of the court in Gottfried’s romance has 
much to do with overcoming adversity.60 The circumstances surrounding 
Tristan’s birth set the tone in this respect for the entire romance. The love of 
Riwalin and Blancheflor has remained secret, and in order to maintain their 
secret love after Tristan is conceived, the lovers depart from Marke’s kingdom 
and return to Riwalin’s homeland. There the lovers are immediately embroiled 
in the ongoing military feud between Riwalin and his feudal overlord Morgan, 
during which Riwalin is killed in battle and Blancheflor dies in childbirth. 
In order to save the infant Tristan from Morgan’s wrath, Riwalin’s loyal servant 
Rual spreads word that the infant has also died. Gottfried’s emotionally laden 
 59. For surveys of the great variety of modern interpretations of Gottfried’s romance, see 
the studies of Mark Chinca (Gottfried von Strassburg: Tristan) and Christoph Huber (Gottfried 
von Strassburg: Tristan und Isolde).
 60. In this respect, Gottfried’s romance is similar to Marie’s lay.
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depiction of these adverse circumstances must have resonated strongly with 
medieval audiences familiar with the perils of feuds and warfare61:
wan diz daz ist diu meiste nôt,
die man zer werlde haben mac:
swâ sô der man naht unde tac
den tôtvînt vor ougen hât,
daz ist diu nôt, diu nâhen gât,
und ist ein lebelîcher tôt.
in aller dirre lebenden nôt
wart Blanscheflûr ze grabe getragen.
michel jâmer unde clagen
daz wart begangen ob ir grabe.
ir muget wol wizzen, ungehabe
der was dâ vil und alze vil.
(1842–53)
The greatest distress in which any man can be is to see his deadly enemy 
before his eyes, day and night. Such peril grips at one’s heart; it  is a living 
death. Amid all this anguish of the living, Blancheflor was carried to her 
grave over which much observance was done with weeping and wailing. You 
must know that there was wild lamentation, much and overmuch.62
The explicit interest in love is still far in the future, but Gottfried is actu-
ally already beginning to develop his approach to it here. Love eventually 
shows itself as the way to overcome such adversity, to manage things in such 
a way that the intensity of emotion experienced negatively as hatred, anguish, 
and fear in the face of a mortal adversary can be experienced positively as 
joy. Gottfried’s romance shows that court society— with love as its highest 
accomplishment— emerges from within strife to place people beyond it, but 
remains continually in danger of lapsing back into it. The vivid experience of 
warfare evoked by the cited verses, which is occasionally in the foreground 
of Gottfried’s narrative, otherwise lurks in the background as the ominous 
 61. “The German aristocratic mentality took for granted violence on a considerable scale. 
The imperial scheme of campaigns within and beyond frontiers of the empire, and the local 
rivalries, which were soluble, or  insoluble, only in feuds, obliged all magnates to retain sub-
stantial retinues of armed men. The political necessity itself contributed to the momentum of 
violence” (Arnold, German Knighthood, 14).
 62. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 65–66.
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alternative to the court society of Marke as well as to the adulterous love upon 
which this society comes to depend.
 The first significant step to address the kind of adversity visible in the 
above- cited verses is a wide- ranging education. Rual raises Tristan as his own 
son (unbeknownst to the latter and the world) and sees to it that he learns 
aristocratic skills such as combat and hunting. Tristan also undertakes an 
intensive study of languages, musical instruments, and books. The strength 
and agility of body and mind that Tristan acquires in his training and studies 
become resources upon which he will later draw in achieving outcomes that 
surpass those of his rivals and detractors. Tristan’s preparatory engagements 
invariably involve coming to grips with adverse circumstances, as we observe 
already in the rigors of the studies to which Rual subjects him:
daz was sîn erstiu kêre
ûz sîner vrîheite.
dô trat er in daz geleite
betwungenlîcher sorgen,
die ime dâ vor verborgen
und vor behalten wâren
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
und iedoch dô er began,
dô leite er sînen sin dar an
und sînen vlîz sô sêre,
daz er der buoche mêre
gelernete in sô kurzer zît
danne ie kein kint ê oder sît.
(2068–92)
This was the first departure from his freedom; with it he joined company 
with enforced cares which had been hidden and withheld from him until 
then [. . .] Yet once having started on it he applied his mind and industry to 
it with such vigour that he had mastered more books in that short space than 
any child before or after him.63
Later in Gottfried’s romance, Tristan becomes the tutor of the future queen 
Isolt and his future lover. Tasked by the elder Queen Isolt to instruct her, 
he subjects her to a similar rigorous course of study and the results are sim-
ilarly successful. Having bettered themselves by means of the painful effort 
 63. Ibid., 68–69.
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invested in their studies, Tristan and Isolt will be better positioned to manage 
the adverse circumstances in which they find themselves later.
 Long before he meets Isolt and begins to instruct her, Tristan is already 
endeavoring to change things for the better with his acquired skills. 
An aborted kidnapping attempt by Norwegian merchants leaves him stranded 
on the coast of Cornwall. After coming upon a hunting party from Marke’s 
court, Tristan dazzles one group of courtiers after another with his skills in 
hunting techniques, languages, and music. He demonstrates these in a series 
of successive performances before courtly audiences that include experts in 
the various respective fields of expertise. Tristan eventually performs before 
King Marke himself and the entire court, and the high standard he continues 
to achieve prompts the king to propose an exchange:
Der künec sprach: “Tristan, hoere her:
an dir ist allez, des ich ger.
dû kanst allez, daz ich wil:
jagen, sprâche, seitspil.
nu suln wir ouch gesellen sîn,
dû der mîn und ich der dîn.
tages sô sul wir rîten jagen,
des nahtes uns hie heime tragen
mit höfschlîchen dingen:
harpfen, videlen, singen,
daz kanstu wol, daz tuo du mir.
sô kan ich spil, daz tuon ich dir,
des ouch dîn herze lîhte gert:
schoeniu cleider unde pfert,
der gibe ich dir swie vil du wilt.
dâ mite hân ich dir wol gespilt.”
(3721–36)
“Tristan, listen to me,” said the king, “you can do everything I want— hunting, 
languages, music. To crown it let us be companions. You be mine, and I will 
be yours. By day we shall ride out hunting, at night here at home we shall sus-
tain ourselves with courtly pursuits, such as harping, fiddling, and singing. 
You are good at these things; do them for me. For you, in return, I will play a 
thing I know, which perhaps your heart desires— of fine clothes and horses 
I will give you all you want! With these I shall have played well for you.”64
 64. Ibid., 91–92; italics in original.
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The new joyful standard of courtliness achieved by Tristan for Cornwall with 
his performances, along with the affection and generosity of King Marke that 
these performances earn him, are the first big payoff for the painful effort he 
previously invested in his studies and for the skill and poise with which he has 
performed before the critical audiences of Cornwall. The exchanges proposed 
by Marke also underscore the close relationship, and the comparable value, 
of the king’s political power and the courtly arts and sciences so capably repre-
sented by Tristan. Tristan is already firmly positioned as Marke’s “companion” 
when Rual, who has long sought him, comes to Cornwall and Marke’s court, 
finally finds his foster- son, and publically divulges the whole story of Bansche-
flur and Riwalin and of Tristan’s birth, to the amazement of all. The talented 
young courtly companion of Marke has turned out to be the king’s nephew. 
Given the close relationship visible in the above- cited verses and in the follow-
ing ones, Marke’s decision to remain unmarried and designate his nephew as 
heir to his kingdoms is perhaps not surprising (see vv. 5152–61).
 From this point forward, Tristan engages himself with the formidable 
knowledge and skills he has obtained in his youth and beyond this as the 
designated heir of the kingdoms of Cornwall and England. One of the crucial 
differences between Tristan and Lanval with respect to the resources gained 
in love becomes evident here. Whereas the riches of love gained by Lanval are 
situated in and channeled through an otherworldly domain beyond Arthur’s 
court to which he eventually returns to stay, the resources that are in play for 
Tristan largely overlap with those that have been designated to him as heir. 
Tristan’s relationship to the rule over Cornwall and England (and possibly 
over Ireland, whose king Gurmun has no male heir) becomes less certain after 
he wins Isolt for Marke. But his interest in the love of Isolt remains inextrica-
bly connected to political and economic interests as long as she produces no 
heir for the king and as long as Tristan continues to prove himself to be the 
only one capable of overcoming threats to Marke’s realm— as demonstrated in 
the case of Morold discussed below.
 The love of Tristan and Isolt grows out of the enmity long plaguing the 
relationship between the Cornwall of King Marke and the Ireland of King 
Gurmun, Isolt’s father. Tristan’s moves in the direction of Isolt begin when he 
answers the challenge of Ireland’s champion Morold, kills him in combat, and 
frees Marke’s court from the painful tribute exacted by Ireland for many years. 
Soon thereafter Tristan must journey to Ireland to seek a cure to the poisoned 
wound inflicted upon him during the combat. Tristan will achieve this cure 
from his mortal enemy, the elder Isolt, queen of Ireland and sister of Morold, 
and known to be the only one capable of accomplishing this cure. Because he 
assumes the incognito identity of “Tantris,” charms the people of Ireland with 
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his many skills (as he had previously charmed the courtiers of Cornwall), and 
thus qualifies himself to be put to work as a tutor for the younger Isolt, Tristan 
succeeds in the seemingly impossible endeavor. In  exchange for his tuition 
of Isolt, Tristan is healed by the queen, who remains ignorant of the cause of 
“Tantris’s” wound. After returning to Marke’s court, Tristan tells of the great 
beauty and courtly accomplishments of the younger Isolt, and pressure grows 
at court for Marke to seek to marry her and produce a male heir. Courtiers in 
Cornwall marvel at Tristan’s accomplishments, but some clearly envy and fear 
him. The king first remains true to his promise to Tristan, but he ultimately 
relents to the pressure when begged to do so by his nephew. Likely fearing 
assassination by rivals or enemies at court, Tristan volunteers to return to 
Ireland and to attempt to win the younger Isolt for Marke. Again traveling 
incognito as “Tantris” to Ireland, Tristan again achieves his seemingly impos-
sible goal, this time by slaying a dragon that has terrorized the kingdom and 
thereby winning the hand of Isolt as the proclaimed reward. As himself rather 
than Tantris— because Isolt has employed her sharpened intellectual facul-
ties to put some clues together and arrive at the truth of his identity— Tristan 
eventually takes possession of the princess of Ireland on behalf of Marke.
 At sea on route to Cornwall, where Isolt is to wed Marke and become his 
queen, the previous political enmity and strife between the realms of Gur-
mun and Marke has still not been put to rest. It  remains prominent in the 
initial interaction between Isolt and Tristan, when the latter as ship’s captain 
approaches the maiden to see if she is faring well during their journey at sea. 
Isolt’s thoughts and feelings are still very much occupied with Tristan’s kill-
ing of her uncle Morold and with the artful trickery with which he has been 
able— as “Tantris”—to deceive everyone in Ireland, win her as a prize largely 
under false pretenses, and take her away from her home and loved ones:
“lât stân, meister, habet iuch hin,
tuot iuwer arme hin dan!
ir sît ein harte müelîch man.
war umbe rüeret ir mich?”
“ei schoene, missetuon ich?”
“jâ ir, wan ich bin iu gehaz.”
“saeligiu” sprach er “umbe waz?”
“ir sluoget mînen oehein.”
“deist doch versüenet.” “des al ein:
ir sît mir doch unmaere,
wan ich waere âne swaere
und âne sorge, enwaeret ir.
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ir alterseine habet mir
disen kumber allen ûf geleit
mit pârât und mit kündekeit.
waz hat iuch mir ze schaden gesant
von Curnewâle in Îrlant?”
(11570–86)
“Enough, Captain,” she said. “Keep your distance, take your arm away! What 
a tiresome man you are! Why do you keep on touching me?” “But, lovely 
woman, am I offending you?” “You are— because I hate you!” “But why, dear 
lady?” he asked. “You killed my uncle!” “But that has been put by.” “Never-
theless, I detest you, since but for you I should not have a care in the world. 
You and you alone have saddled me with all this trouble, with your trickery 
and deceit. What spite has sent you here from Cornwall to my harm?”65
Love marks a new stage of the imaginary action of Gottfried’s romance, but 
indications in these verses of continuing strife, of  the intensity of negative 
emotion we first observed in the circumstances surrounding Tristan’s birth, 
enable a view of love as something that emerges from or grows out of such 
conflict rather than as a radical break from it.
 After Tristan and Isolt find and unknowingly drink a magic potion 
concocted by the elder Isolt to bring about a happy and loving relationship 
between her daughter and her future husband Marke, Lady Love makes a 
familiar entry into Gottfried’s narration as an irresistible force:
ê sî’s ie wurden gewar,
dô stiez s’ir sigevanen dar
und zôch si beide in ir gewalt.
si wurden ein und einvalt,
die zwei und zwîvalt wâren ê.
(11713–17)
Before they were aware of it she had planted her victorious standard in 
their two hearts and bowed them beneath her yoke. They who were two and 
divided now become one and united.66
Here as elsewhere, love— whether initiated by a potion or not— is something 
that happens to lovers. It is an overwhelming force or cataclysmic event over 
 65. Ibid., 193.
 66. Ibid., 195.
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which lovers have no control and to which they can seemingly only react. 
Lovers are played as in the case of Alexander and Soredamors in a previous 
section of this chapter, or conquered by love as in the case of Tristan and Isolt 
here (or  that of Blancheflor and Riwalin before them). In  the case of Isolt 
particularly, we  observe that an emotion absolutely and forcefully directed 
toward the other as enmity (haz), suddenly becomes a love (minne) that is just 
as absolutely and forcefully directed. Here as elsewhere, as well, we observe 
in the ensuing verses that lovers as players tend to be in the best position 
to come to grips with the force of love and manage it to their advantage and 
enrichment.
 The best medieval articulation of the absolute involvement with love as an 
opportunity or investment may be the response of Tristan to the disclosure 
by Isolt’s maidservant Brangaene that the potion that has led to their love will 
also lead to their death:
“nu walte ez got!” sprach Tristan
“ez waere tôt oder leben:
ez hât mir sanfte vergeben.
ine weiz, wie jener werden sol;
dirre tôt der tuot mir wol.
solte diu wunneclîche Îsôt
iemer alsus sî mîn tôt,
sô wolte ich gerne werben
umbe ein êweclîchez sterben.”
(12494–502)
“It is in God’s hands!” said Tristan. “Whether it be life or death it has poi-
soned me most sweetly! I have no idea what the other will be like, but this 
death suits me well! If my adorable Isolde were to go on being the death of 
me in this fashion I would woo death everlasting!”67
“Death everlasting”—possibly Gottfried’s most striking poetic move— takes the 
sweet suffering of love ubiquitous in court poetry to another level. As a courtly 
reiteration of the Christians’ absolute investment in the heavenly kingdom, 
“death everlasting” is consistent with the absolute Christian parameters of love 
as developed by Gottfried here and elsewhere in his romance. Already in the 
prologue, Gottfried provocatively regards the story of the adulterous love of 
Tristan and Isolt as life- sustaining “bread” for the “noble hearts” among his 
 67. Ibid., 206.
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audience, in what amounts to a courtly, poetic reiteration of the terms of the 
Holy Eucharist in the interest of adulterous love.68 Here, in  Tristan’s “death 
everlasting,” an  inversion of the Christian sense (which nevertheless remains 
Christian, as  things are left “in God’s hands” and are expressed everlastingly) 
seems to become evident. Tristan’s êweclîchez sterben seems to invert the infinite 
sense of the Christians’ play for the heavenly kingdom— infinite insofar as its 
sense is toward the immeasurably great or large, something unbound by time or 
space— and makes of it a play that finds absolute value in something temporally 
and spatially limited, that is, another mortal self in this finite world. Tristan’s 
total commitment to the joys of a “death everlasting” in love seems to establish a 
new benchmark in the general tendency throughout courtly culture to seek and 
find absolute value in temporal, perishable cultural goods. The ancient bishop 
Augustine of Hippo and the medieval abbot Bernard of Clairvaux would doubt-
less have considered the absolute investment of self in this kind of love to be 
utterly at cross- purposes with the Christian striving for the heavenly kingdom. 
But this is clearly not the case in the imaginary action of Gottfried’s romance 
and in other narrative and lyric poetry at court involving love. At court, figures 
who manifestly understand themselves to be Christians are speculating that 
God will regard their absolute investments in love as an acceptable reiteration, 
elaboration, or variation of their absolute investment in the heavenly kingdom, 
rather than as something necessarily at cross- purposes with it.69
 Tristan’s words indicate love is both an overwhelming force and the lovers’ 
latest and greatest difficult venture, in which they turn things to their advan-
tage as they have always done before. Love happens to them as something 
beyond their control, but it also happens to them because of who they are and 
what they have been able to do. In Gottfried’s imaginary action, no one other 
than Tristan and Isolt could be in a position to take the love potion in the 
particular time and place in which they take it. None other than Tristan and 
Isolt could find their way to each other in love as rapidly and adeptly despite 
the upheaval love is causing. Love happens to Tristan and Isolt and nobody 
 68. See vv. 233–40 in Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Ranke).
 69. Contrast the view of James A. Schultz, who writes: “If the theology of concupiscence 
was not widely known outside the church, the related distrust of all things sexual certainly was 
[. . .] At  this historical moment, when vernacular literature was exploring new themes in the 
context of a courtly culture that was coming into its own and feeling a new confidence, Eilhart’s 
refusal to ask why people make love and Gottfried’s refusal to locate the beginning of love any-
where outside of love signal a refusal to engage these discourses.” For Schulz, the love potion is 
the culturally significant “milestone” of this refusal: “This is a signal moment in the history of 
European sexuality, the moment when a self- conscious and sophisticated secular discourse on 
love declared its independence of the related theological and medical teachings on the subject” 
(“Why Do Tristan and Isolde Make Love?,” 80).
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else, because of the natural gifts, acquired skills, and successful strategies they 
have exhibited to this point. They soon begin to turn love to their advantage 
by employing these same faculties and abilities, as we see in the manner in 
which Gottfried varies the play on words between “love,” “sea,” and “bitter” 
in the exchanges between the lovers, whereby they are first able to ascertain 
their joint interest.70 The lovers’ exchanges in the passage below demonstrate 
the crucial transition Tristan and Isolt effect from love as irresistible force— 
associated with the turbulence of the sea by which they are surrounded and 
the bitterness associated with any difficult life- transforming challenge— to love 
as opportunity, as the way to the other:
“ei schoene süeze, saget mir:
waz wirret iu, waz claget ir?”
Der Minnen vederspil Îsôt,
“lameir” sprach sî “daz ist mîn nôt,
lameir daz swaeret mir den muot,
lameir ist, daz mir leide tuot.”
dô sî lameir sô dicke sprach,
er bedâhte unde besach
anclîchen unde cleine
des selben wortes meine.
sus begunde er sich versinnen,
l’ameir daz waere minnen,
l’ameir bitter, la meir mer.
der meine der dûhte in ein her
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dô er des wortes z’ende kam,
minne dar inne vernam,
er sprach vil tougenlîche z’ir:
“entriuwen schoene, als ist ouch mir,
lameir und ir, ir sît mîn nôt.
herzevrouwe, liebe Îsôt,
ir eine und iuwer minne
ir habet mir mîne sinne
gar verkêret unde benomen,
ich bin ûzer wege komen
 70. We saw an earlier version of this play on words above in Chrétien de Troyes’s Cligès. 
However, it  seems Gottfried probably follows his stated source, Thomas, whose work also 
included the sea/bitter/love play on words, as indicated by the Carlisle fragment; see Grimbert, 
“Cliges and the Chansons,” 128.
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sô starke und alsô sêre:
in erhol mich niemer mêre.
mich müejet und mich swaeret,
mir swachet unde unmaeret
allez, daz mîn ouge siht.
in al der werlde enist mir niht
in mînem herzen liep wan ir.”
Îsôt sprach: “hêrre, als sît ir mir.”
(11982–12028)
“Come now, sweet, lovely woman,” he  whispered tenderly, “tell me, what 
is vexing you, why do you complain so?” “Lameir is what distresses me,” 
answered Love’s falcon, Isolde, “it is lameir that so oppresses me, lameir it is 
that pains me so.” Hearing her say lameir so often he weighed and examined 
the meaning of the word most narrowly. He then recalled that l’ameir meant 
‘Love,’ l’ameir ‘bitter,’ la meir ‘the sea’: it seemed to have a host of meanings 
[. . .] When he got to the bottom of the word and discovered ‘Love’ inside 
it, “Faith, lovely woman,” he whispered, “so it is with me, lameir and you are 
what distress me. My dearest lady, sweet Isolde, you and you alone and the 
passion you inspire have turned my wits and robbed me of my reason! I have 
gone astray so utterly that I shall never find my way again! All that I see irks 
and oppresses me, it all grows trite and meaningless. Nothing in the wide 
world is dear to my heart but you.” Isolde answered, “So you, sir, are to me.”71
The lovers may be “utterly” lost in love at this moment, but we observe that in 
identifying what ails them and in finding the solution in each other, they are 
already beginning to find their way again. Thanks to their knowledge of the 
subtleties of linguistic meaning and their ability to reason things out by pro-
cess of elimination— skills honed in their studies and life experience— Tristan 
and Isolt here begin to turn to their own advantage what is controlling them. 
Here they are no longer merely suffering a love that is happening to them but 
also taking initiative and making love happen— as only they can. The way is 
difficult for Isolt and Tristan at the beginning of their love, and it will continue 
to be so. This seems to be one of the main points Gottfried makes in this 
groundbreaking romance.
 The romance’s prologue had already anticipated the difficulty of the pio-
neering effort the principal lovers will have to make and prepared the way for 
the appropriate assessment of this effort:
 71. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 199–200.
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Hei tugent, wie smal sint dîne stege,
wie kumberlîch sint dîne wege!
die dîne stege, die dîne wege,
wol ime, der si wege unde stege!
(37–40)
O Excellence! how narrow are thy paths, how arduous thy ways! Happy the 
man who can climb thy paths and tread thy ways!72
Few courtiers will reach the high standard Gottfried holds forth here— 
perhaps just Tristan and Isolt in the imaginary action of his romance, and the 
“noble hearts” among the poet’s audiences— but for them is reserved a high 
standard of accomplishment and a corresponding joy that remains unknown 
to others. Gottfried’s romance is unfinished. It  breaks off in the midst of 
Tristan’s agonized quandary about whether he should marry Isolt of the White 
Hands, whom in his turbulent state of mind he confuses with his own beloved. 
Based on the surviving fragments of the romance by the Anglo- Norman poet 
Thomas, whose version of the story Gottfried tells us in his prologue that he 
favors, we know this love leads to death. Having received another poisoned 
wound, Tristan sends from his exile to Marke’s court for his own Isolt, the only 
one who can heal him. After his wife Isolt of the White Hands falsely tells him 
the sails of the ship returning from Cornwall are black— the prearranged sig-
nal his beloved was unable to come— Tristan dies, and upon finding him, Isolt 
perishes shortly thereafter. However Gottfried might have ended his romance, 
we  know the overarching narrative framework of the story is painful and 
sorrowful in contrast to the end of Marie’s Lanval and the happy endings of 
romances such as Érec et Énide and Parzival. Within the limitations afforded 
by his subject matter, Gottfried nonetheless exploits the story’s potential for 
the rare joy that comes from achieving the most impressive results under the 
most difficult circumstances.
 The joy achieved in love, however qualified its full appreciation may be, 
has broader social implications, as we also saw in the case of Marie’s Lanval. 
The lovers’ standard of excellence, and the rewards in love that they acquire 
because of this standard, do not pertain to them alone. As we have seen, the 
steps leading toward love are simultaneously steps out of and away from the 
adversarial strife and pain visible in the circumstances of Tristan’s birth and 
in many prior and subsequent episodes (Riwalin’s attack on Morgan, Mor-
gan’s counterattack, Tristan’s vengeance against Morgan, Tristan’s battle with 
 72. Ibid., 41.
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Morold, the enmity between Cornwall and Ireland, etc.). During the time in 
which love is pursued at Marke’s court, it can even be seen as preventing or 
overcoming potential strife there. Love is joyful and enriching in enabling 
strife within unity, anger without hatred, as  Gottfried illustrates with this 
description of the lover’s relationship during the time at Marke’s court when 
suspicion has not yet fallen upon them:
ouch enwart niht under in verborn,
dane waere ouch underwîlen zorn.
ich meine zorn âne haz.
und sprichet aber ieman daz,
daz zorn ungebaere
under sô gelieben waere,
binamen dâ bin ich sicher an,
daz der nie rehte liep gewan.
wan diz daz ist der Minnen site,
hie enzündet sî gelieben mite,
hie mite sô viuret sî den muot.
wan alse in zorn vil wê getuot,
sô süenet sî diu triuwe,
so ist aber diu liebe niuwe,
und aber der triuwen mê dan ê.
(13031–45)
Nor did it fail to happen now and again that there was anger between them— 
anger without malice, I mean. And if anyone were to say that anger is out of 
place between such perfect lovers, I am absolutely certain he was never really 
in love, for such is Love’s way. With it she kindles lovers and sets fire to their 
emotions. For as anger pains them deeply, so affection reconciles them, with 
the result that love is renewed and amity greater than ever.73
After the love of Tristan and Isolt has begun, the closest thing to the mortal 
hatred previously visible in their relationship— for example in Isolt’s hostility 
toward Tristan at the beginning of their journey from Ireland to Cornwall— 
is the anger of lovers’ quarrels, which only heightens their desire. Love enables 
a mitigation of aggression in the relationship between Tristan and Isolt, and it 
involves a similarly pacific negotiation of the potentially volatile relationship 
between the lovers and Marke’s court. When cultivated as a game, as  in the 
 73. Ibid., 212.
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passage below from shortly after Isolt’s successful withstanding of the ordeal,74 
love involves a kind of interaction with Marke’s court in which Tristan and 
Isolt get what they need, desire, and merit, without causing any broader social 
or political upheaval:
gespilen unde gesellen
die ensulen niemer gewellen,
daz in diu state widerseit,
oder si wellent al ir leit.
sô man enmac, der danne wil,
daz ist ein harte unwaege spil.
sô man wol müge, sô welle:
daz ist guot spilgevelle,
dane lît niht herzeleides an.
die gespiln Îsôt und Tristan
sô sî der state niht mohten hân,
so liezen sî die state gân
mit dem gemeinen willen hin.
der wille der sleich under in
lieblîchen unde suoze
in micheler unmuoze.
gemeine liebe, gemeiner muot
die dûhten sî süeze unde guot.
(16431–48)
Companions in love should never want what opportunity denies them, 
or  they will want their sorrow. To desire when the means are lacking is a 
very impolitic game. When you have the means— that is the time for desir-
ing. This game is rich in opportunities, it is not fraught with sorrow. When 
these partners Isolde and Tristan were unable to seize their opportunity, they 
let the occasion pass, content in their common will, which, never tiring, stole 
tenderly and lovingly from one to the other. A common desire and affection 
seemed sweet and good to them.75
Thus engaged in a game “rich in opportunities,” the lovers pursue their love 
and find ways to defer to social and political necessities and practicalities as 
they do so. With discipline and restraint, and calling upon all their trained 
 74. I discuss Isolt’s ordeal at the end of chapter 2.
 75. Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan (Hatto), 257.
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faculties and life experience, the lovers do their best to make the right moves 
at the right times and places. These moves are indicative of a finer disposition 
of self that is able to situate the joy of love in “a  common desire and affec-
tion,” when finding a way to physical union would be “impolitic.” Absolute 
love in Gottfried’s romance has a clearly situational logic, and Isolt and Tristan 
have shown themselves to be masters of situations. In  the verses preceding 
the above- cited passage, which describe the broader state of affairs at Marke’s 
court subsequent to Isolt’s Ordeal, Gottfried has already indicated that the 
successful moves of the lovers also have socially beneficial effects:
Aber haete Tristan unde Îsôt
überwunden ir sorge unde ir nôt
und wâren aber des hoves wol.
der hof was aber ir êren vol.
ir beider lobes enwart niemê.
si wâren aber heinlîch als ê
ir beider hêrren Marke.
(16403–9)
Once more Tristan and Isolde had surmounted their cares and perils, once 
more they were happy at court, which again overflowed with their honours. 
Never had they enjoyed such esteem. They were as intimate again as ever 
with Mark their common lord.76
At this moment, the lovers have each other, they have their position at court, 
and the court possesses the lovers as its most accomplished and capable repre-
sentatives. Quite arguably, this is as good as things get in Gottfried’s romance. 
The poet has already provided ample demonstrations of the alternatives to 
this courtly order based on love. Any frictions between love and politics at 
Marke’s court have to be weighed against the anguish and fear associated with 
Morold’s demands for tribute, or  with Morgan’s vengeful attacks to which 
Tristan’s mother and father fell victim when he was born. The dissimulations 
with which Tristan and Isolt pursue their amorous interest enables joy for the 
lovers and— even if not at the same level— also for other courtiers, which is 
clearly preferable to the manifest alternative.
 In his prologue, Gottfried is already preparing medieval and modern audi-
ences to understand the benefits love brings to everyone. In the fourth chapter 
of this study, we considered the implications of these verses for the assessment 
 76. Ibid.
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of Gottfried’s own level of achievement as poet- performer. Here as there, love 
is supposed to have a beneficial social effect overall, even if the highest joys 
of love are reserved for a select few. I cite the relevant verses below at greater 
length, and now with specific reference to the proper appraisal of the lover’s 
efforts in the imaginary action:
Der guote man swaz der in guot
und niwan der werlt ze guote tuot,
swer daz iht anders wan in guot
vernemen will, der missetuot.
Ich hoere es velschen harte vil,
daz man doch gerne haben wil:
dâ ist des lützelen ze vil,
dâ will man, des man niene wil.
Ez zimet dem man ze lobene wol,
des er iedoch bedürfen sol,
und lâze ez ime gevallen wol,
die wîle ez ime gevallen sol.
Tiure unde wert ist mir der man,
der guot und übel betrahten kann,
der mich und iegelîchen man
nâch sînem werde erkennen kann.
(5–20)
We do wrong to receive otherwise than well what a good man does well- 
meaningly and solely for our good. I  hear much disparagement of what 
people nevertheless ask for. This is niggling to excess, this is wanting what 
you do not want at all. A man does well to praise what he cannot do without. 
Let it please him as long as it may. That man is dear and precious to me who 
can judge of good and bad and know me and all men at our true worth.77
Gottfried’s prologue is all about the accurate assessment of good things that 
are done for us. Looking forward to the subject matter of his romance, it  is 
about understanding the benefits and growth that court society experiences by 
way of the interest in absolute love, even— indeed, especially— in this absolute 
love. Gottfried may well anticipate resistance to his conception of the absolute 
love of Tristan and Isolt as a benefit rather than detriment to court society in 
his endeavor to shape its assessment with these verses. Later audiences and 
 77. Ibid., 41.
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readers, especially modern ones who view love anachronistically in subjective 
terms, will tend to assess the love of Tristan and Isolt as socially damaging or 
disintegrative. Nevertheless, we have observed in this chapter that the efforts 
of Tristan and Isolt deserve to be evaluated according to the terms the poet 
presents in his prologue— lest we “disparage” what we “nevertheless ask for,” 
“niggle to excess,” and fail in the end to “judge” people and their actions at 
their “true worth.”
 Gottfried’s rendering of love arguably puts the finest point on a tendency 
we have observed in the romance poetry of some of the most famous poet- 
performers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As an absolute investment 
in another perishable being, love involves a joy or pain that is experienced 
most directly and fully by lovers, but that is clearly of value for the entire 
court. By way of their different connections to love, courtiers stand to experi-
ence substantial individual and collective growth. As we have seen, diminish-
ment and pain also remain possibilities in the difficult competitions associated 
with love. Despite their downsides, the absolute investments of self in love that 
we first observe in the court poetry of the High Middle Ages continue. Euro-
pean courts stay bullish on love, and the enthusiasm eventually spreads from 
courts to cities, and beyond. Love and adventure as we have observed them 
in this chapter and the last are conspicuous indications of the emergence of a 
culture of wagers and investments, of a medieval society based on risks and 
rewards in which the sacrifices of sufferers are being replaced by the ventures 
of entrepreneurs. Love and adventure are among the first global moves for 
perishable goods that will increasingly shape the cultural action of the later 
Middle Ages and modernity. As such they are trendsetters.
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C H A P T E R  7
The Modern Self in Play
THE GLOBAL AS INDIVIDUAL
St. Augustine’s influential City of God against the Pagans helped shape the cul-
tural action of the Middle Ages in terms of a bipartite city modeled on impe-
rial Rome. In this influential patristic text, the heavenly city of the Christian 
faithful involves a longer- term dualist approach to things that finds absolute 
value in the eternal, spiritual- intellectual resources of the heavenly afterlife, 
while the worldly city— the pagan populace lacking the universal overview 
and disposition of things provided by faith— continues to establish the value 
of things much more immediately and discretely according to the character-
istics and demands of different specific times and places. Augustine’s spec-
ulation, as  that of Paul before him, was that Christians would choose the 
creator over creation, the everlasting good of the heavenly afterlife over the 
perishable goods of this temporal life, and sacrifice themselves or “die to the 
world” in emulation of Christ. At  the same time, in  a manner that leaves 
room for Christians’ free will as well as for God’s omniscient and omnipotent 
capacity to establish perfectly just outcomes on the future Judgment Day, the 
heavenly and worldly parts of Augustine’s bipartite city comingle indetermi-
nately. It remains impossible for mortals— even one as authoritative as Augus-
tine himself— to disentangle heavenly and worldly goods or determine their 
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ultimate value. In this study, we have seen that the indeterminacy visible in 
Augustine’s text— which with its imperial Roman dimensions is arguably the 
most expansive vision of the Christian faith bequeathed by antiquity to the 
Middle Ages— seems to have left room for if not inspired further speculations 
on the part of culturally bullish princes, poet- performers, and courtiers in the 
Middle Ages, particularly as of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In what 
other, other concerns might Christians legitimately invest themselves? Might 
the Christian global mobilization of self that has been accomplished in the 
interest of the heavenly afterlife be redirected to mutable perishable ends in 
ways that result in growth rather than perdition? As courtiers increasingly 
speculate on the value of temporal, transitory things— as strikingly visible in 
their poetry of adventure and love— we have observed that a society based on 
sacrifice is being replaced by one based on wagers and investments.
 As long as the cultural action remains generally consistent with the impe-
rial Christian parameters envisioned by Augustine in late antiquity, it seems 
primarily communal rather than individual or subjective in the modern sense. 
Even the literary and artistic achievements of Humanism and the Renaissance, 
however striking in their individual manifestations, do not seem to counter-
vail the communal, imperial sense of the Christian cultural action. The accom-
plishments of the uomo universale lauded by Jacob Burckhardt as specifically 
Italian achievements may be seen as extending and elaborating the adven-
turous and amorous dispositions of self that are observable in court poetry 
north of the Alps in earlier centuries. Popes are among the principal patrons 
of Renaissance artists whose works, so dynamically, elegantly, and powerfully 
scaled to individual dimensions, help represent glory on an imperial scale. 
Already at the end of the thirteenth century, Dante’s Divina Commedia takes 
us along with our guides Virgil and Beatrice through the teeming expanse of 
hell, purgatory, and heaven as imagined with unprecedented individual color 
and detail by il sommo poeta. When the poet comes across Marco Lombardo 
in Purgatory, the latter describes the bipartite imperial city in the same critical 
vein as Walther von der Vogelweide had done about a century earlier:
Soleva Roma. che il buon mondo feo,
due Soli aver, che l’una e l’altra strada
facean vedere, e del mondo e di Deo.
L’un l’altro ha spento, ed è giunta la spada
col pastorale, e l’un con l’altro insieme
per viva forza mal convien che vada;
però che, giunti, l’un l’altro non teme.
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Rome, that once kept the world good by her rod / was wont to have two suns, 
whose light made clear / both roads, that of the world and that of God. / One 
hath the other quenched; to crozier / hath now been joined the sword, and 
it must needs / be ill going, when the two together fare; / for, when joined, 
neither power the other dreads.1
In Dante’s poetic rendering, the medieval world is still identifiably organized 
along bipartite imperial Christian lines, but it seethes with competitive energy, 
internal pressures, and rivalries to the point that it seems about to break apart 
in its myriad individual constituent elements. Religious figures such as John 
Wycliffe, Jan Hus, and Girolamo Savonarola question the Roman church’s 
claims to cultural supremacy, more or less bluntly criticize it, and begin to 
place religious experience on a more individual footing, thus anticipating 
many of the moves that Martin Luther will later make.2 The earlier critics and 
reformers underscore and add to the building pressures— borrowing from 
Dante’s Marco Lombardo, we might say to the “ill- going”—within the imperial 
Christian church, without yet being positioned to effect a significant cultural 
shift. As  objectionable or in need of reform as the Roman church may be, 
no widely embraced alternative to its directive force seems to exist before the 
sixteenth century. As long as the European cultural action still occurs mainly 
according to the parameters of the bipartite City of God originally envisioned 
by St.  Augustine, it  arguably remains medieval and communal according 
to the primacy of individuals’ collective involvement in the City’s universal 
Christian mission. Modernity and subjectivity could be seen to begin when 
the individual self— disengaged or emancipated from the bipartite impe-
rial Christian church, but like it, aspiring to dispose globally of resources— 
becomes the new principal locus of cultural indeterminacy.3 We first begin to 
 1. Text and translation from Dante Aligieri, Divine Comedy, 378–79. Placing these words 
in the mouth of Marco Lombardo, “whom Dante and his contemporaries apparently saw as a 
man of outspoken righteousness in a generally corrupt society” (Ruud, Critical Companion to 
Dante, 486), gives them legitimacy.
 2. In many mystical writings produced as of the High Middle Ages, religious action is 
already occurring in very individual terms, to  the degree it is disengaged from institutional 
religiosity in seeking the mystical unio directly. However, the mystical trend toward individu-
alism does not seem to generate any broader cultural shift, even if it contributes to tensions.
 3. I have noted that the earlier transition from a culture of sacrifice to a culture of wagers 
and investments needs to be regarded not as inevitable or essential (i.e., given in the nature of 
things), but rather as a shift in the preponderance of certain kinds of moves in the action. This 
transition of global religious authority from the imperial church to the individual self needs to 
be regarded in terms of a similar significant shift in the prevailing kinds of cultural moves that 
occurs especially in the more northern regions of western Europe.
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observe such a broad and systematic religious disengagement of the individual 
from the imperial Christian church as a consequence of the writings of Martin 
Luther and their dissemination via the printing press that occurs in the early 
sixteenth century. By the time this occurs, it seems as though mutable, tem-
poral, physical- material cultural resources have been so efficiently valorized 
over previous centuries that the individual self, for all its manifestly perishable 
characteristics, has nonetheless become worthy to take the place of the impe-
rial church as the principal locus of religious cultural action.
 In this concluding chapter, I  follow through my global approach to the 
European cultural action and consider some especially pioneering and influ-
ential ways in which individuality displaces the global parameters of the impe-
rial Christian church as the principal locus of cultural indeterminacy.4 In the 
next two parts of this chapter, which deal with significant cultural moves 
made in the Reformation and Enlightenment, respectively, I focus on individ-
ualized or subjective articulations of the universal that are on the cutting edge 
of European cultural developments. In the penultimate section of this chapter, 
I return to the focal points of this study in examining courts, adventure, and 
love as rendered in the imaginary competitive action of Mark Twain’s A Con-
necticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court. In  this nineteenth- century romance, 
we observe how an absolutely empowered Gilded- Age Yankee— familiar with 
moves of the Reformation and Enlightenment— makes an all- or- nothing play 
to enlighten and modernize his medieval world. On the basis of the different 
cases considered in this chapter, and with the help of additional consider-
ations by Hannah Arendt and Jean- François Lyotard, I  conclude with some 
open- ended observations about emancipation and totalitarianism as global 
moves of (post)modernity.
REFORMATION MOVES
In the earliest years of what will come to be known as the Protestant Refor-
mation, the Augustinian monk Martin Luther composes a brief treatise in 
German titled Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen— On the Freedom of a 
 4. “The key historical events in establishing the principle of subjectivity are the Refor-
mation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.” In this chapter, I follow the course of 
modernity here staked out by Habermas. More specifically with regard to Luther— my starting 
point in this chapter— Habermas continues: “With Luther, religious faith became reflective; 
the world of the divine was changed in the solitude of subjectivity into something posited by 
ourselves” (Philosophical Discourse, 17).
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Christian (1520).5 According to the terminology employed in it, the principal 
purpose of this treatise is to provide more efficient Christian parameters for 
cultural action, and Luther achieves this purpose by shifting the parameters 
from imperial to individual dimensions.6 This shift has become necessary, 
in Luther’s view, mainly because of the false claims of papal representatives 
of the imperial Roman church to dispose of cultural resources that, by right, 
belong to worldly authorities (i.e., because of the mixing of crozier and sword 
lamented by Marco Lombardo in Dante’s Inferno). These false claims on the 
part of the Roman ecclesia have resulted in the waste of cultural resources, 
both of spiritual- intellectual and of physical- material kinds (i.e., the souls lost 
based on belief in the efficacy of such human contrivances, the monies paid 
for indulgences of sins from Germany to Rome). In  the open letter to Pope 
Leo X accompanying his treatise, Luther begins with reference to the ruin that 
has resulted from the papacy’s disastrous management of cultural resources:
Denn sag mir, wozu bist du doch nutz in dem Papsttum; denn je ärger und 
verzweifelter einer ist, desto mehr und stärker mißbraucht er deine Gewalt 
und Titel, die Leute zu schädigen an Gut und Seel, Sünd und Schand zu 
mehren, den Glauben und Wahrheit zu dämpfen.7
For what happens in your court, Leo, except that, the more wicked and exe-
crable any man is, the more prosperously he can use your name and authority 
for the ruin of the property and souls of men, for the multiplication of crimes, 
for the oppression of faith and truth, and of the whole Church of God?
 5. Citations of Luther’s German texts are from Martin Luther, An den Christlichen Adel 
deutscher Nation, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen. (In the 
notes, I will reference only the single text among these three that I am quoting.) I cite English 
translations of Luther’s “Dedicatory Letter of Martin Luther to Pope Leo X” and “On the Free-
dom of a Christian” from the online Modern History Sourcebook.
 6. While the new reformed brands of Christianity starting with Luther will, of  course, 
be closely associated with early modern communal developments (see, for example, the article 
of Peter Blickle, “Reformation and the Communal Spirit,” 133–67), the focus of my reading of 
some of Luther’s significant early writings is on the implications of the central position given 
to the individual self, which is mentioned by Habermas in the note above, and which Derek 
Wilson puts this way in his book, Out of the Storm: “Luther was undertaking the monumental 
task of creating a whole evangelistic system of theology and ethics. Moreover, he was making 
the individual conscience the sole arbiter in such matters. No other authority governing human 
conduct existed other than the word of God and no ecclesiastical or civil power could be placed 
above it” (179).
 7. Luther, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 115. For Luther’s early modern German 
text, I  will also refer the reader to von  Clemens’s edition of Luthers Werke in Auswahl; here 
“Ein Sendbrief an den Papst Leo X,” 5.
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In this letter to Leo, Luther implements an individualizing move that is consis-
tent with the ideas he will develop in the treatise proper. We observe here that 
he disengages Leo as an individual— ostensibly even as a potentially sympa-
thetic one— from the pope’s institutional role as the chief official presiding over 
such disastrous ruin and waste. This is consistent with Luther’s broader strat-
egy to disengage individual Christians from the imperial Christianity of papal 
Rome. The move nevertheless remains largely rhetorical, because the Medici 
Pope Leo is very much in need of the sale of indulgences to underwrite his 
lavish living and is entirely invested in the current condition of the papal court 
that Luther wishes to expose and decry. The following description shows in 
greater vivid detail what the imperial church has become in Luther’s view of it:
Denn das ist dir selbst jedenfalls nicht verborgen, wie nun viel Jahre lang aus 
Rom in alle Welt nichts anderes denn Verderben des Leibs, der Seelen, der 
Güter, und aller bösen Dinge allerschädlichste Exempel gleichsam hinein-
geströmt und eingerissen sind. Welches alles öffentlich am Tage jedermann 
bewußt ist, wodurch Römische Kirche, die vorzeiten die allerheiligste war, 
nun geworden ist eine Mordgruben über alle Mordgruben, ein Hurenhaus 
über alle Hurenhäuser, ein Haupt und Reich aller Sünde, des Todes und der 
Verdammnis, so daß man sich nicht gut denken kann, wie die Bosheit hier 
noch zunehmen könne, wenngleich der Antichrist selber käme.8
For many years now, nothing else has overflowed from Rome into the 
world— as you are not ignorant— than the laying waste of goods, of bodies, 
and of souls, and the worst examples of all the worst things. These things 
are clearer than the light to all men; and the Church of Rome, formerly the 
most holy of all churches, has become the most lawless den of thieves, the 
most shameless of all brothels, the very kingdom of sin, death, and hell; 
so that not even Antichrist, if he were to come, could devise any addition 
to its wickedness.
The once majestic Rome— the medieval incorporation of the heavenly City of 
God imagined by St. Augustine— has become for Luther the equivalent of a 
“Babylon or Sodom.”9 Luther’s sordid picture of the cultural action associated 
with Rome underscores pernicious spiritual and material waste, the perdition 
 8. Luther, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 113–14; “Ein Sendbrief an den Papst 
Leo X,” (Clemens), 3–4.
 9. Luther likens Rome to the Old Testament cities of sin in the paragraph preceding the 
above- cited passage. Similarly sharp and colorful criticisms, such as the still recent ones of 
Savonarola, were already in currency.
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“of  goods, of  bodies, and of souls.” Luther’s language suggests that the dire 
situation lamented by Marco Lombardo in Dante’s purgatory has reached a 
breaking point. The consequential move that Luther makes in view of this cul-
tural ruin and waste is to reject the imperial Roman parameters for religious 
cultural action altogether, and to transpose the dualistic hierarchical order-
ing of spiritual- intellectual and physical- material resources as conceived by 
Paul and Augustine— along with the indeterminacy this ordering has always 
involved— to patently individual parameters.
 The treatise’s title— On  the Freedom of a Christian— is  programmatic. 
“Freedom” as understood and defined by Luther in this treatise and else-
where is a scripture- and faith- based individual religiosity disengaged from 
any and every external guideline, restriction, or prohibition associated with 
the imperial Roman church. The emancipation of Christians from the eccle-
siastical dictates of imperial Rome is the most significant aspect of a broader 
spiritual freedom of Christians from any and every external religious restric-
tion or prohibition whatsoever, which follows from Luther’s understanding 
of the supreme value of individual faith and his qualification of the value of 
works. With his rejection of the spiritual value of works to effect salvation, 
Luther gives a new spin to an ancient move— the Apostle Paul’s rejection of 
the spiritual value of the laws of the Israelites— at a moment in the European 
cultural action when it serves to liberate individual Christians from the laws 
of the imperial Roman ecclesia that have shared in the governance of western 
European Christendom for more than a millennium. By insisting on a faith- 
and scripture- based religiosity of entirely individual dimensions, Luther effec-
tively streamlines Christianity, in a manner analogous to Paul’s streamlining 
of Judeo- Christian righteousness in the direction of faith in the early years 
of Christianity. Luther reiterates another ancient move as well, though on his 
systematically individualized scale:
ein jeglicher Christenmensch [ist] von zweierlei Natur, geistlicher und leib-
licher. Nach der Seele wird er ein geistlicher, neuer, innerlicher Mensch 
genannt, nach dem Fleisch und Blut wird er ein leiblicher, alter und äußer-
licher Mensch genannt.10
Each single Christian Man is composed of a twofold nature, a spiritual and a 
bodily. As regards the spiritual nature, which they name the soul, he is called 
 10. Italics have been added here and to the English translation to draw attention to the 
individuality of Luther’s religious conception; Luther, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 
125; “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen” (Clemens), 11.
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the spiritual, inward, new man; as  regards the bodily nature, which they 
name the flesh, he is called the fleshly, outward, old man.11
The dualist contest between higher spiritual- intellectual and lower physical- 
material (here: “fleshly”) cultural resources— a  flashpoint in the action of 
the imperial Christian church in the Middle Ages— is  ongoing in Luther’s 
conception of the individual Christian self. Correspondingly, the universal 
harnessing of resources that has occurred on an imperial level in the Roman 
church becomes with Luther a newly individualized sovereignty or power over 
all things, as indicated by the use of the individualizing modifiers of “Chris-
tian” in the above- cited passage— Ein jeglicher Christenmensch—“each single 
Christian”—and in another of the main theses with which Luther begins his 
treatise: “Ein Christenmensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Ding und niemand 
untertan”12—“A Christian is lord over all things, and subject to none” (italics 
added). As was previously the case in the Christian cultural action, this sov-
ereignty is framed indeterminately in terms of a sameness, according to which 
spiritual- intellectual resources completely pervade physical- material ones (just 
as providence pervades the seeming randomness of events presenting itself to 
mortal humanity), at the same time as the latter resources are to be regarded 
by and subjected to the former as something absolutely and inimically other.
 The freedom of the individual Christian as understood by Luther is sup-
posed to be a strictly spiritual freedom that pertains to the individual Chris-
tian’s posture toward all things physical, material, “fleshly.” For Luther, the 
correct evaluation of and posture toward the things of this world cannot be 
imposed or regulated by any external agency such as the church, but comes 
about from within the individual as a consequence of faith. Having died to 
the world, the individual becomes lord over it, then freely serves it, as Christ 
served sinful humanity with his death and resurrection. Hence, the individual 
Christian self is not only “lord over all things” but also servant of one and 
all, as Luther states immediately after the above- cited pronouncement of the 
Christian individual’s absolute sovereign freedom: Ein Christenmensch ist ein 
dienstbarer Knecht aller Ding und jedermann untertan13—“A Christian man is 
the most dutiful servant of all, and subject to every one.” Despite the individ-
ualized scaling of the indeterminate dualist dynamics on which everything 
 11. “On the Freedom of a Christian” (Wace and Buchheim).
 12. Luther, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 125; “Von der Freiheit eines Christen-
menschen” (Clemens), 11.
 13. Ibid., 125; “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen” (Clemens), 11.
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continues to hinge, the reward to be experienced in Luther’s version of Chris-
tianity still possesses universal, quasi- imperial dimensions:
Wer kann nun ausdenken die Ehre und Höhe eines Christenmenschen? 
Durch sein Königreich ist er aller Ding mächtig, durch sein Priestertum 
ist er Gottes mächtig, denn Gott tut, was er bittet und will, wie da steht 
geschrieben im Psalter: “Gott tut den Willen derer, die ich ihn fürchten, und 
erhöret ihr Gebet”–zu welchen Ehren er nur allein durch den Glauben und 
durch kein Werk kommt.14
Who then can comprehend the loftiness of that Christian dignity which, 
by its royal power, rules over all things, and, by its priestly glory, is all pow-
erful with God; since God does what he seeks and wishes; as  it is written: 
“He will fulfill the desire of them that fear Him: He also will hear their cry, 
and will save them”? (Ps 145:19). This glory certainly cannot be attained by 
any works, but by faith only.
In Luther’s individualized conception of the Christian life, there is no longer 
anything other than the cultivation of scripture- based faith that one may do 
to bring oneself closer to heaven. The heavenly joy experienced already in 
this world— the all- powerful “loftiness” referenced by Luther— becomes an 
ongoing condition based on the continual effort on the part of the individ-
ual Christian to strengthen faith by means of scriptures. Nothing else one 
does, no mutable thing in this temporal world has any intrinsically superior 
value with regard to one’s salvation, that is, everything is equally valuable or 
exchangeable in its subordinate status vis- à- vis the sovereign Christian self. 
In  a world in which the values of things has been newly leveled, such sov-
ereign faithful Christians freely serve others, sharing with them the endless 
bounty of the heavenly reward they receive via faith.
 Luther’s individualized gospel is disseminated by means of the still rela-
tively recent European printing technology, developed by Johannes Gutenberg 
in the mid- fifteenth century, in a manner that illustrates this gospel’s dyna-
mism. The dynamics of the production of the ancient and medieval codex 
page had been relatively fixed and slow, as  the letters had to be set down 
sequentially and could be changed only with great effort (i.e.,  as a palimp-
sest). Every single manuscript page resulting from these dynamics was unique 
(consider, for example, the image of the codex page featuring the illumination 
 14. Ibid., 136; “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen” (Clemens), 18.
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of the poet Marie de France at work that is included in the fourth chapter of 
this study). By contrast, the characteristics of book production with the new 
printing technology are highly fluid and rapid, corresponding to the different 
possible arrangements of individual types within the rectangular iron forme 
or frame, and to the almost instantaneous reproduction of entire pages once 
the desired types in the frame are in their proper place in the bed of the press. 
These technological characteristics reproduce identical copies of a given page, 
thus losing contact with the absolutely unique characteristics of the medie-
val codex page.15 But they enable a speed, economy, and scale of production 
capable of making scriptures available to individual Christians everywhere, 
thus complementing and reinforcing the newly framed individuality of the 
(religious) cultural action.16 Among the most significant of the many Lutheran 
writings soon flowing off the printing press is Luther’s translation of the Bible 
into German, the widespread popularity and influence of which suggest how 
great the cultural value of the literary vernacular has become since the ear-
liest forays of Otfried von Weissenburg.17 In his Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen 
(1530)—“Open Letter on Translating”—that accompanies the publication of 
his Bible, Luther lingers on his use of the word allein—“alone”—in  render-
ing Romans 3:28 (Arbitramur enim justificari hominem per fidem sine operibus 
 15. We have no problem today seeing the printing press as an inevitable, beneficial devel-
opment. However, it  is tempting to consider that the lost quality of the original might already 
have been negatively experienced in the early days of the printing press, much like what we 
today experience during a time when real books are being supplanted to a large degree by 
electronic devices. In  the former instance, based on the findings of this study, the imperial 
church as communal absolute would be associated with the uniqueness of the manuscript page 
that has been lost or put behind, and lament concerning its passing would logically have been 
experienced most acutely by the priestly cast that was losing its control over the Word (efforts 
to criminalize the printing of vernacular bibles scarcely seem to have slowed this process down; 
see Flood, “Martin Luther’s Bible Translation,” 45–46). In  the latter case, and other similar 
cases that we seem to experience ever more frequently in our own digitally and technologically 
enhanced cultural action as ever more bookstores go out of business, we may be reiterating this 
sense of loss (or of the putting behind) of an original communal absolute (which of course, seen 
inversely, is also an emancipation). I discuss the cultural significance of Luther’s bible transla-
tion, in connection to Luther’s Sendbrief and Walter Benjamin’s conception of the artwork in 
the age of its mechanical reproduction, in my article, “Singularity of Aura and the Artistry of 
Translation.”
 16. Stephan Füssel writes: “Gutenberg’s invention is as simple as it is ingenious: texts were 
broken down into their smallest components, i.e. into the 26 letters of the Roman alphabet, and 
from placing single letters in the right order, the new text would result time and time again. 
Texts had been copied over the centuries by writing them completely and sequentially, or by 
cutting them equally completely in wood [. . .], but now only the letters of the alphabet had to 
be cut and supplies cast, and they would always be available for setting up whatever text was 
chosen” (Gutenberg and the Impact of Printing, 15).
 17. Otfried’s forays were considered in the fourth chapter of this study.
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legis—“We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the 
Law”) with the wording allein durch den Glauben—“by faith alone.” Luther’s 
critics had found “alone” objectionable because it seemed to involve an imper-
missible addition that was not justified by the original text, as the Latin equiv-
alent of the German allein is not in the text of the Vulgate. This is Luther’s 
famous reply to those critics:
Man muß nicht die Buchstaben in der lateinischen Sprache fragen, wie man 
soll Deutsch reden, wie diese Esel tun, sondern man muß die Mutter im 
Hause, die Kinder auf der Gassen, den gemeinen Mann auf dem Markt drum 
fragen, und denselbigen auf das Maul sehen, wie sie reden, und darnach 
übersetzen.18
We do not have to ask about the literal Latin for how we are to speak 
German— as  these asses do. Rather we must ask the mother in the home, 
the children on the street, the common person in the market about this. 
We must be guided by their tongue, the manner of their speech, and do our 
translating accordingly.19
Luther’s “alone” goes to the heart of the individualization of the religious cul-
tural action that his writings are effecting. Allein underscores Luther’s individ-
ualized conception of the religious action as independent from any external 
worldly agency or works, and beyond this, it designates the general sense of a 
newly fluid, individualized mode of experiencing God’s word that is enabled 
and accelerated by the technological capacity of the printing press to deliver 
it to every single, solitary Christian, in the manner of speaking of those same 
single Christians, whoever and wherever they may be— mothers, children, 
common people— on streets, in homes, and at the marketplace.
 Luther’s typographically amplified moves help to mobilize individual 
Christians in a new cultural action in which the rules of play have become 
less clear, even those regarding the most basic questions of the Christian life. 
How far might the spiritual freedom of the Christian extend in the direction 
of potentially sinful engagements with this temporal world, such as the capa-
bilities of the physical- material properties of the printing press or the collo-
quial turns of phrase of a vulgar language to render the word of God? At what 
point(s)  do spiritual- intellectual and physical- material cultural resources 
 18. Luther, Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen, 159; “Ein Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen” (Clemens), 
179–93, here 187.
 19. The cited English translation of Luther’s “An Open Letter on Translating” is from the 
online translation by Gary Mann in the Internet Christian Library.
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overlap to a degree or in a way that makes the newly individualized religious 
action sinful, as the bipartite imperial city of the papacy had made itself sin-
ful from the Lutheran perspective? Another early treatise of Luther dissem-
inated along with On the Freedom of a Christian is his open letter An  den 
Christlichen Adel deutscher Nation—“To the Christian Nobility of the German 
Nation”—in which Luther argues for the removal of all controls over desires 
and appetites of the flesh imposed by the Roman church. According to Luther, 
the faithful individual Christian has no need of such controls and an individ-
ual lacking faith will not benefit from them. Luther presses forward against 
all such external strictures to the point that he argues for dispensing with the 
requirement of celibacy for pastors, because forbidding a man and woman left 
alone together from succumbing to temptation is, as he puts it, like “putting 
fire and straw together and forbidding them to smoke and burn.”20 Luther has 
in mind the circumstances of pastors living among the town and village com-
munities for which they provide. Advocating the removal of the requirement 
of celibacy in such cases seems practical and efficient. Nonetheless, by insist-
ing people will inevitably succumb to temptations of the flesh, as if compelled 
by a force of nature, Luther opens up the ways in which the flesh is to be 
engaged by the spirit to arrangements other than the strict (i.e., celibate) sub-
jugation of the former to the latter.
 In the event the Bible provides no clear indications that might inspire 
faithful individual Christians to an accord, how will it be possible to deter-
mine whether celibacy or the arrangement proposed by Luther is righteous 
rather than sinful? A similar question might be posed about another passage 
in On the Freedom of a Christian, in  which Luther warns Christians not to 
mistake their spiritual freedom for a release from responsibilities:
Das ist die christliche Freiheit, der bloße Glaube, der da macht, nicht daß wir 
müßig gehen oder übel tun können, sondern, daß wir keines Werks bedürfen, 
um Frommsein und Seligkeit zu erlangen.21
This is that Christian liberty, our faith, the effect of which is, not that we 
should be careless or lead a bad life, but that no one should need the law or 
works for justification and salvation.
 20. The corresponding German is in Luther, An den Christlichen Adel deutscher Nation, 67. 
The English rendering here is from Luther, “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,” 
149–234, here 192.
 21. Luther, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 131; Clemens, 15; italics added to orig-
inal quote and translation.
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Albeit negatively or inversely, Luther here articulates the newly framed inde-
terminacy of the individualized cultural action that starts with the Reforma-
tion.22 Who is to say, or  how is one to determine, who or what is careless, 
slothful, or wicked? How are matters involving carelessness, sloth, or evil to 
be arranged when the authoritative imperial Christian church that previously 
regulated them has been discredited as a brothel? The cultural action is seem-
ingly opened up to the possibility of carelessness, sloth, and evil, with no reli-
gious (i.e.,  religiously legitimate) mechanism or agency in place other than 
individualized faith to prevent or avoid lapses.
 We have seen in the cases of the physical- material apparatus of the print-
ing press and the vulgar colloquialisms of children, mothers, and common 
men at the marketplace that the cultural action is opened to new opportuni-
ties in the valuation of resources, novel risks, and rewards that are entirely in 
accord with faith according to Luther’s understanding of it. Luther’s turn to 
the German nobility in his open letter to them provides indications of how 
he thought the cultural vacuum left behind by the discredited bipartite impe-
rial church should be filled. The German principes, acting on behalf of their 
Christian brethren, should call a council and undertake a thorough reform 
of religious, political, and social matters. In  this text, Luther pragmatically 
calls upon the culturally best- positioned players to bring about the reforms 
he thinks are needed. However, the problem of the religious or spiritual legit-
imacy of arrangements in the newly individualized cultural action seems 
thereby only to be deferred rather than solved. Placing matters in the princes’ 
hands, while politically expedient and crucial for the survival of Luther’s Ref-
ormation, cannot guarantee that decisions in the newly reframed cultural 
action will be righteous or in accord with an individualized religiosity based 
on faith. The lack of certainty (i.e., the greater cultural indeterminacy) follows 
from the individualized scaling of the (religious) cultural action. As  long as 
the religious action occurred imperially, the dictates of popes and emperors 
were necessarily in some way legitimate even when these authorities were at 
odds. When religion becomes a primarily or strictly individual matter, it no 
longer seems in the same way to provide interpersonal communal standards 
of evaluation.
 22. There is another, similar passage, in  which the indeterminacy of the newly framed 
individualized religious cultural action is put differently, though again ex negativo: “Nicht, dass 
wir aller Ding leiblich mächtig wären, sie zu besitzen oder zu brauchen wie die Menschen auf 
Erden; denn wir müssen sterben leiblich und kann niemand den Tod entfliehen” (italics added; 
Luther, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 135; Clemens, 17)—“Not that in the sense of 
corporeal power any one among Christians has been appointed to possess and rule all things” 
(“On the Freedom of a Christian,” Modern History Sourcebook).
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 The secular German princes will never wield religious authority in the 
same universal manner as medieval popes and emperors, but Luther’s turn 
to them calls upon the best- positioned players in the newly defined European 
cultural action, those disposing of the skills and resources that will enable 
them to be most effective in the intense competitions to come. While there is 
no longer any way to demonstrate that the outcomes achieved by princes in 
their ongoing contests among each other and with the papacy are religiously 
correct or best in a cultural action evermore shaped by individualized faith, 
at the very least outcomes will be reached in competitions at the highest level, 
among the early modern cultural competitors best positioned to achieve max-
imal tangible results. In the above- mentioned open letter on translating that 
accompanies the publication of his vernacular bible, Luther provides indirect 
support for the notion that competition among the most resourceful people at 
the highest cultural levels is the best way to ensure optimal cultural outcomes. 
In response to papal critics of “his” Bible,23 Luther challenges these critics to 
come up with a “better” one, thereby suggesting that the Bible itself— the foun-
dation of faith- based individual religiosity— is contingent on the best efforts 
of its human renderers as competitors. In the same manner as one observes in 
the cultural action elsewhere, Luther describes his own efforts and those of his 
translating team figuratively as a physical, even athletic effort:
Es läuft jetzt einer mit den Augen durch drei, vier Blätter und stößt nicht 
einmal an, wird aber nicht gewahr, welche Wacken und Klötze da gelegen 
sind, wo er jetzt drüber hingehet wie über ein gehobelt Brett, wo wir haben 
müssen schwitzen und uns ängsten, ehe wir denn solche Wacken und Klötze 
aus dem Wege räumeten, auf daß man könnte so fein daher gehen.24
One can now read three or four pages without stumbling one time— without 
realizing just what rocks and hindrances had once been where now one trav-
els as if over a smoothly- cut plank. We had to sweat and toil there before we 
removed those rocks and hindrances, so one could go along nicely.
Luther’s own efforts have cleared the way for something of no less import 
than the optimal rendering of the text upon which individual faith is based. 
If people can move with dispatch toward salvation, this is in part an outcome 
of Luther’s individual investment of self, the toil he has invested in his trans-
lation and the superb level of this toil. The value of princes’ engagements 
 23. As he calls it in his Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen, 153; Clemens, 180.
 24. Luther, Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen, 158; Clemens, 183.
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on behalf of the cultural reforms for which Luther is calling may need to be 
regarded in the same way that Luther here invites us to assess his own activ-
ity in the domain of translation. Here as there, the moves deemed to be in 
greatest accord with faith will be those perceived as best in the ongoing cul-
tural action— those that best clear away hindrances so that one can “go along 
nicely.” Trying to fashion a better, more efficient Christianity, Martin Luther 
inadvertently helps bring about a different, modern kind of global cultural 
action with individualized dimensions.25 Not surprisingly in view of the Ref-
ormation moves we have considered above, the princes are at first best situated 
in the newly defined parameters of action to make consequential moves and 
experience cultural growth.
ENLIGHTENMENT MOVES
By 1714, nearly two centuries after Luther’s early writings, princes in many parts 
of Europe will have become absolute sovereigns, combining in their persons 
and their offices religious and worldly dignities. In  this year, the philosopher 
and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, nearing the end of a distin-
guished career among the intellectual luminaries of the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries, publishes La Monadologie, a short text that explains 
the makeup and dynamics of the cosmos in terms of “monads.” Leibniz’s Mona-
dologie provides us with views of yet another “city”—to go along with those we 
surveyed in the initial chapters of this study— and one that is definitively mod-
ern, even if there are some hints that it too follows in the tradition of Augustine’s 
bipartite civitas. The city Leibniz places before us, writing in the courtly French 
of his era, consists of an infinite number of perfectly articulated, yet completely 
discrete, autonomous, individual building blocks called “monads.” Each of these 
substances provides an absolutely unique perspective of the whole:
Et comme une meme ville regardée de differens côtés paroist toute autre, 
et comme multipliée perspectivement; il arrive de même que par la multitude 
infinie des substances simples, il y a comme autant de differens univers, qui 
ne sont portant que las perspectives d’un seul selon les differens points de 
veue de chaque Monade. Et c’est the moyen d’obtenir autant de variété qu’il 
est possible, mais avec le plus grand ordre qui se puisse, c’est à dire, c’est le 
moyen d’obtenir autant de perfection qu’il se peut.
 25. Richard von Dülmen elaborates this general idea in his essay, “The Reformation and 
the Modern Age.”
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And as one and the same town viewed from different sides looks altogether 
different, and is, as it were, perspectively multiplied, it similarly happens that, 
through the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as  it were, 
just as many different universes, which are however only the perspectives 
of a single one according to the different points of view of each monad. And 
this is the way to obtain as much variety as possible, but combined with the 
greatest possible order, that is to say, it is the way to obtain as much perfec-
tion as can be.26
Every single monad constituting Leibniz’s city is different from every other 
one, it  contains all the characteristics and potential by which it functions 
(i.e.,  it receives no external influences, because it has no “windows”), and 
it constantly strives to realize its own specific individual potential or end.27 
A degree of the dualism that we saw in Augustine’s bipartite city is manifested, 
as monads of a lower level live and strive in their own modest way without 
self- awareness, whereas only the monads functioning at a higher spiritual- 
intellectual level possess what Leibniz calls “apperception.” Only these highest 
or plus parfaite—“more perfect”28 monads can comprehend how a city consti-
tuted by such infinitely diverse individual building blocks, each with its own 
specific potential and striving, remains intact rather than falls apart. But the 
overriding sense in Leibniz’s city is one of unified purpose(s), not of parts that 
are dualistically at odds. The unifying principle or master plan holding this 
city together, despite the infinite diversity of the discrete individual monads 
constituting it, is God’s absolute power as the Monarque de la Cité divine des 
Esprits— the “Monarch of the Divine City of Spirits.”29 Leibniz’s city, we dis-
cover, is  also a heavenly city- state, and as such, it  is necessarily the best of 
all possible worlds for him. This is because all the monads constituting it, 
though each one is a unique mechanism and none is influenced in any way 
by another, have all nevertheless been designed or programmed by God from 
the beginning to function in perfect harmony. Individual characteristics and 
striving have been arranged in them in such a way that they work together 
optimally in the manner of a perfectly fitted and finely tuned machine.
 26. French text and English translation from Leibniz, “Monadology” (Rescher), here 200–
201. In sections 85 and 86 of his Monadologie, where he discusses souls or spirits as the “group 
of monads of the highest level” (283), Leibniz reiterates key terms of Augustine’s City of God 
according to his own early modern terms, most visibly in using the term Cité de  Dieu with 
reference to the assemblage of all spirits (284).
 27. Despite this, in  the Monadologie, Leibniz never uses the terms “freedom, free agent, 
liberty of action, or the like,” as Rescher observes (278).
 28. Leibniz, Monadologie, 171.
 29. Ibid., 286.
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 The monadic city placed in view by Leibniz is one of the important out-
comes of early- modern enlightenment thinking.30 As one of the principal cul-
tural players of his time, Leibniz contends with Isaac Newton for the honor of 
having invented the infinitesimal calculus, one of the principal mathematical 
tools of modernity with which people have sought and acquired new values 
from what— in  this study— I  have been calling mutable, temporal, physical- 
material cultural resources.31 He also contends with a mechanistic Cartesian 
view of the cultural action, according to which consciousness and the men-
tal apprehension (and evaluation) of  things occurs in ways consistent with 
Descartes’s famous ontological move, cogito ergo sum. Descartes’s dualist 
move radically valorizes the purely intellectual capacity and regards physical- 
material things as uniformly external and subject to intellectual conscious-
ness.32 To the degree the mechanistic Cartesian view of the cultural action 
assesses spiritual- intellectual goods as superior to and absolutely distinct 
from physical- material ones, it reiterates something akin to the foundational 
Judeo- Christian move that posits the ascendency of spiritual- intellectual over 
physical- material resources. With his monadic city, Leibniz advances an alter-
native global model that contrasts with Cartesian dualism.33 Most important 
about Leibniz’s city and every single monad constituting it is its indivisible 
unity, which outweighs any dualistic characteristic or tendency. As a totality, 
Leibniz’s city is completely integrated in its infinite diversity on account of the 
divine master plan of the Architecte de la Machine de l’univers—“the Architect 
of the Mechanism of the Universe”34—that holds everything together in the 
 30. I occasionally capitalize “Enlightenment,” for example in juxtaposition to “Reformation” 
or whenever a more limited and focused historical understanding of an eighteenth- century 
“Age of Enlightenment” seems appropriate. However, since my understanding of enlightenment 
tends to see it in terms of cultural moves, or in terms of an ongoing possible approach to things 
that is not necessarily specific to a particular period of time, I will typically use the more generic 
lower- case “enlightenment.”
 31. In her book The Origins of the Infinitesimal Calculus, Margaret E. Baron writes, “The 
infinitesimal calculus has been the principal tool in the exploitation of the earth’s resources, 
the charting of the heavens and the building of modern technology. Applications occur wher-
ever there exist measurable phenomena: gravitation, heat, light, sound, electricity, magnetism 
and radio waves” (1). Calculus as described by Baron is consistent with the trend I have been 
observing in this study, beginning in the High Middle Ages, toward finding absolute value in 
cultural resources understood to be finite. See also Ursula Goldenbaum and Douglas Jesseph, 
Infinitesimal Differences.
 32. See Rosemond, Descartes’s Dualism.
 33. For example, see Leibniz’s criticisms of “les Cartesians” in the Monadologie: “This is 
where the Cartesians went badly wrong in taking no account of perceptions that are not apper-
ceived. This led them to think that ‘spirits’ alone are monads, and that there are no souls of 
beasts or other entelechies” (75).
 34. Ibid., 286.
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optimal way. Leibniz’s city is an early modern reiteration and elaboration of 
the imperial city of antiquity and the Middle Ages to the degree it is held 
together by the Christian God’s providential master plan, but unlike its pre-
decessors, it  consists of the innumerable discrete individuals of which it is 
constituted. Each of these is utterly self- sufficient, a universe unto itself, and 
the best one it can possibly be.35
 Apart from monads and calculus, Leibniz lays claim to the invention of the 
binary number system, and it would be appropriate to assume that the makeup 
of his monadic “city” would also include binary properties.36 For Leibniz, 
binary numbers combine metaphysical and physical properties in their capac-
ity to render quantities and even abstract notions as sequences of ones and 
zeros. In a letter composed in his native German to Prince Rudolph August 
von  Braunschweig- Lüneburg- Wolfenbüttel in early 1697, Leibniz states that 
binary numbers reveal the mystery of creation in all its diversity and unity:
Denn einer der Haupt- Punkten des christlichen Glaubens, und zwar unter 
denjenigen, die den Weltweisen am wenigsten eingegangen und noch den 
Heiden nicht wohl beizubringen, ist die Erschaffung aller Dinge aus nichts 
durch die Allmacht Gottes. Nun kann man wohl sagen, daß nichts in der 
Welt sie besser vorstelle, ja gleichsam demonstriere, als der Urprung der Zah-
len, wie er allhier vorgestellet, durch deren Ausdrückung bloß und allein 
mit Eins und Null oder Nichts, und wird wohl schwerlich in der Natur und 
Philosophie ein bessers Vorbild dieses Geheimnisses zu finden sein.
For one of the main points of Christian belief— something the worldly wise 
have grasped only poorly and that pagans cannot comprehend at all— is the 
 35. Morris Kline provides further specific illustration of Leibniz’s conception of this world 
as the “best of all possible” ones, and, more generally, corroboration for the religious context 
in which I am placing Leibniz and some of his principal ideas: “The conviction that the world 
was mathematically designed derived from the earlier linking of science and theology. We may 
recall that most of the leading figures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not only 
deeply religious but found in their theological views the inspiration and conviction vital to their 
scientific work.” Kline mentions Copernicus, Kepler, Descartes, and Newton in this context, 
and continues with respect to Leibniz: “Leibniz’s explanation of the concord between the real 
and the mathematical worlds, and his ultimate defense of the applicability of his calculus to the 
real world, was the unity of the world and God. The laws of reality therefore could not deviate 
from the ideal laws of mathematics. The universe was the most perfect conceivable, the best of 
all possible worlds, and rational thinking disclosed its laws” (Mathematical Thought, 620).
 36. See, for example, Leibniz, Monadologie: “So one can say that monads can neither come 
into being nor end save all at once; that is, they can begin only by creation and end only by 
annihilation” (57). This principle of creation is also at the heart of Leibniz’s cosmological con-
ception of binary numbers.
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creation of all things out of nothing by God’s absolute power. Now one can 
say that nothing in the world shows this better— one could even say demon-
strates it— than the origin of numbers as I am introducing it here, by means 
of their expression exclusively with One and Zero or Nothing. There will 
scarcely be a better illustration of the mystery of creation to be found in 
nature or philosophy.37
According to Leibniz’s understanding of the religious characteristics of binary 
numbers, everything can be seen as coming back to the duality of one and 
zero. The coming into being of One as the creation of everything (= 1) out of 
nothing (= 0) by a single omnipotent deity is describable as an early modern, 
post- Lutheran reiteration of the dualist global perspective explored in the ini-
tial chapters of this study.38 In the Judeo- Christian cultural action of antiq-
uity in chapter one of this study, we observed the emergence of new universal 
perspectives from which cultural resources can be considered and assessed 
uniformly. It is this perspective— as incomprehensible to the Roman pagans of 
Augustine’s day as it continues to be to the “pagans” referenced by Leibniz in 
the cited passage— that is now advanced as the One of Leibniz’s binary num-
ber system. The One and Zero, upon which binary numbers and arithmetic 
are based, are physical markers of God’s metaphysical creation of everything 
out of nothing. Binary numbers tangibly reiterate the act of creation and, 
as such, function as the underlying ordering principle of the cosmos. In his 
essay “Explication de Arithmétique Binaire,” Leibniz presciently observes that 
the binary number system, based on its interconnected physical (geometric) 
and metaphysical properties, might have practical applications. For example, 
it  could enable “assayers to weigh all sorts of masses with few weights and 
could serve in coinage to give several values with few coins.”39
 We observed above that the properties of the mechanically printed 
page complemented the newly fluid disposition of cultural resources for 
 37. Leibniz, Zwei Briefe, 19. My English translation, and the italics are added.
 38. In her article “Leibniz as a Lutheran” (169–92), Ursula Goldenbaum points out that 
Leibniz experienced his earliest intellectual formation in a strongly Lutheran household and 
his university studies occurred in the intellectual and religious milieu of Erfurt, not far from 
Luther’s Wittenberg. Leibniz’s positions in religious and philosophical matters are much too 
universal and eclectic to say that he ever takes an identifiably Lutheran stance. Nevertheless, 
the Lutheran streamlining of the individual’s relationship to God in the direction of the faith of 
the single Christian alone can readily be seen as preparing the way for and facilitating Leibniz’s 
numeric- mathematical view of the Christian cosmos in terms of zeros and ones, with no other 
extraneous considerations or instances being allowed to muddle the clarity of the dynamic 
dyadic relation.
 39. The corresponding French text is in Leibniz, “Explication de  Arithmétique Binaire,” 
224. I cite the online English translation by Lloyd Strickland, 224.
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the individual (Christian believer), and their functioning had the effect of 
amplifying and accelerating the new (Christian) individuality throughout 
the cultural action. Now, Leibniz imagines binary numbers as a religious 
ordering principle underlying everything in an optimally ordered universe. 
These numbers are not merely a measure of things, but a tangible, physical, 
“geometric” manifestation of their origin and purpose. A  physical- material 
apparatus designed to exploit the dynamic potential of binary numbers with 
their cosmological characteristics would seemingly have infinite potential to 
exploit resources and amplify and accelerate the cultural action. The potential 
of such an apparatus, in which binary numbers or their placeholders— such 
as the presence or absence of electrical currents in a microprocessor— are the 
functional equivalents of the moveable types of the printing press, seems to be 
limited only by the specific physical- material properties of the apparatus and 
the energy available to power it. In view of the momentum of the European 
cultural action, it seems inevitable that the means for constructing and pow-
ering such an apparatus will become available.40
 Leibniz’s speculation that an omnipotent God holds things together globally 
and individually in an optimal way is well suited to the absolutist era in which 
he lived, in which the absolute control of things by a higher power was the politi-
cal norm. His “city” remains intact only as long as the absolutist faith undergird-
ing it can be maintained.41 In the penultimate decades of the eighteenth century, 
when princely absolutism begins to teeter, Immanuel Kant no longer believes 
one can know with certainty what Leibniz in the first decades of the same cen-
tury was still quite sure about. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant employs his 
own reason to question some of the basic assumptions of thinkers of enlight-
enment before him, such as Descartes and Leibniz. Kant systematizes what he 
thinks human reason can reasonably know, and this does not include the divine 
 40. About this moment, in  our own recent past and extending into our present, Fried-
rich A. Kittler writes: “One century was enough to transfer the age- old monopoly of writing in 
the omnipotence of integrated circuits” (Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 18–19). Kittler’s views 
here reinforce the idea of an expansion and acceleration of the cultural action, though his 
study’s focus on recent technological developments causes the variety of ancient medieval and 
early modern moments of technological transition to receive short shrift, and thereby to appear 
monolithic. The transition from scrolls to codices, and from scribal codices to printed books, 
breaks up the “monopoly of writing” into different cultural stages that lead, however slowly 
by comparison, in the direction of the digital breakthrough. Kittler does not mention Leibniz, 
whose cosmological understanding of binary numbers provides what might be regarded as a 
kind of “symbolism” for the digital age.
 41. If God as Monarque de la Cité divine des Esprits were not already indicative enough, 
the paternalistic, absolutist undergirding of Leibniz’s city is made even more explicit in section 
84 of his Monadologie: “[God] is in regard to [spirits] what an inventor is to his machine [. . .], 
but also what a prince is to his subjects, and even a father to his children” (278).
THE MODERN SELF IN PLAY ∙  225
plan of “the master- builder of the universe” (just as it does not include being 
able to rule this out).42 Enlightenment as understood by Kant can no longer be 
about the ongoing self- realization of the “best of all possible worlds” and the 
individual parts constituting it. Looking farther back than Leibniz, Kant’s under-
standing of the cultural action seems almost like the inverse of Martin Luther’s. 
Whereas Luther understood the world as good and meaningful only as the site 
of the free outpourings of the rewards of faith and as evil by virtue of its capacity 
to ensnare or entangle the flesh, Kant considers that an enlightened individual 
must endeavor to realize itself fully in this world. In order to do so, the individ-
ual must avail itself of its own reason and not let its course be decided by others, 
as we see in the definitive exhortation with which Kant begins his famous essay, 
“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784)—“Answer to the Ques-
tion: What Is Enlightenment?”: “Sapere aude!” Habe Mut dich deines eigenen 
Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung—“ ‘Sapere aude!’ 
Have courage to use your own reason!—that is the motto of enlightenment.”
 The connection between Kant and Luther becomes closer and more com-
plex upon greater scrutiny. On an individual level, the imperative to enlighten 
in the sense of to liberate oneself continues a century- long tendency in the cul-
tural action. Having been emancipated from the dictates of the bipartite impe-
rial church by Luther’s moves in the early sixteenth century, the individual self 
is here urged by Kant near the end of the eighteenth century to free itself from 
any and every external dictate whatsoever that inhibits or impedes the individ-
ual’s use of reason to bring about enlightenment. Seemingly free and solitary 
as never before, the individual, newly lacking any metaphysical certainties by 
virtue of the employment of its reason, now puts itself in play and endeav-
ors to realize itself fully in a world to be assessed, possessed, and enjoyed for 
its own sake and via the exercise of reason. Banking on the integrative and 
stabilizing capacity of faith, Luther had called on the believing individual to 
free itself from all external hindrances in order to realize itself fully in a spir-
itual sense. Now, in  the philosophical action of the late eighteenth century, 
the integrative and stabilizing capacity of faith is no longer available in the 
same way, and Kant banks on reason in calling upon the individual self to 
enlighten itself by freeing itself from any and every external controlling force. 
In their different ways, Luther and Kant— with Leibniz occupying an interme-
diary position— endeavor to fix or determine the value of the individual self 
in terms of some stable benchmark or standard.
 The early modern cultural action observed thus far in this chapter sug-
gests that if reason can take the place of faith on the cutting edge of cultural 
 42. See Grier, “Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics.”
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developments— as  the way to self- fulfillment, as  the intrinsic principle that 
holds the individual in place or stabilizes its value— then the value of the early 
modern individual self is seemingly subject to the greatest possible fluctuation 
and potentially infinite or infinitesimal further qualifications. Now that the 
individual self is defined primarily by reason rather than by faith, one might 
pose versions of the question that we asked above in the case of Luther. How 
can reason succeed where religion has seemingly fallen short in the ongoing 
cultural action of modernity? How will individual reason— the presumptive 
new guiding principle of individuality in the modern cultural action— having 
been turned by Kant toward itself and having come to know it cannot know 
God as it once had, or rely on any other metaphysically given standard, con-
tinue in its ongoing functioning to be able to know itself, or know that the way 
in which the world has been arranged is reasonable?43
 In the above- mentioned essay on enlightenment, Kant shows us the way in 
which he thinks the functioning of reason and the progress of enlightenment 
should proceed by reiterating a familiar cultural move:
Der öffentliche Gebrauch seiner Vernunft muß jederzeit frei sein, und der 
allein kann Aufklärung unter Menschen zustande bringen; der Privatge-
brauch derselben aber darf öfters sehr enge eingeschränkt sein, ohne doch 
darum den Fortschritt der Aufklärung sonderlich zu hindern. Ich verstehe 
aber unter dem öffentlichen Gebrauche seiner eigenen Vernunft denjeni-
gen, den jemand als Gelehrter von ihr vor dem ganzen Publikum der Les-
erwelt macht. Den Privatgebrauch nenne ich denjenigen, den er in einem 
gewissen ihm anvertrauten bürgerlichen Posten oder Amte von seiner Ver-
nunft machen darf. Nun ist zu manchen Geschäften, die in das Interesse des 
gemeinen Wesens laufen, ein gewisser Mechanismus notwendig, vermittelst 
dessen einige Glieder des gemeinen Wesens sich bloß passiv verhalten müs-
sen, um durch eine künstliche Einhelligkeit von der Regierung zu öffentli-
chen Zwecken gerichtet oder wenigstens von der Zerstörung dieser Zwecke 
abgehalten zu werden. Hier ist es nun freilich nicht erlaubt, zu räsonnieren; 
sondern man muß gehorchen.44
 43. Many of the questions posed in the latter part of the volume What Is Enlightenment? 
are variations of the question I am posing here, for example that of Georg Picht: “If enlightened 
thinking posits standards for itself out of itself, if  it is supposed to be its own tribunal, then 
the process of enlightenment itself invites the question who the subject of this thinking, the 
lawgiver of this tribunal, is supposed to be. The empirical individual cannot lay claim to this 
legislative role, for he is aware, precisely if he is enlightened, that by his drives and interests he 
is entangled in the world in manifold ways and subject to dependencies from which he cannot 
free himself for true autonomy” (“What Is Enlightened Thinking?,” 372).
 44. Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage,” 171.
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The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring 
about enlightenment among human beings; the private use of one’s reason 
may, however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly 
hindering the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one’s own 
reason I understand the use which someone makes of it as a scholar before 
the entire public of the world of readers. What I call the private use of reason 
is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he 
is entrusted. Now, for many affairs conducted in the interest of a common-
wealth a certain mechanism is necessary, by means of which some members 
of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so  as to be directed 
by the government, through an artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least 
prevented from destroying such ends). Here it is, certainly, impermissible to 
argue; instead, one must obey.45
Reason can and should be able to question everything, but to prevent its func-
tioning from being politically and socially disintegrative, Kant here divides 
enlightenment and the individuals participating in it into two parts. We might 
consider these the higher part corresponding to the critical scholar and the 
reading public, and the lower part corresponding to political and social 
arrangements that may be in need of criticism and change (for which reason 
they are lower), but with which one must “artificially” or virtually conduct 
oneself as if one were in accord with them. Kant’s dualist move has the effect 
of shielding reason from the potentially disintegrative effects of its own ongo-
ing scrutiny of itself and the world. It does so by confining reason’s actions 
to a scholarly domain, disengaged from the political, social, and economic 
structures (including society’s physical- material infrastructure) upon which 
the pursuit of the ordinary ends of life— as well as of the more exalted ends of 
scholars and their reading publics— depends. Though it clearly has very dif-
ferent motives, the Kantian dualist move thus has patently Lutheran aspects. 
It  seems the individual is completely and truly free only in a domain above 
and beyond its actions in the world of practical political, social, and economic 
relations. Following the Lutheran move, the individual becomes free in a 
higher domain (of  scholars and the reading public), while it must continue 
to obey and conform to the dictates of authorities in the world (even if only 
“artificially”).46 Some of the same questions growing out of Luther’s dualist 
 45. Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?”; italics in original.
 46. Another important theme linking Luther’s Reformation and Kant’s Enlightenment is 
the need for obedience to authority in the lower cultural domain; Luther had set forth his 
views on obeying in 1523 in his treatise Von weltlicher Obrigkeit und Wieweit man ihr Gehorsam 
schuldig sei (English edition in: Luther and Calvin).
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arrangement of things based on individual faith arise here from Kant’s differ-
ent dualist arrangement of things in the Age of Enlightenment. How will it 
be possible to know that the world has been arranged or ordered in a manner 
consistent with the higher principle— previously faith, now reason? With more 
specific reference to Kant’s dualism as expressed in his essay: how exactly is the 
enlightenment achieved above supposed to result in concrete changes below?
 Kant’s answer to these questions in his definitive essay on enlightenment 
reiterates another identifiably Lutheran move. Without going into the precise 
dynamics according to which enlightenment as the articulation of higher pub-
lic and lower private cultural resources will proceed, Kant makes clear it should 
proceed top down. Kant calls upon individuals to obey when acting in the pri-
vate domain near the beginning of his essay. Again, near the end of it, Kant 
reinforces the notion that enlightened individuals should privately conform to 
the political and economic status quo rather than question it, by invoking the 
authority of King Frederick II. The enlightened despot, patron of the philosophe 
Voltaire and sovereign over the Prussia in which Kant lived and worked, pre-
sumably can and will see to it that enlightenment will go forward and that the 
higher insights achieved by scholars among the reading public are implemented 
in the lower private sphere in a way and at a pace that is not overly disruptive 
to the political and social order. Like Luther before him, though consistently 
banking on reason rather than faith, Kant believes that optimal cultural out-
comes will rely on the judicious exercise of princely power. In the end, it seems, 
one has to hope or have faith that the enlightened despot Frederick will remain 
committed to enlightenment and freedom, and allow the implementation of the 
best of the scholarly ideas in political, social, and economic practice.
 With Kant as with Luther before him, the reliance on princely power defers 
rather than answers the question about the precise articulation of higher and 
lower cultural spheres. Enlightenment based on the individual’s use of its 
own reason, independent of the guidance of others, shows itself in the end 
to be largely dependent on the power of a prince as judge or referee in the 
cultural action. It is better in Kant’s view for people to move along slowly and 
steadily toward enlightenment, like toddlers learning to walk, with the arms 
of well- meaning princely guardians nearby to catch them if they fall, than risk 
stumbling by going too fast. Of  course, Kant’s is only one of many rival late 
eighteenth- century approaches to the realization of enlightenment. Between 
the slow, safe, and steady top- down approach to enlightenment espoused by 
Kant, and the explosive bottom- up dynamics of the enlightenment- inspired 
French Revolution that begins some five years later, a wide range of enlightened 
dispositions in the cultural action becomes visible. Those sympathetic to the 
Revolution will differ markedly from Kant’s cautious view that the enlightened 
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individual of this time, given too much freedom, would only be capable of 
making “an uncertain leap over even the narrowest ditch, since he would not 
be accustomed to free movement of this kind.”47 For the sympathizers with the 
Revolution, no jump could be sufficiently high or far, no pace sufficiently fast.
 The ideals of liberté, egalité, and fraternité that were so prominent in the 
consequential penultimate decade of the eighteenth century in which Kant 
wrote his hallmark essay found a lasting poetic expression in Friedrich Schil-
ler’s poem dedicated to Joy, An die Freude— Ode to Joy— published a year after 
Kant’s enlightenment essay and subsequently merged into the final movement 
of Beethoven’s “Choral Symphony” in the following century. Space is made 
here for Schiller’s ode because all the stanzas of this poem frame joy as the 
source and end of human striving, as we have observed in this study. Now as 
before, at  that indeterminate locus where spiritual- intellectual and physical- 
material cultural resources are articulated, there is joy, albeit not as a preview of 
the fuller or fullest measure of joy to be experienced in another, better world:
Freude heißt die starke Feder
In der ewigen Natur.
Freude, Freude, treibt die Räder
In der großen Weltenuhr.
Blumen lockt sie aus den Keimen,
Sonnen aus dem Firmament,
Sphären rollt sie in den Räumen,
Die des Sehers Rohr nicht kennt.48
Joy, in Nature’s wide dominion,
Mightiest cause of all is found;
And t’is joy that moves the pinion,
When the wheel of time goes round;
From the bud she lures the flower,—
Suns from out their orbs of light;
Distant spheres obey her power,
Far beyond all mortal sight.49
Schiller’s Ode to Joy as later put to music might be regarded as the anthem of 
enlightenment, as a lyrical articulation of the joy experienced by emancipated 
 47. Kant, “What Is Enlightenment?,” 17.
 48. Schiller, Werke, 186.
 49. Idem, Works, 26.
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individuals and an emancipated world coming into its own for the first time in 
history. At the same time, Schiller’s piece also poetically sets the course of the 
modern cultural action in a way that is consistent with the main concerns of the 
medieval romances. The solidarity with one’s peers achieved via adventure and 
the absolute spiritual- physical relationship to another mutable mortal achieved 
in love is accomplished here by becoming eines Freundes Freund—“the friend 
of a friend” and by winning ein holdes Weib—“a lovely woman.” In the chorus 
following the above- cited fourth stanza, the heroes of the Age of Enlighten-
ment are urged to course joyfully and boldly forward toward their prize:
Froh, wie seine Sonnen fliegen
Durch des Himmels prächt’gen Plan
Laufet, Brüder, eure Bahn,
Freudig wie ein Held zum Siegen.
As through heaven’s expanse so glorious
In their orbits suns roll on,
Brethren, thus your proud race run,
Glad as warriors all- victorious.50
How will the cultural athletes of modernity fare as they proceed along the 
track Schiller lays out for them? Pertinent answers to this question, which 
return us to the concerns of courts, adventure, and love, are provided by Mark 
Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, composed one hundred 
years after the beginning of the French Revolution.
A GILDED- AGE CONNECTICUT YANKEE 
ADVENTURES FOR HIGH STAKES
Mark Twain’s Arthurian narrative (1889) imaginatively returns us to the medi-
eval action of romance poetry, but expands its parameters to include industrial 
modernity as represented by the “Connecticut Yankee” Hank Morgan. For 
much of Twain’s novel, it  seems that the superiority continually manifested 
 50. Rüdiger Safranski observes that Schiller’s poem “An die Freude” grew out of moments 
in the young poet’s life, when he was very much occupied by the idea and experience of love and 
friendship. Later on, the poet considered the poem so flawed that he was reluctant to include it 
in the edition of his collected poems (Friedrich Schiller, 202 and 218–19). Beethoven’s employ-
ment of Schiller’s Ode in his Ninth Symphony, mentioned in my text, suggests that noteworthy 
later readers did not share Schiller’s critical view of the poem.
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by the Yankee over his medieval rivals in their ongoing intense competitions, 
besides generating humor and entertainment for nineteenth- century audi-
ences, might possibly lead to a happy final outcome for all that is generally 
consistent with the optimistic spirit of Schiller’s above- cited verses.51 The view 
of Twain’s imaginary action to be presented in this chapter focuses not on the 
lengthy sections of Twain’s narrative that are clearly designed to amuse and 
entertain, but rather on some of the Yankee’s basic values and assumptions 
about how the world is supposed to work and on the cataclysmic final struggle 
between modernity and the Middle Ages that occurs in the Battle of the Sand 
Belt near the end of the novel, which may be viewed as a possible outcome of 
these values and assumptions when put into action.52
 The Yankee first presents himself in a way that strongly suggests he would 
not have been an avid reader of Schiller’s poetry or of the medieval romances:
I am an American. I  was born and reared in Hartford, in  the State of 
Connecticut— anyway, just over the river, in the country. So I am a Yankee of 
the Yankees— and practical; yes, and nearly barren of sentiment, I suppose— 
or poetry, in other words. My father was a blacksmith, my uncle was a horse- 
doctor, and I was both, along at first. Then  I went over to the great Colt 
arms- factory and learned my real trade; learned all there was to it; learned to 
make everything: guns, revolvers, cannon, boilers, engines, all sorts of labor- 
saving machinery. Why, I could make anything a body wanted— anything in 
the world, it didn’t make any difference what; and if there wasn’t any quick, 
new- fangled way to make a thing, I could invent one— and do it as easy as 
rolling off a log.53
 51. Everett Carter writes, “In 1889, most readers, the illustrator Dan Beard among them, 
thought they were reading a book about a Yankee’s praiseworthy attempt to make a better world 
[. . .] Hundreds of passages in the book support this premise, and dozens more document that 
the actions he takes have as their purpose the redesign of Arthurian England according to 
the American plan” (“Meaning of A Connecticut Yankee,” 419); more recently, Railton writes, 
“It  is worth quoting the contemporary reviews, because from teaching Connecticut Yankee I 
have learned that modern readers have difficulty seeing the novel as its original audience did. 
Regardless of whether they like the book, those readers assume Twain intends Hank to be an 
admirable hero who speaks for Twain himself ” (Mark Twain, 82).
 52. My approach is consistent with a more critical view of the Yankee and his modus 
operandi, which has not been lacking in the critical literature on this novel. In a look at the 
copious earlier scholarship in his book published in 1988, Hoffman presents these views of the 
Yankee: “daimonic entrepreneur,” “an American individualist,” “Manifest Destiny made flesh” 
(Twain’s Heroes, 81). More recently, Messent suggests the Yankee represents “vulgar materialism 
and Gilded Age opportunistic enterprise,” and later writes on the Yankee’s attempt to remake 
the Middle Ages in a modern image: “Hank’s late nineteenth- century American value- system 
has proved, in many ways, as flawed as the one it would replace” (Cambridge Introduction, 95).
 53. Twain, Connecticut Yankee, 4.
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In this introduction, the Yankee advances many of the values and interests 
he will advance in the medieval world in which he suddenly finds himself, 
which are those of the rapid industrialization occurring especially in north-
ern Europe and North America in the century separating Twain from Kant 
and Schiller. For the nineteenth- century Yankee, the cultural action is about 
making things that control and manipulate the world in different, more or 
less destructive ways. He makes no distinction, beyond the successive order 
in which they are listed, between “guns, revolvers, cannon,” on the one hand, 
and “boilers, engines, all sorts of labor- saving machinery,” on the other. If the 
distinction doesn’t “make any difference” for the Yankee, this may be because 
rapid industrialization in its convergence with enlightenment disposes of no 
clear extrasubjective criteria according to which the congruence of a given 
new technology with the course of enlightenment might be fixed. The Yankee’s 
assumption seems to be that what may be dangerous or useless to some may 
have redeeming beneficial virtues for others and that it will always be possible 
to build another machine, “easy as rolling off a log,” to counteract any damage 
caused by previous ones. In Twain’s imaginary Middle Ages, the Yankee builds 
whatever the situation calls for, without wasting valuable time straying from 
his practical approach, waxing philosophical, poetic, or sentimental, or pon-
dering the ethical implications of his machinery.
 As Twain’s Arthurian narrative progresses, it  becomes evident that the 
Yankee’s approach to the cultural action is indebted as much to an eighteenth- 
century idea of enlightenment as to the values and interests of nineteenth- 
century industrialization. As  the Yankee becomes increasingly familiar with 
the hierarchical, undemocratic political and social structure of his medieval 
world, we see that he is driven by convictions similar to those of the enlight-
ened critics of the inherited privileges and power of Church and nobility in the 
time leading up to Kant and the French Revolution. After he has gained some 
familiarity with the medieval world in which he finds himself, we observe the 
Yankee characterize and criticize it from a patently enlightened perspective:
The truth was, the nation as a body was in the world for one object, and 
one only: to  grovel before king and Church and noble; to  slave for them, 
sweat blood for them, starve that they might be fed, work that they might 
play, drink misery to the dregs that they might be happy, go naked that they 
might wear silks and jewels, pay taxes that they might be spared from paying 
them, be familiar all their lives with the degrading language and postures of 
adulation that they might walk in pride and think themselves the gods of this 
world. And for all this, the thanks they got were cuffs and contempt; and so 
poor- spirited were they that they took even this sort of attention as an honor.
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 Inherited ideas are a curious thing, and interesting to observe and exam-
ine. I had mine, the king and his people had theirs. In both cases they flowed 
in ruts worn deep by time and habit, and the man who should have proposed 
to divert them by reason and argument would have had a long contract on 
his hands.54
The power of “inherited ideas” is precisely the thing from which one must free 
oneself in order to become enlightened, according to Kant’s above- discussed 
essay on enlightenment. Where things are not being done reasonably, there is 
an obligation to try to bring about change by way of criticism, argument, and 
persuasion. The Yankee shows himself here to be familiar with the imperative 
of enlightenment to use one’s reason, but even his most forceful articulations, 
such as this one, reveal the complexity and difficulty of the particular chal-
lenge he faces. Not only would the effort to enlighten his world involve a “long 
contract,” but the Yankee revealingly includes himself among those who would 
find it difficult to move out of “ruts worn deep by time.” The Yankee here con-
cedes that we may find him as inflexible as the unenlightened medieval people 
around him, which does not bode well for the future in view of how widely 
divergent the “ruts” in question are.
 Corresponding to the passages cited thus far, the Yankee plays a role 
with two aspects. He  is an advocate of nineteenth- century North American 
industrialization as well as of eighteenth- century European enlightenment. 
He  wants to enlighten his medieval world and also to control it completely 
with his industrial technologies. The manner in which he first articulates his 
ambitions early in the novel suggests that the quest to control trumps the 
nobler mission to enlighten:
I didn’t want any softer thing: I would boss the whole country inside of three 
months; for I judged I would have the start of the best- educated man in the 
kingdom by a matter of thirteen hundred years and upwards. I’m not a man 
to waste time after my mind’s made up and there’s work on hand.”55
One of the deeper “ruts” in which the Yankee apparently finds himself is the 
calling to be “boss.” He  soon realizes this ambition, obtaining an author-
ity he joyfully trumpets as “enormous” and “colossal” (for our purposes 
we might also say absolute), but for the continuing power of “the Church” 
 54. Ibid., 65.
 55. Ibid., 17.
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as his ultimately indomitable rival.56 With the power he has achieved, the 
Yankee—“not a man to waste time”—proceeds expeditiously with his dual aim 
of enlightening and industrializing the dark ages. Only a few years later, the 
Yankee provides this status report on his civilization- in- the- making:
My works showed what a despot could do, with the resources of a kingdom 
at his command. Unsuspected by this dark land, I had the civilization of the 
nineteenth century booming under its very nose! It was fenced away from 
the public view, but there it was, a gigantic and unassailable fact— and to be 
heard from, yet, if I lived and had luck. There it was, as sure a fact, and as 
substantial a fact as any serene volcano, standing innocent with its smokeless 
summit in the blue sky and giving no sign of the rising hell in its bowels. 
My schools and churches were children four years before; they were grown- 
up now; my little shops of that day were vast factories, now; where I had a 
dozen trained men then, I had a thousand now; where I had one brilliant 
expert then, I  had fifty now. I  stood with my finger on the button, so  to 
speak, ready to press it and flood the midnight world with intolerable light at 
any moment. But I was not going to do the thing in that sudden way. It was 
not my policy. The people could not have stood it; and, moreover, I should 
have had the Established Roman Catholic Church on my back in a minute.
 No, I  had been going cautiously, all the while. I  had had confidential 
agents trickling through the country some time, whose office was to under-
mine knighthood by imperceptible degrees, and to gnaw a little at this and 
that and the other superstition, and so prepare the way gradually for a better 
order of things. I was turning on my light one- candle- power at a time, and 
meant to continue to do so.57
The construction of this “hidden” civilization that the Yankee would like even-
tually to institute throughout his medieval world takes about five years. This 
provides a rough imaginary criterion for assessing how much faster the accel-
erated cultural action of the Yankee is occurring than that of his medieval con-
temporaries. Taking the year 528 ce— the year of the solar eclipse that saves the 
Yankee at the beginning of the novel— as our starting point,58 and 1889—the 
year of publication of Twain’s novel— as an arbitrary date approximating the 
time of the Yankee’s industrial Connecticut, we ascertain that the representa-
tive of enlightened industrial modernity accomplishes in less than five years 
 56. Ibid., 62–63.
 57. Ibid., 82–83.
 58. Ibid., 15.
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what will take the better part of fourteen hundred years for his contemporaries 
and their descendants to accomplish in the course of history. Exemplifying the 
acceleration and amplification of the cultural action of modernity, the Yankee 
lays out a modern industrial world— albeit one still kept secret— alongside the 
medieval one, and the imaginary “Middle Ages” of Twain’s narrative is thereby 
made larger, richer, and vastly more complex.
 The amplified cultural action brought about by the Yankee involves a huge 
speculation. Aware of the volatility of the divided world he has created, the 
Yankee wagers he will have enough time to close the cultural gap between the 
dark ages and the mechanical apparatus of modernity he has created. This gap 
corresponds to the outstanding enlightenment of his future civilized, modern-
ized workforce, and the Yankee proposes to close the gap in a manner remi-
niscent of the approach we observed above with Kant: better to move in slow, 
careful steps, keeping fundamental political and social structures intact, than 
risk moving too fast and thereby causing his medieval protégés to stumble, 
which in the Yankee’s mind would occur most dangerously as a reaction on 
the part of the Church. The Yankee banks on being able to bring enlighten-
ment to medieval people where they live and work. Proceeding “by impercep-
tible degrees” and employing “confidential agents,” the Yankee hopes medieval 
people will be persuaded to abandon their medieval world and assume posi-
tions in the modern industrial one he is creating for them. As  an enlight-
ened “despot” disposing of the material resources of his whole world, both the 
medieval and modern parts of it, the Yankee exercises a regulatory function 
similar to that which Kant proposed for Frederick II of Prussia in the latter 
eighteenth century, though the similarity is superficial. For Kant and Freder-
ick II, enlightenment could easily happen too fast. For the Yankee, as we soon 
see, it really cannot happen fast enough.
 The kind of enlightenment on which the Yankee speculates leads in the 
direction of the industrial infrastructure— the factories, along with the schools 
and churches preparing the workforce to power them59—which he has cre-
ated. The Yankee’s hope is that medieval people will become enlightened as 
they freely, knowledgably, peacefully, and smoothly assume positions in his 
industrial apparatus. For the eventuality that medieval people do not become 
enlightened in due time, or that some other major obstacle presents itself, the 
Yankee appears to have no backup plan, but his thinking on the French Revolu-
tion reveals a possible future course of events for which he manifests sympathy:
 59. The Yankee’s religious approach is clearly informed by Reformation moves of the kind 
that we observed earlier in this chapter: “Everybody could be any kind of a Christian he wanted 
to; there was perfect freedom in that matter” (Ibid., 81).
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There were two “Reigns of Terror,” if we would but remember it and consider 
it: the one wrought murder in hot passion, the other in heartless cold blood; 
the one lasted mere months, the other had lasted a thousand years; the one 
inflicted death upon ten thousand persons, the other upon a hundred mil-
lions; but our shudders are all for the “horrors” of the minor Terror, the 
momentary Terror, so to speak; whereas, what is the horror of swift death 
by the axe, compared with lifelong death from hunger, cold, insult, cruelty, 
and heart- break? what is swift death by lightning compared with death by 
slow fire at the stake?60
The Yankee has selected an approach to enlightenment that proceeds by 
small increments, but here he shows signs that he might not be averse to a 
very different and much faster approach to enlightenment and modernity 
that would proceed along a bloodier track. In view of the Yankee’s thoughts 
about the “ever- memorable and blessed Revolution, which swept a thousand 
years of such villainy away in one swift tidal wave of blood,”61 his characteri-
zation of the industrial apparatus that he has created as a “rising hell” in the 
“bowels” of the medieval world sounds more ominous. In the Yankee’s some-
what ambivalent notions about the best way forward to enlightenment, his 
thoughts about the bloodshed of the French Revolution represent the closest 
thing he has to an alternative plan of action, in  the event his slower, incre-
mental approach to enlightenment falls short. If it came to this, one might ask 
what role the Yankee’s “labor- saving machinery” will play? What exactly will 
it mean to “flood the midnight world with light”? How might the “horror of 
swift death by the axe” be enhanced by the Yankee’s nineteenth- century tech-
nological knowhow?62
 As Twain’s narrative brings us ever closer to the resolution of the ques-
tion concerning how enlightenment is to be achieved in this case, the Yankee 
engages himself to the best of his ability in the pursuit of adventure and love. 
Love is a modest concern at best, probably as a consequence of the Yankee’s 
practical and unsentimental approach to things. He  wins his wife Alisande 
(“Sandy”) in  the joint adventure that he undertakes with her, despite the 
communication gap between her medieval, magical view of things and his 
own realistic, pragmatic one. Few details are provided: the Yankee and Sandy 
marry, have children, and enjoy a private domestic bliss that belongs more to 
 60. Ibid., 111–12.
 61. Ibid., 111.
 62. I elaborate these considerations in connection to the critical theory of Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer in my essay, “Revolutions and Final Solutions: The Dialectic of Enlight-
enment in Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court.”
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the nineteenth century than to the “sixth century” of this imaginary Arthu-
rian world. Greater and more revealing is the Yankee’s interest in adventure. 
In  view of his generally speculative bent, it  is consistent to see him regard 
knight errantry correspondingly:
A successful whirl in the knight- errantry line— now what is it when you 
blow away the nonsense and come down to the cold facts? It’s just a corner 
in pork, that’s all, and you can’t make anything else out of it. You’re rich— yes, 
suddenly rich— for about a day, maybe a week: then somebody corners the 
market on you, and down goes your bucket shop.63
Knight errantry in Twain’s narrative might well be termed ad- venture capital-
ism, not only according to the Yankee’s view of it as a medieval chivalric prac-
tice but also according to the specific uses to which the Yankee puts it. One 
such use is the Yankee’s production of Persimmon’s Soap, with which he hopes 
to cleanse the medieval world and which he advertises by using errant knights 
as traveling billboards.64 Near the end of Twain’s narrative, the role played by 
ad- venture capitalism has become much more significant. The Yankee’s incre-
mental approach to enlightening and modernizing the medieval world has 
brought about significant innovative changes, including a willingness on the 
part of the most important knights of Arthur’s court to collaborate with the 
Yankee in the transformation of the Round Table to a stock board, on which 
knights now sit as shareholders and speculators. Predictably, Launcelot is 
president of the board.
 The Yankee’s effort to enlighten, civilize, and modernize his medieval world 
ultimately falls short, and the collapse of his high stakes speculation grows out 
of turmoil in the marketplace. Amplifying the action from Malory’s account of 
the downfall of Arthur’s court, Twain adds a preface to the traditional account 
of the trap set by Mordred and Agravaine to catch Launcelot and Guenever. 
In a conversation between the Yankee and his enlightened medieval assistant 
Clarence at the outset of the chapter titled “War!,” we discover Launcelot has 
cornered the market of the London- Canterbury- Dover railroad line by buying 
up vast quantities of cheap stocks deemed a “wildcat.”65 Mordred and Agra-
vaine are “among the flayed,” forced to redeem stocks they sold to Launcelot 
“at  fifteen and sixteen and along there” for two hundred eighty- three when 
“the Invincible One” comes calling. The downfall of Arthur’s court, in Twain’s 
 63. Twain, Connecticut Yankee, 177.
 64. Ibid., 138–41.
 65. Ibid., 413.
238 ∙  CHAPTER 7
account, thus grows out of stock market speculations gone bust. With Arthur 
and his familiar chivalric retinue gone from Twain’s novel, a power vacuum 
results. The Yankee, as “the Boss,” tries to fill it by declaring a Republic, but 
the Church declares the Interdict and thereby brings the twenty- five or thirty 
thousand remaining knights of England back under its control as the impla-
cable enemy of the Yankee. Positions polarize and events accelerate, leaving no 
more time for the Yankee’s incremental approach. The endeavor to enlighten 
in slow short steps has been overtaken by events.
 In the ensuing action, the “Terror” of the French Revolution shows the way 
forward, as we had reason to believe it might. In defense of his Republic, the 
Yankee engages the “insurgent chivalry of England” in the Battle of the Sand 
Belt, resolved to destroy superstition, tyranny, and the inherited privileges of 
nobility with his nineteenth- century industrial version of the guillotine. With 
the cohort of fifty- two enlightened boys he has managed to bring over to his 
side, the Yankee takes a position in Merlin’s cave, which he has surrounded 
with a minefield and electric fences. Water has been diverted from a nearby 
brook to flood a ditch that will be created by detonating the mines. Knights 
proceeding through this perilous terrain will also face withering machine 
gun fire. Elsewhere in the kingdom, the industrial civilization that the Yankee 
hoped would be occupied by his newly enlightened workforce has been rigged 
with explosives and set to explode when a button is pushed at the command- 
and- control center in Merlin’s cave. When the forty thousand knights of the 
chivalry of England move forward into this battleground, the full destructive 
potential of the Yankee’s technological know- how becomes evident. He sets off 
the explosives rigged to his distant schools and factories to prevent them from 
falling into the hands of his enemies. Then he “floods the midnight world”—
in  a manner quite different from the ambition to enlighten that formed 
the  original context of this phrase— with water and electricity directed into 
the ditch and fences where the masses of knights have tried to take cover. The 
Yankee’s prepared battleground shows itself to be a technological apparatus 
capable of producing death on a mass scale. The Yankee’s wonderment over 
the destructive potential of the devices he has made, presumably “as easy as 
rolling off a log,” is clear as he examines what the explosion has left behind:
As to destruction of life, it was amazing. Moreover, it was beyond estimate. 
Of course, we could not count the dead, because they did not exist as indi-
viduals, but merely as homogeneous protoplasm, with alloys of iron and 
buttons.”66
 66. Ibid., 432.
THE MODERN SELF IN PLAY ∙  239
We discover by the end of Twain’s Arthurian romance that this horrific 
destruction may be no more that the ravings of a shattered, dying man, per-
haps hallucinations that could scarcely be believable to the kind of practical, 
nineteenth- century man as whom the Yankee first introduces himself. It is as 
if the destruction he has wrought among his chivalric adversaries has revisited 
the Yankee, leaving little or nothing that could be said to “exist as individuals,” 
and leaving the veracity of his detailed account of his medieval adventures 
and the reliability of his judgment in question. The modern subjective self 
here, at the end of Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, 
is either an incoherent madman— not really an individual self anymore and 
scarcely more substantial than the “homogeneous protoplasm” produced by 
the war machines in his crazed mind— or he is perhaps the shattered remnant 
of the omnipotent, all- conquering spirit of European modernity, which the 
Yankee has turned against the medieval past, though to his ultimate demise 
and that of thousands of others. The Yankee’s approach anticipates the kind of 
individualized, yet global totalitarian moves that will largely shape the cultural 
action of the next century.
EMANCIPATION, TOTALITARIANISM, AND 
THE (POST)MODERN CULTURAL ACTION
Endeavors to “stabilize” the modern subjective self67—a  concern addressed 
at the beginning this study— have continually sought to reiterate an expe-
riential integrity and existential assurance imagined in the Middle Ages,68 
while screening out its perceived tyrannical and oppressive aspects, such 
as those excoriated by the Connecticut Yankee. Positing any kind of trans- 
subjective scheme or master plan that is not arbitrary, oppressive, and ulti-
mately destructive— as, for example, the master plan of the Connecticut Yan-
kee turns out to be— has nevertheless proven difficult. Looking back in this 
study, we  have observed that any presumed cultural stasis, any integrity of 
experience and existential assurance attributed to the Middle Ages in moder-
nity, may be illusory. From a modern perspective characterized by the rapid 
acceleration and expansion of the European and global cultural action, selves 
 67. With “stabilize” I return to the term used by Habermas that I also cited in the first 
chapter of this study; see Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 20.
 68. See for example Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, which connects modernization with a 
“removal from historically prescribed social forms and commitments in the sense of traditional 
contexts of dominance and support,” and with a related “loss of traditional security with respect 
to practical knowledge, faith, and guiding norms” (italics in original; 128).
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and things in the European Middle Ages might wrongly seem to have been 
stationary. In  much the same way as modern people, medieval people had 
to achieve and maintain their relative positions in competitions— ongoing 
competitions involving risks and rewards. We  have observed that religion 
and empire, more than being forces that held medieval people in place, were 
parameters according to which they engaged in the action and sought rewards 
for themselves and their own. As  global parameters, religion and empire— 
by way of adventure and love, as considered in this study— eventually become 
defining features of the emancipatory, individualized cultural action of moder-
nity, in which individuals potentially become worlds to themselves and others.
 In the transition from medieval to modern, the autonomous subjective self 
does not so much disengage or liberate itself from the medieval religious and 
imperial self upon which this study has focused, as reiterate it in new ways, 
as  one sees nowhere more clearly than in the early theological writings of 
Martin Luther. Global, imperial parameters as a potential of the early modern 
individual self, rather than as external constraints holding the individual in 
place, subsequently enable Leibniz to put forth the One of his binary num-
ber system as an absolute, as the mathematical equivalent to and proof of the 
Christian God’s creation of everything out of nothing. Kant is later able to call 
upon the modern self to avail itself of this global potential in a very different 
way, in  the interests of an enlightenment that empowers the individual self 
absolutely and in a manner devoid of the religious trappings with which abso-
lute power was previously associated. In different ways but to similar effect, 
Luther, Leibniz, and Kant— in cutting edge cultural moves of Reformation and 
Enlightenment— empower or emancipate the individual One absolutely and 
set it loose in a new cultural playing field. The result is new kinds of action 
in which the rules of the game are understood to be in the individual players 
themselves, and by extension in different individual cultural domains, such as 
“science, morality, art in general.”69 Still, each of the above- mentioned figures 
also has recourse to princely power to regulate the newly defined and increas-
ingly dynamic if not volatile cultural action, in  which every single self has 
become, potentially, an emperor. In  the examples from Luther, Leibniz, and 
Kant, the ongoing deference to princely power might account for the fact that 
the aspect of competition among the newly conceived autonomous individuals 
virtually disappears from view. In the imaginary action of Mark Twain’s Con-
necticut Yankee, this aspect comes to the fore with full force. We behold an 
 69. Compare Zygmunt Baumann’s Freedom: “In  the absence of one all- powerful, over-
whelming current, individual ships must have their own gyroscopes to keep them on course” 
(41). The quotation in text, also cited in my first chapter, is from Habermas, Philosophical Dis-
course, 20.
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everyman Yankee wielding the technological power of industrial modernity 
against his medieval adversaries, desiring to do so in the interests of an iden-
tifiably Kantian enlightenment and becoming himself an absolute despot, who 
regulates the cultural action with the best of intentions albeit to a disastrous 
end.
 The constitution of the religious- imperial self of the Christian Middle 
Ages is not left behind or overcome, but rather becomes part of the vastly 
faster and more resourceful modern self by which it is extended and varied. 
The Connecticut Yankee’s revolutionary modus operandi in Mark Twain’s 
imaginary action is demonstrative of the reiteration of older cultural moves in 
new and different ways. Hannah Arendt’s concluding words on Fascism and 
Communism in her Origins of Totalitarianism (1949) are worth citing here, 
because they similarly draw attention to totalitarianism as a new global form 
of government, and with a terminology of potentiality that is consistent with 
the one I have employed in this study:
There remains the fact that the crisis of our time and its central experience 
have brought forth an entirely new form of government which as a potenti-
ality and an ever- present danger is only too likely to stay with us from now 
on, just as other forms of government which came about at different histor-
ical moments and rested on different fundamental experiences have stayed 
with mankind regardless of temporary defeats— monarchies, and republics, 
tyrannies, dictatorships and despotism.70
Since the mid- twentieth century when Arendt wrote on totalitarianism, the 
parameters of the action have been increasingly shaped by moves of radically 
different dimensions and technological characteristics, though with similar 
underlying features. Integrated circuits and microprocessors have realized, 
and in ever new ways continue to realize, the potential of binary numbers 
to— as Leibniz put it—“weigh all sorts of masses with few weights” or “give 
several values with few coins.” Whereas the imperial or totalitarian move con-
tinues to render things globally or infinitely according to an absolutely other 
perspective, idea, or master plan, microprocessors shape the cultural action 
according to a seemingly infinitesimal version of the same principle, with the 
cosmological One of Leibniz’s binary number system standing in for the abso-
lutely Other. Invested in multitudinous interests, ranging along the political 
spectrum from emancipation to totalitarianism, the electronically enhanced 
absolute One of Leibniz is set in play via the myriad digital moves that have 
 70. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 478.
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come to pervade the contemporary cultural action. Individuals’ ability to avail 
themselves of these moves seems to be limited only by the cultural resources 
of which they dispose overall. The status of self in Lyotard’s Postmodern Con-
dition (1979) is worth citing at this point for its descriptive value in this regard:
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a 
fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. 
Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a  person is always located at 
“nodal points” of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may 
be. Or better: one is always located at a post through which various kinds 
of messages pass. No  one, not even the least privileged among us, is  ever 
entirely powerless over the messages that traverse and position him at the 
post of sender, addressee, or referent.71
In this study, the “mobility” of self to which Lyotard refers has been regarded 
in different terms. We have observed that the individual self, however “tiny,” 
possesses an absolute, global potential. In view of the absolute characteristics 
of binary numbers as conceived by Leibniz, the increasingly minute moves 
of our electronically enhanced, digitized cultural action can be seen as con-
sistent with and potentially embellishing or merging with global moves of 
grander dimensions. Following upon and elaborating its ancient, medieval, 
and early modern precedents, the postmodern condition on which Lyotard 
reports seems to show itself as positions, postmodernity as spins on modernity. 
A  “grand narrative” that remains, however increasingly broken into infinite 
and infinitesimal perspectives, is  the global, imperial, or— to  use Arendt’s 
designation— totalitarian one.72
 Corresponding to the ongoing cultural action as I have endeavored to view 
it, this study must remain open ended. Its final words and final cited source 
might most aptly be the last lines of Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitari-
anism, which follow immediately upon the previously cited ones and some-
what qualify the dangers of totalitarianism by laying out the emancipatory 
characteristics of the potentiality underlying it.73 Instead, I conclude here with 
 71. Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 15.
 72. Immediately before the above- cited passage, Lyotard had used the term “grand Narra-
tives,” more specifically, “the breaking up of the grand Narratives,” to describe the status of the 
principal strategies for the legitimation of knowledge in modernity.
 73. The paragraph at the end of Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism reads: “There remains 
also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is 
the promise, the only ‘message’ which the end can ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes 
a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom. 
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a similar but more elaborate passage from Arendt’s The Human Condition 
(1958), with a prefatory reiteration of my suggestion that what is at stake in 
this potentiality might be not so much a condition as positions. Arendt’s words 
here, as those at the end of her earlier book, fittingly return us to St. Augustine 
and are consistent with my view of culture as action:
To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the 
Greek word archein, “to begin,” “to lead,” and eventually “to rule,” indicates), 
to  set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin 
agere). Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, 
men take initiative, are prompted into action. [Initium] ergo ut esset, creatus 
est homo, ante quem nullus fuit (“that there be a beginning, man was created 
before whom there was nobody”), said Augustine in his political philosophy. 
This beginning is not the same as the beginning of the world; it  is not the 
beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself. With 
the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, 
which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom 
was created when man was created but not before.74
Initium ut esset homo creatus est—‘that a beginning be made man was created,’ said Augustine. 
This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man” (478–79).
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